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ABSTRACT 
 
  
This thesis examines the paradox of the Chile-Peru border, and specifically the 
Chilean border city of Arica, between 1925 and 2015. Through an eclectic mixed 
method ‘collage’, primarily relying on archival research and extended interviews, the 
richness of the lived experience of the border comes to the fore. Arica has been a 
space of violence since it was appropriated from Peru by Chile in the War of the 
Pacific (1879-1883) and I am interested in how this violence has lingered and 
manifested itself in various ways since Arica officially became Chilean territory in the 
1920s. This violence often stems from a performance of Chilean machismo at the 
border. Arica is a space of contradiction. A space of extreme nationalism but also of 
rejection of the Chilean state, of being central to the Chilean nation but also of being 
peripheral and abandoned. Over five ‘border moments’ over ninety years Arica 
oscillates between centrality and marginality dependent on threats to Chilean 
sovereignty at the border. 
Through a chronological and multi-disciplinary arc the history of violence in 
Arica can be better understood. The thesis begins in 1925 when the United States 
became involved in the dispute over the Chile-Peru border that hadn’t been settled 
since the War of the Pacific. Violence permeated the region and made an attempted 
plebiscite impossible and although the border was demarcated through other means 
in 1929, Arica soon became ignored by the Chilean state. A state of abandonment 
remained until the 1950s when economic initiatives enacted at the regional level 
succeeded in raising the prospects and spirits of Arica, purging the area of violence, 
until the 1970s when General Pinochet’s new economic plan reversed Arica’s 
progress. Arica instead became a military space in this decade as tensions arose 
between Pinochet and Peruvian dictator General Velasco and international violence 
returned. This international level is then contrasted with violence at the corporeal 
level in Arica in the 1980s when HIV/AIDS and abortion both became increasingly 
pertinent at the border. The thesis closes with how violence remains present in Arica 
today, particularly as seen through the 2014 maritime border dispute. 
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repre
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ENAMI The Chilean National Company for Mining 
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HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection 
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NSA US Government National Security Agency 
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OSS US Government Office of Strategic Services 
SAG Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero (Agricultural and Livestock Service) 
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sent the intended meaning and so translations are not always strictly literal. Any errors 
are the fault of the author. 
 
Note on terminology: 
The term ‘Arica’ can refer to the city of Arica, the region of Arica, and also the 
department of Arica. Chile is divided into 15 regions corresponding to internal 
political units that have a system of more or less autonomous administration, although 
working in coordination with the ministries and national government bodies. Each 
region, in turn, is divided into provinces and departments. Until 2007 the city of Arica 
belonged to the Region of Tarapacá. In early 2007 however the Chilean government 
decided to create a new region in the northernmost territory of the country for reasons 
of greater autonomy named the Region of Arica & Parinacota. The region is made up 
of two provinces, Arica and Parincota each of which have two departments, Arica and 
Camarones, and Putre and General Lagos, respectively. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 
CHAPTER ONE 	  
INTRODUCTION 
 
A Story of Five Border Moments 
One 
Sitting in the Library of Congress in Washington DC a year stretched out ahead 
of me. These solemn archives were the beginning of twelve months spent on fieldwork 
in pursuit of understanding the Chile-Peru border and the Chilean city of Arica in 
particular. The year would include nine months living in Arica, a decision I began to 
question the deeper I delved into the extensive records of the archives. I had become 
engrossed in two diaries in the Library’s collection, those of General John J. Pershing 
and his aide Major Quekemeyer who had spent several months living in Arica 
between 1925 and 1926. They and many other American citizens were sent there by 
the US President in order to resolve the fifty-year border dispute between Chile and 
Peru. Their plan was an attempted plebiscite to decide the sovereignty of the 
territories of Arica and Tacna that had been taken by Chile from Peru in the War of 
the Pacific. In their diaries Pershing and ‘Quek’ criticised every possible aspect of 
Arica, from the ignorance and ugliness of the local people to its unattractive situation 
on the edge of the Atacama Desert and both rejoiced when they were freed from their 
duties and could return to ‘God’s country’. Could Arica really be so unpleasant? Their 
stay certainly hadn’t done their health any good, Pershing was forced to leave Arica 
due to hypertension and an oral infection and Quekemeyer tragically died young from 
pneumonia very shortly after leaving Arica. 
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Figure 1: General John J. Pershing’s first entry in his Arica diary. August 9th 1925. Container 335, John J.Pershing 
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 	  
I hadn’t expected the archives to force me to confront my feelings about the lived 
experience of fieldwork, that I would follow in the footsteps of these American 
diplomats and like them embed myself in the community in order to understand the 
legacy of violence on the border and how it can be resolved. The Americans 
encountered extreme violence, so severe was the persecution of Peruvians by Chileans 
that the plebiscite could not be held and the border issue was not solved until three 
years later. However the Arica of 1925 was not the Arica which I would come to 
know, ninety years of history, of vastly shifting politics, of life had shaped a city which 
would have been unrecognisable to Pershing. The Americans had travelled down to 
3 
this foreign, dusty town in an attempt to heal the border, to nurse the gaping wound 
that the Chile-Peru border had become. A wound that I discovered over the following 
year could not and likely would never completely heal. 
 
Two 
 
Figure 2: Panorama of Arica from the Morro. 2013. Author’s photo 	  
On my first day in Arica I walked up the Morro, an enormous headland that 
towers over the otherwise flat city and the strategic point from which Chile had 
captured Arica from Peru in the War of the Pacific. It was under the midday sun that 
I trekked up to the top and had my initial view over the city, of the endless Pacific 
stretching out westwards, of thousands of buildings packed together from the foot of 
the Morro out into the hazy desert that embraces Arica. In this very beige view the 
port, of which I had read so much, stood out with its brightly coloured shipping 
containers. I walked down to the port and was surprised at how compact it was, a mix 
4 
of small fishing boats, larger tankers, a colony of enormous sea lions, and another of 
pelicans all vying for scraps. I knew that the port had been Arica’s very reason for 
existence and source of prosperity for hundreds of years but what existed today didn’t 
seem extensive enough. I began to realise that all the infrastructure I encountered in 
my daily life carried this same sense of faded glory, buildings which would have been 
cutting-edge in the 1960s seemed a little tired now. The bus station, the shopping 
centres, the football stadium which was right next to my house, the university where I 
came to be based, even the beaches called back to a once-modern past. The 
connection became clear once I learnt of the extent of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica, 
a board of development that existed between 1958 and 1976 and had built the 
entirety of the city’s primary infrastructure. The JAA was exalted by locals as bringing 
the ‘golden years’ or ‘heyday’ to Arica, raising the poverty stricken area out if its 
malaise and bringing peace to the area so marred by conflict. What I couldn’t 
understand was why did this project end? What happened at the border to mean that 
economic progress was no longer the priority when a populated and prosperous 
border region is one of the best border defences? 
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Figure 3: View of the port of Arica. 2013. Author’s photo 
 
Three 
One of the interviews I conducted while on fieldwork was with an older Ariqueño 
who had an interesting revelation for me, in the 1970s under Pinochet’s dictatorship 
he had been asked by high-ranking officials to work as a spy when he was traveling to 
Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina for work. The military was gathering information on 
resources and personnel in these neighbouring countries in case of military warfare. I 
was well aware of the political turmoil within Chile in the 1970s but was rapidly 
learning about Pinochet’s foreign policies during the decade as well. Arica, despite its 
relative economic irrelevance was a symbolic trophy for Chile and desired by Peru 
and Bolivia and one Peruvian dictator, Juan Velasco Alvarado, made his dreams of 
recovering the city before the 1979 centenary of its theft by Chile very clear indeed. 
What happened in Arica as it became a pawn in this game of national pride between 
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Chile and Peru? What was it like to live on such a vulnerable border? Why did this 
war, so resolutely calculated by Velasco, never come to pass? 
 
Four 
In one week I had three revelations regarding health at the border. The first time 
I actually encountered the Chile-Peru border crossing, a small collection of buildings 
named Chacalluta about halfway between Arica and Tacna, I noticed some banners 
at the border rising awareness about HIV/AIDS and the importance of getting tested. 
A couple of days later I was talking to a Spanish teacher who said to me, ‘do you 
know where the highest rate of HIV in Arica, and possibly in Chile is?’ I said I had no 
idea and she told me ‘your workplace, the university’. It was then shortly after this 
conversation that I read a newspaper article about a young woman who had been 
searched at Chacalluta border crossing and was found to be carrying her own aborted 
foetus. When questioned by officials she explained that she was returning to Arica 
from Tacna where she had gone to have an abortion and had to bring proof back for 
her boyfriend that she had gone through with the procedure. These three events so 
close in proximity to one another forced me to consider the effect this border was 
having on the real lives and health of everyday people, why does Arica have an 
HIV/AIDS rate so much higher than the national average? What led to this young 
Chilean woman crossing the border to her home country with her aborted foetus?  
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Figure 4: HIV awareness poster on the Chile-Peru border. 2014. Author’ photo 
 
Five 
Whilst living in Arica I would go to various cultural events, partly as a form of 
ethnographic research to better understand the city and its citizens but also with 
friends and two celebrations stuck with me. The first was carnival, or to give it it’s 
proper title, carnaval andino internacional con la fuerza del sol, a three day party with ten 
thousand dancers mainly from Peru, Bolivia, and Chile performing traditional dances 
in groups through the streets of the city with the hopes of bagging a top prize. Now 
one of the biggest carnivals on the continent the event has only existed since 2002 
when it was established to celebrate the Andean heritage and culture present in the 
north of Chile which is so closely entwined with Peru and Bolivia but is non-existent 
in the rest of Chile. The booming percussion, extravagant costumes, and warlike 
dances were alien to my British senses but not to the tens of thousands of spectators 
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who would jump in from the sidelines to dance with the performers and have their 
photos taken with them. 
 
Figure 5: A group dances at carnival. 2014. Author’s photo 	  
The other big event in Arica’s dancing calendar is the National Cueca 
Championship that takes place in June and has been part of Ariqueño culture since 
1968. The cueca is the national dance of Chile, enacting the courtship ritual of a 
cockerel and a hen, dancers wear traditional Chilean huaso clothing of a poncho, 
riding boots and spurs and it embodies the southern Chilean countryside. It was 
therefore odd for me to see this dance of the lush green pastures performed in the 
barren desert of Arica after the Andean drums of carnival. While carnival was a 
recent invention to rewrite Chile’s difficult and racist relationship with the extreme 
north, the installation of the cueca championship in Arica in the 1960s had been the 
opposite, it was a stamping of the most Chilean of traditions on the one city in Chile 
which refused to conform to Chile’s particular performance of nationhood.  
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It was this juxtaposition between these two faces of Arica that interested me, how 
Arica has ongoing international territorial disputes, national struggles for recognition 
and continuing corporeal violence. Arica is a place where the border is crossed on a 
daily basis, where Peruvian food is enjoyed with gusto and Ariqueños feel more in in 
tune with Tacneños than with Chileans in the south, yet Arica is also the centre of 
Chilean nationalism as portrayed by the 2014 maritime border dispute and a 
continuing legacy of racism and xenophobia. A year after sitting in those serious 
archives of Washington DC I had lived this crazy paradox of the border, I had seen 
how exclusion and inclusion could coexist but never happily, and I was beginning to 
understand the never-quite-healed line in the sand which separated and joined Chile 
and Peru. 
 
 
Making Sense of the Border Stories 
Each of these five episodes in the history of Arica examined throughout the thesis 
are rich enough to be the subject of a thesis in their own right but I have a different 
aim; to show how through ninety years of history the border has oscillated between 
being central but also marginal to the Chilean state, that the border has been a cause 
for violence but also an opportunity to escape it, that the border is an everyday lived 
space but also a space of spectacle and event. It is these five moments as a whole that 
highlight the incongruities, paradoxes, and stark weirdness of borders. As the Peruvian 
writer Mario Vargas Llosa (2008) has argued, Latin America is a continent infused 
with paradoxes and I argue that the border is the exemplar par excellence of this. The 
border is a space central to the nation, which must be secured at all cost yet is also 
peripheral, marginal, abandoned by the state when sovereignty is not being 
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threatened. The Chilean state would like the Chile-Peru border to be a simple 
dividing line between the modern, homogenous Chile and the ‘other’ to the north yet 
in reality the borderlands are too complex and paradoxical to just be a line. The 
border constricts inhabitants of the borderlands into hyper-nationalistic roles, living in 
a dangerous threatened area. However at the same time the border offers 
opportunity, creates cultural hybridity, and means citizens can escape the confines of 
their nation. Due to these paradoxes it becomes impossible to speak of one border 
identity, rather it is individual experiences which tell the richest stories, whether of the 
famous American General Pershing so far from home, a poor fisherman trying to feed 
his family, a prostitute evading HIV, a young soldier terrified of war, or a woman 
desperately seeking an abortion. There can be no homogenous border identity with 
different bodies affected by the border in such different ways.  
The thread that connects the five border moments is violence. Violence will be 
considered here through various definitions, from international warfare to disease to 
racism, as well as attempts to eradicate violence from Arica. The border as a space of 
violence is often knotted with the border as a space of machismo; a particular 
performance of Chilean masculinity that has oftentimes led to outbursts or threats of 
violence or dangerous ideologies. The changes in what violence means and how it is 
implemented or quelled is studied chronologically with the first empirical chapter 
looking at the 1920s, the second at the 1950s until 1976, the third at the 1970s, the 
fourth at the 1980s until the present day with the final chapter examining Arica today. 
The quirkiness of Arica as a border city becomes the focus, tracing how over the 
time period, at the international, national, and corporeal scales, violence or its 
pacification can be studied through different geographical lenses. This thesis is as 
much concerned with the verb ‘to border’ as it is with the noun ‘border’. The thesis 
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begins with the process of demarcating the Chile-Peru border in the 1920s but 
demarcation does not mean the end of the process of bordering, it is in this case an 
ongoing practice that is as present today as it was in the 1920s. Boundary disputes are 
never truly ‘settled’ or ‘closed’; the process of bordering continues whether at the 
international level, the state level, or through the lived experiences of those at the 
border. These scales are inherently interconnected; global political shifts occur due to 
individual’s decisions, bodies are affected by global changes. Rachel Pain’s work on 
the scales of violence and the interweaving of military and intimate themes from a 
feminist perspective underpins my work on scale. Pain (2015) discusses both domestic 
violence and international warfare to draw out the intimate-geopolitical. Interestingly 
Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) has used the phrase ‘intimate terrorism’ to describe the 
experience of living in the borderlands between a ‘Third World’ and a ‘First World’ 
country. Pain makes a strong case for the intimate as not being ‘dripped down upon’ 
by geopolitical processes but instead conceptualises them as part of a single complex 
of violence. Pain (2014) successfully argues that it is impossible to assign terrorism, 
whether everyday or global terrorism, different levels of importance or to separate 
them into hermetic scales. The intimate and the global are instead part of the same 
structures that interweave, connect, and disconnect and are far from being binary 
oppositions (Pain and Staeheli 2014). 
Borders seem vital to order, to making sense of the world we have inhabited but 
as this thesis shows there is nothing clean cut or ordered about borders, they are 
messy, precarious spaces, not just abstract lines on a map. While for Santiaguiños or 
Limeños the border may be a far-off line, for those who inhabit the borderlands the 
border is a way of life, a threat to life, an escape from the state, and home. Just as the 
border has multiple personalities as does this thesis and it is precisely in jumping 
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between historical geography, economic geography, political geography, health 
geography, and cultural geography that the true richness and complexity of the 
border can emerge. Due to this interdisciplinary jumping the register and writing style 
necessarily shift in order to better represent each particular topic, the content, and the 
methodologies used. Latin American studies has a particularly strong tradition of 
interdisciplinarity which has been hugely influential to my work and it is in this 
tradition that I write, not being bound by any singular discipline. This is also reflected 
in the mixed-methods employed which in their totality act as a ‘collage’. 
This thesis is an experiment in new ways of looking at the border. My approach 
of drawing from traditional historical archives, in-depth interviews, and social media 
across wildly different themes such as international diplomacy, economic initiatives, 
fishing, racism, and abortion is experimental ‘crazy geography’. The Chilean writer 
Benjamín Subercaseaux (1940) was the first to use the phrase loca geografía with regards 
to Chile and I use it here to describe the border but also to describe my research 
approach. It does initially appear ‘crazy’ to attempt to bring together five border 
moments that at first glance have little in common but I argue that this radical 
methodology enables a new way of understanding violence at the ‘crazy’ border. My 
experimentalism is inspired by certain writers who have played with, across, and 
through boundaries in the pursuit of new perspectives. These writers include Cynthia 
Enloe with her inspiring work with feminism and politics, Gloria Anzaldúa who works 
on feminism, queer theory, and borders, and a whole raft of magical realist Latin 
American writers who give space to the fabulous, to the seemingly unreal, and to 
crazy geography. Arica’s ‘craziness’ emerges in how it is portrayed nationally and 
internationally. The city often makes headlines for strange events surrounding 
national border demarcation, drugs, or the sensationalist 2015 story of a 
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malnourished two-year-old boy being breastfed by a local dog. This northernmost 
Chilean city has always had an air of mystery and weirdness surrounding it. 
The metaphor of the ‘wound’ runs throughout the thesis influenced by key 
writers. Again, my argument owes a lot to Gloria Anzaldúa’s work on the border as 
una herida abierta [an open wound] but also to Mark Salter who conceptualies the 
border as a ‘suture’. The wound metaphor aptly describes two areas tearing away 
from one another, often due to violence, but also invokes the metaphor of healing. 
Anzaldúa (1987) uses the terms ‘scab’ and ‘hemorrhage’ to explain the borderland 
that forms a ‘third country’. The two sides can become knitted back together even if 
this inevitably leaves a scar. The Chile-Peru border is envisaged as a wound that 
various actors have attempted to heal while others have contributed to the 
aggravation of the wound. Another writer working through the metaphor of the 
‘wound’ is Karen Till whose description of places, cities and landscapes as ‘wounded’ 
configures the relationships between memory and place. For Till “[p]laces described 
as wounded are understood to be present to the pain of others and to embody difficult 
social pasts” (2012:108). This recognition of the importance of history in the present 
landscape gives an element of temporality to the border that, particularly in this thesis 
is as important as its spatiality. By thinking about a place as wounded, those who 
inhabit that place can begin the difficult work of mourning loss (Till 2005). 
This thesis aims to investigate how and why a culture of violence has been 
created and maintained yet also contested at the Chile-Peru border. Violence is a 
scalar phenomenon at the Chile-Peru border and so the international, national, and 
corporeal scales will be interrogated to better understand the use, threat, or 
suppression of violence. The third and final aim is to understand how a sustained 
culture of border violence has affected the city of Arica and its inhabitants from 1925 
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to 2015. The contribution of this thesis to geography will be to bring the citizens of 
the borderlands back into border studies in the vein of more anthropological work 
being done in Latin America. I am interested in what it means to live on a border 
which was demarcated in the 1920s but which never stops going through the process 
of bordering.  I am interested in how violence has never really left the border and how 
this violence has been imbued with machismo. Through empirical research this thesis 
highlights the paradoxical and contradictory nature of borders that oscillate in 
international and state importance depending on external threats. 
These ideas, of the complex and ongoing processes of bordering, of fundamental 
violence at the border, of the interlinked scales at the border, and the impact this has 
on real lives, are studied predominantly through feminist theory and critical theories. I 
employ intersectional feminism to better understand the relationships between 
multiple identity variables such as race, ethnicity, class, sexuality and gender as well as 
to investigate masculinity and violence. I additionally use critical borderlands and 
critical political theories to build on this and interrogate paradigms of power and 
privilege. My year of fieldwork in the United States, Chile, and Peru was roughly split 
between archival research and ethnographic research, mainly oral histories. 
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Figure 6: Map showing the location of Arica. Google maps. 	  
To situate this thesis in a historical and geographical context, although the area 
has been settled by humans for 10,000 years, Arica as a town was founded by Spanish 
conquistadors in 1541 as a port for exporting the silver mined in Potosí in present-day 
Bolivia (Andrien 2001; Cobb 1949). Arica was part of the nascent Peruvian republic 
from 1821 and subsequently, as Fifer (1964) states, with the discovery of guano 
(seabird excrement) in the 1840s and nitrates in 1866, Arica slowly grew as 
prospectors moved to the Atacama region to seek their fortune. This competition for 
resources led to persistent territorial claims between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile that 
culminated in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).  
The War of the Pacific was declared on the 1st March 1879 and at heart was 
about the fight for resources in the Atacama Desert, namely guano and nitrates. 
Beyond resources, Bolivia and Peru had bitterly envied Chile for its material 
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prosperity, orderly political life without revolutions, and uninterrupted growth 
(Baptista Gumucio 1980). Nitrates were little valued in the colonial era but in 1809 
their value as a fertilier became known (López Urrutia 2008). Chile began exploiting 
the nitrate reserves in the Atacama Desert to great financial benefit, exacerbating 
Peruvian and Bolivian resentment. In 1878 Bolivian President Hilarión Daza imposed 
a tax upon Chilean nitrate companies that heightened tensions between the nations 
and Bolivia declared war against Chile. By April 1879 Peru had sided with its ally 
Bolivia on the basis of a secret pact the two nations had signed. Subsequent battles 
saw Chile claim swathes of territory from both Bolivia and Peru, reaching as far as the 
Peruvian capital of Lima. 
The consequences of the War of the Pacific were that, as Chile had taken 
Bolivian territory, Peru and Chile became neighbours; Chile expanded its territory by 
a third; and the history of animosity between Chile and the two defeated nations 
deepened. According to Milet (2004) a dichotomy between Chile and Peru was born; 
the winner and the loser, the invader and the invaded, the prosperous and stable 
country in contrast with the volatile country wracked with poverty. The War of the 
Pacific is one of the most significant events in Peruvian collective memory with Chile 
becoming the ‘perpetual enemy’, the counterpoint to which the Peruvian identity is 
formed (Miyahira et al. 2010). According to Van Der Ree (2010), the War of the 
Pacific was a double blow for Peru and Bolivia, firstly losing territory and then seeing 
Chile exploit the nitrates below the ground to great economic gain. Both Peru and 
Bolivia were humiliated and Chile’s marker as being an imperialist neo-liberal state 
was born. Chile’s victory in war and occupation of the north was fundamental to its 
reconfiguration as a culturally, racially and morally homogenous nation-state 
(Tamborino & Guizardi 2014).  
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On the worldwide stage, the War of the Pacific tended to divide opinion with 
countries siding with either Chile or with Peru and Bolivia. Europe and North 
America favoured the smaller Chile with its perceived stable democracy and Anglo-
Saxon influences. On the other hand, most Latin American nations sided with Peru 
and Bolivia as Chile had come across as overly aggressive and with a predominantly 
white population in comparison with the more indigenous other countries of the 
continent (Encina 1954). This has not been helped by Chilean declarations of 
superiority, labeling themselves as more progressive and civilised, leading to the title 
‘the English of the south’ (Klaiber 1978). Peru had been weak and unable to contest 
Chile’s land grab of the war and so agreed to sign a treaty with Chile. The 1883 
Treaty of Ancón granted Chile ten years to remain in the Tacna and Arica provinces 
that it had appropriated from Peru, after which time a plebiscite would be held to 
decide ownership (Borchard 1922). However the plebiscite did not take place after the 
ten years and in order to create a population which had far weaker Peruvian 
sympathies, over the decades that followed, Chile began its aggressive ‘chileanisation’ 
policies of closing private schools, suppression of the Peruvian press and churches, the 
deportation and murder of Peruvians, and the relocation of Chilean nationals into the 
provinces (Skuban 2007). The thesis begins at this point in the 1920s when Peru and 
Chile decide to end the five decades of border dispute with the involvement of the 
United States.  
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CHAPTER TWO 	  	  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Imagine a contested border region. It might be anywhere in the world. There are a 
range of ways to settle the issue: violence, a referendum, international arbitration. 
Whatever means are adopted, or imposed, the outcome will have consequences for 
people on both sides, depending on who they are. While some will accept it, some may 
not. Populations may move, towns and regions may be ‘cleansed’, genealogies may be 
rewritten. The boundaries of the collectivity may be redrawn. 
          R. Jenkins 2004:3 
 
This thesis examines the processes and effects of bordering in one city, Arica on 
the Chile-Peru border.1 This is not with the aim of making sense of the border or 
borders in general but to illustrate the nonsensical strangeness and inherently 
paradoxical nature of borders, spaces that are at once integral to the nation and at 
the same time are peripheral extremities. This thesis unpicks this nonsensical 
strangeness by drawing on what appear to be vastly different themes in vastly 
different registers but which one by one add to the richness of the border. Borders 
are spaces where patriotism and loyalty to the nation are exalted but are also hybrid 
spaces, taking on characteristics from across the border. Chile, a country which 
stretches over 4,300km in length but whose average width is just 177km is a border 
in itself, buttressed by Argentina to the east, the Pacific Ocean to the west, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Chile-Peru border is examined as a border and not a frontier because the latter tends to be posited as the 
vast and empty spaces which are technically within the country’s borders but lie beyond the limit of the nation 
state. As this thesis will argue, Chile’s borderlands are not beyond the limit of the state. 
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Bolivia and Peru to the north. Chile is an anomaly in world geography, clinging onto 
the side of South America thanks to the protection of the Andes and the indomitable 
Atacama Desert. Chile’s impenetrability has created a ‘crazy geography’, a bizarrely 
shaped nation-state that has persisted in spite of its small population. In order to 
understand borders in this context, this review will cover border studies but then 
move on to topics which have influenced this thesis in a more profound way, namely 
Latin American studies, theories of violence, and work on bodies and identity. 
 
Border Studies 
The field of border studies has been dynamic and shape-shifting, developing 
throughout the twentieth century but thriving since the 1990s. In the 1980s, border 
studies had become more interdisciplinary and then prospered within academic 
departments in Europe and North America during the following decade. The 1990s 
saw a spate of arguments denouncing borders as porous, permeable, and increasingly 
irrelevant in the new globalised world order (Ohmae 1990; Friedman 2005; Caney 
2005; Welchman 1996) However this thesis joins the multitude of work opposing this 
view, arguing instead that borders are becoming increasingly important, controlled, 
and strengthened, and at an increasing rate since 9/11. We live, according to Blake 
(2000), in a time when borders worldwide are more difficult and dangerous than they 
have ever been. In 2011, approximately 20,000km of the world’s borders were 
marked by walls or borders with an additional 18,000km with security features such 
as surveillance and patrols (Diener & Hagen 2012). Even ‘border walls’ (Vallet & 
David 2012), border barriers with fixed masonry foundations, are being re-built 
despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent boom in cyber technologies 
and free movement of capital which led to the borderless world theories.  
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However, not all borders are homogenous and there are huge differences 
between securitisation and movement of goods and people between borders. Not all 
individuals are equally mobile and detached from place in our globalised world; 
rather, globalisation has been economic, not social, increasing the mobility of goods 
across borders while hampering the movement of all but select bodies. Paasi (2005) 
argues that borderless world theories are damaging to the nuanced, unique 
experiences of border regions and we need instead a less universalising view of 
boundaries. This rests on Anderson’s (1996) work that argues that, far from being 
abstract lines in the sand, boundaries are central to political life and are intrinsically 
related to notions of identity, citizenship, statehood, and inclusion and exclusion. 
Such processes of identity and difference at the border, claims Yuval-Davis (1997b), 
determine spaces of agency, how citizenship is performed and what this shows about 
practices of belonging.  
Since the late 1980s there has been a shift to research on the processes of bordering 
rather than the borders themselves. As Popescu writes “[b]orders are never finished; 
instead they are always in the making, always being imagined and reimagined. What 
matters more is the border-making process rather than the shape borders assume at 
one time or another” (2012:21). Rebordering is not only about the reinforcement of 
existing state borders, but also about different ways of bordering that include new 
types of borders and new border functions (Walters 2002, 2006). 
Much of this thesis contemplates the historical geography of bordering, 
beginning in the 1920s, which raises different questions about global connections and 
their effects on bordering processes. International influences impacted the Chile-
Peru border in remarkably different ways throughout the ninety years studied. My 
research is therefore dependent on an understanding of border theory that takes 
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borders seriously in this ‘globalised borderless world’ and understands them not as 
simple lines differentiating two places but as differentiated places themselves. Places 
where new identities are created, where multiplicity is recognised, where nationalism 
can be celebrated or disparaged, where a distinctive culture emerges, and where 
borders are experienced and crossed. It is important to note however, that shifts in 
border locations means that borders can cross people; it is not just people who cross 
borders. This can be seen through examples of Europeans who have never moved 
out of their village yet have lived in various countries as borders were redrawn 
throughout the twentieth century, and at the Chile-Peru border whereby territorial 
appropriation switched the nationality of communities who remained rooted. 
Border demarcation as an act has been so concretised in human societies that it 
seems a natural and inevitable undertaking and we define nations and territories by 
where they begin and where they end (Agnew 2007; Grosby 1995). The state wields 
power over space and border making or breaking is part of how the state configures 
its spatial domination. State boundaries thereby become a limit of state control to be 
maintained by force or threat of force. Overt displays of power at the border are 
often how states cement their long-term goals of standing firm and displaying one’s 
potential influence in what Snyder and Diesing have termed “reputation for resolve” 
(1977:185). Popescu also acknowledges the power intrinsic to border demarcation 
and writes; “[i]n order to unearth the power of boundaries, we need to ask whose 
interests are being served by the imposition and maintaining of various borders” 
(2012:23). When such displays of power are questioned they can be contested and 
subverted.  
While border studies has given this thesis an important theoretical basis, I aim to 
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situation and individual experiences which make borders such rich and interesting 
spaces. Border studies is too often tired, reverting back to platitudes about how 
borders always have dual sides or that borders connect as well as separate and so this 
study is firmly situated in multidisciplinary work which engages with colonialism, 
critical politics, identity studies, and feminism. Some notable work has successfully 
worked away from traditional border studies to provide new and fresh perspectives. 
In Border as Method (2013) Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson assess the proliferation 
of borders and a renewed focus on their complexity in the modern world. They 
argue that violence is intrinsic to shaping the lived experiences of borders, using the 
example of migrants dying crossing borders. By taking the border as an ‘epistemic 
angle’ Mezzadra and Neilson provide a new way of looking at power, capital and 
sovereignty.  
Even though border studies has largely moved away from the border as a line, I 
argue that the spatial characteristics of borders are still important. Whether 
biometrics at airports, lethal journeys across seas or deserts, or a passport control 
checkpoint, space remains central. I am wary of arguments that ‘borders are 
everywhere’, an assumption that can delegitimise the experiences of those whose 
lives are shaped, twisted, or even ended by borders. While there are strong 
arguments that globalisation has led to the ubiquity of borders, I remain interested in 
the human-ness of state borders and the role of state power in the borderlands in an 
attempt to validate the lives of borderland citizens, especially those who due to 
factors such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, and sexuality experience increased 
violence at the border. The following sections therefore explore how borders can be 
understood through Latin American history, the relationship between violence and 
borders, and where bodies and individual experience come to the fore. 
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Borders in Latin America 
The term ‘Latin America’ emerged in France in the mid-nineteenth century, 
used at a Paris conference in 1856 by Chilean politician Francisco Bilbao and in 
1861 in Le revue des races Latines (García San Martín 2013). Other early recorded 
accounts were by the Colombian José María Torres Caicedo and the Argentine 
Carlos Calvo. The term ‘America’ itself is thanks to the Italian explorer Amerigo 
Vespucci who landed on what is now Brazil in 1499 and whose name inspired 
German cartographer Martin Waldseemüller to add the term to a map in 1507 
(Dunkerley 2004). The Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman, in an early 1958 
work deconstructing European colonial discourse initiated the idea of the invention of 
Latin America by Europe in place of the discovery of Latin America. John Phelan 
(1968) made the distinction between two Americas, the Latin and the Saxon and 
followed O’Gorman’s notion of Latin America as a European invention. Phelan 
argued that it was conceived in France to position the French as the leader of a Latin 
‘race’ pitched against the Anglo-Saxon and Slavic ‘races’. 
For Argentine semiotician Walter Mignolo ‘America’ is the European invention 
of the first modernity with ‘Latin America’ being the second modernity. The first 
modernity corresponds with the colonial era while the second is a different type of 
coloniality altogether, as he writes, “The ‘idea’ of Latin America is that sad one of 
the elites celebrating their dreams of becoming modern while they slide deeper and 
deeper into the logic of coloniality” (2005:58). Therefore for Mignolo, Latin America 
is more than just a name to designate an entity or to express an identity, it’s a 
‘political project’. In The Idea of Latin America Mignolo debunks ‘the ontology of 
continental divides’ and instead shows how Latin America is a constructed, 
prescriptive idea with a highly racialised history. Modernity is inextricably 
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intertwined with coloniality, and not just the colonial occupation of territory by 
Europeans but in an ongoing sense of political and economic control. For Mignolo 
there is no modernity without coloniality, “[i]f we...stop seeing 'modernity' as a goal 
rather than seeing it as a European construction of history in Europe’s own interests” 
then the essence of a decolonial shift could occur (2012:xix). Border thinking is, for 
Mignolo, “the necessary epistemology to delink and decolonize knowledge and, in 
the process, to build decolonial local histories, restoring the dignity that the western 
idea of universal history took away from millions of people” (2012:x).  
Mignolo (1996) has been interested in the shift in colonial relations in Latin 
America from European ‘decadent colonialism’ towards a new breed of imperial 
colonialism wielded by the United States. The continent does not therefore have one 
experience of postcolonialism; it has been multifaceted and historically dependent. 
Europe and the United States, especially after the Second World War, have exerted 
power, primarily economic, over the territories to their south. Latin America’s 
borders were demarcated and mapped by Europe and the United States, dictating 
nationality, movement, and spatial identities from afar and positing Latin America as 
a distinct place south of the US border. This unusual border history of colonial 
demarcation has profoundly marked the experience of being Latin American. The 
Peruvian author Mario Vargas Llosa (2008:7) notes this impact;  
“What does it mean to feel you are Latin American? It means being 
aware that the territorial boundaries dividing our nations are artificial, 
imposed arbitrarily during the colonial years. And neither our leaders 
during the emancipation period nor the republican governments that 
followed bothered to correct that situation. In fact, they often worsened 
things by further separating and isolating societies whose commonalities 
were deeper than their petty differences.” 
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The whole continent has been defined, argues Larry Herzog (1990), by the 
U.S./Mexico border and Richard (1996) even goes as far to call the whole of Latin 
America a border, as it is so often perceived as being culturally peripheral in the 
global imagination. These often arbitrarily demarcated borders created national 
obsessions with promoting a national identity in the scarcely populated ‘frontier’ 
borderlands (Baud 2000). The bordering of Latin America first occurred in the 
imagination of early European explorers and the subsequent mapping of physical 
borders made it a continent “fashioned rather than found”, according to Merrell 
(2004:4). Latin America was imagined as a counter-space to Europe, a remade 
world, a promised land. Much of this creation of a ‘new’ space was rooted in racial 
othering and this often became embedded within Latin American societies. Orlove’s 
(1993) work on order in colonial and postcolonial Peruvian geography conveys 
historical shifts in the enactment of power over the physical terrain but also the 
peoples of Peru. Orlove tells how “colonial orderings emphasized historicized racial 
differences among persons within a relatively balanced and homogeneous space, 
while postcolonial orderings stressed naturalized regional differences among places 
within a homogeneous, though covertly racialized, population” (1993:301). 
Environmental determinism was employed as a way to represent ‘indians’ in 
geographical discourse, people were seen as shaped by the geographical spaces they 
inhabited.  
The complex history of colonialism and violence in Latin America has resulted 
in difficulties over the rights and responsibilities of demarcating and crossing borders. 
It was after the collapse of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in the nineteenth 
century that nation building in South America truly began despite military leader 
Simón Bolívar’s attempts to keep Spanish-speaking territories unified. Various 
26 
conflicts took place between the fledgling nations in order to assert power and define 
borders such as the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and The War of the Triple 
Alliance (1864-1870). Colonial borders were rarely demarcated and were, according 
to Bruslé (2007) relatively permeable frontiers. 
Present day state borders in Latin America exist largely thanks to the principles 
of uti possidetis juris (legal possession) and uti possidetis de facto (effective possession) 
which were held up in struggles for independence from colonial powers. Simón 
Bolívar emphatically pursued uti possidetis juris to temporarily fix Spanish 
administrative units that could then be reworked and demarcated as appropriate 
(Parodi 2002). Yet these administrative units have persisted beyond Bolívar’s 
expectations and many of these boundaries that were drawn from afar by colonial 
powers with little knowledge of the territories remain. Border theorists must be wary 
of overthinking this persistence however due to the prevalence of Latin American 
scholars falling into what John Agnew (1994) terms the ‘territorial trap’; of trusting 
too much in the supposed fixity of territory, of states, and of identities.   
Even after independence border demarcation in Latin America was prohibited, 
to a substantial degree, to the physical geography of the continent with impermeable 
tropical forests and towering mountain ranges (Amilhat-Szary 2007). Mandel 
(1980:429) claims that less economically developed countries “tend to rely more on 
territorial concerns for the pursuit of their national interests. And in cases where a 
colonial power determined their boundaries prior to independence, there is a 
particular urgency to the full attainment of border claims”.  
Borders in South America are “pressure points” (Bolin 1992:172) and with over 
18,000 miles of borders they are undoubtedly central to the history, geography, and 
character of the continent. Border disputes have been rife in Latin America with 83 
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territorial claims between nation-states between 1816 and 1992 on the continent 
(Hensel 2001). Yet while forces have often been deployed and conflict has occurred, 
the escalation to full-scale war has been rare and in global comparison the continent 
was relatively free from interstate warfare during the twentieth century (Domínguez 
et al. 2003). The legal principle of uti possidetis juris has been key in the management 
of Latin American border conflicts. The idea of a shared commonality, particularly 
in South America, has also helped deter leaders from armed conflict in favour of a 
Bolivarian entity based on a balance of power for mutual benefit. However, although 
war due to border disputes has been rare, border disputes have persisted on the 
continent. These border disputes have mainly stemmed from the colonial 
demarcation of sparsely populated areas that became increasingly settled and known, 
but more recently maritime border conflicts have been more prominent since the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas raised the issue of limits in 
the seas.  
The difficult geography with border areas often in mountain ranges, rainforests 
or deserts has made previous mapping and reconnaissance of the borderlands 
challenging. Peaceful diplomacy has been the ideal solution for these disputes often 
with a neutral third party involved. Throughout Latin American history the neutral 
party has varied between the British monarchy (Chile-Argentina Beagle Conflict, 
1978), the Organiation of American States (particularly in Central America) and 
with many being resolved at the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The 
Tacna-Arica border issue is one of the longest running in the history of Latin 
America and, to refer back to the quote by Jenkins that opened the chapter, violence, 
a referendum, and international mediation have all been employed to end the 
dispute.  
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Chile’s unusual shape originated in the sixteenth century when conquistadors 
came down from Peru in search of riches and settled in the now-central region of 
Chile where Santiago was founded. When Chile won independence from Spain in 
1818 it was roughly a third of the size it is today but in the War of the Pacific (1879-
1883) Chile expanded to the north appropriating territory from Peru and Bolivia and 
around the same time gradually took more and more land from the indigenous 
Mapuche to the south. Chile slowly elongated, unable to move eastwards due to the 
Andes, and the ribbon shape Chile holds today emerged. 
Political terrain on the continent has been largely conceptualised through 
geopolitics, an approach that has influenced thinking about how states should behave 
and assert their spatial power, and a term whose use has been well mapped out by 
Les Hepple (1986). Since independence from Europe the military has tended to hold 
positions of power and influence in Latin America with military state leaders drawing 
upon geopolitics. This became increasingly so in the twentieth century in Chile 
where General Augusto Pinochet taught geopolitics at the Chilean War Academy 
and published books on the subject (Dodds 1993).  
Borders in Latin America have been demarcated and contested often due to 
very conscious ideas about state power and domination over certain territories. 
Kjellen and Ratzel’s geopolitical theories of organic state growth were popular on 
the continent when post-independence nations were contemplating the stretching of 
their borders into the sparsely populated peripheries (Hepple 2004). The metaphor 
of the state as an organ was employed by military leaders to legitimate military 
intervention against external threats but also ‘cancerous cells’ within the state that 
were harmful to the organ as a whole (Hepple 1992). Les Hepple’s study of the 
application of Halford Mackinder’s ‘Eurasian heartland thesis’ to South American 
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geopolitics argues that Lewis Tambs, academic and American Ambassador to 
Colombia, had been the first to locate the Bolivian triangle as the ‘South American 
heartland’. Tambs (1965) cited certain geographical features that gave him reason to 
label Bolivia as a pivot area and believed that communists would target the area in 
order to gain control of the continent. Mackinder was clearly widely read in Latin 
America as shown by the fact that Pinochet’s 1968 book Geopolitica included in the 
appendix a Spanish translation of Mackinder’s seminal 1904 paper ‘The 
geographical pivot of history’.  
In Chile the idea of nationalism is deeply linked to the idea and physical space 
of territory. The historian Mario Góngora (1981) has therefore argued that Chile is 
by essence a country of war; the desire for and practice of historical territorial 
expansion has defined the country that Chile is today. It would seem that in Chile 
geography and militarism remain intertwined as seen through the controversy over 
the International Geographical Union (IGU) holding the 2011 regional meeting at 
the Military School in Santiago, a space of torture and murder under the Pinochet 
dictatorship. In spite of an international petition to change the location of the 
meeting, the IGU did not directly address the issue (Hirt & Palomino-Schalscha 
2011).  
 
 
Violence: from Borders to Bodies 
Violence is spatially located and is disproportionately located at borders and in 
border cities. Various scholars have explored the causes of violence and the different 
types of violence such as behavioural or structural (Jacoby 2008; Collins 2008; 
Scheper-Hughes & Bourgeois 2006; Zizek 2008) but I am more interested here in the 
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link between violence and power. Violence in Latin America is fuelled by the desire 
for domination that is in turn often fuelled by an expected performance of 
masculinity. Throughout twentieth century Latin America, argues Biron (2000), the 
cliché of using violence against women to prove male virility has been ubiquitous. 
The strength and identity of a nation-state is defined and established by its national 
masculinity and, argues Biron, violence often occurs due to a crisis of masculinity. 
Violence as tied to masculinity or machismo can be employed at the broadest to the 
most intimate scales as will be explored later. Violence is simultaneously present at 
international borders, in cities, and in bodies as outlined here. 
While this thesis is a study of the varying forms of violence that have been 
enacted at the Chile-Peru border, the escape from or pacification of violence is a 
phenomenon that has also been enacted at the border. Pacification can be a positive 
process in search of peace or non-violence and pacifism as a political movement 
spurns the use of violence. However pacification can also be used to refer to a more 
insidious policy of suppressing certain groups. James Dunkerley’s (1994) work on 
Central America posits pacification as political transition rather than a permanent 
institutionalisation of democracy. Pacification in Latin America often refers to the 
subjugation of indigenous peoples by European colonisers or Latin elites, such as the 
attempted pacification of the Mapuche in Southern Chile. In this thesis the verb ‘to 
pacify’ will be used with respect to attempts to calm the border, to reduce conflict, 
whether by the local community or the state.  
Borders in Latin America have been so formed by and charged with violence 
that attempts to bring peace to the borders is an overt act, it is not a passive 
obliviousness to violence but an active working towards peace. Latin America has often 
been described by scholars such as Imbusch et al. (2011) as the world’s most violent 
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region with violence being an endemic aspect of everyday life which has resulted in 
the overlooking of periods of peace and democratisation which is why here the 
history of violence on the border is examined inclusively, with its moments of both 
violence and peace encompassed. While Chile is one of the least violent countries in 
Latin America by homicide rate not all types of violence are so quantifiable with 
structural violence being pervasive on the entire continent. Structural violence refers 
to conditions of exclusion and poverty that limit health, opportunity, and access to 
vital public services (Briceño-León & Zubillaga 2002).  
Peace will be regarded here as the ‘absence of violence’ (following Galtung’s 
1996 argument) despite it being a notably more complex concept. However, talking 
about peace in this way necessitates a definition of violence, a complex term that 
many have attempted to define. It is defined by the World Health Organiation 
(1996) as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, 
against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either 
results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment, or deprivation” and allows flexibility for interpersonal or collective 
violence at various scales. This is a particularly useful definition when examining the 
nuances of violence such as its threat, its attempted suppression, and health policy as 
violence as in this thesis. George Kent (1993) defines violence as doing harm to 
another in the pursuit of one’s own preferences which, although being a limited 
definition, importantly incorporates power, and an interrogation of who wields and 
who benefits from the enactment of violence runs throughout the thesis. 
This thesis draws heavily on the work of Mark Salter who uses the metaphor of 
the border as a suture. For Salter “the suture- as a process of knitting together the 
inside and the outside together and the resultant scar- better evokes the performative 
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aspects of borders” (2012:734). This is a useful way to understand how meaning is 
given to borders due to the ways in which they are delimited and transgressed. 
Violence is an inherent part of creating the border, the suture, but the very existence 
of the border thereby works to naturalise the violence employed to create it.  Salter 
draws on the work of Giorgio Agamben, Rob Walker, and Carlo Galli in creating an 
idea of the suture that better examines the role of borders in the creation of both 
sovereign states and the system of sovereign states. Salter begins with the assumption 
that all borders are performative; it is through delimitation and transgression that 
they are created and given meaning. This idea will run throughout the thesis because 
it effectively allows for border demarcation to be a complex and unfinished process. 
As Salter argues “[s]utures are never always or completely successful, just as stitches 
in a wound may lead to healing but also leave a trace of their own through the scar” 
(2012:735). Importantly, Salter keeps humans to the fore; “[b]orders then knit the 
world together, but also knit us as subjects into the bordered world” (2012:736). The 
inhabitants of the border are unavoidably stitched into the border itself. The ongoing 
process of the suture and the scar it creates that affects the citizens of the borderlands 
becomes a particularly useful way for understanding the Chile-Peru border which 
oscillates between being a space of rupture and repair. 
As well as being about the border, this thesis examines a border city and so an 
understanding of the nature of cities provides a useful background. As Stephen 
Graham (2010) has illustrated, cities worldwide are being increasingly recognised as 
battlegrounds of political violence. Graham argues that bordering has been integral 
to this at scales from international borders to the construction of borders between the 
rich and poor within cities. A reading of Latin American cities cannot be complete 
without the Brazilian ‘geographer’s philosopher’ Milton Santos. Through his life and 
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work Santos (1996) fought against discrimination and for equality and respect for 
diversity. He was interested in the social construction of space but also in the 
temporal dimension of space, arguing that space changes its characteristics 
throughout time periods. Santos was interested in globalisation which he argued has 
the effect of making urban networks more complex and that the more places 
globalise, the more unique they become. Territories will develop a specific 
combination of components that will not be found anywhere else. Santos’ work can 
thereby become highly useful for examining an urban network that lies on an 
international border. 
Conflict and development have rarely been studied together, rather it is often 
assumed that conflict is a moment of crisis and development begins when the crisis 
ends. Some work however has recognised the relationship between 
underdevelopment and the likelihood of conflict (Collier 2000). MacGinty and 
Williams’ (2009) book on conflict and development has been particularly useful in 
writing the human dimension back into conflict studies and offers a critical 
perspective to highlight that development can in fact cause conflict and have 
negative consequences. The role of gender in conflict has been highlighted by Bouta, 
Frerks & Bannon (2005) who emphasise how gender roles change throughout conflict 
and into the post-conflict stage. During conflict women can be empowered by taking 
on roles that were previously filled by men who then become engaged in warfare. 
These are roles that tend to disappear once the conflict ends.  
Much of the discussion around power and violence returns to issues of 
sovereignty and territory. Claudio Minca and Nick Vaughan-Williams analyse 
borders through a Schmittian lens and argue that “the principle of sovereign power 
is based on an original act of violence, a revolutionary act, and the border represents 
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in many ways the spatialisation of this very violence” (2012:760). They argue that for 
Carl Schmitt the border is an integral part of a nation’s territory but is also 
inescapably exceptional, a ‘zone of anomie’. It is in this zone that the state enacts 
violence and this can be seen spatially through the existence of the border. Conflict 
and violence are catalysts for change, often leading to new borders or new 
manifestations of power. As John Dewey has argued; “[c]onflict is the gadfly of 
thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates to invention. It shocks us 
out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving. Not that it always 
effects this result; but that conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity” 
(1922:300). This contriving that Dewey mentions can often be an extension of 
control or domination over extended bodies, territories, or processes. For Colin Flint 
conflict is inherently territorial, as he has written, “war, whether interstate or 
guerrilla, is a political process that has as its purpose the control of territory to enable 
subsequent projections of power” (2005:6).  
Stuart Elden has successfully brought a deeper understanding to the term 
‘territory’ within geography, arguing that the historical dimension and complexities 
of territory have been neglected (2010a;2010b;2013b). Elden has detailed the 
development of the idea of territory within Western political thought and stressed 
that territory is more than ‘land’ and ‘terrain’ but is still related to both ideas. 
Territory cannot refer to a homogenous idea but instead territory “…is geographical, 
not simply because it is one of the ways of ordering the world, but also because it is 
profoundly uneven in its development” (2010a:812). Elden has made the argument 
that we should not define territory simply as a bounded or bordered space, or at least 
not without unpacking the terms ‘boundaries’ and ‘space’ conceptually and 
historically. Just as bordering has been seen as a process, so too has Elden 
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conceptualised territory, writing that “[t]erritory is a process, not an outcome; not so 
far from what is increasingly being understood as an assemblage, continually made 
and remade” (2013a:36). 
State building has been violent throughout the world’s history and Latin 
America is certainly no exception; “Statebuilding involves imposing a unified, 
centralized state and pacifying autonomous regions, seizing border areas, and 
imposing regulation, taxation and territorial control” (Newman 2013:141). The 
borderlands become a space of subjugation and control at the moment of territorial 
expansion but that does not mean that violence ends once the territory is 
consolidated under the nation-state. I am interested in these ideas in as far as how 
this act of subjugation has been felt by the people subjugated, not just as an abstract 
act. In his seminal 1987 work Michael Taussig examined colonialism in South 
America and the imposition of colonialism on the ‘wild’ indigenous population, 
specifically with regards to rubber plantations in Colombia. This area, the Putomayo 
region, became a ‘space of death’ whereby British capitalists inflicted a reign of terror 
against indigenous people, their culture, and their collective memory. It is this effect of 
violent statebuilding or colonialism on bodies that becomes pertinent. 
Violence at borders is ripe for study within geopolitics and international 
relations, theorising the historical and contemporary shifts in power and domination 
over the globe. This often focusses on the military, a topic that Rachel Woodward 
has argued needs to be studied in more thoughtful, precise ways. Woodward (2005) 
believes that to better understand broad themes such as power and violence we 
should examine the mundane and routine activities of militarism with the aim of 
pursuing a critical military geography.  Also aiming to problematise preceding 
research on militarism, Jennifer Fluri has called attention “to the need for additional 
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research on the corporeality of battlegrounds from within the theatres of war as well 
as the corporeal markers and their displacements and meanings in different spatial 
contexts” (2011:291). Despite historical changes in violence and warfare that have 
arguably created some distance in combat, the body remains tied to warfare in 
multiple ways. As Fluri has written, “[t]he body is often the battleground onto which 
violence is orchestrated, and rights and victimization-based discourses are 
expounded to shape public opinion, policy and political action” (2011:291).  
Much scholarship on violence and the body has been informed by Elaine 
Scarry’s The Body in Pain (1985) which analyses the nature and reality of pain and the 
implications of pain in warfare and torture. Being in pain, she says, causes us to be 
our least human because we are least able to express ourselves and share ourselves 
with others. Inflicting pain is an illegitimate and unjust way of gaining power over 
other human beings because in essence we obliterate their ability to be human.  
Scarry’s work is working from and speaking to Hannah Arendt’s writings on the 
political implications of the imcommunicability of pain, although Scarry is more 
interested in pain as a private, human experience. Arendt’s seminal On Violence (1970) 
argued that power and violence are completely antithetical; they are not the same, 
they are in fact direct opposites. Where there is the absolute domination of one, the 
other cannot exist; violence appears when power is threatened. For Arendt, “[p]ower 
is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence 
only so long as the group keeps together… without a people or group there is no 
power” (1970:45). To turn Arendt’s ideas to gender, for Raewyn Connell “[v]iolence 
is part of a system of domination, but is at the same time a measure of its 
imperfection. A thoroughly legitimate hierarchy would have less need to intimidate. 
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The scale of contemporary violence points to crisis tendencies (to problematise a 
term from Jürgen Habermas) in the modern gender order” (1995:84). 
Another philosopher who has contributed immensely to geographical 
understandings of violence, control, and corporeality has been Michel Foucault. 
Among his many significant contributions, that most pertinent to this thesis has been 
biopolitics. Following the work of Foucault, biopolitics is a term denoting social and 
political power over life and was first discussed during his lecture series Society Must Be 
Defended given at the Collège de France from 1975–1976. Foucault described 
biopolitics as “a new technology of power...[that] exists at a different level, on a 
different scale, and [that] has a different bearing area, and makes use of very 
different instruments” (2003:242). Foucault argued that with the development of 
technology authorities improved their potential to control subjects “through general 
hygiene programmes, or more general policies regarding sexuality, it is also achieved 
through city planning, insurance schemes and education” (Legg 2005:141). The far-
reaching implication of this is, argue Rabinow and Rose (2006), that through the 
implementation, or lack of implementation, of this control biopower can be read as 
the state’s authority to ‘let die’ as much as to ‘make die’. 
Highly influenced by Foucault, Judith Butler’s work has been important in 
examining violence, discussing in Precarious Life (2004) the value of human life and the 
social justice implications of mourning. Butler’s work is also important here in terms 
of her earlier work Gender Trouble (1990) where she problematised hegemonic 
understandings of gender as based on innate, natural differences between two sexes 
and instead proposed that constructed gender difference has created sex difference. 
Butler has argued that gender and sexuality rely on being repeatedly performed or 
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‘cited’ in order to function as mutually constitutive categories of subjectivity and this 
has great implications for masculinities studies and how masculinity is accomplished. 
The relationships between gender, violence, and war have been successfully 
mined by scholars at various scales. For example, for Cynthia Enloe (1983) the 
military is the epitome of patriarchy and she argues that the oppression of women is 
a fundamental part, not just a consequence, of the militarist ideology. Enloe has been 
influential in disrupting the ‘natural’ status quo of military regimes to fully 
understand the gendered dynamics of the military at a much broader scale than first 
imagined.  
The philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2005) also studies the broadest scales and 
has written about violence against women’s bodies arguing that it is a global issue 
affecting every single woman whether that violence is rape, domestic abuse, forced 
prostitution, sexual harassment, stalking, the undernutrition of girls or myriad other 
forms. Nussbaum argues that not all women are equally vulnerable to violence; it 
affects women at varying magnitudes due to factors such as nation, culture, and class, 
but affects all women regardless. There has been some suggestion that with greater 
gender equality in a society the less likely military action is to be taken to solve 
international disputes (Caprioli 2000). However such claims have been disputed by 
feminists who argue that this only reinforces the gender binary argument that men 
are inherently aggressive and women pacific. Tickner (2002) claims that this idea 
disempowers women by rendering them as idealistic and utopian. It also suggests 
that women are naturally disconnected from the military, something Enloe (1983) 
has impressively argued to be far from the truth. 
However, we can also understand these relationships at precise locations and at 
the scale of the body. For example, Sharon Pickering (2010) has argued that extra-
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legal border crossings have significant gendered dimensions and this often entails 
gender-based violence as a means of control. In terms of corporeality, in their study 
of Sri Lankan women, Hyndman and De Alwis (2004) found that bodies are the 
most immediate and delicate scale of politics as corporeal sites and markers of gender 
and national identity. The authors examine relations of gender and nation within the 
context of conflict and contend that a feminist approach is crucial in order to 
understand the gendered processes of identity construction in the context of 
competing militarised nationalisms. Wartime is highly gendered with rape being one 
of the most effective weapons in wartime but Jelke Boesten (2010;2014) has argued 
that gendered violence is more complex than ‘rape-as-weapon’; gendered violence 
cannot always fit a neat narrative of rape as a political strategy during conflict. She 
has examined the differences between wartime violence and peacetime violence 
through her work in Peru where she found that the state forces were the main 
perpetrators of sexual violence, reproducing institutionalised structures of violence 
and inequality. Boesten argues that sexual violence continues post-conflict and that 
“‘peace’ is not necessarily the right term for the state in which many women live” 
(2010:114). 
As this overview of violence and borders has shown, violence often intersects 
with certain identities, whether gender as mentioned previously or sexuality or 
ethnicity among many others and this is an intersection that is prevalent throughout 
the thesis. It is therefore imperative to understand identity formation at the border.  
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Borders, Bodies, and Identities 
To continue this theme of borders and bodies away from an explicit focus on 
violence, the way in which individuals view themselves and how they are seen and 
portrayed by others is key to this thesis. Work from and about Latin America has 
been exceptional in this area and has been enormously influential to my work. To 
speak of a border identity recognises the simultaneous collective border identity felt 
by communities residing in the borderlands but also the individual border identities 
based on unique experiences and positions.  
Gloria Anzaldúa’s conceptualisation of the ‘border identity’ stems from the US 
Southwest-Mexican border but is constructed through psychological boundaries such 
as ethnicity and sexuality, resulting in a place of neglect and peripherality. As she 
writes; “[a] border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A borderland 
is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural 
boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forgotten are its 
inhabitants” (1987:3). The population of the borderlands inhabit a ‘third country’ 
that is different from the two countries either side of the border but they learn 
cultural expectations from both. Anzaldúa’s semi-autobiographical work experiments 
with poetry and prose and weaves between Spanish and English which she argues is 
the only way to describe the US-Mexico border experience. Also working on the US-
Mexico border, Pablo Vila’s work has emphasised the multiplicity of borders and 
border identities; “[n]ot only different people construct distinct borders and disparate 
identities around those borders, but those different borders acquire a distinct weight 
in relation to the different subject positions (and the different narratives within those 
subject positions) people decide to identify with” (2003:611). Vila argues that there is 
no unified culture in the borderlands but rather border inhabitants configure their 
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sense of identity around multiple factors such as nationality, ethinicity, and race on 
top of regional factors. 
A third US-Mexico border theorist, Arturo Aldama, has worked extensively on 
the border and chican@ identities and has argued that the border is a free-zone of 
violence, at least for those traveling north from Mexico and the violence does not 
end by ‘making-it’ to the US.2  Instead the border is infinitely elastic and inescapable 
for Latinos who confront racism and sexism as immigrants. The difference entailed 
by being a border-crosser is unavoidable, as Aldama describes it, “[l]inguistic 
violence- the creation of the Other- interanimates violence on the body” (2002:58). 
This focus on how the border has been experienced by those who inhabit the 
borderlands that really began in the 1980s has been influential in my work such as 
the study of the US-Mexico border by Mario Ojeda (1981) that focusses on power 
and how borders are spaces of asymmetrical power. Jorge Bustamante (1989) has 
extended this idea to processes of ‘othering’ on the US-Mexico border and 
examining the reasons for why people cross the border. Borders are often seen to 
create binaries of ‘them’ and ‘us’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’. This 
necessitates some level of power, the concept of creating borders as protection is 
inherently colonial with the powerful able to dictate rules of exclusion (Balibar 2004; 
Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006).  
Recent scholarship on borders and bodies has focussed on the relationship 
between bodies and biometric borders, how corporeal mobilities are being governed 
and monitored in the post 9/11 world (Amoore 2006; Muller 2010; Epstein 2007). 
However, in other ways, bodies at the border have remained remarkably unchanged 
despite technological advancements in governance; certain bodies are still excluded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The symbol ‘@’ or the letter ‘x’ is sometimes used in place of the letters ‘o’ and ‘a’ which denote gender in the 
Spanish language. This can be used as shorthand for both ‘male and female’ or to resist gender binaries. 
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in an old-fashioned way from crossing borders for being too brown, too poor, too 
‘other’. 
Nira Yuval-Davis in her work on identity, gender, borders, and ideas of 
‘belonging’ (1997a;1999;2004) has emphasised how the process of constructing 
borders determines the nature of belonging, creating an ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy. 
Yuval-Davis takes an intersectional approach and argues that the nature of 
belonging is determined by various positionings such as gender, class, and ethnicity. 
These differences are what determine state borders according to Diener and Hagen 
who write that “[t]he formation of state borders generally results from unequal 
power relationships that both reflect and cross various social boundaries” (2012:70). 
A constructivist approach to borders and territory argues that the segregation 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ across territory cannot be explained by characteristics such 
as race, ethnicity, language, or religion but occurs due to and through unequal 
power relations within and between social systems.  
However, simultaneously, despite these notions of borders separating 
‘belonging’ and ‘not-belonging’, borders are also “a place of feedback, exchange and 
process”, a place where hybridization and cultural overlap can occur (Welchman 
1996:178). For Newman, “[h]ybridization takes place in contact zones, where people 
from different groups or territories begin to cross borders and where they experience 
processes of mutual adaptation negotiated through daily working relations with each 
other” (2003:19). The ‘us’ and ‘them’ do not always act against one another but can 
blend and merge and influence the ‘other’ across the border.  
The apparent paradox between borders as a space of difference but also as a 
space of hybridity has been an interesting point of departure for many academics. 
Henk Van Houtum along with colleagues at the Nijmegen Centre for Border 
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Research in the Netherlands have since 1998 been critically studying borders in 
terms of identity, sovereignty, and the tension between borders as spaces of exclusion 
but also as a space of hybridity and meeting. Borders are ‘Janus-faced’, they cannot 
be easily mapped or compartmentalised, they are inherently ambiguous, “poised 
between openness and closure, inclusion and exclusion, fear and desire” (Van 
Houtum, Kramsch, & Zierhofer 2005:12). The process of bordering occurs in order 
to create territorial order but paradoxically creates new, differentiated space and 
identities (Van Houtum & Ton Van Naerssen 2002). 
On a similar note political geographer John House has been important in 
understanding how frontier zones that are peripheral economically, socially, and 
politically suffer from underdevelopment as a result of their distance from the societal 
core. He states that frontier zones can be “the focus for political discontents, 
nurtured by isolation, deprivation, a sense of cultural identity, or trans-frontier 
affinities” (1980:458). House recognises that as well as being potential spaces of 
conflict, “the frontier is also an international meetingplace and, as such, potentially a 
launching-pad for international cooperation to mutual benefit” (1980:457). House 
advocates policy intervention to mitigate the problems felt so keenly in frontier zones 
with the added benefit of increasing international cooperation and encouraging 
peace. The complexities of national borderlands are also shown by John Augelli’s 
statement that they “tend historically to be zones of cultural overlap and political 
instability where the national identity and loyalties of the people often become 
blurred” (1980:19). 
When speaking of identity and ‘othering’ in Latin America, debates over race 
and ethnicity are highly important. Much of the most interesting work on race and 
ethnicity has come from Latin American scholars such as Alfonso Múnera in his 
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2005 book on the construction of race and geography in nineteenth century 
Colombia. Múnera provides a detailed argument of how racial categorisation was 
fundamental to the creation of the nation-state. For an understanding of the relation 
between Latin America and the rest of the world it is imperative to study work 
emanating from the continent. Néstor García Canclini (1999;2002) for example is an 
Argentine anthropologist and philosopher whose work on globalisation and 
interculturality has been vital to cultural studies and the relations between Latin 
America, Europe, and the United States, and among Latin American countries. 
Latin American scholars are also significant for their commitment to real change and 
progress on the continent. Rossana Reguillo (2012) is one such scholar-activist whose 
work on youth, urban spaces, and fear has led to social change. Additionally, fore-
mentioned Milton Santos believed in the transformative power of geography, the 
power of geography to take Brazil out of its underdevelopment and he systematically 
searched for coherent geographical theories that could have practical implications 
for global underdevelopment. 
Borders are, therefore, rich spaces for academic research whereby identity and 
culture can be studied especially due to the intersection of the corporeal, national, 
and international scales which all become so salient at the border. It is the literature 
that breaks out of the often dry field of border studies and instead looks at power and 
violence and people which is most useful here. This thesis is therefore part of this 
important body of work begun by critical theorists, feminists, and philosophers that is 
unavoidably multidisciplinary and always calling back to the importance of Latin 
America.  	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CHAPTER THREE 	  
METHODOLOGY 	  
 
This section explains the epistemological and practical research strategies 
adopted by setting out the methodology and methods of the project. The 
methodology consists of the principles that guide the research, it “refers to the 
rationale and the philosophical assumptions that underlie any natural, social or 
human science study, whether articulated or not” (McGregor & Murname 2010:2).  
The methods chosen for which to conduct the research are directly influenced by the 
methodology. Considering that the research examines ninety years of violence in the 
border city of Arica a variety of methods were necessary to reflect both the chronology 
and area of study. In order to investigate the aims of my research, a combination of 
archival and ethnographic methods were employed to study both the historical and 
cultural significances of the border. In contrast to the official narrative predominantly 
found in the archives visited- what economic policies were employed in Arica, how 
the military was employed in the far north and so on- ethnographic fieldwork 
provided nuance and unofficial narratives, it allowed me to understand what it is like 
to live in a border city, in a contested territory, in a city on the periphery of a nation. 
The earlier chapters rely more heavily on archival documents produced and 
collected at the time whereas later chapters are additionally based on interviews and 
social media. The methods chosen throughout the research reflect the 
appropriateness, relevance, and access issues of the chronology and varying topics. 
For example it was necessary to study documents and diaries from the 1920s due to 
none of the actors being alive and when studying abortion, interviews and media 
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reports were necessary because, due to abortions being illegal, there are no official 
documents or statistics. Again, I used oral history and newspaper reports to study the 
almost-war of the 1970s due to the lack of an official narrative. This mix of methods 
reflects the complexity of Arica and the Chile-Peru border and the aim was to 
produce a ‘collage’ whereby fragments from seemingly vastly different methods create 
a new picture. The resulting collage provides a clear picture made up of small scraps 
of knowledge, to borrow Aristotle’s overused but useful platitude, the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. Each of the five chronological border stories sheds light on 
the often-contradictory nature of the border and the bringing together and overlaying 
of mixed methods through collage was perfectly placed to capture this. The aim of the 
chosen methodology and method was to study violence in Arica through depth and 
detail rather than to provide a representative and statistically valid picture of Arica. 
The fieldwork took place between 20th August 2013 and 20th August 2014 
beginning with six weeks in Washington DC, six weeks in Santiago de Chile and the 
following nine months in Arica with visits to Peru.  
 
Critical Perspectives 
Just as Cynthia Enloe (1983) asked herself ‘why should a feminist study the 
military?’, I have asked myself, ‘why should a feminist study dead white men?’ I 
consider myself to work as a feminist geographer yet unlike the majority of feminist 
research I am not explicitly studying gender. Therefore, what does it mean to be a 
feminist geographer? And in particular what does it mean to be a feminist geographer 
working in Chile on topics which are on the whole not explicitly feminist? Feminism 
for me cannot be an afterthought, a late addition to the ‘add and stir’ method to 
augment diversity. The numerous labels designating various types of feminism “signal 
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to the broader public that feminism is not a monolithic ideology, that all feminists do 
not think alike, and that, like all time-honored modes of thinking, feminist thought has 
a past as well as a present and a future” (Tong 1998:1). Coined by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw (1991) intersectional feminism studies social, cultural and biological factors- 
in the case of this study that includes poverty, class, race, sexual orientation, gender, 
illness- and how they create nuanced experiences of oppression and discrimination. 
Intersectionality is a perspective which aids the study of how gender intersects with 
other identities and how these intersections result in unique experiences (Morris 2007) 
and my own views and the views which influenced this thesis came from my 
experiences of fieldwork, it was over the year of research that I fully understood the 
importance of intersectional feminism at the border. It also demonstrated to me how 
feminism is about more than just women’s issues and that gender inequality cuts 
through all arenas of social existence, even violence at an international border. 
Working as an intersectional feminist geographer involves drawing on the work 
of writers such as Gloria Anzaldúa, bell hooks, and Linda Smith (2012) who argues for 
‘decolonising methodologies’ which necessitates the insertion of Indigenous principles 
into research methodology so that research practices can play a role in the assertion of 
Indigenous people’s rights and sovereignty. In practice this demands an emic focus, 
research led by the participants rather than by myself, in an attempt to better 
understand the local perspective. As much power as possible was shifted over to the 
researched and not the researcher. This however can bring its own challenges as I am 
allowing various voices to speak but many of the voices in my work are powerful, 
often white, men. Yet I do not allow this to undermine my work. Perhaps Stanley and 
Wise (1993:66) put it best when they said; the “western industrial scientific approach 
values the orderly, rational, quantifiable, predictable, abstract and theoretical: 
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feminism spat in its eye”. Just by looking at the contradictory, paradoxical nature of 
Arica I am working as a feminist geographer. There is no denying that the resulting 
thesis reflects my position and choices, I select the quotes which to include which 
brings its own issues, as others (Opie, 1992; Stacey, 1988) have pointedly questioned, 
are these extracted quotes really giving a voice to ‘others’ in any meaningful way?  
Working as a feminist geographer necessitates grappling with such questions. 
My intersectional feminism is also present in the way I understand moments of 
transnationalism in the history of the border, how at various points the US and 
Europe have become involved in Arica and the paternal discourses this entails. 
Skinner et al. argue that “what is particular in feminist research is that the approaches 
adopted should come at the topic under investigation in a way that is... likely to reflect 
the experiences of women and children, rather than distorting them” (2005:17). In 
that vein I sought out voices of women who had been silenced in the archives or 
society, attempting to round out the history of Arica with their stories included. 
According to Maguire “feminist research...consists of no single set of agreed upon 
research guidelines or methods. Nor have feminists agreed upon one definition of 
feminist research” and so, despite the fact that my thesis much more than a study of 
gender in Arica, feminist geography is consistently present in my research (1987:74). 
Feminist research goes far beyond adding women into research, as Zelewski & 
Parapart (1998) have argued in their study of international relations, if the discipline is 
constructed around men and masculinity it is necessary to destabilise the subject of 
‘man’ in order to destabilise international relations. Masculinities studies really 
emerged in the 1990s with growing awareness that not just women are affected by 
patriarchal control and regulation of gender. Thinking about masculinity raises 
questions about power and privilege and whether all men wield power, how 
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masculinity is performed across time and space, and how masculinity is plural and 
dependent on many other factors. A study of violence necessitates an understanding of 
hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) and I attempt to unpack 
the role of masculinity and machismo in the persistence of violence on the Chile-Peru 
border.  
Machismo is the stereotype of hypermasculinity associated with Latin American 
maleness which developed, argues Hardin (2002), due to Spanish conquistadors’ 
reaction to indigenous gender and sexual expression. Studies of machismo, 
masculinity, and violence often focus on on-on-one violence, gangs, and sexual abuse 
but less attention has been paid to the wider scales of international and state decision 
making which this thesis taps into. For Connell “in a globalizing world, we must pay 
attention also to very large-scale structures. An understanding of the world gender 
order is a necessary basis of thinking about men and masculinities globally. Hegemony 
in the contemporary gender order is connected with patterns of trade, investment, and 
communication dominated by the North” (2005:369). This large-scale process has 
defined what it means to perform Chilean masculinity which in turn “has often 
furnished governing elites with a powerful rhetoric for dignifying the political order” 
at the level of the state (Tosh 2004: 50). A feminist perspective is therefore useful here 
in examining the institutional and international scales of machismo as well as the 
individual scale.  
However, no researcher works from just one position and my work is strongly 
influenced by critical borderlands theories. Critical borderland studies tends to disrupt 
the traditional view of borders as static and natural by illustrating how this is disrupted 
by communities and individuals who relate to borders in alternative ways, living 
across them, on them, or between them. Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan Williams 
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(2012) argue that critical borderlands studies has shifted focus to the processes of 
bordering as opposed to the concept of the border, an idea discussed in the previous 
chapter. The multitude of actors and the different ways in which they engage in 
‘borderwork’ (Rumford 2012) is, for me, an important way of approaching the study 
of a border. Citizens on the border, particularly indigenous communities, have far too 
often been ignored from work on borders in Latin America and so these border 
subjects become central to my work. This is entwined with a critical political 
perspective which “questions the privileged forms of representation whose dominance 
has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects, objects, acts, and themes through 
which the political world is constructed” (Shapiro 1989:13).  
This questioning takes seriously unchallenged notions of truth and theory and 
problematises them by examining power. The presence of violence in this thesis is 
therefore understood through overt or covert power relations at the international, 
state, or local scales. Parodi has written that “from a critical perspective, geopolitics is 
not an aberration, but provides almost the perfect example of how theory is linked to 
power” which is particularly pertinent in Latin America where a strong geopolitical 
tradition has historically been disseminated through certain institutes of power 
including military and diplomatic institutes (2002:38). Due to these influences power 
within Latin America must be critically examined, not just the oppression of the 
continent and its peoples by colonial and imperial powers which while being 
supremely important can neglect the histories of the “suppression and disappearance 
of indigenous cultures and enslavement of black populations” by white urban elites in 
Latin America as highlighted by Radcliffe and Westwood (1996:13). By employing a 
feminist perspective, a critical political perspective, and a critical borderland 
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perspective it becomes possible to look beyond the status quo and to find ways to 
break down unquestioned paradigms. 
 
Doing Research ‘There’ 
Following Cindi Katz’s demand that researchers interrogate a “conscious 
awareness of the situatedness of our knowledge”, my status as a white, middle-class, 
young British woman greatly affected my research (1992: 498). My nationality is 
especially important in a region with a strong history of anti-British, anti-imperialist 
uprising in the nitrate fields of northern Chile (Skuban 2008). However, I was easily 
assimilated into life in Arica due to contact I had made with academics at the history 
and geography department at the Universidad de Tarapacá in Arica. I became more 
involved in the department than I had anticipated and was provided with an office, 
was able to discuss my work with knowledgeable colleagues, and lectured on cultural 
geography and academic English as well as helping on fieldtrips. This provided me 
with privileged opportunities when attempting to access archives, government 
documents, or interviews as, unlike the University of Nottingham, it is an institution 
familiar to and integrated into the local community. 
According to Haraway, this interrogation that Katz emphasises is vital because 
“positioning is…the key practice grounding knowledge”; the results of my research 
are enabled by power relations due to my unique positioning (1991:193). In the US 
archives I was treated as just one of many British researchers without interest while in 
the Chilean archives I was more of a rarity. Various employees wanted to know how I 
had come upon my topic of study and why on earth I would want to leave the UK to 
live in Arica.  
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Acknowledging my positionality became a daily task as the Spanish language 
necessitates a positioning of oneself in relation to others in the way certain terms are 
used. I used the formal ‘usted’ with most contacts I made throughout my research due 
to them being older than me or being in a professional setting but with some, for 
example in some interviews, I used ‘tú’ or shifted from ‘usted’ to ‘tú’ as the interview 
progressed and familiarity was gained. Some treated me in a highly professional 
manner, using ‘usted’ with me, with the interviews taking place at their place of work 
or in my office at the university. Others were much more informal and I was invited 
into their homes to share once (an evening snack) and the interviews were relaxed, 
often veering off-topic to ask questions about the UK, to play with grandchildren, or 
to complain about Chile. The informality of these interviews led to candidness with 
some interviewees opening up to me and disclosing highly personal information, likely 
sensing a freedom with a young European researcher which isn’t so readily found in 
wider Chilean society.  
As Gade (2001) and Watson (2004) set out, learning a second language for 
fieldwork is enormously difficult and time-consuming but has extensive benefits for 
both the research and the researcher. Learning a language “may be a step towards 
shifting the balance of power between researched and researcher, and may help 
generate insights that could otherwise be ignored” (Watson 2004:62). I undertook 
extensive language courses in Spain and Chile as, argues Veeck (2001), the greater the 
competency of the researcher’s language skills, the more comprehensive and accurate 
the results. Starting a new language from scratch was a daunting process and so I 
proceeded on sound advice that successful language acquisition necessitates being 
child-like, being vulnerable, being willing to make a fool of yourself, to open yourself 
up with awe and wonderment. The consequences of this approach were 
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embarrassment and mortification but also a strong command of the language. My 
being ‘there’ was necessary in order to visit certain archives and conduct ethnographic 
fieldwork but it also affected me and influenced my work in ways I hadn’t previously 
considered. The countless hours of research I had done on the place I would call my 
home for nine months couldn’t match up to the feel of a place which can only be 
understood through personal experience. 
 
Historical Archives 
The archives I accessed throughout my year of fieldwork varied enormously in 
every way. My research began with five weeks in Washington D.C. at the Library of 
Congress and the National Archives, College Park, Maryland. In these US archives I 
studied holdings such as the papers of John J. Pershing, Calvin Coolidge, and William 
Smith Culbertson all of whom were involved in the border demarcation process in the 
1920s, Classified Salvador Allende Files, United States Consular Records for Arica 
and Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State 1788-1990. Both 
archives required a face-to-face application process and the provision of paperwork to 
prove my status as a PhD student. The archives were large, imposing, over air-
conditioned, and with strict security procedures. I was scanned, my bags were 
checked, and my notes were inspected on departure. I was surrounded by calmly busy 
researchers and I blended into the masse. The type of materials accessed varied from 
personal diaries, official letters and memos to microfilm reproductions. The latter 
made concentration difficult, without the physicality of turning pages, of taking 
photos, of changing the boxfiles. As Arlette Farge laments, “these systems of 
reproduction are useful for preservation, and undoubtedly allow for new and fruitful 
ways of questioning the texts, but they can cause you to forget the tactile and direct 
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approach to the material, the feel of touching traces of the past. An archival 
manuscript is a living document; microfilm reproduction, while sometimes 
unavoidable, can drain the life out of it” (2013:15). The only tangible experience with 
the microfilm and break in the monotony of scrolling came once in the sudden 
snapping of a microfilm roll and the rewinding of dozens of metres of film by hand. 
The Santiago archives (Biblioteca Nacional, Archivo Nacional, Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas, Banco Central) were a very different environment, when I was 
allowed into them. Between long siestas, feriados (national holidays) and strikes, access 
was sporadic. At each archive I was immediately given a meeting with an employee to 
whom I explained my research and who gave me advice on what collections to 
investigate. Every single one suggested I would be better off visiting one of the other 
archives. This was my first experience in Spanish language archives, a linguistic 
challenge that slowed my progress until I had memorised all the legal jargon only 
found in the archives and never in the classrooms in which I had learnt the language. 
Many leather bound books had been poorly kept previously and disintegrated as I 
opened them, causing me to sweep leather crumbs off the table when the archivist 
wasn’t looking. 
The archives in Arica brought yet another archival experience. The archives are 
at the local government level, holding documents about affairs relating to the province 
as well as local newspaper records. Through looking at archives at different tiers of 
administration, from national to local, distinctions between what information about 
Arica is deemed important could be uncovered. As Miles Ogborn wrote, “The 
historical geography of the archive is also the historical geography of processes of 
centralisation and of local autonomy” and this can be clearly seen through the 
geographies of the Chilean archives that have been under the governance of vastly 
55 
different government administrations since their inception (2011:90). Located on the 
top floor of the Universidad de Tarapacá library, one employee runs and supervises 
the Archivo Histórico Vicente Dagnino. I was granted permission to look at any files I 
wanted and began to plough through the collections during the university summer 
break. I was almost always the only researcher with the one employee opening the 
archive just for me. I sat, looking over the city from one of the few tall buildings, with 
a fan at full blast, riffling through fileboxes packed with hundreds of loose papers in 
various stages of legibility.  
The newspapers had all been digitally captured which meant I spent weeks sitting 
at a computer in the archive, scrolling through thousands of images, scanning for key 
words, and print screening relevant articles. Far from the highly regulated archival 
spaces I found in the US, Chile gave me freedom, to be alone with the documents, to 
spread multiple boxes on the vast tables around me, to control the temperature and 
lighting of my workspace. Access was unproblematic across all institutions I visited, 
my status as a researcher from a prestigious British university and my link with the 
Universidad de Tarapacá meant that I was accepted into all with only the minutiae of 
bureaucratic procedures to contend with. 
In contrast to these archives, social media, a burgeoning resource in geographical 
research, also became a useful source of secondary documents, generating an archive 
space entirely different from the official institutions I had visited. The entirely Internet 
based resource of the social media site Facebook was potentially vast (with over 1.2 
billion monthly active users) and so I located certain Facebook groups in order to 
generate an archive of discourse surrounding Arica. This was facilitated by certain 
groups which were established to encourage discussion such as ‘Ese Arica de Antes’, 
‘Viví en Arica en los años 70’ and ‘Arica Estado Independiente’. This meant that I 
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could find a pool of information regarding the history of Arica, those who lived in 
Arica during the 1970s, and the movement calling for independence of the region 
generated by people interested in these topics. The benefits of using these groups are 
that discussions are real-time and timings of posts can be checked to the minute, 
postings and comments are entirely unaffected and unprompted by myself as a 
researcher and neither am I imposing bias by selecting participants. Collective 
experience and sentiment can be witnessed, especially as Facebook can be 
antagonistic and many people get fired-up and enthusiastic in their postings.  
This does of course bring disadvantages as well as individuals may over-react, 
playing up to a part in a way they may not do in real life situations, as Gosling et al 
(2011) found, extroverted individuals use Facebook more frequently than introverts. 
Despite this, Back et al. (2010) concluded that Facebook tends to act as a true 
extension of one’s actual personality, not a self-idealised one. Another disadvantage is 
that although Chile has a very high level of Internet use with 90.7% of Internet users 
using Facebook, these Facebook groups are lacking viewpoints from those without 
internet or who choose not to comment on the site.1 Using Facebook as an archive 
can bring other challenges such as struggling to locate relevant posts or by its nature 
escaping neat geographical boundaries. However in this case these were not obstacles 
as the Facebook groups, expressly about Arica, meant that posts were conveniently 
on-topic about my area of study, to the extent that the groups’ administrators swiftly 
delete non-Arica posts. Using Facebook does raise some ethical questions particularly 
regarding consent and privacy, as explored by Zimmer (2010), and so any comments 
reproduced here are anonymous, with no identifiable details, and translated from 
Spanish to English making any quotations untraceable.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Statistics from ComScore http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press-Releases/2011/7/In-Chile-15-24-Year-
Olds-Are-Most-Engaged-Internet-Users 
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Textual analysis was used to uncover themes and meaning in the archives in 
what McKee describes as “an educated guess at some of the most likely interpretations 
that might be made of a text” (2003:1). While the majority of the documents studied 
in the archives were texts, images, mostly photographs, were analysed as well. 
Photographs contain meanings, symbols and signs that give us a glimpse at a historical 
past that would otherwise be hidden from us. Yet at the same time the image was 
purposively constructed and the camera registers what has been chosen to register 
(Alía 2005). Images must therefore always be studied in context, with an 
understanding of the lifecycle of the image. This lifecycle passes through three 
principal stages; the moment it is created, the moment it becomes an artefact, and the 
moment it is re-examined. Rather than being an objective representation, the images 
have elements of both ‘record’ and construct’ (Van Leeuwen & Jewitt 2001). Felix 
Driver (2003:228) has outlined the visual nature of geography and stated that “the 
“visual” has, in fact, long been scrutinised by geographers and others interested in the 
history and forms of geographical knowledge”. The bulk of the images used in this 
research were from a board of development in Arica which ran from 1958-1976 and 
are comprised of photos taken by representatives of the board to show progress and 
modernity, the successes of the board, making it necessary to be sceptical over what 
they therefore do not show.  
Archives are a space of memory (Ogborn 2010) and this memory is highly 
constructed. Through the process of archival research “…a new object is created, a 
new form of knowledge takes shape, and a new ‘archive’ emerges. As you work, you 
are taking the preexisting forms and readjusting them in different ways to make 
possible a different narration of reality” (Farge 2013:63). The records kept are of those 
in power, official state and municipal records, newspapers which dictated the 
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contemporary discourse, even personal diaries were only kept of those in important 
positions, General John J. Pershing and his secretary, Major Quekemeyer. 
Throughout my investigations into the content of these archives the context remained 
key; why certain documents are or are not there, what has been destroyed and how 
this has been structured by the power relations of state, colony, and empire (Duncan 
1999). As illustrated by my use of social media, the archive has expanded in its 
definition (DeSilvey 2007) and the archive has now become an object of study for the 
researcher in itself. As Carol Steedman has written, “the Archive is made from selected 
and consciously chosen documentation from the past and also from the mad 
fragments that no one intended to preserve and just ended up there” (2001:68). 
Particularly with the government sources I was mindful of Baker’s statement that “no 
source should be taken at face value: all sources must be evaluated critically and 
contextually” (1997:235).  
As Arlette Farge convincingly argued in her elegant portrait of French historical 
archives “[p]rinted texts seek to make an announcement and create a certain belief, to 
modify the state of things by advancing a particular narrative or commentary. They 
have been ordered or structured according to systems that are more or less easily 
discernable, and whatever form they might have taken, they have been brought into 
existence to be convincing and to change what people think” (2013:5). Farge later 
writes; “[a] historical narrative is a construction, not a truthful discourse that can be 
verified on all if its points” (p.95). There are distinct power relations at play in 
archives, argues Duncan (1999), which tend to be constructed by elite white men, the 
recognition of this and attempts to manage it through additional ethnographic 
research has been crucial. Many newspaper docuents were used throughout the thesis 
with the local Arica newspaper La Defensa being used the most due to the full and 
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consistent record that has been preserved by the Archivo Histórico Vicente Dagnino. 
However, this historical narrative constructed by La Defensa must be critiqued as it was 
an overtly right wing political newspaper writing within a bounded environment, 
particularly post 1973 when the Pinochet administration decimated freedom of the 
press. Numerous newspapers were destroyed and an unknown number of journalists 
were killed under the regime. An awareness of the limitations placed on the media is 
therefore present throught my historical analysis, particularly from 1973 to 1990.  
In 1988 Gillian Rose and Miles Ogborn lamented the lack of feminist historical 
geography scholarship arguing that while scholarship was being done, it was not being 
done by geographers. They argued that “historical geography's ignorance of feminism 
has resulted at best in the marginalisation of women, and at worst in their total 
exclusion from the histories which are created and taught by historical geographers” 
(1988:405). While this has changed to a large extent, feminist approaches are still 
much needed within historical geography and political geography too. A decade after 
Rose and Ogborn opened this debate, Karen Morin and Lawrence Berg (1999) 
assessed how the discipline had responded to their call to understand past societies 
through a feminist lens. Morin and Berg conclude that British feminist historical 
geography has tended to focus on the discipline of geography, geographical 
knowledges, and colonialism/imperialism as seen though the work of Mona Domosh 
(1999) and Alison Blunt (1994) who have examined the not always positive roles of 
women in Empire. 
A later 2003 paper by Mona Domosh and Karen Morin built on the 1999 survey 
of the discipline by highlighting in what ways much of feminist geography is already 
historical and in what ways much of historical geography is already feminist while 
remaining critical of the scholarship still lacking. Feminist historical geography has 
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been challenging from a methodological standpoint because historical geography has 
tended to emphasise archives that are generally constructed and controlled by elite, 
usually white, men. Therefore the materials available to the researcher will only offer 
certain perspectives. The danger of looking for women’s stories and women’s spaces, 
argues Mona Domosh (1997), is that it bolsters notions of separate women’s and 
men’s spaces instead of conducting a feminist analysis of historical landscapes, the 
constructions of which were predominantly by men. 
 
Ethnographic Research 
In order to provide a more local, less elitist, and more nuanced perspective I also 
undertook semi-structured interviews “organized around ordered but flexible 
questioning” (Dunn 2010:110) with a specific focus on more personal, less structured 
oral histories. Oral history became an influential academic research method in the 
1970s and 1980s (Riley and Harvey 2007) and, according to Smith and Jackson 
(1999), is a politicised enterprise of ‘writing culture’ and uncovers not only individual 
identity but also collective identities (Perks and Thomson 2006). All narratives are 
‘narratives of identity’ (Anderson 1991) and oral histories provide “a context in which 
identity is practiced” (Friedman 1992:840). Mario Garcés, a Chilean historian, defines 
oral history as “a history that is born of individuals’ memories of their past and is 
normally expressed as testimony to significant experiences of the personal and 
collective past” (1996:191). According to Gómez-Barris the value of oral history “goes 
beyond an often ill-defined or excessively narrow ‘duty to remember’, for its intent is 
not to immortalize a given view of events but to retrieve the richness of a given period 
through the experiences of those who, though they played the central roles in it, are 
often presented as an inert and amorphous mass” (2010:61). Oral history work allows 
61 
for participants to speak with their own voice, to narrate their own experiences that, 
as post-colonial theorists such as Edward Said (1993) and Homi Bhabha (1990) have 
argued, are central to human dignity.  
Twenty-two in-depth interviews/oral histories (see table below) were carried out 
and an additional five short interviews were also taken with healthcare providers in 
Tacna, Peru. Living and becoming involved in community life in Arica was an 
integral part of the research. My field diary and photographs became important 
records of participant observation. According to Hammersley & Atkinson, 
“ethnography usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in 
people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening 
to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, 
collecting documents and artefacts – in fact, gathering whatever data are available to 
throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry” (2007:3).  
As previously mentioned, speaking in Spanish means automatically considering 
ones positionality depending on who I was interviewing. My position shifted between 
the interviews and in some, Geiger’s claim that “a young researcher will find herself in 
the position of being considered a daughter” rang true (1990:176). However usually, 
despite my age I was often regarded as a privileged ‘expert’, interviewees did not 
‘dumb down’ their language for me despite it being obvious that I am not a native 
Spanish speaker and my views were invited and respected. Although some people may 
have felt antagonistic toward me due to my undoubted privileges this was never made 
known to me and did not appear to negatively affect any of my interviews.  I was 
aware that trust may be difficult to form with participants after reading a Chilean 
Health Ministry study which found that “Only 16 percent of Chileans considered 
others trustworthy” but again, I did not see this adversely affecting my research.  
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Consent forms were filled out by interview participants who chose varying levels 
of anonymity depending on the sensitivity of the topic discussed. Some, especially 
those in professional positions such as healthcare workers were happy to be filmed (in 
order to aid transcription) and to use their real names whereas others, principally 
regarding the topics of spying and abortions asked not to be recorded or for their real 
names to be used. In these cases I took notes. However, all interviewees have been 
given pseudonyms in order to protect the identities of those who did not wish to be 
named.   The interviews that were recorded, either with a dictaphone or videocamera, 
INTERVIEWS 
 PSEUDONYM ROLE DATE LOCATION DURATION 
1 Alejandro González JAA employee 18th June 2014 Their home 2:20 
2 Franco Muñoz JAA employee 30th June 2014 Their home 1:15 
3 Sebastian Rojas Gov worker/ 
Journalist 
8th August 2014 Their home 2:40 
4 Vicente Díaz Academic 12th August 2014 Their office 0:55 
5 Joaquin Pérez Armed Forces 7th June 2014 Café 1:10 
6 Nicolás Soto Armed Forces 31st May 2014 Café 0:45 
7 Francisca Contreras Peruvian woman 28th June 2014 Their home 0:40 
8 Matias Silva Armed Forces 28th June 2014 Mutual friend’s 
home 
1:20 
9 Pablo Martínez Armed Forces 21st April 2014 Their home 1:00 
10 Constanza 
Sepúlveda 
Wife of soldier 10th July 2014 Their home 2:10 
11 Tomás Morales Doctor 23rd July 2014 Their office 1:10 
12 Hernán Rodríguez Historian 31st July 2014 Their home 2:15 
13 Catalina López Healthcare Worker 21st March 2014 My office 1:05 
14 Paulina Fuentes Healthcare Worker 
Cripac 
14th March 2014 Their office 1:20 
15 Christian 
Hernández 
Various Health Roles 23rd April 2014 Their office 0:50 
16 Gabriela Torres Healthcare Worker 
Iquique 
11th July 2014 My office 1:10 
17 Valentina Araya Healthcare Worker 22nd April 2014 Their office 1:25 
18 Alejandra Flores Healthcare Worker- 
UTA 
22nd July 2014 Their office 2:00 
19 Florencia Espinoza Healthcare Worker- 
SEREMI 
11th April 2014 Their office 0:55 
20 Daniel Valenzuela Healthcare Worker 12th August 2014 Their office 1:15 
21 Ana Castillo Student- abortion 17th August 2014 Mutual friend’s 
home 
1:20 
22 Felipe Ramírez Ciudidana Global 1st April 2014 Church 1:15 
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were transcribed in order to be analysed. I took as few notes as possible when they 
were being recorded so that I could focus on the interview but took notes on emerging 
themes, key points, and body language. Data has been stored anonymously and 
password secured.  
The ethnographic side of the research raised some ethical concerns especially as 
some interviews touched subjects such as espionage and illegal abortions as previously 
mentioned. The research was conducted in a way as to minimise the exposure to 
psychological harm following my belief that sensitive issues should not be skirted 
around by researchers just because it entails more work on ethical approval. I ensured 
that the participants fully understood the nature of the study and that their 
participation was voluntary.  A statement was made that confidentiality of recovered 
data would be maintained at all times, and that identification of participants would 
not be available during or after the study if they so chose.  
There were very few ‘neutral spaces’ to choose from as an interview location, 
many people would be uncomfortable to be seen to be interviewed in a public place 
and those being interviewed in a professional capacity wanted to be interviewed at 
their place of work. Non-professional interviews tended to take place in the 
interviewee’s homes which I only did if I felt safe, if contact had already been made 
with the interviewee, and if the address had been passed on to a friend or colleague. 
Elwood and Martin “…suggest that the interview site itself produces “micro-
geographies” of spatial relations and meaning, where multiple scales of social relations 
intersect in the research interview” (2000:651). Entering the interviewee’s home 
became a form of participant observation whereby I was able to glean more 
information and understanding of them and how they lived. 
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Most interviews were semi-structured, I wrote some questions in advance 
particular to each interviewee but did not adhere to them entirely, I followed new 
avenues when they came up and abandoned some areas of enquiry if they became 
irrelevant following recommendations by Valentine (2005). The interviews were 
always led by the interviewee as much as possible, my questions were open-ended, 
allowing them to answer how they wanted and at length, with some interviews lasting 
for well over two hours. Sensitive subjects were approached with caution and only 
after trust had been gained and the interviewee was certain that they were 
comfortable discussing the topic. The interviewee’s for the most sensitive topics were 
accessed through gatekeepers rather than approached directly. 
While access was not a problem with the archival research, ethnographic 
research proved more complicated. Considering that the thesis covers such vastly 
different ground my interviewees were also vastly different, spanning military 
personnel, healthcare workers, historians, a journalist, a young woman who sought an 
abortion, and housewives. I set out knowing that I wanted to speak to Ariqueños from 
a wide spectrum of society but getting in touch with potential participants and 
encouraging them to talk to me was another matter. Due to these difficulties I began 
by interviewing professionals who spoke to me from the perspective of their job and 
were therefore easier to find by email.  
Living in Arica I was often meeting people and the subject of my research came 
up quickly due to me being something of an anomaly as a young British woman in the 
region. Through quotidian activities I met research participants or people who could 
put me in touch with participants. I also used social media to find participants, posting 
appeals for participants on Facebook groups about Arica. Facebook groups are a 
useful way to engage with hard-to-reach groups and can be an effective way to make 
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contact with potential participants because, Baltar and Brunet (2012) argue, the 
researcher is showing their personal information through their profile and 
participating in the groups which are of interest to the potential participants. This 
‘purposive sampling’ (Cameron 2005) was necessary in order to find participants 
relevant to my research instead of a representative sample of the population. 
Following Valentine “the aim of an interview is not to be representative (a common 
but mistaken criticism of this technique) but to understand how individual people 
experience and make sense of their own lives” (2005:111). 
I therefore chose not to use computer programs to code my data as I actively did 
not want to quantify the data in any way. It is, therefore, unavoidable that I am 
interpreting the data collected through a unique and biased lens; I construct a certain 
reality of the history of violence in Arica. The histories collected are also incredibly 
subjective and of course, certain events may be remembered incorrectly by 
participants. My empirical chapters are quote-heavy, taking an emic focus preferring 
to relay the thoughts and experiences of my research participants and subjects as 
independently as possible even though the quotes and their length were mediated by 
myself. I actively chose to limit the use of the first person in the empirical chapters.  
The thesis began with very broad ideas and it was only by living in Arica, 
exploring documents and speaking to those who live there that the five chronological 
themes set out in the thesis emerged. Qualitative data analysis did not therefore begin 
once all data had been collected and formally organised but was a fluid process which 
began as soon as I began generating data (Stake 1995). This means that an enormous 
amount of information was generated, far more than could be included in the thesis. 
Interviews were transcribed into Spanish and only the quotes extracted for use in the 
thesis were translated into English. Once transcribed all interviews were carefully 
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studied for key themes and these themes were compared across the interviews, looking 
for linkages, similarities, and differences as well as in comparison to data generated 
through the archival research where relevant. Quotes were extracted to illustrate and 
better explain the key themes. Feminist methods have been much more intertwined 
with ethnographic research than with historical geography and I feel that my 
approach to the interviews conducted and the topics addressed came naturally from a 
feminist standpoint. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 	  
RE-PRESENTING INTERNATIONAL 
DIPLOMACY ON A GLOBAL STAGE: THE 
TACNA-ARICA SETTLEMENT OF THE 
1920S 
 
 
   “Volumes could be written about it and [even] then only a small part could be told”  
                                                            -John J. Pershing, October 2nd 1925 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Map showing disputed area, 1925. ‘Orders plebiscite in Chile-Peru Tilt’ The World, New York, 
10th March 1925 
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Arica in the 1920s was experiencing great stress as the axle of a grave diplomatic 
problem. Arica was stuck literally and metaphorically between Chile and Peru, not 
official sovereign territory of either. After the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) Peru and 
Chile signed the Treaty of Ancón on the 20th October 1883 that granted Chile rights 
over Tacna-Arica for 10 years after which a plebiscite would be held for the citizens of 
the provinces to decide sovereignty. Peru had not wanted to sign the treaty but felt 
pressured to as during the war Chilean forces had invaded Lima and this appeared to 
be the only way to ensure their departure. This ten-year period was allotted in order 
to provide enough time to establish the necessary bureaucratic conditions for the 
plebiscite (González Miranda 2008; Calderón 2000). Despite the fact that there were 
several attempts to reach a diplomatic solution to the dispute, including the almost-
involvement of the Queen of Spain Maria Cristina, the proposals were thwarted again 
and again and plebiscite began to lose validity as an effective method of resolution 
(Álvez Marín & Irarrázaval Gomien 2000; Soto Lara 2014a).1  Between 1895 and 
1898 Chile offered alternative proposals to Peru such as buying the provinces outright, 
dividing them with Arica going to Chile and Tacna to Peru, or changing the area in 
which the plebiscite would be held. Peru refused all proposals, insisting that the 
Treaty of Ancón must be upheld (Wambaugh 1933). The primary problem was that 
neither Chile nor Peru seemed particularly disposed to setting a date for the plebiscite 
and every discussion led to disagreement over particulars such as who would be 
eligible to vote (Ruz & Díaz 2011; Calderón 2000).  
A sizeable proportion of the local population were indigenous, primarily Aymará, 
communities who did not hesitate to express their intention in voting for Peruvian 
sovereignty in the plebiscite (Díaz, Galdames & Ruz 2013; Galdames & Díaz 2007). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In 1898 the Billinghurst-Latorre protocol was signed under which three representatives, from Peru, Chile, and 
Spain would organise appropriate conditions for the plebiscite with Spain as arbiter. It was eventually rejected by 
Chile. 
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In 1894, when the plebiscite was due to be held under the terms of the Treaty of 
Ancón, the population of the region under dispute was 80% Peruvian.2 By 1917 the 
Chilean and Peruvian population of Arica were roughly equal which would result in a 
‘dead heat’ if the plebiscite were held that year.3 In order to increase the number of 
Chilean voters and decrease the number of Peruvian, the Chilean state began a 
process of ‘Chileanisation’. This policy significantly shifted the demographics of the 
provinces through the closing of Peruvian schools, churches and press, added military 
presence, the bolstering of a Chilean press system, the deportation of an estimated 
40,000 Peruvians, and a colonisation policy for Chileans (Reyes & Espinoza 2007; 
Skuban 2007; Cadíz 2013). Violence had not left the provinces after the War of the 
Pacific, instead they remained in a state of emergency whereby previous legislation 
and jurisdiction was suspended for almost five decades. The region was militarised just 
as it had been decades earlier in the War of the Pacific just without the signifiers of 
uniforms and battlefield maneuvers. 
Until 1910 the state of pax castrense had been largely peaceful and non-eventful 
but it was after this date that the Chilean government began to chileanise the territory 
more aggressively and that Peruvians became ingrained as the absolute enemy in 
Chile.4 Peru did the same and envisaged Chile as a ferocious monster positing the 
return of the ‘captive provinces’ of Tacna and Arica as a moral imperative. The 
dehumanisation of the other by both Chile and Peru was widespread and in all forms 
of media apart from in the provinces of Tacna and Arica where Chile had full control 
over all disseminated materials. Chile was so determined to retain these territories, not 
for their resources which were negligible, but to act as a buffer to protect the rich 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ‘Latin America Border Disputes’ Container 183. Charles Evans Hughes Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC 
3 Out of a population of 12,871, 41% of citizens were Chilean, 44% Peruvian, 11% Bolivian and 4% were of other 
nationalities. Diaz Araya (2010)  
4 The situation of Chileans and Peruvians living side-by-side in these provinces has been termed pax castrense by 
Chilean historian Sergio González Miranda (2004), describing enemies living together in the same territory.  
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nitrate territories to the south which had been taken in the War of the Pacific. This 
was a space absent of sovereignty and bringing Tacna-Arica into the official territory 
of the nation-state became of utmost importance for both Chile and Peru. 
It wasn’t until July 1922 that the border issue, often described as the ‘Alsace-
Lorraine of South America’, was addressed in any serious way when the United States 
with President Warren Harding became the formal arbitrator for the dispute at the 
request of the contesting countries (Diaz Araya 2014; Borchard 1922).5 This decision 
to resolve the dispute was largely economic, the pending issue was hurting Chilean 
and Peruvian trade, particularly since the Panama Canal opened. The involvement of 
the US as mediator was an endeavour to heal the rift between Peru and Chile, to 
finally settle the territorial problems remaining after the War of the Pacific. Peru had 
long favoured outside arbitration and specifically by the United States whereas Chile 
had some doubts as to the involvement of the US as Chilean military aggression in the 
Pacific would make international diplomacy difficult and was unsure as to US interests 
in the region (González Miranda 2004).6 However it was deemed that only a highly 
respected nation such as the US could influence the situation as every time that Chile 
and Peru met alone the situation would worsen.7  
Chile was not the only one with misgivings, US Secretary of State Charles Evans 
Hughes requested that the matter not be submitted to the President of the United 
States but instead proposed that it be presented to a board of distinguished jurists. 
However, “the parties would not hear to it. They insisted that the President should be 
the arbitrator… Secretary Hughes was very reluctant to agree to this, but when both 
parties declared that there would be no arbitration unless the President were the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In 1920 Peru turned to the League of Nations to ‘reconsider and revise’ the Treaty of Ancón but later withdrew 
the demand, possibly due to pressure from Washington. 
6 ‘TACNA-ARICA DISPUTE WAS LONG AND BITTER’. RAYMOND, L. B. New York Times 26th May 1929 
7 Letter from Freyre to Secretary of State, 20th October 1911. Box 723. 2515/241. RG 59 Department of State 
Decimal File. US National Archives, Maryland 
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arbitrator, the Secretary found himself face to face with the alternative of blocking the 
only possible basis of agreement, or of yielding to the firm request”.8 President 
Harding acceded and in 1922 drew up an award and plan for progression at the joint 
cost of Chile and Peru.9  
When Calvin Coolidge took the Presidency in 1923 he officially accepted the 
office of Arbitrator and in 1925 stated that a fair and honest plebiscite would be able 
to be held in the disputed provinces of Tacna and Arica, a statement which surprised 
many considering Chile’s aggressive Chileanisation policies. Peru was initially 
unhappy with Coolidge’s plan, arguing that the plebiscite shouldn’t be held and 
instead the US should exercise total civil and military control of the provinces to the 
exclusion of Chilean civil and military forces. Violent demonstrations took place in 
Lima with natives of Tacna-Arica petitioning the government with changes that they 
deemed would be necessary in order to make the plebiscite fair (Wilson 1979).  
Peru’s contention was that the Treaty of Ancón stated that the plebiscite should 
have been held exactly ten years after the treaty was signed whereas Chile understood 
the treaty as stating that the plebiscite could be held anytime after the ten-year period. 
Peru therefore believed that because the plebiscite had not been held on the ten-year 
date, it could not be held at all.10 Meanwhile, in Chile, the award was received with 
much excitement and an official holiday was proclaimed. Peru’s complaints were 
disregarded and Coolidge appointed General John J. Pershing as President of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Latin America Border Disputes’ Container 183. Charles Evans Hughes Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC 
9 The cost of US involvement estimated before the commission began was US$60,000 to be paid by both Chile 
and Peru directly to the US which would be US$800,000 at today’s rates. [Letter from Frank B. Kellogg to 
President Calvin Coolidge. 1st June 1925. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC] By August 1925 the Plebiscitary Commission demanded another US$132,000 (US$1.8 million 
at today’s rates) split between the two countries to cover mounting costs. [Letter from Frank B. Kellogg to 
President Calvin Coolidge. 12th August 1925. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC] 
10 ‘Tacna-Arica complicatons’. Washington Post. 30th March 1925 
72 
Plebiscitary Commission. His acceptance of the position was seen as a coup for the 
diplomatic process and great enthusiasm surrounded his appointment.11 
The term plebiscite, which is formed of the roots for ‘people’ and ‘decree’, is a 
vote in which the electorate chooses to support or reject a proposal, usually on the 
matter of sovereignty. In the interwar period plebiscites were seen as a scientific, 
rational way to settle disputes as opposed to hot-headed jingoism. An orderly 
plebiscite was posited as the antidote to the caudillismo plaguing South America, the 
persistence of military leaders who gained support based on their charismatic image 
but acted as authoritarian warlords or dictators. American political scientist Sarah 
Wambaugh became the world’s leading authority on plebiscites as she had been 
involved in the implementation of many, including the Tacna-Arica plebiscite. 
Wambaugh believed in the power of plebiscites as a fair and just way to solve the 
proliferation of border disputes, especially after World War I, she stressed that a fair 
plebiscite depended upon the territory being neutralised which is why a neutral party 
should be involved. This idea goes back to the Treaty of Versailles, the agreement at 
the end of World War I that officially ended the state of war between Germany and 
the Allied Powers.  
Although the redrawing of international borders in Europe by plebiscite often 
created new ethnic tensions, the approach remained popular in Latin America and 
plebiscites were seen as an effective way to democratically settle border disputes. 
Wambaugh believed in attempting to gain an understanding of the area in dispute 
and her method was “…interview[ing] peasants and high officials alike in an effort to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 “It was stated at the White House that the President was very much pleased that such an eminent citizen of the 
United States of world wide reputation was willing to accept the position which is considered one of the most 
important offices of public trust which an American citizen can be called upon to discharge.” POTUS press 
release. 23rd March 1925. Reel 114. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC 
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learn the sentiment in areas where plebiscites are held”.12 Plebiscites were becoming 
an expert process and relied on the involvement of knowledgeable outsiders such as 
Wambaugh.  
The Tacna-Arica plebiscite was meant to be a truly democratic process, giving 
local citizens the power to have their say in world politics. This ideal of bottom-up 
power was however dashed by national and international politics that came into play. 
The plebiscite was theoretically a fair and people-led way to heal the fractured and 
violent border region. To borrow from Mark Salter’s (2012) metaphor of the border 
as a ‘suture’ the diplomacy enacted here was the attempted suturing of a wound that 
had been open for almost fifty years. Two sides, Peru and Chile, were aggressively 
tearing away from one another and the plebiscite was seen as the operation to bring 
the sides closer and knit them neatly together.  
Although the dispute and the attempted plebiscite are unknown now, they were 
significant international events at the time, described in the Argentine press as; 
“undoubtedly one of the events of deepest significance in the international relations of 
this continent in recent years”.13 The dispute had global reach but fundamentally 
changed both Chile and Peru as nations. Fighting for Arica and Tacna led to a 
spiritual refounding of Peru as a nation, Peru was reborn as a nation during the War 
of the Pacific and the half a century of territorial dispute that followed became the 
basis for Peru’s national identity (Zapata 2011). The fore-mentioned comparison of 
Tacna-Arica with Alsace-Lorraine originated from the territories in both cases being 
seen as a prize for the conflicting nations, arguing that the citizens of the areas 
rightfully belonged to one nation more than the other, and campaigns to instill 
nationhood more profoundly in the territories (by the French and Chileans in these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 ‘Woman is expert on plebiscites’. The Washington Post 6th December 1931  
13 ‘Peru and the Arbitral award’ La Prensa, Buenos Aires. 3rd April 1925 Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 
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cases). Just as political elections had been a key way for citizens of Alsace-Lorraine to 
assert their civic sentiments, the idea of the plebiscite served to galvanise patriotism in 
both Peru and Chile, the former desperate not to lose national territory and the latter 
determined to retain its hard-won war booty.  
Peruvian resistance against the Chilean occupation of Tacna and Arica after the 
War of the Pacific was irrepressible and Peru’s most well known historian, Jorge 
Basadre, who was born in occupied Tacna wrote about his experiences attending a 
secret Peruvian school where they would patriotically sing the Peruvian national 
anthem (Basadre 1982). Peru used the War of the Pacific as a symbol of great injustice 
around which to form a unified national identity. Chile on the other side of the border 
used her victory in the War of the Pacific as the justification for Chilean ownership of 
Tacna-Arica and staged events such as reunions of war veterans to bolster these 
sentiments (Figure 8). Even though the monetary worth of the provinces could not 
justify both countries’ efforts to claim sovereignty, with the American Ambassador to 
Peru describing the situation as two bald-headed men fighting over a comb, in terms 
of patriotism and pride Tacna-Arica could not have been more valuable.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Letter from Moore to Secretary of State, 12th April 1929. Box 723. 2515/3335. RG 59 Department of State 
Decimal File. US National Archives, Maryland  
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Figure 8: Reunion of Chilean veterans of the War of the Pacific. Tacna, 23rd August 1925. AHVD Fondo 
Sergio Chacón 
  
This chapter will argue that studying biography is a rich and novel way to 
understand the Tacna-Arica territorial dispute and introduce the key actors whose 
actions were so influential. The chapter will then outline Pershing’s experiences of 
arriving in Arica in 1925 to a violent situation that had been little understood by 
officials back in Washington. The Americans’ views of Latin Americans, women, and 
other Americans as well as how the local communities viewed them in turn are then 
examined. The final sections will assess why the plebiscite was a failure and how the 
dispute was finally resolved. 
 
Pershing & Quekemeyer 
Studies of how the plebiscite was observed have been examined from the 
perspectives of Chilean and Peruvian media, the Spanish press, and the New York 
Times and Washington Post in the United States, yet personal diaries and American 
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correspondence have not been critically examined (Skuban 2007; Soto Lara 2014a; 
Llanos Sierra 2011). This chapter is based predominantly on the diaries of General 
John J. Pershing and his secretary Major John George Quekemeyer who were living 
in Arica from August 1925 until January 1926. Pershing was head of the Plebiscitary 
Commission leading a team of Americans who worked alongside a group of Chileans 
and a group of Peruvians who had been assigned by their respective governments. 
The idea was that these men and their employees would take initiative and work 
together to create an atmosphere conducive to a free and fair plebiscite in Tacna-
Arica. Through Pershing’s meticulous diaries which run from the 2nd August 1925 
until the 20th January 1926 when he returned to the United States due to illness and 
was replaced by Major General William Lassiter, we can follow the painstaking details 
of the attempted plebiscite, relationships between diplomatic professionals, and the 
personal experiences of an American based in Arica. Quekemeyer’s diaries on the 
other hand show the social life of Americans in Arica as well as the trials of keeping 
the peace in an unstable diplomatic situation. 
Pershing arrived in Arica aged 64, he was at this time General of the Armies, a 
position to which he had been appointed in 1919, a war hero and highly respected 
military man. His position in Arica was widely celebrated but the difficulty of the 
challenge was noted. The Lewiston Daily Sun described Pershing’s appointment as an 
“undertaking he knows will involve heavy responsibilities and much labor. He must 
defer indefinitely the retirement he has enjoyed in name only since he relinquished his 
post as chief of staff of the Army”.15 Pershing’s fame, despite his illustrious career and 
significant impact on world politics, has diminished greatly since his death and he 
does not hold a prominent place in historical consciousness in comparison to other 
figures whom he outranked. His biographer attributes this to the fact that “Pershing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Lewiston Daily Sun, 24th March 1925 
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was not likable in the least. He was instead an insufferable nitpicker obsessed with the 
smallest detail of military regimentation” (Perry 2011:xiii). His strict moral code 
superseded any care for what others thought of him. 
The diaries of Major John George Quekemeyer that are kept as part of the 
Pershing archive at the Library of Congress provide an interesting counter-perspective 
to that of Pershing. Quekemeyer was Mississippi-born and graduated from the United 
States Military Academy at West Point in 1906. He acted as aide-de-camp to Pershing 
during the First World War and became so indispensible that he worked for the 
General for the rest of his life. Unfortunately, in February 1926, just one month after 
being released from his work in Arica, Quekemeyer contracted pneumonia and died, 
aged just 41. His mother, heartbroken, died the following day and a double funeral 
was held. Pershing wrote a heartfelt letter to the mother of his dear friend and 
confidant, but the letter was never read.  
Quekemeyer’s diaries show a different side of life in Arica for the Americans, the 
Major paints a sociable picture of dinner parties, multiple poker nights every week, 
films brought over from the US for everyone to watch, making cocktails, having to put 
up with prohibition on the US boats, who likes to play tennis or go horse riding, who 
got burnt sunbathing at the beach, and who goes to the café Los Baños for dancing on 
Sunday afternoons. Quekemeyer took on great responsibility for the precise social 
protocol that could have knocked the delicate balance in Arica. He struggled with 
seating plans multiple times, the politics involved of who is talking to who, who could 
not possibly be sat next to who became a headache for Quekemeyer. Through the 
diaries of both men we see how ‘Quek’ became an invaluable confidant and sounding-
board for the General, as the major wrote; “On these [horse]rides and other times 
when we are alone he tells me everything that has been said in the different 
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conferences that he has had”.16 However, the content of Quekemeyer’s diaries is likely 
to have been consciously edited due to the fact that “at any rate a copy of this diary 
will go to mama so she will get a little idea of what I am doing”.17 Therefore politically 
sensitive comments and other personal events may have been purposively omitted.  
The use of biographical approaches in this chapter allows us to reconstruct a key 
historical moment in Peru and Chile’s nation building and identity formation and a 
significant attempt at Pan-American diplomacy to soothe a highly violent region. 
Notions of Pan-Americanism were fervent in the twentieth century and the Tacna-
Arica dispute arose at an ideal time (Whitaker 1954). While scrupulous descriptions of 
the plebiscite have been recounted elsewhere, this chapter attempts to see the 
plebiscite through the perspective of General Pershing and other Americans involved; 
how those in Arica felt burdened with an impossible task, abandoned by Washington, 
stuck between the combatant plenipotentiaries of Chile and Peru in a continent they 
didn’t understand, and with Pershing’s health failing. 18 This chapter acts as a case 
study illustrating the subjectivity, prejudices, and performances that underpin and 
problematise international diplomacy, diplomacy that was enacted to dissipate the 
burgeoning violence on the border.  
 
Actors in the Theatre of Diplomacy 
Questions of international peace, continental stability, and local harmony were 
being battled over in one city during the ‘darkest time in Arica’s history’ (Soto Lara 
2014b). A group of powerful men performed a play; a tragic story of blood, intrigue, 
lies and deception which finally lowered its curtains in 1929 with “the type of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 21st August 1925 Quekemeyer personal diary entries, Container 335, John J.Pershing Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC [hereafter the date and diary author (Pershing or Quekemeyer) 
will be used] 
17 22nd August 1925 Quekemeyer  
18 See: Dennis (1931), Wilson (1979) and Yepes (1999) for detailed precedings of the plebiscite.  
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diplomacy which has been the dream of world statesmen since the World War”.19 
The provinces of Tacna and Arica act as a stage upon which both official and 
unofficial actors play certain pre-written roles where human-ness and personality take 
a significant role in diplomatic outcomes and how diplomatic processes are perceived 
by invested audiences, in South America and the world.  
The official actors, the ones who were visible on the global stage, were the 
appointed bureaucrats involved in attempting to hold a plebiscite to determine the 
sovereignty of the Tacna and Arica provinces. Pershing, with all his prestige was 
undoubtedly the star of the show, he was given “the best residence in the port”, the 
official residence of the general manager of the Arica-La Paz railway as his living 
quarters and was courted by numerous South American statesmen and officials.20 
Pershing travelled to Arica with a large American Delegation who numbered 120 in 
total at one count in March 1926.21 A presence that in a relatively small city must 
have been considerable. Many of the other Americans appointed to the Tacna-Arica 
plebiscite had previously worked in the Panama Canal Zone, likely chosen for their 
language skills and knowledge of Latin America. Jay J. Morrow who was entrusted 
with the drawing of the boundary lines had been governor of the Panama canal and 
men were sent from Panama to Arica in August 1925 to assist with interviewing, 
translating and generally to aid the American team.22 
 Often the American delegation was performing a miniature play just for the 
Peruvian and Chilean officials. General Pershing, with his American Delegation, 
arrived in Arica on 2nd August 1925, resolute to do their utmost to oversee a ‘free and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  William Smith Culbertson, American Ambassador to Chile 1928-1933. Container 59, William Smith 
Culbertson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 
20 Living, climatic and other conditions in Tacna-Arica with reference to the plebiscite commission. Egmont C. 
Von Tresckow. 19th April 1925. Box 5. General Francis L. Parker Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC 
21 Container 5, Francis LeJau Parker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 
22 POTUS press release. 27th March 1925. Reel 114. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC; 22nd August 1925 Quekemeyer  
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fair plebiscite’ whereby the citizens of Tacna and Arica would vote to decide who was 
the rightful sovereign of these contested provinces. Pershing’s diaries show that from 
the very first days of their arrival in Arica it was overwhelmingly evident that 
underhand and violent behavior from the Chilean state and local civilians would 
mean that the plebiscite could not be free or fair for Peruvian citizens. Nevertheless, 
the Americans had no choice but to work towards creating an environment whereby 
the plebiscite could be held, however fruitless this endeavor seemed, through arduous 
conferences, ultimatums to the Chileans, and the collection of testimonies of the 
systematic abuse of Peruvians. Pershing and his team were forced to perform this role 
under immense pressure, impotent to engage in real diplomatic work yet having to 
appease their Chilean and Peruvian counterparts. Cables from the US State 
Department show how fragile the situation was with the US terrified that the slightest 
wrong move would ruin their influence in South America.23 
The Chilean member of the Plebiscitary Commission, Agustín Edwards Mac-
Clure (1878-1941) was a Chilean lawyer, diplomat and businessman, who also 
founded the Santiago edition of El Mercurio newspaper in 1900. He had inherited the 
Valparaiso edition of El Mercurio from his father, both of which were traditionally 
conservative newspapers and later played significant roles in the ascent of Pinochet’s 
military government. Edwards held various political offices including Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, and was elected President of the 
General Assembly of the League of Nations from 1922 until 1923.24 In the diaries of 
Pershing and Quekemeyer, Edwards is portrayed as a forthright man who is not 
afraid to make his views heard. Pershing sees him as unctuous and sometimes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Personal diary entries, Container 334, John J.Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC 
24 The Tacna-Arica region was not part of Chile and so was governed by the Chilean Foreign Office, which was 
headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edwards. 
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backhanded but also admires his character and enjoys his company in social 
situations. On the other side of the dispute was the Peruvian member Manuel de 
Freyre y Santander (1872-1944). Freyre was a Peruvian diplomat who spent the 
majority of his working life as Peruvian minister in foreign posts such as China and 
Japan, Argentina, the United Kingdom and the United States. Having been born in 
Washington D.C. and spending many years abroad, Freyre was seen to have a 
detachment from the Peruvian people, portrayed as British of character, an elegant 
and well-spoken diplomat without the superciliousness of Edwards.  
 
Figure 9: L-R: Freyre, Pershing and Edwards. August 1925. University of Houston library, Texas, United 
States, Online Photographic Archive. 
 
The idea was that Pershing, Edwards, Freyre, and their employees would work 
together to create an atmosphere conducive to a free and fair plebiscite in Tacna and 
Arica. Unfortunately these three men in charge admitted to their lack of suitability to 
the task, as Pershing wrote; “We chatted in very cordial fashion each of us in turn 
avowing ignorance of plebiscites, Mr. E. being a banker, Mr. Freyre an engineer 
although Ambassador to Argentina, and I having no other than military experience. If 
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expressions of wishes to carry out the plebiscite in good faith and give every voter a 
fair deal could have determined the matter all would have ended well then and there”. 
Expressions of good faith however proved to be insufficient.  
These three elite cosmopolitan men, Pershing, Edwards, and Freyre, were the 
public faces of the Tacna-Arica Plebiscitary Commission yet this story of powerful 
men in their starring roles veils the local truth. There was an abundant mass of other 
performers who have largely been erased from the great Tacna-Arica show. The 
inhabitants of the provinces were not a passive audience; they played a significant role 
in shaping the diplomatic landscape through acts of defiance, contestation, and 
resistance. Far from the confidential cablegrams and banquets of ambassadors, the 
local citizens of Tacna and Arica were fighting, less visible on the global stage, but 
with no less vigour that the government officials. This chapter seeks to examine how 
international diplomacy to suppress violence is performed on a global stage to a 
watchful public, the enactment of which often masks the complexities of the 
micropolitics that are really at play behind the scenes.  
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Figure 10: Group of citizens outside the Plebiscitary Commission offices, 1925. Ese Arica de Antes, 
Facebook group. 
 
The presence of all these actors, finding themselves together in the Tacna-Arica 
provinces make up a transnational geopolitical assemblage of the kind theorised by 
Jason Dittmer. Dittmer (2015) argues that a focus on the microscales of politics at the 
local, national and global scales has become increasingly popular in political 
geography in a movement away from state-centred discourse. For Dittmer (2014), 
assemblage is a ‘bottom up’ process. While the meetings of the Plebiscitary 
Commission led by Pershing, Edwards, and Freyre are an obvious political 
assemblage it is the added mix of other Americans, Chileans, and Peruvians who 
converged on the provinces as well as the citizens who had already been living there 
who formed this bottom up process of assemblage. ‘Unofficial’ diplomacy can play an 
enormous role in political action following the work of McConnell, Moreau and 
Dittmer (2012). They emphasise the power of mimicry in legitimising the official 
84 
narrative. Costas Constantinou (2006) has coined the term ‘homo-diplomacy’ in order 
to better address the inter-personal, experiential and experimental dimensions of 
diplomacy. Diplomacy as simply intergovernmental ignores the richness and 
complexity of the reality of enacted diplomacy. Taking a different perspective, Merje 
Kuus (2008) has focussed her attention on the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’, those 
powerful individuals who hold considerable power in diplomacy. She emphasises that 
this is not to assign superior knowledge to them but to recognise the influential roles 
they play in world history and politics. With an awareness of this previous work it is 
possible to combine a study of official diplomacy by governmental actors who are 
inescapably influential and the non-official voices of local citizens and women that are 
not readily found in historical narratives. In order to gain a rich understanding of 
diplomacy at the border it is necessary to explore the human and personal as well as 
the wider geopolitical events. 
The plebiscite was an attempt at pacifying the border between Chile and Peru 
and ending a decades old dispute. However, the deployment of international 
diplomacy does not always mean the absence of violence, violence, or at least the 
threat of its use, is inherent in political relations (Hauriou 1980). Diplomatic action is 
not always an innocent tool to soothe violence but can be its own form of violence in 
pursuit of a certain national or international order. Pershing’s lexicon used to describe 
the attempted plebiscite hints at being playful but more often veers toward violence. 
The idea of the diplomatic proceedings as a boxing match between Peru and Chile is 
a common trope in his diaries with phrases such as “opening bout”, “final showdown” 
and “spar for advantage”. This suggests violence but within accepted boundaries; the 
countries can all play by the rules and a champion can legitimately emerge. However 
other instances show a more volatile violence with “we have fired all batteries”, that 
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“a state of war practically exists now” and that “it would be as impossible to get these 
two men [Edwards and Freyre] together as it would be to settle a row between two 
bull terriers”. To reiterate, this vocabulary was not used in reference to the physical 
violence existent in the territories but to the meetings and speeches undertaken in the 
name of international diplomacy.  
Yet in contrast to this there are other moments where the plebiscite appears to be 
a game between the international officials as shown by “they may be only bluffing- 
and it is up to us to call the bluff” and “he will turn and try to read me limb from limb 
but that is part of the game”. Violence is constant in this attempted diplomacy 
through physical violence and threats against all actors whether Chilean, Peruvian, or 
American. This is present in the persistent violent language used within diplomacy 
and the sexism and racism employed by the white American men living in Arica 
between 1925 and 1926. 
 
First Impressions of Chilean Tyranny  
As soon as Pershing stepped off the USS Rochester, on 2nd August 1925, Arica 
struck him as an overwhelmingly Chilean city. He wrote: 
As viewed from the ship, the town of Arica seemed to be in gala attire. 
Two United States flags were seen floating above the two houses that had 
been set apart and out on order for our use. All the other flags seemed to 
be Chilean. Indeed Mr. Edwards said in our conversation that there were 
very few Peruvians in Arica, and further, that everything was arranged for 
the plebiscite and that it should not take long to get through with it, as 
about 80% of the population were Chileans. He said they wanted to 
remain under Chile… There were no evidences of Peruvians in the crowd, 
the atmosphere feeling entirely Chilean.25 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 2nd August 1925, Pershing  
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Figure 11: Panoramic view of Arica, 1925. Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. 	  
Charles Evans Hughes as US Secretary of State had declared in 1922 that a free 
and fair plebiscite could be held in Tacna-Arica, a statement corroborated by 
President Coolidge, but Pershing immediately began doubting this possibility on his 
arrival. Straight away Pershing sensed that the lack of Peruvians in Arica may have 
been due to certain actions on the part of the Chileans. Pershing was exasperated with 
the task that lay ahead and described the problem as a “quarrel between Chile and 
Peru over a piece of territory which intrinsically is hardly worth the price of the 
plebiscite. But sentiment which plays such a large part in the actions of both people 
prevents either from yielding or at least has done so for some 30 years”. The arid 
provinces of Tacna and Arica had not been seen as of interest until the discovery of 
nitrates which saw a surge of economic activity by Chile, Peru and Bolivia in the 
Atacama Desert, usually funded by European merchants. This richness of resources 
was the primary cause for the War of the Pacific but fifty years on when the plebiscite 
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was attempted, patriotism and national pride became the primary motivators for the 
dispute between Peru and Chile. Both nations so vehemently hated the other, at least 
in the metropoles, that neither could lose face by relinquishing the symbolic territories.  
Just three days after arriving in Arica, on the 5th August, Pershing was fully aware 
of the problems of holding a plebiscite and that it appeared to be impossible;  
I am not a defeatist but this old difference has existed so long and so 
much bitterness has been engendered that all sense of fairness is entirely 
lacking in reality. They both see things through intense hatred and both views 
are very much prejudiced... Under the conditions that now exist a fair 
plebiscite is impossible, and many changes will be necessary to make it 
possible. 
 
Pershing refers to the plebiscite as “impossible” 49 times in his diary due to the 
systematic violence employed by Chileans against Peruvians that “was worse than in 
Soviet Russia” and “a story I believe unparalleled on this continent for persecution, 
coercion, intimidation and deportation”.26  Pershing lists many atrocities committed 
against Peruvians such as deportations, physical assaults, rape, and murder and 
Quekemeyer described that Peruvians “are actually afraid to show their heads above 
water”.27  
Violence became entrenched in the Tacna-Arica provinces when the territory 
was appropriated by Chile in the War of the Pacific and only became more systemic 
in the fifty years until the attempted plebiscite in the 1920s. The Chilean populations 
of Tacna and Arica forced the Peruvian or pro-Peruvian populations into submission 
with the hope that Chile would easily win the plebiscite but the result was that, due to 
their actions, the plebiscite could never be held. Hostilities were also aimed at the 
Americans which by September 6th 1925 had become so pronounced that Pershing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 2nd October 1925, Pershing 
27 10th August 1925, Quekemeyer  
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withdrew his subordinates from the field for their own safety.28 In one incident, an 
American woman, Jackie Deitrich, was even fired at.29 
These violent acts were carried out by individuals and groups, most notoriously 
‘the cowboys’, a gang of Chileans from the ‘Tacna and Arica Society’ who rode on 
horses, dressed identically, armed and looking for trouble. Chilean gangs would even 
tar houses in Tacna-Arica occupied by Peruvians with a black cross to allow Peruvians 
to be victimised easily and accurately (Figure 12).30 It appears that many of the 
protagonists of the worst cases of violence against Peruvians were Chileans from the 
South, namely Santiago 2000km from Arica who migrated to the provinces in order 
to add to Chilean votes (González Miranda 2004b).  
It is important therefore to point out that while the state officials were the most 
prominent actors in the Tacna-Arica dispute, the inhabitants of the provinces were 
not a passive audience, they played a significant role as actors in shaping the 
diplomatic landscape through acts of defiance, contestation, and resistance. Whether 
‘cowboys’ terrorising Peruvians, Peruvian victims of systematic violence, or Aymará 
communities who felt no ties to either nation, the citizens of Tacna-Arica were 
actively engaged in Pershing’s attempted plebiscite. This sense of purpose, however 
violent, had the effect of uniting local citizens across class divisions (Soto Lara & 
Pizarro Pizarro 2014). These united Chileans were then able to ‘construct an ‘other’’ 
across the border, to define their local and national identity in direct opposition to the 
enemy Peru (Galdames Rosas, Ruz Zagal & Meza Aliaga 2014). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Box 6, RG 76 Records of boundary and claims commissions and arbitrations. Tacna-Arica Arbitration 1925-
1926, US National Archives, Maryland 
29 15th November 1925, Quekemeyer  
30 ‘TACNA-ARICA FIASCO PICTURED BY DELEGATE’. Wambaugh. S. New York Times. 29th August 1926; 
González Miranda (1995)  
89 
 
Figure 12: Peruvian house in Arica marked with a cross. Walter O. Runcie Archive. 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/28047774@N04/8069131948/ [accessed 08/05/2014] 
 
As well as violence carried out by individuals or informal groups, other atrocities 
were carried out by the Chilean authorities such as one case of a Peruvian woman 
whose husband travelled from Tacna to Arica for business where he was taken by the 
authorities, put on a steamer south and prohibited from returning. The woman went 
to speak with the governor of Arica who said she should be glad her husband’s throat 
wasn’t cut. She was left helpless in Tacna with four small children.31  
Other violations included the Chilean government censoring all mail passing 
from Chile to Peru and Peruvians living in the provinces were threatened with having 
to join the Chilean military, as those born there were forced to do from 1912.32 All 
celebrations or carnivals had to be cleared with the Chilean authorities and only those 
events that were concurrent with nationalist ideals were permitted (Díaz Araya 2006). 
It was, therefore, highly difficult for pro-Peruvian groups to organise although there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 13th August 1925, Quekemeyer  
32 Letter from Douglas Potts to President Calvin Coolidge. 12th August 1925. Calvin Coolidge Papers. Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Box 132. RG 76 Tacna-Arica Arbitration. US National Archives, 
Maryland 
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were dynamic leaders resisting Chileanisation particularly in rural parts of the 
territories (Díaz Araya, Ruz Zagal & Mondaca Rojas 2004). Chile also began 
establishing its own national infrastructure such as the first Chilean school in the rural 
indigenous interior in 1905 (Tudela 1993). Education was strictly in Spanish with 
indigenous languages prohibited (Díaz Araya 2006). More Chilean schools quickly 
spread across the indigenous communities acting as a vehicle through which to 
disseminate Chilean culture, norms, and values. Teachers became the propagators of 
national Chilean identity and patriotism in the extreme north. 
Peruvian press was eradicated as the Arica and Tacna Provinces became a 
hotbed of Chilean publishing, churning out leaflets and newspapers, making their 
loyalties clear and creating a one-dimensional voice in Arica. The Chileans were 
urgently producing Chilean propaganda such as Figure 13 showing a typical Chilean 
roto embracing two women, one labeled Tacna and the other Arica, both caressing 
him with a Chilean flag behind. The roto who symbolises the common Chilean and is 
a source of national pride is capable of retaining and caring for his two women 
(Klaiber 1978). Meanwhile, those selling the Peruvian newspaper, La Voz Del Sur, 
never lasted as sellers on the streets of Arica for very long despite the paper being 
moderate and not containing provocative articles according to Freyre.33 When Freyre 
appealed to Pershing to control the Chilean press, his Chilean counterpart Edwards 
defended the ‘liberty of the press’ that is guaranteed by the laws of Chile.34 Edwards’ 
response was not surprising given that his family owned El Pacifico, one of the three 
primary Chilean newspapers in Tacna-Arica. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Box 132, RG 76 Records of boundary and claims commissions and arbitrations. Tacna-Arica Arbitration 1925-
1926, US National Archives, Maryland; Box 7, RG 76 Records of boundary and claims commissions and 
arbitrations. Tacna-Arica Arbitration 1925-1926, US National Archives, Maryland 
34 ibid. 
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Figure 13: 1920s pro-Chile poster. http://historiabarriga.blogspot.co.uk [accessed 03/02/2015] 	  
This violence against Peruvians was inescapably racist and xenophobic. Lighter-
skinned Chileans treated the indigenous populations as passive subjects; they were 
expected to assimilate to Chilean culture and norms (Aguirre Munizaga & Mondaca 
Rojas 2011). Chilean machismo feminised indigenous bodies, casting them as weak 
and submissive and thereby appropriate passive subjects. The advent of the Chilean 
government completely changed existing governing structures in indigenous 
communities, destroying civic networks. The provinces at the time also had sizeable 
populations of African descent who were also subjugated in the same way, non-
Chilean cultural expressions whether Aymará or black were regarded as Peruvian 
(Vergara 2012). Indigenous communities who actively resisted Chileanisation found 
that rebellion brought far more problems than benefits (Soto Tancara 2014). Chile 
was refiguring itself as a homogenous nation, one ethnicity, one culture, and so the 
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indigenous communities of northern Chile had to be assimilated. It is in this way that 
these actions on the part of the Chilean state can be seen as a form of internal 
colonialism; occupying the northern territories and controlling its citizens through 
violence and terror (González Casanova 2003).  
Despite the extreme threat to their safety, hundreds of Peruvians born in the 
region descended on Tacna-Arica in preparation for the vote and due to the scarcity 
of accommodation they were provided with an encampment in the Chinchorro area 
of Arica (Figure 14). The stipulations for who would be able to vote were complex but 
broadly applied to men over twenty-one who were not criminals, insane, or working 
in certain public institutions unless they had been born in Tacna-Arica. Peruvians 
born in the provinces were technically free to return to Tacna-Arica to vote but the 
Chilean control and violence in the area complicated this supposed freedom. 
 
Figure 14: Peruvian encampment, 1926. Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. [accessed 17/11/2013] 	  
The Chilean member, Agustín Edwards, dismissed criticisms of the violence 
between Chileans and Peruvians by saying that such clashes “are frequent in all 
countries” and gave the example of violence between prohibitionists and anti-
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prohibitionists in the US.35 The Chilean authorities refused to carry out requests by 
the Plebiscitary Commission which would make Tacna-Arica a less violent region or 
carried them out without really changing the situation. For instance the commission 
requested that Bustos, the Governor of Arica be removed which the Chilean 
government did but reappointed him to be Intendente of the Province of Tarapacá, 
the area to which he had deported Peruvians so he could, therefore, ensure that they 
would not be returned to Tacna-Arica.36  
The violence carried out by Chileans served to undermine the Chilean cause, 
legitimise Peruvian claims and ultimately led to the Americans declaring a free and 
fair plebiscite impossible. This entirely counterproductive situation can be rationalised 
by Hannah Arendt’s theory of power and violence whereby “[r]ule by sheer violence 
comes into play where power is being lost” (1970:47). Arendt argued that power and 
violence are completely antithetical; Chile’s sovereign power was under threat in the 
Tacna-Arica provinces and so violence became a means to stabilise this loss of power.  
Therefore, Pershing’s first impressions of Arica and the prospective plebiscite were not 
hopeful and only worsened during his stay. An unfortunate combination of factors; a 
poorly drawn award, bitter rivals, and systemic violence meant that the Americans 
were presented with an insurmountable task.  
 
Relationship with the US State Department 
This ‘impossible’ and violent situation encountered by Pershing was worsened by 
the ineptitude of the United States government whose “heads are in the sand on this 
subject” of the realties of the plebiscite. Pershing did not hold back in his scathing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Address of his Excellency Senor don Agustín Edwards, Chilean member of the Plebiscitary Commission at the 
Session of the Commission, 5th June 1926. Container 5, Francis L. Parker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC 
36 ‘TACNA-ARICA FIASCO PICTURED BY DELEGATE’. Wambaugh. S New York Times. 29th August 1926 
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remarks, especially against Charles Evans Hughes who devised the award, writing 
that; “It all goes to show what too much theory and too little practical experience 
combined can perpetrate” and that “of all the idiotic schemes for running a plebiscite 
this in the most so”. As a highly practical man, Pershing was frustrated by US lawyers 
who had never seriously considered how the 1922 award could be applied on the 
ground. On top of their “ignorance of South American elections” the US State 
Department that for Pershing “seems to me something like a kindergarten” was also 
prone to “meddling without my request” and putting too much trust in Chilean 
officials in Washington. Meanwhile in Chile, this meddling Chilean official, politician 
and lawyer Barros Jarpa was lauded by citizens of Arica for his role in fighting the 
Chilean cause in Washington.  
Regarding the practicalities of the Plebiscitary Commission and the US State 
Department, Pershing could not have been more pessimistic. Soon after arriving in 
Arica, Quekemeyer had been optimistic and wrote; “[i]t looks like Washington 
intends to back up the General in whatever he does so that is most encouraging” but 
he was disillusioned by December when he wrote; “A cable arrived from the states 
and it looks to me as if our own state department is not going to back the General up 
as they should. I fear that that bunch of “boobs” up there would sacrifice the General 
on the slightest provocation”.37 Quekemeyer dismissed “the usual wishy-washy stuff 
from the State Department” but also became frustrated with the American legal 
advisors based in Arica, Dennis and Kreger, of whom he wrote; “The more I see of 
lawyers, the less real common sense I think they have”.38 This highlighted the 
problem of US intervention; those located in Washington couldn’t understand the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 19th August 1925, Quekemeyer; 8th December 1925, Quekemeyer  
38 9th December 1925, Quekemeyer; 16th September 1925, Quekemeyer  
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situation as it was in the provinces. The gulf between appearance and reality was just 
too great.  
In September 1925 Pershing received a cable from US Secretary of State Frank 
B. Kellogg saying that while the State Department appreciated the General’s efforts in 
creating a fair plebiscite he should accept that fairness will never be achieved so it 
would be better to “approximate them as nearly as practicable and still be consistent 
with the terms of the award”, adding that it would be unfortunate for the commission 
to leave without completing its mission.39 This angered Pershing who wrote on the 
matter; “I shall not stand for an election that has not even the semblance of 
fairness”.40 Kellogg strongly recommended that Pershing give “careful considerations” 
to “any reasonable suggestions” from Chile.41  
This raises questions over the true interests of the United States State 
Department. While Pershing was striving for principles of fairness and equality the 
State Department wanted the plebiscite to take place in spite of Chilean terror. Could 
the United States have wanted a Chilean victory in the plebiscite in order to stabilise 
their considerable economic interests in the region? Perhaps the US government 
wanted the plebiscite to occur whatever the cost to democracy. From the beginning of 
the War of the Pacific both the US and Britain wanted peace in the region so as not to 
compromise their industries in South America and when supplemented by continued 
US involvement in Chile as outlined throughout the thesis, this idea does not appear 
too far-fetched. 
Due to the apparent ineffectuality of the plebiscite, very soon after the American 
Delegation arrived in Arica they discussed with Washington alternative routes to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Cable from Kellogg to Pershing, 18th September 1925. Box 723. 2515/1613. RG 59 Department of State 
Decimal File. US National Archives, Maryland 
40 23rd September 1925, Pershing. Underline by Pershing. 
41 5thSeptember 1925, Pershing. 
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settling the dispute. On the 15th August 1925, less than a fortnight after arriving, 
Pershing discussed the idea of a treaty with Salomón, an adviser to the Peruvian 
Commission. Two days earlier Pershing had mentioned to Freyre the possibility of 
dividing the territories with Arica going to Chile and Tacna to Peru. However, a 
common feature of the attempted plebiscite, both Peru and Chile were adamant that 
they would not lose national pride nor take any blame and so neither country wanted 
to be the one to call the plebiscite a failure and suggest outside settlement. Edwards 
told Pershing that dividing the territories would be impossible because Tacna, due to 
its dependency on the port of Arica, would economically collapse. Salomón suggested 
to Pershing that one solution to this could be for the President of the United States to 
propose the idea of a treaty to both Peru and Chile simultaneously.   
It seems that both countries were searching for an excuse to call off the plebiscite 
despite their refusal to admit it publicly. Freyre, the Peruvian commissioner, told 
Pershing that a reason needed to be found for abandoning the plebiscite but Pershing 
replied saying that Chile would not agree to this and instead “we should have to find a 
formula that would satisfy both and at the same time saving their faces” and together 
discussed how this could occur. A month later, in October 1925, Freyre was 
requesting neutralisation but Pershing informed him that this would not be possible 
under the 1922 award. Despite these attempts it seemed that the problem could only 
be solved through a plebiscite and so the officials ploughed on. 
 
Chile, Peru, and the Local Communities 
The benefit of studying personal diaries is that Pershing and Quekemeyer include 
private perceptions that they undoubtedly would not have wanted public at the time. 
The delicate act of diplomacy rested upon social niceties and displays of respect 
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between the US, Chile, and Peru even when this was palpably difficult for those 
involved. Pershing’s diaries include many descriptions of the Chilean member, 
Edwards, with far fewer of his Peruvian counterpart, Freyre. Pershing’s first 
impression of Edwards was that he “has all the suavity of manner of the Latin and the 
appearance of an Englishman. His long experience in Europe as Ambassador has left 
him extremely polite and smooth no doubt his having been president of the League of 
Nations also gives him confidence in himself and much prestige among his own 
people”. Pershing was torn between liking Edwards who has “an attractive 
personality” yet also “has a way of pushing his face close to yours when he is speaking 
to you which is most annoying”. Despite Edwards being “slippery and untrustworthy” 
and conducting himself in an “oily style” a kind of friendship appeared to blossom 
between the two men and Pershing understood that although the two men played 
warring parts in the play of diplomacy, it is not personal and the two men shared 
similarities such as “the same energetic manner at times”.  
In contrast to Edwards, Freyre is drawn by Pershing as an easily wounded and 
heartfelt character who earnestly appeals to Pershing on the fate of the Peruvian 
people. Freyre was known to speak English faultlessly and to assume an aristocratic 
manner, he determinedly stuck by his principles refusing all offers of help from the 
Chileans, even in assistance finding accommodation in Arica which meant the 
Peruvians had to stay living at sea on their ship, the Ucayali. The two enemies, 
Edwards and Freyre, personally got on very well according to Pershing, yet on the 
battleground of the commission meetings they fought hard to “differ on every point”, 
they had to play the part of the ruthless fighter for the audiences in their respective 
countries. Both men saw themselves as protectors of their respective nations, 
masculine Latin men who refused to back down on their demands. 
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Pershing found nothing positive to say about Chileans or Latin Americans in 
general in his Arica diaries, yet expressed his views that, for example, the Chileans 
“are a queer lot and their minds, like the minds of all Latin’s, move almost at right 
angles to our own”. Pershing also asserted that the Chileans are “entirely 
untrustworthy… deceitful, given to false statements, misrepresentation and lacking in 
all those qualities which we as Anglo-Saxons stand for and live for”. This view was 
supported by Quekemeyer who said of the Chileans; “Dirty sort of people to deal 
with, I must say and I’m sorry we ever got mixed up in this”.42 The manner in which 
Pershing spoke of the Chileans and his statements regarding the plebiscite has meant 
that Pershing is generally seen by Chilean historians as sympathetic to the Peruvians 
(González Miranda 2008). Chileans have been convinced since the 1920s up to the 
present day that Pershing showed favouritism toward the Peruvians due to the rumour 
that he had a Peruvian mistress, a rumour which cannot be traced through any 
documents, not even his personal diaries. Yet Pershing did have a reputation as a 
womaniser, albeit a discrete one, and it remains unknown whether this gossip has any 
basis in fact. 
Edwards and Freyre, who had spent considerable time in the United States and 
Europe, were regarded more or less as intellectual equals to the Americans but the 
local citizens were considered to be ignorant children who couldn’t be expected to 
understand the lofty cerebral ideals of a just plebiscite. Pershing’s views of the 
communities living in the Tacna-Arica provinces are unsurprising for a white elite 
American. He stated his desires for an ‘ideal plebiscite’ “but that this was impossible 
here where most of the people were ignorant being of indian blood”. On Pershing’s 
first visit to Tacna he claimed that of the local population, just “2% was of the white 
race of which the Chileans sometimes boast”. On another nearby town, Quekemeyer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 28th November 1925, Quekemeyer  
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wrote; “Tarata is nothing more or less than an indian village of nearly 2000 
inhabitants… I suppose the natives were all very much interested in the affair, that is, 
as much as you could interest these un-educated indians in anything of this sort”.43 
These communities of “indian villages” were at odds with Chile’s ideals of whiteness, 
modernity, and development at a time when Chile automatically classified all Chilean 
citizens as ‘white’. These communities, whose stories are much harder to uncover 
than those of the white elites, appear to have been somewhat disconnected from 
notions of states and nationhood as Pershing remarks, “it did not seem to me that the 
transfer of territory meant much to the Indians”.  
Other reports from the time similarly describe the indigeneity of the residents of 
the Tacna and Arica provinces many of whom only spoke Aymará (Basadre 1975). 
These communities tended to adopt Peruvian national identities as a reaction against 
the violent and intrusive chileanisation policies and were, therefore, enemies of the 
Chileans during the era of the attempted plebiscite (Díaz Araya, Galdames & Ruz 
2013). While Chile fought tirelessly to remain in control of the territory, many 
inhabitants of the provinces were at odds with Chile’s plans of progress and 
modernisation, a problematic situation for Chile. This Chilean view of exceptionalism 
on an ‘indian continent’ appears to have translated to the Americans as in a report 
given to the Americans before their departure for Arica to brief them on the climate 
and living conditions of Arica it is stated; “the Chileans are more intelligent and keep 
their persons and dwellings much cleaner than the native Peruvians and Bolivians 
who are generally dirty and indifferent”.44 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 31st August 1925, Quekemeyer. During the War of the Pacific Chile had also appropriated the smaller region of 
Tarata but Coolidge’s award had already stipulated that this territory be immediately handed back to Peru as it 
could not be legitimately claimed by Chile. The official ceremony to repatriate Tarata occurred a few weeks after 
the arrival of the Americans in Arica. 
44 Living, climatic and other conditions in Tacna-Arica with reference to the plebiscite commission. Egmont C. 
Von Tresckow. 19th April 1925. Box 5. General Francis L. Parker Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC 
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While indigeneity was an arena of violence for the local populations, it was a 
space of experimentation for the Americans. There was a sense that when the 
Americans were abroad they could transgress social norms that they could not in the 
US. Quekemeyer played tennis with another American, Dennis, and two Chileans 
who turned up at the courts of whom he remarked; “well the girl and man both 
looked just like mulattoes and I know if any of my Yazoo friends had seen me playing 
with them, they never would have allowed me to come home again”. 45  US 
imperialism of the time was tied to racist ideologies of white superiority as increasing 
numbers of non-white people were coming under US domination all over the globe. 
However, in Arica, so far from Mississippi, Quekemeyer could cross ethnic borders.  
Despite not understanding the local population, when Pershing left Arica in 
January 1926 his leaving statement was directed towards the inhabitants of the 
provinces as he reaffirmed his deep interest in the fair completion of the plebiscite, 
that the wellbeing and happiness of the residents of Tacna-Arica has come to be his 
most sincere wish (Medina 1926). Even though he believed certain citizens were not 
his intellectual equals, Pershing still recognised their right to a free and fair 
democracy. 
 
Women in Tacna-Arica 
Along with the indigenous population as a whole, women fail to be regarded with 
any high esteem in Pershing’s diaries. He personally found indigenous women 
unattractive stating that “I must say that a homelier bunch of women would be hard 
to find anywhere in the world”. Likewise, Quekemeyer’s views on local women were 
similarly disparaging, he wrote; “I seldom ever see a woman except the natives who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 16th September 1925, Quekemeyer  
101 
are dark in color and all look as if they need baths” but was happily surprised one day 
when “Cox, Jones and I dined with Mr. Claro at the Chilean Embassy. He had half a 
dozen very attractive Chilean women present- I didn’t know that there were as many 
attractive women in this neck of the woods”.46 Peruvian and Chilean women generally 
seem to either add local colour; “Passing through the Indian villages people especially 
women and children were grouped here and there along the road, saying ‘buenos 
dias’ and some throwing flower petals at us”; be presented as victims, as in one case 
where a Peruvian woman was raped in front of her husband by a Chilean police 
officer; or be a source of annoyance, “[t]he governor’s wife (Mrs. Bustos) being my 
especial burden”.  
American-born women aren’t represented in a much better light, even those who 
were knowledgeable professionals in their own right. The stories of four women 
involved in the Tacna-Arica question are included here as an act of rebalancing the 
official, male-driven narrative that has persisted since the 1920s. Sarah Wambaugh, 
Annie Smith Peck, Maggie Conroy, and Jackie Deitrick provide a counter-view yet 
still give a specific, privileged perspective. Women are rarely included in formal peace 
processes but when they are involved they are likely to make a different contribution 
to the peace process (Bouta, Frerks & Bannon 2005). In contemporary peace processes 
there is little equality of voice meaning women’s views are not as widely invited, 
listened to, or appreciated and this was far more unequal in 1920s South America. 
The first female voice is that of Sarah Wambaugh who was employed by the 
Peruvian government due to being “an authority on plebiscites”, in fact the world’s 
leading expert, possessing knowledge Pershing, Edwards, and Freyre all noticeably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 12th August 1925, Quekemeyer; 6th September 1925, Quekemeyer  
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lacked.47 Yet she was infantilised by Pershing who stated that he couldn’t imagine she 
would be of much use to the Peruvians. The US State Department had, before the 
Americans left for Arica, obtained materials from Sarah Wambaugh on the basis of 
her knowledge yet refused her involvement. Wambaugh had potentially caused 
problems for herself with the US government a year earlier when in 1924 she had 
written a letter which was published in the New York Times criticising President 
Coolidge for taking credit for the reconstruction of Austria whereas Wambaugh 
argued that the President only hindered the situation.48 Consequently Peru capitalised 
on the Americans’ rebuff of Wambaugh by employing her as a valuable member of 
their plebiscitary team even awarding her the Order of the Sun.49 
Wambaugh was a vocal critic against Chile during the attempted plebiscite and 
wrote passionate articles demonstrating her view in The New York Times based on her 
ten months living in the region with reports stating that “every Peruvian ship that left 
the territory looked like a hospital. Men, women, and children, with bandaged heads 
and lacerated limbs, victims of Chilean policy, crowded their decks. In certain cases, 
she says, the Chileans even resorted to torture”.50 She believed that US prestige in the 
area had been greatly undermined by the farce and argued that the provinces of 
Tacna and Arica should be immediately handed over to Peru. Yet she nevertheless 
admired Pershing and wrote; “I have seen something of diplomats and consider that 
he belongs in the first rank. The problem given him was one impossible of solution”.51 
The American team also rejected the offered assistance of Annie Smith Peck who 
had extensive experience of South America and was fluent in Spanish yet was deemed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Letter from Raymond E. Cox to General Pershing. 20th March 1925. Container 336. John J.Pershing Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 
48 ‘THE SALVAGING OF AUSTRIA’. Wambaugh, S. New York Times. 2nd November 1924  
49 ‘Chic Dr. Wambaugh's job takes her to hot spots of world political arena’. Mary Van, R. T. The Washington Post. 
14th April 1948  
50 ‘Says Tacna-Arica Hurt Our Prestige’ The New York Times. 29th June 1926 p.3 
51 ‘TACNA-ARICA FIASCO PICTURED BY DELEGATE’. Wambaugh. S New York Times. 29th August 1926  
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unnecessary by Pershing. Peck wrote to Pershing offering her services in the Tacna-
Arica plebiscite (Figure 15), demonstrating her clear knowledge of the situation having 
met Peruvian refugees who had been deported from Arica.52 Pershing was warned 
that “Miss Peck has already poured out her soul on the Tacna-Arica Arbitration in 
letters to the President and the Secretary, both of which received a routine 
acknowledgement only. She is apparently anxious to get into the limelight and of 
course would be absolutely unsuited for work on the Commission. May I suggest that 
you thank her for her interesting letter and for her offer to be of service in the 
forthcoming plebiscite”.53 Pershing did reply to Peck remarking that her comments 
were interesting and appreciated and that he would “keep in mind” her offer of 
service in connection with the plebiscite.54 This theatre of international diplomacy was 
a man’s world and Quekemeyer made his views very clear when he stated; 
“Personally I cannot see why American women would want to get mixed up in this 
affair down here”.55 
Like Wambaugh, Peck also wrote letters to the New York Times on the subject of 
Tacna-Arica and argued that the provinces should be returned to Peru.56 Her opinion 
on why the plebiscite failed was that it never should have been allowed so long after 
the Treaty of Ancón, she believed that “[t]he most tactful and skillful diplomat could 
not have brought it to pass. The opportunity for diplomacy was before the ordering of 
the plebiscite”.57 Another admirer of Pershing she wrote that “[t]here was no failure 
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in diplomacy at Arica by General Pershing. The colossal diplomatic blunder, 
unfortunately, was made in Washington”.58 
 
 
Figure 15: Pamphlet sent by Peck to Pershing. Letter from Miss Annie Peck to Pershing. 12th April 1925. 
Container 338. John J.Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 	  
Just as Peru had seen the value of Wambaugh’s expertise, another woman 
employed by the Peruvians was Maggie Conroy, an interpreter who spent an entire 
year on the cruiser Ucayali off the coast of Arica, she and Wambaugh being the only 
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women aboard. Described as cheerful throughout and with unrelenting faith that the 
border issue would be solved peacefully she similarly held Pershing in high esteem. In 
one interview she said; “Gen. Pershing won my undying admiration by the part he 
played in the negotiations… He was in a very difficult and delicate position, but he 
carried it off splendidly… Pershing, of course, leaned toward military precision and 
order, and Freyre toward diplomatic dignity. Edwards was much more discoursive- a 
different type entirely”.59  
The fourth woman written out of, or never written into, this historical event was 
Jackie Deitrick, an American journalist who was employed to cover the plebiscite for 
the South American English-language newspaper the West Coast Leader as well as 
Peruvian paper La Prensa. Deitrick had been residing in Panama but had never been 
to South America and “[l]ike the majority of her countrymen and women, she knew 
of Tacna-Arica only as an obscure territorial controversy which the President of the 
United States had been called upon to arbitrate somewhere in South America” 
(Deitrick 1926:iiv). She joined the Peruvians aboard the Ucayali, becoming friends 
with Wambaugh, and despite being surrounded by Peruvians, was adamant that her 
views would remain neutral writing in one article; “I’m here to state that I don’t know 
the first thing about the situation and don’t, as a matter of fact, give a darn. It’s not 
my squabble”, and in another; “there’s one thing I’m quite certain of; nothing shall 
influence me toward any stand but a neutral one. As I said before, it’s not my fuss”.60 
Deitrick expected to stay in Arica for ten days but, like the other actors involved, 
became drawn into the complexities of the situation and quickly found that she could 
not be an impartial observer.  
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In her later articles Deitrick described herself as “Peruvian by sympathy” and 
that she can no longer remain unprejudiced after interviewing local citizens and 
hearing shocking stories of violence and abuse of Peruvians by Chileans.61 Her work 
even gives us greater insights into the lives of local women, telling stories of victimised 
Peruvian women but also mentioning in one article that some of the Chilean spies in 
Tacna-Arica were women.62 Deitrick later became an almost-victim of the intense 
violence herself when she and some Peruvians were shot at when seeking out a 
Peruvian man who had been attacked by Chileans. She claimed that the American 
lawyers tried to convince her to confess that she hadn’t actually been shot at but had 
only heard a firework or car backfiring, once again raising questions over American 
subterfuge and duplicitous influence. 
 
Figure 16: Jackie Deitrick. Deitrick, J. (1926) What Price Tacna-Arica? The West Coast Leader: Lima, Peru 	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62 13th October 1925. Deitrick, J. (1926) What Price Tacna-Arica? The West Coast Leader: Lima, Peru 
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The inclusion of these four women is important to the Tacna-Arica story, while 
these four women’s voices tend to be harder to find in archival research when they 
can be located they provide important perspectives on the case and can be used to 
rewrite women back into a narrative from which they have been silenced. This is a 
contentious point however, have women been actively silenced or have they been 
subject to strategic forgetting or even byproducts of cultural forgetting? Women are 
always ‘there’, as Cynthia Enloe (1989) has very effectively illustrated, but their 
legacies are less consistent, to what extent has this been engineered? Moreover, of 
these women included, three are American and Conroy was an elite Peruvian, where 
are the voices of local women, particularly indigenous women who have for so long 
been silenced? It remains that indigenous women have been written out of the 
archives as well as out of history. They exist as traces, mentioned by those more 
privileged, whether Pershing commenting on their looks or Deitrick alluding to their 
presence. Machismo was dominant in 1920s South America and women were not to 
be part of the official narrative, local women had no voting rights in the plebiscite and 
even the most expert of women were ignored. This has remained to large extent as the 
thesis, particularly chapter seven, will illustrate. 
 
The Portrayal of the Americans  
In contrast to the ‘indians’ who couldn’t understand democracy and the women 
who so tiresomely meddled, the American men in Arica and Pershing in particular 
were exalted by themselves as all-American heroes. Self-assured machismo was not solely 
the domain of the Latinos. Pershing remains steadfast to his principles of just 
diplomacy, stating; “I should be willing to stay here until Doomsday if I thought a fair 
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plebiscite could be held”. 63  This was reinforced by Quekemeyer who admired 
Pershing’s work and wrote; “Our chief is certainly showing his wisdom and by little 
private talks of hard common sense is beginning to bring light out of darkness”.64 
Quekemeyer also made it clear that Pershing would not be easily swayed by Chilean 
rhetoric, as he said of a conversation with Van Dyke, an adviser to the Chileans; “they 
seem to forget that the General is down here to see that this election is conducted in a 
fair way and its my guess that it will be pulled off that way or not at all”.65 Pershing 
was frustrated that the citizens of Tacna-Arica were blinded by nationalism and that 
“…neither party has any other idea than that one must be on one side or the other. 
They have not the slightest notion that one can be neutral and just”.66 Pershing was 
also irked by Americans who did not meet his approval, his opinion of Van Dyke, the 
American lawyer employed by the Chileans was that “[h]e would be sufferable if he 
would refrain from going about criticizing our own countrymen”.67 If the Americans 
in Washington weren’t quite so righteous, Pershing was committed to upholding his 
sense of American duty. 
With the Americans’ views on the local communities and other Americans very 
apparent, how did the Chileans and Peruvians view the Americans? The South 
American elites involved in the plebiscite held Pershing and the other Americans in 
high esteem, having pleaded for Coolidge’s involvement despite his reluctance. In the 
initial stages of the plebiscite both Chile and Peru saw the Americans as on their side 
but Edwards often became frustrated when Pershing began to criticise the violence of 
the Chileans. The Americans certainly attempted to regulate local opinion of them as 
shown by lengthy discussion over the US navy in Arica. A US cruiser, the Rochester, 	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remained stationed at Arica during the majority of the time period which was strongly 
recommended by Pershing and much enjoyed by Major Quekemeyer who relished 
the company of more Americans and the American goods they could provide. 
However the State Department was anxious that “psychologically it might have a bad 
effect in South American countries… it seems possible that both Chile and Peru may 
misinterpret the presence of an American cruiser during the plebiscitary period. 
There is also the possibility that other Latin American countries may feel that the 
United States is carrying out its Award by force”.68 Nevertheless the Rochester 
remained at Arica apart from trips to re-coal in Callao, Peru and no bad feeling on 
the part of the local communities was apparent.  
What the non-elite Chileans and Peruvians thought of the Americans was largely 
influenced by the local press. Chilean press was often critical of the Americans with 
Quekemeyer writing; “It being two months since our arrival here, the Chilean papers 
this morning are all carrying articles more or less criticizing us for the delay in the 
actual conduct of the plebiscite”. 69  The anti-American tone taken by Chilean 
newspapers was however dropped when the failure of the attempted plebiscite became 
apparent in June 1926. Chile had been complaining about US involvement, using the 
slogan Latin America for Latin Americans but this wasn’t going down well with 
neighbouring countries who placed the failure of the plebiscite firmly on Chile.70 
Along with disparaging articles the Chileans also circulated anti-American and 
anti-Peruvian propaganda such as the following postcard that came into the 
possession of one American (Figure 17). The postcard shows cartoon versions of 
Edwards, the Chilean Member sodomising Freyre, the Peruvian member while 
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Pershing and Leguia, the Peruvian president urinate. Leguia is saying to Pershing, “it 
looks like Edwards put it all in, [while] we conform to the league that rules us”. Pete 
Sigal has argued that in Latin American cultures, a man penetrated by another man is 
effeminate, and lacks valour and honour. However, a man penetrating another man 
can be seen as embodying extreme male dominance (Sigal 2003). The passive 
homosexual in this machismo dichotomy thereby becomes feminised. In this context 
therefore, Edwards is not weakened by a homosexual act but is humiliating and 
dominating feminine Peru. While studies have shown that in lived experiences of gay 
Latino men the binary of active/passive is far more complicated than this stereotype, 
prevailing machismo ideas of homosexuality in the 1920s were bounded by this 
dualism (Vidal-Ortiz, Decena, Carrillo & Almaguer 2010). 
 
Figure 17: Chilean propaganda postcard. 16th February 1926. Box 5. General Francis L. Parker Papers. 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 
 
Another less vulgar cartoon was used by a satirical Chilean magazine founded by 
Agustín Edwards, Corre Vuela, to portray the situation of Pershing in Arica with its high 
proportion of cholos (Figure 18). Cholos are Latin Americans of indigenous descent, 
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often used specifically for Peruvians, potentially in a derogatory way (Klaiber 1978). 
The caption reads; 
“Cholo: You, General, like a good protestant are always reading the Bible. 
Pershing: Yes, and since coming to Arica and needing to understand you lot, I keep  
finding myself reading the same chapter. 
Cholo: Which? 
Pershing: Which has it been? That of Job…” 
 
Figure 18: Conversation between Pershing and a ‘Cholo’. Cover image. Corre Vuela, Santiago de Chile. 3rd 
November 1925 
 
The cartoon is referencing the theme of the Book of Job of ‘why do the righteous 
suffer?’, Pershing, by no fault of his own has been plunged into a nightmarish situation 
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of violence and frustration with no solution to the Tacna-Arica dispute being 
apparent. A third cartoon (Figure 19) portraying Pershing was published by Chilean 
magazine Sucesos and shows the General as sympathetic to the Peruvian cause. Peru is 
represented by a prostitute pleading to Pershing; 
“for forty-five years I have been a victim of that bad man [Chile]. He took the two girls away 
from me and refuses to give them back, claiming that I declared war on him, and that he 
sacrificed thousands of lives and spent many millions” 
Pershing, crying, responds; 
“your grief touches my very soul. And you have only to see what I am capable of when 
something affects me so deeply”  
These three cartoons along with numerous newspaper articles, whether through 
attempts to humiliate the Americans or Peruvians or with racist depictions, will have 
influenced how everyday citizens viewed the Americans and their role in the 
plebiscite. The Americans, seen as righteous saviours of the backwards Latin 
Americans in their own eyes but as arrogant meddlers in the eyes of Chile and Peru 
were given a futile task; sent by their government to organise a plebiscite which should 
never have been declared possible it was hardly surprising when the idealistic project 
fell apart. These cartoons of Pershing highlight how Tacna-Arica was a place where 
Chilean political opinion was openly shared, both in the official press but also with 
covert propaganda. Chilean images were shared freely in a way Peruvian propaganda 
couldn’t be and this availability remains in the archival record. Although Chileans 
had initially been happy with Coolidge’s 1922 award they soon became disgruntled 
with Pershing’s attitude and, in their opinion, unfair favouring of the Peruvians. 
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                Figure 19: Cartoon of Pershing. Cover image, Sucesos, Santiago de Chile 3rd December 1925 
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The Plebiscite Disintegrates 
Pershing had been hoping to leave Arica as soon as possible to escape the 
nightmare of the failing plebiscite and to see his son Warren, but in January 1926 he 
was forced to return to the United States for urgent medical treatment. He was 
suffering from an oral infection of the jaw that had dangerously increased his blood 
pressure. Pershing’s doctor’s opinion was that “General Pershing has hypertension 
which is progressive partly due to stress and strain of plebiscite and also doubtless to 
oral focal infection”.71 Quekemeyer rejoiced at being finally freed from Arica and the 
plebiscite and wrote on their day of departure; “My last day in Arica- thank goodness. 
Hurrah!!”72 and; “After the departure of General Lassiter we ‘upped anchor’ and 
started for God’s Country, home. There is no country like it. As for Arica, I hope to 
never see the damn place or its rotten people again. I never remember leaving a place 
before where I felt less sorry to be going”.73 Meanwhile, Pershing wrote of their 
impending departure the brief; “thanks to God”. 
There was some skepticism over Pershing’s claim of ill-health with one Florida 
paper reporting that “[p]ress cables from South America indicating surprise that 
Pershing is regarded here as a sick man added to the feeling in many quarters that the 
general is the victim of a diplomatic illness”.74 This was refuted in the same paper a 
few days later stating, “[o]fficials in Washington are exceedingly emphatic in their 
assertion that Pershing’s illness is in no sense a “diplomatic sickness” and point out 
that such a statement is most unfair and ungenerous to Pershing”.75 Once in the 
United States Pershing made statements that a free and fair plebiscite seemed unlikely 
and the press increasingly began to speculate on the chances on him ever returning to 	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Arica. By February 1926 the US press was reporting the plebiscite as a failure with the 
New York Times running an article describing Pershing’s views of the plebiscite being 
impossible while the Chileans continue with their behaviour against the Peruvians.76 
Pershing resigned on 27th February 1926, ruling out his return to Arica for good. 
As Pershing left Arica he was replaced by Major General William Lassiter, 
former Commander of the American forces in the Canal Zone, who soon held the 
same sentiments as his predecessor regarding the impossibility of the plebiscite. 
Pershing’s departure left both Chile and Peru unhappy, saddled with a new President 
of the Commission and further than ever from reaching a solution to the territorial 
dispute. Chile was upset with Pershing’s interference in their plebiscite which it 
seemed from the outset would run in their favour. The Chilean commission was not 
pleased with the decision made by Lassiter and Pershing with Edwards complaining 
that Pershing’s Committee of Investigations never once investigated the deaths of 
Chilean citizens and police at the hands of Peruvians and were from the outset in 
favour of Peru (Edwards 1926). They accused Pershing and later Lassiter of partiality 
towards Peru and suggested the intervention of the League of Nations. The United 
States was strongly against this idea that could contradict the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. 
Instead, on 14th June 1926, General Lassiter, with the support of General Pershing, 
submitted a substantial report to the Department of State and with powerful 
conditions of violence described, the plebiscite was abandoned that very day. The 
declaration that the plebiscite was unviable was a pyrrhic victory for Peru, they had 
international recognition of the tyranny imposed by Chile in Tacna-Arica but the 
provinces remained under Chilean control. Peru had a diplomatic triumph, with 
perverse thanks to the violence of the Chileans, but didn’t make any real gains in 
terms of reclaiming the much-desired provinces of Tacna and Arica. 	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Figure 20: Pershing (left) leaves Lassiter (right) in charge. Deitrick, J. (1926) What Price Tacna-Arica? The West 
Coast Leader: Lima, Peru 
 
There were four potential solutions after the plebiscite was abandoned; that the 
provinces remain in the hands of Chile; the division of the region possibly with a 
corridor to the sea for Bolivia; the neutralisation of the region either as an 
independent state or under the jurisdiction of another power; or it could be ceded to a 
third party.77 Sarah Wambaugh was a strong advocate of returning the provinces to 
Peru but making Arica a ‘free port’ allowing Bolivia an outlet to the sea sharing its 
administration with Peru.78 Neutralising the territory would have provided a free port 
for the area seen as the ‘heart of South America’, ideally located for maritime transit 
with the whole west coast of the continent into the Pacific as well as inland South 
America. 
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Mr. Stabler, the Secretary General to the Plebiscitary Commission, explained in 
a letter that he would not be opposed to the idea to the territory being neutralised and 
adds an idea to “blow up the ‘morro’ with high explosives so as to destroy the cliff 
which has caused so much trouble and has and will always be pointed to as the ‘rock 
of contention’ between Chile and Peru. The material could be used for a breakwater 
and a lighthouse or a monument could be erected to San Martin on the site of the 
‘morro’”. 79  The ‘morro’ is the prominent headland dominating the otherwise 
remarkably flat urban landscape of Arica. Much of the dispute had centered around 
symbolism and national pride, focussing on imagery such as the morro and veteran 
soldiers from the War of the Pacific. The Chilean press at the time declared that 
“[t]he Tacna and Arica affair has been exploited, and not so very long ago, President 
Leguia declared that it had been used as an instrument of agitation in the internal 
politics of Chile, and Peru, and it has also been used as a diplomatic arm in the 
relations of Chile and Peru with other Republics”.80 Even as early as 1924 the fight 
over Tacna and Arica was described as a ‘hackneyed political weapon’ (Álvarez 1924). 
The value of the territory was monetarily worth far less than the efforts and expenses 
of the attempted plebiscite would suggest but national pride and political one-
upmanship more than made up for this disparity. 
 
A Resolution is Found  
The resolution of the Tacna-Arica dispute, after decades of violence and 
international diplomacy, was somewhat anti-climatic. There was no great war 
between Peru and Chile as some had predicted, the territory was not dramatically 	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passed over to Bolivia or made into an independent state. In fact, progress was made 
far from Arica, on a journey to Havana for the Sixth American Conference that 
Chilean diplomat Carlos Silva Vildosola met with delegates from Peru. Mr. Francis 
White, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, was attending the conference 
“and talked with them more or less about a settlement”.81 This was, therefore, a great 
shift in the power of the decision making process over the border dispute. While it had 
earlier seemed that the citizens of the provinces would draw the border of the Tacna-
Arica provinces through a plebiscite, its failure transferred the power to choose to the 
top of the pile, to the national heads of state and government officials.  
 In July 1928, and with the involvement of US Secretary of State Frank B. 
Kellogg, came the surprising announcement that Peru and Chile were to resume 
diplomatic and commercial relations after a hiatus since 1910 and the path to peaceful 
negotiation began. Then, on the 17th May 1929 President of the United States 
Herbert Hoover announced a final settlement of the dispute and the Treaty of Lima 
was signed in June 1929. The Treaty awarded the province of Arica to Chile and 
Tacna to Peru with Chile paying six million dollars to Peru in compensation along 
with a significant number of provisos (St John 2000). Forty-five years after the Treaty 
of Ancón, the pending issue of Tacna-Arica finally had a solution.  
Former Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes declared that “[t]he settlement 
was well received by the majority of the people both in the nations involved and in 
foreign countries. By it, Peru recovered Tacna, which contained the major portion of 
her former citizens. Chile retained Arica, where the population brought there for 
government and railroad work was largely Chilean. Peru had discharged her duty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Letter from Frank B Kellogg to William Smith Culbertson May 7th 1930. Container 59, William Smith 
Culbertson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 
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toward her lost citizens, and Chile was relieved of anxiety over her northern 
frontier”.82 It seemed that finally peace had arrived at the border. 
 
Figure 21: The official delivery of the province of Tacna to Peru. 28th August 1929. AHVD Fondo Sergio Chacón 
 
Although the lucky encounter in transit to Havana was the turning point for the 
Tacna-Arica resolution, no single actor can be pinpointed as responsible for this 
diplomatic success. Instead it was a dialogue between certain key players. William 
Smith Culbertson, American Ambassador to Chile, outlines the three men who he 
believes can be credited for the settlement; US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, 
Chilean President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1927-1931) and Peruvian President 
Augusto Leguía (1919-1930).83 It is undeniable that the actors taking the final bow, 
showered with praise and written into the history books were the official statesmen 
and government officials of the United States, Peru, and Chile. Culbertson’s view 
completely removes the individuals who attempted the plebiscite, now seen as an 
embarrassing failure. However, as Sarah Wambaugh (1933) argued, the settlement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Latin America Border Disputes’ Container 183. Charles Evans Hughes Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC 
83 Reels 15-41 , Frank B Kellogg Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 
120 
would not have occurred without the attempted plebiscite, the action of the 
plebiscitary commission forced Chile to accept a compromise settlement. Despite all 
of Pershing’s and his team’s hard work in Arica, and the splitting of the territories 
being an alternative settlement which Pershing himself desired, the eventual resolution 
in 1929 was distanced from the aborted plebiscite and even in biographies of 
Pershing, Arica only ever awards a brief mention, if at all. Moreover, the totality of 
this assemblage of actors, with the local communities and women who undoubtedly 
shaped events in Tacna-Arica never found their voices in the official story. 
 
Conclusions 
Since the War of the Pacific the provinces of Tacna and Arica had been 
characterised by violence, first by international warfare and territorial appropriation 
and subsequently by almost five decades of systemic violence against Peruvians in the 
name of ‘chileanisation’. The involvement of the United States in the 1920s to aid the 
completion of the plebiscite was an act of pacification, a way to suture the wound and 
put an end to the simmering tension in the disputed provinces of Tacna and Arica, 
although diplomacy brought its own type of violence. These disputed territories 
became central to the Chilean nation-state as a symbol of national pride and honour 
and the border was at the forefront of national consciousness. While the team of 
Americans headed by Pershing attempted to determine the appropriate regulations 
for the plebiscite, the extreme violence in the territory meant that no free and fair 
plebiscite could be held and so US involvement was terminated.  
The diaries of John J. Pershing and John Quekemeyer as well as numerous other 
documents included here provide a rich addition to previous work on the Tacna-Arica 
dispute, giving a more personal insight into the diplomatic efforts that ultimately led to 
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failure. The plebiscite, although futile, shows us the struggles of vastly different actors 
working together; Americans attempting to impose notions of voting which had never 
before existed in Chile or Peru, white elite officials in a land of “Indians”, a culture of 
extreme violence which meant no-one was safe. All these struggles were watched 
closely by expectant audiences; Chileans, Peruvians and Bolivians whose entire futures 
would be determined by the plebiscite, and Americans, fascinated by the work being 
done down in South America by their hero, General Pershing. Personalities, 
particularly those of Pershing, Edwards, and Freyre indisputably affected the 
diplomatic process through the roles they performed and their personal interactions. 
In this way, geography and biography truly are closely connected.  
A resolution to the Tacna-Arica question was eventually found, years after 
Pershing set sail for his beloved homeland statesmen from the US, Chile and Peru 
agreed upon a settlement which Pershing himself had proposed, giving Arica to Chile 
and Tacna to Peru. With the Treaty of Lima Arica became a border city overnight, 
and the Tacna-Arica region that for so long had been a unified, interdependent space 
was rudely divided. It would seem that that this troublesome border issue had finally 
been laid to rest and Chile could officially embrace the province of Arica into the 
Chilean nation. However the 1929 settlement did not create lasting peace within the 
province of Arica or between Chile and Peru. As this thesis will go on to illustrate, 
violence has never left Arica and this can be seen through different scales from the 
international to the national to the corporeal. 
Chile’s potential sovereignty over Tacna-Arica was tantalisingly close at the 
beginning of the 1920s and the Chilean state was prepared to fight for it at the cost of 
international disapproval over the state’s aggression and the daily reality of violence in 
the territories. Chile’s northern border became central to the state’s geopolitical ideas 
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of state expansion with a healthy state being an organism that grows. The loss of this 
territory would have been a crushing defeat and so Tacna-Arica shifted from being an 
ambiguous grey zone on the edge of the Atacama to the region defining the ideals of 
the Chilean state in the 1920s. Arica was put, quite literally, on the Chilean map. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
	  
DEVELOPMENT AT THE BORDER: THE 
JUNTA DE ADELANTO DE ARICA 
(1958-1976) 
 
"La Junta lo hizo todo, menos el Morro" 
“The Junta made everything, except for the Morro” 
 
Throughout the 1920s the provinces of Tacna-Arica had been at the forefront of 
Chilean national consciousness. The country was asserting itself as a modern powerful 
nation and demarcating its northern border became central to this project. However, 
as soon as Arica was brought officially into the Chilean state in 1929 the borderlands, 
no longer under threat, immediately lost their urgency and Arica became a forgotten 
northern city. Arica fell from being the most important centre of Chilean-ness to the 
least. The Chilean state had had no official development plan for Arica beyond 
populating the northern territories with as many Chileans as possible and eradicating 
Peruvian influences. Unfortunately the incorporation of Arica into Chile coincided 
with the 1929 financial crisis during which the nitrate industry of northern Chile was 
the most affected industry in the country and the region fell into poverty. 
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Arica remained in a state of neglect; the town 
had 20,000 inhabitants and lacked basic services such as schools, lighting, safe 
drinking water, a harbour, and workers' quarters (Ríos Flores 1992). Arica was just a 
small border port which those in the rest of Chile knew little about, the state had been 
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so preoccupied with integrating the northern territory into the state in the 1920s but 
failed to concern itself with the wellbeing of the country’s northernmost provinces 
once they were officially Chilean. The residents of the department of Arica had been 
so overwhelmingly patriotic, to the extent of murdering those who wouldn’t vote in 
favour of Chile, yet the state apparently did not harbour the same sentiments of 
loyalty toward its own citizens.1 
     Figure 22: Port of Arica, 1930. AHVD Fondo Sergio Chacón 	  
Investment by the Chilean state in the 1930s was limited and the decade saw 
orchestrated breaks in the relationship between the previously closely related cities of 
Tacna and Arica. The free movement of goods to the now Peruvian Tacna was 
prohibited, completely changing the relationship between the provinces which until 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term ‘department’ is used to describe the region of the city of Arica and its surroundings, forming one third 
of the Province of Tarapacá. Arica remained as part of this province until the Arica and Parinacota Region was 
created on October 8, 2007 under Law 20.175 by Michelle Bachelet. 
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1929 had been complementary with many families residing between both regions with 
movement free and fluid. The cities had always had a symbiotic relationship and the 
establishment of a regulated international border between them was detrimental to 
the development of Arica. It wasn’t until 1942 that a commercial treaty was signed 
between Tacna and Arica that allowed for some movement of goods across the border 
(Pizarro Pizarro & Ríos Bordones 2005).  
The 1930s and 1940s were therefore quiet years in Arica with those who had 
fought so passionately to make the city Chilean frustrated by its lack of development. 
These citizens were not ones to take this abandonment lightly and systematically 
campaigned the Chilean government to intervene in the stagnation of the department. 
The city, during its years of economic inertia and lack of development became one of 
the most politically active regions of Chile, which was expressed through numerous 
political groups calling for help.2 This frustration can also be seen through the local 
press. In 1931 local newspaper El Ferrocarril reported that Arica’s Chamber of 
Commerce appealed to the President of Chile to intervene in “some measures to save 
the situation… that Arica is not alive, it survives almost entirely on the transit of goods 
and passengers from… Bolivia and to a lesser extent the provinces of Southern Peru 
and it’s little life consists only in the agriculture of its small neighbouring valleys…”3  
The Encyclopaedia of Arica stated; “The rest of the country made progress toward 
development but no-one showed any real interest in including the city of Arica in this 
development. Without doubt it was a difficult, complicated region and everyone 
shunned it” (Velez Coke & Castex Marambio 1972:xiii). These arguments were 
substantiated by statistics reported in 1936 by El Farrocarril regarding the discrepancies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For example, the Comité Pro-Defensa de la Crisis (1931), el Comité Pro-Defensa Proletaria (1931), Liga de 
Arrendatarios (1931), Cámara de Comercio (1929), Comité Arica Pro-Puerto Libre (1933), Confederación de 
Trabajadores de Chile (1936), and the Comité Pro-Resurgimiento de Arica (1937), among others. Ríos Flores, M. 
(1992) p. 14 
3 El Ferrocarril, 12th June 1931 
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in Chilean government investment in the three departments of Chile’s northernmost 
province, Tarapacá: 
Government investment in Tarapacá province 1936 
(US$)4 
Department of Arica 24,799 
Department of Pisagua 54,702 
Department of Iquique 245,827 
 
President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo had taken an interest in the city during his 
1927-1931 presidential term, being the one to sign the 1929 Treaty of Lima, but had 
failed to make the region thrive. And so, when he returned to the presidency 1952-
1958, the development of Arica became a priority. Chile was undergoing changes in 
the mid twentieth-century and Arica was the perfect blank slate to convert into a 
laboratory of modernity.5 However, it was the will and action of the political groups 
that prompted the President to take notice of Arica. One group, Comité de Defensa 
de Arica, after traveling to Santiago and having their pleas for support ignored, 
declared on the local radio that if the Chilean government didn’t assist it would write 
a formal statement declaring that Arica wished to be assimilated into Peru. The 
severity of this ultimatum worked, local pressure and the fear of Arica being lost to 
Peru was successful and legislative changes began.6  Consistently throughout the 
history of Arica the Chilean state has only taken an interest in Arica when national 
sovereignty is threatened. 
The first changes came with Arica’s transformation into the ‘puerto libre’ of 
Chile, the ‘free port’ whereby all goods that entered the port would be free of import 
or landing taxes. This was followed up in 1958 by the ‘Junta de Adelanto de Arica’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 El Farrocarril, 15th March 1936 
5 Modernity is used here is terms of faith in science and technological development, a move towards capitalism, 
industrialization and urbanization.  Modernity in Chile became fortified with Pinochet’s government 1973 
onwards with its conviction in the benefits of the neoliberal economic model.  
6 Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014 
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(JAA), a board of development that was created to catalyse Arica’s development and 
to raise it up to the Chilean national level.  
The Junta de Adelanto de Arica acted as a form of economic pacification of the 
northern border bringing hope and prosperity to the languishing region and lifting it 
out of its violent and troublesome past. Just as international diplomatic action had 
attempted to ‘suture’ the border politically, from the 1950s onwards local citizens 
attempted to do so through economic development. The border once again was 
becoming a centre, not just a forgotten periphery. This isolated city became more 
fully integrated into the Chilean national imagination, at times displaying overt 
Chilean-ness, while at the same time bourgeoning its own regional identity that was 
often in direct contrast to the hegemonic national identity. The paradox of the border 
as a space of nationalism but also of intense regionalism is ever-present. Much to the 
dismay of the citizens the JAA was disbanded in 1976 and Arica has not reached these 
days of glory since. Due to political and economic changes in Chile during the 1970s, 
the JAA was dissolved and progress and development in Arica ground to a halt. 
Industries that had brought necessary funds to Arica either left or collapsed and, even 
after 18 years of the JAA, Arica was unable to be an economically self-sufficient region 
without the special measures that brought into being the puerto libre and the JAA.  
Luis Galdames (2005) has argued that the inhabitants of Arica were passive, 
waiting for solutions to arrive from Santiago, and lacking a strong cultural formation. 
This chapter however argues that while the state created the laws for the puerto libre 
and JAA it was the citizens who mobilised and put these plans into action. The region 
had been suffering due to its border location, a characteristic of the region that was 
non-existent prior to 1929, as well as regional isolation and distance from Santiago. 
This chapter assesses how economic development, authorised by the state but carried 
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out by those in Arica, attempted to soothe Arica’s violent past and create a healthy 
prosperous region for all sectors of society.  
The chapter draws from archival materials such as JAA official documents, the 
JAA photographic archive, and newspaper records of the time and is supplemented by 
oral histories collected by those who worked for the JAA or lived in the city during its 
lifespan. These oral histories include two JAA employees, Franco Muñoz and 
Alejandro González, who were able to contribute information about the JAA from the 
inside as well as numerous citizens whose lives were affected by the organisation. This 
combination of sources portrays a rich picture of Arica during the years of the JAA, 
showing its dreams and successes but also its hiccoughs and failures that are notably 
absent in the public imagination today but became apparent during analysis of 
newspaper records.  
Unfortunately only one newspaper archive makes up the bulk of newspaper 
records; La Defensa de Arica, a right-wing paper that favoured the military government. 
This is clearly apparent in articles after General Augusto Pinochet’s coup d’etat which 
describe Marxist President Salvador Allende’s government as “decadent and chaotic 
to the extreme” and “the darkest and most corrupt phase in Chile’s political history” 
with Pinochet bringing in “the second national independence”.7 Fortuitously for this 
chapter, the JAA remained as separate from politics as it could be in the 
circumstances and articles about the JAA, which was popular amongst all political 
factions, often relay information about projects and meetings without opinion or 
political bias. It did also publish separate opinion pieces that span a variety of political 
views. While using just one newspaper source is not ideal, La Defensa provides an 
important perspective on JAA activities as well as public opinion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 La Defensa. 31st December 1973 
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The use of three different photographic archives from the Archivo Historical 
Vicente Dagnino (Fondo Edmundo Flores, Fondo JAA and Fondo Sergio Chacón) 
provides a picture of the JAA which the organisation wanted outsiders to see, one of 
dynamism, progress, and modernity, thereby necessitating a critical analysis. This 
one-sided view of the JAA hides failures, mundane meetings, and discontent. These 
humdrum meetings can however be seen though the JAA official documents which 
are kept at the Archivo Historical Vicente Dagnino and include minutes, acts, 
telegrams and many more documents from the day-to-day work of the JAA which 
provide information such as exact dates, details of who made decisions, dissenting 
opinions within the JAA, and how decisions were made. It is therefore important to 
combine the inevitable biases of all methods, oral histories, newspaper records, official 
JAA records, and photographic archives in order to uncover the most rounded view of 
the JAA and its impact on Arica as possible.  
 
 
The Puerto Libre 
On the 25th July 1953 President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo signed Decree 303 
that designated Arica as a puerto libre that allowed goods to enter the port of Arica 
without taxes.8 Decree 303 marks the beginning of a process of overt support of Arica 
by the Chilean state through tax exemption laws, customs allowances and special 
treatment in order to revive the economy and create a pole of attraction with 
economic influence in the northern region (LeBlanc 2006). This had enormous 
benefits in Arica including economic prosperity, receiving immigrants from Chile and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 ‘Puerto Franco’ may be a more appropriate term as ‘Puerto Libre’ technically denotes a lack of customs duties 
but also the absence of any fiscal control whereas a Puerto Franco more accurately represents Arica where there 
was a lack of customs duties but with some fiscal control remaining. However, the term used in Arica is ‘Puerto 
Libre’ and is therefore used in this study.  
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other countries, and consequently saw development in terms of housing, sanitation, 
education, and other services. 
 
Figure 23: President Ibáñez del Campo visiting Arica. Velez Coke, J.R. and L. Castex Marambio (1972) 
Enciclopedia de Arica: Ensayo de información general del Departamento. Editorial de Enciclopedias. Regionales: Santiago 	  
Ibáñez’s new policy brought a wave of hope to Arica, it “opened the doors to 
progress for our city, so repeatedly abandoned due to centralism and lack of 
understanding” (Velez Coke & Castex Marambio 1972:x). Don Alejandro Gallo, 
diputado for Arica, expressed in the House of Representatives that “Arica needs to 
develop its temporarily halted progress through the construction of roads and bridges, 
mining, the irrigation of valleys, cultivating sugarcane, etc. To bring about all these 
major projects, our government finds itself with empty coffers but declaring Arica a 
puerto libre would radically change this situation”.9 Decree 303 gave Arica the 
opportunity to draw away from its symbiotic dependency on Tacna, to differentiate 
itself from Iquique, the more prosperous Chilean city to the south, and to integrate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “El Ferrocarril”, 26th February 1932 A diputado is comparable to a British Member of Parliament 
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itself more effectively into the Chilean national economy (Podestá 2004). According to 
the Encyclopaedia of Arica “[i]t was no longer an anaemic village, lost in its solitude, 
veiled in old glories. Its population grew hour by hour. Those who visited- and it was 
thousands every day- returned surprised and enchanted” (Velez Coke & Castex 
Marambio 1972:43-44).  
In the popular imagination the most explicit demonstration of the success of the 
puerto libre was the growth in population from 23,033 in 1952 to 46,659 in 1960 but 
this had geopolitical ends (Galdames 2005). The impact of the puerto libre was 
described by Ariqueño writer Alfredo Wormald Cruz as a “huge advance for Arica” 
which transformed a “quiet and lifeless city” into “a whirlwind of activity” which was 
“the surest way to ensure sovereignty at the extreme of this country” (Wormald Cruz 1968:216 
Emphasis added). A populated and economically successful border city was seen 
geopolitically as an effective deterrent to an outside border invasion. The puerto libre 
had a colossal impact on the economy of Arica as shown by the following comparison 
of economic figures between 1953 and 1957.  
 1953 195710 
Salaries 70.000 727.000 
Customs income 15.800 154.700 
Municipal income 12.500 92.500 
 
The hope was that the decree would give Arica the foundations to become self-
sufficient in fifteen years and that merchants from all of Chile would be attracted to 
Arica to buy imported products at a reasonable price. However, despite the 
indisputable successes, in 1958 it was deemed that the puerto libre had not reached its 
goal that had been to create a consolidated industrial core and to be relatively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Amount in escudos. Velez Coke, J.R. and L. Castex Marambio (1972) Enciclopedia de Arica: Ensayo de información 
general del Departamento. Editorial de Enciclopedias. Regionales: Santiago  
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autonomous. The decree was only able to provide temporary development and a 
‘moment of splendour’.11 The solution therefore was to repeal Decree 303 and instead 
create a new entity that would take a holistic approach to the development of the 
department; and it was named the Junta de Adelanto de Arica. 
 
The Birth of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica  
President Ibáñez signed Law 13.039 on the 15th October 1958 which aimed “to 
develop the production and progress of the Department of Arica and consequently 
grow and consolidate the population of the border area” through “true administrative 
decentralisation”.12 This was to be done through the work of the Junta de Adelanto de 
Arica, a decentralised public service with legal and financial autonomy. The JAA was 
created in order to meet or directly control the needs of a public in terms of the social, 
economic, political and cultural environment of Arica (LeBlanc 2006). One 
government minister stated that this decentralisation was crucial in order to give 
remote Arica the necessary advantages to compete with favoured, central regions.13 
These two legal exceptions for Arica, Decree 303 and Law 13.039 have concreted 
President Ibáñez, ‘The General of Hope’ as a legendary figure in the Ariqueño 
collective imagination, the only statesman to give the region the chance the citizens so 
strongly believed it deserved. 14  Ibáñez’s lasting status can be seen through a 
monument in the city to his honour (Figure 24). 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12th August 2014 
12 Interview, Franco Muñoz. 30th June 2014; La Defensa. 16th October 1971 
13 AHVD Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966 
14 La Defensa. 15th October 1974 
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Figure 24: Monument to President Ibáñez del Campo with JAA employee. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: President Ibañez del Campo signs Law 13.039, 24th September 1958. Ese Arica de Antes, 
Facebook group. [accessed 07/08/2014] 
 
The JAA was financed through collecting import and sales taxes in the region 
and instead of giving all funds to Santiago who would then distribute the total 
countries resources as the government saw fit, Law 13.039 gave preference to Arica as 
the only department allowed to keep its own resources and spend as JAA 
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representatives chose.15 The law had the dual objective of developing a struggling city 
but also to quell the discontent of the far north with the heavily centralised 
government that was unable to meet the needs of Arica. The geography of Chile, with 
such extreme length and thinness, plays an enormous part in the failure of centralism 
in Chile and “has been a problem that has been faced throughout its history”.16 It is a 
prevailing assumption that the more compact and circular in shape a state, the easier 
it is to govern with ease of transport and communication, greater control over the 
population and minimal borders. Chile’s geography could not be further from this. 
Borders were heavily contested throughout Latin America in the twentieth century 
and it made sense to populate and economically strengthen Arica in order to fortify 
Chile’s northern border. It was hoped that Law 13.039 would heal the wounds left by 
centralisation and give increased power and responsibility to Ariqueños.  
The JAA worked explicitly for the region and its people and effectively 
disseminated information to the public so that they had a full understanding of the 
works of the JAA (Figure 26). This was done almost daily through local channels of 
communication, primarily newspapers, as well as by inserting information into the 
landscape such as through public display boards (Figure 27).  
 
 
Figure 26: JAA slogan; ‘An Ariqueño organisation servicing the region and the country’. La Defensa. 31st 
December 1968 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014 
16 La Defensa. 13th October 1975 
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     Figure 27: JAA information stand. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
The structure of the JAA was split between a finance team and a team who 
focussed on the implementation of projects with a total of roughly 200 employees 
ranging from architects to gardeners.17 Within this second team there was a council 
consisting of representatives from the areas of mining, industry, and commerce and 
they worked together, looking at what the community needed, what funds were 
available, and to decide which projects to implement. 18  These employees were 
commended for directly instigating the success of the JAA with one article stating, 
“[t]hanks to this institution, and the vision and regionalist spirit of its directors and 
personnel, in just sixteen years the once small city of 20,000 inhabitants with the 
appearance and air of a village, has been transformed into a thriving urban centre, 
with over 150,000 inhabitants… No city in Chile has been able to grow so quickly, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014 
18 ibid. 
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fact at a national record”.19 It was important that the JAA was led by those within 
Arica. The Mayor of Arica, Santiago Arata stated in one JAA meeting; “The region 
will progress on the basis of its own men”.20 In comparison with the power wielded 
over Arica by state officials and international diplomats in the 1920s, the future of 
Arica was finally in the hands of its own citizens. 
While the JAA acted within the physical municipality it was separate to the 
municipal government, although they did collaborate on occasional projects such as 
parks and public lighting (Figure 28).21 It was not an easy relationship between the 
JAA and the municipal government but in 1965 it was declared that “finally the JAA 
and the municipality march in full agreement”.22 After a period of disagreements both 
groups made a deal to work together on mutually beneficial projects such as parking, 
a small shopping mall, a theatre, and other buildings. 
 
 
Figure 28: Public street lighting project in Arica, 1965. La Defensa. 10th May 1965 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 La Defensa. 15th October 1974 
20 AHVD Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966 
21 La Defensa. 18th January 1964 
22 La Defensa. 12th March 1965 
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The JAA was born in a spirit of optimism and this was carried through the 
implementation of various projects such as industry, health, education, the 1962 world 
cup, transport, tourism, and in the rural interior. Each of these projects is critically 
examined for its purpose and success.  
 
Industry at the Northern Border 
Prior to President Ibáñez’s laws of the puerto libre and the Junta de Adelanto, 
industry was not significant in Arica:23 
Employment in Arica by Industry in 1946 24 
Agriculture 27.7% 
Communications and Commerce 27.5% 
Service Industry 19.5% 
Industry 16% 
Mining 3.4% 
 
However, this changed with the puerto libre and opened the region up to 
national and international trade, making the port of Arica a prime location for export 
and import. This meant industry could flourish through importing raw materials and 
parts and exporting products to other parts of Chile or Latin America and the port as 
the vital hub of industry in Arica was heavily protected and modernised.25 The 
President of ASINDA (The Association for Industry in Arica) stated that “Arica’s 
geographical position will be vital for industrial exchange”, he claimed that Arica 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Industry here is defined as economic activity concerned with the processing of raw materials and the 
manufacture of goods in factories. 
24 Keller  (1946) p.43 
25 For example the expansion of the commercial port in 1962 (AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA. 94. 1962) 
and a large breakwater constructed south of the port in 1966 to reduce the rough waters found at the port. 
(AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA. 297. Acuerdo 2.533, 1966) 
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benefited from a “privileged location” and that “we want not just to sell to our 
neighbours but rather to establish a favourable exchange from every point of view”.26 
          Figure 29: Port of Arica, 1964. Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. [accessed 27/15/2014] 	  
When the puerto libre was followed by the JAA “the general survey of all natural, 
terrestrial or maritime resources in the area, and to plan on using the resources 
located” became a key objective of the organisation.27 For example, the JAA became 
increasingly interested in the mining industry (Figure 30), working alongside ENAMI 
(The National Company for Mining) to explore mining options in the rural interior. 
There were great hopes that copper, the primary mineral of Chile, would be found.28 
The precordillera was prospected for copper and geochemical investigations were to take 
place in the region of Belén-Ticnamar where a variety of minerals were hoped to be 
found.29 Unfortunately while some mining was possible no great reserves such as those 
which exist south of Arica were located. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 La Defensa. 20th April 1970 
27 Ministerio de Hacienda. 1958. Ley 13.039 crea la Junta de Adelanto de Arica. Art.2.    
28 La Defensa. 25th March 1971 
29 La Defensa. 31st December 1975 
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Figure 30: Mineral reserves, Tacora. Date unknown.. AHVD Fondo Sergio Chacón 	  
The JAA was dreaming of a big industrial future for the region, one local 
newspaper declared that “Arica marches to the goal of a great industrial empire, with 
the mobilisation of big capital and the deployment of technical and human forces like 
never has before been seen at this far end of the country”.30 Arica was determined to 
be a frontrunner in technological modernity, particularly in electronics and 
automobile manufacture. To fulfil this dream the JAA gave out credit and loans to 
support industry and enterprise as well as creating a city for workers with all the 
housing and services necessary (Velez Coke & Castex Marambio 1972). Manufacture 
was integral to Chile’s import substitution industrialisation (ISI) model which had 
shaped the Chilean economy since the 1930s, a model that advocated replacing 
foreign imports with domestic production based on the ideology that a country should 
attempt to reduce its foreign dependency through the local production of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 La Defensa. 11th September 1968 
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industrialised products.31 Arica therefore imagined a future for itself as the production 
centre of Chile’s ISI economy. 
 
 
 
 
The success of these efforts was visible in Arica as seen in the above table. 
Imports increased so drastically because Law 13.039 meant that any item 
manufactured in Arica could leave the city without taxes. The tax on luxury items at 
the time was enormous making many products a distant dream for all but the super-
rich. As one citizen describes it “having a TV back then was like having a really good 
car nowadays” until Arica put such items into the hands of the average Chilean.33 
Many automobile manufactures, most famously Citroën, opened assembly plants in 
Arica as, if any stage of manufacture took place in Arica, the vehicles could be sold 
tax-free. By 1962 20 automobile manufacturers had plants in Arica that by 1964 
produced 7,797 vehicles annually meaning that same year only 8 passenger cars were 
imported into Chile (Bizzarro 2005). The mayor of Arica, Santiago Arata, even stated 
the importance of the automobile industry for strengthening ‘Chilean-ness’ in the 
region. Arica had become the automobile centre of the country, industry was not just 
affecting the region itself, but the whole of Chile.34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The ISI model remained in Chile until the free market neoliberal economy was brought in by Pinochet’s 
government. 
32 Anuarios de Comercio Exteriro DEC. Estadisticas Superintendencia de Aduanas. Enciclopedia de Arica (1972) 
p.85 
33 Interview with Tomas Bradanovic 21st April 2014 
34 AHVD Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966 
Visible Trade in Arica (000’S USD)32 
Year Exports Imports 
1952 971 1.024 
1966 8.885 27.147 
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Figure 31: Mayor of Arica, Santiago Arata Gandolfo visits local businesses. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
In fact the JAA became so fundamental to industry that COPROCA (The 
Confederation for Commerce and Production in Arica) declared that the “Junta de 
Adelanto must exist at all costs”.35 Arica’s population was expanding rapidly due to 
employees being attracted to the plentiful work opportunities and patterns of 
consumption had changed in the whole country. It therefore became necessary to 
sustain industry in Arica for the benefit of all. 
Photographic archives suggest that women were employed by industries in Arica, 
although no official statistics exist. Figures 32 and 33 below show female employees 
representing industries in Arica. Traditional gender roles and an ingrained culture of 
machismo in Chile have meant that women’s participation in the workforce outside of 
the home has historically been low but did augment nationally during the active years 
of the JAA. Women's workforce participation in the period 1960 to 1982 fluctuated 
between 20.9 and 26.5% and rose to 30.7% at the end of 1984. Between 1960 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 La Defensa. 8th June 1963 
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1982 there was a 25% increase in the proportion of married women in the Chilean 
labour force (Muchnik de Rubinstein et al. 1991). The increase in low-skilled, low-
paid work, although some women did hold skilled roles, in manufacturing in Arica 
saw a growing number of women enter the workplace. 
 
         
Figure 32: Women at a stand at an industrial fair, Arica. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
     Figure 33: Female employees at an electronics company. Date unknown. AHVD EF 	  
Through support and encouragement from the JAA many industries from 
electronics to mining enterprises were able to develop and flourish at the border, 
trading across international borders. The presence of large companies such as Citroën 
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were a great advantage to the Ariqueño economy but Arica also had a great quantity 
of small light industries who in their mass brought a great dynamism to the city. The 
production of goods free from exorbitant taxes affected Chileans all over the country 
and “allowed Arica to permanently integrate itself into the productivity of the 
country”.36 Law 13.039 was the key to unlocking this wave of industry but it was the 
work in Arica by the JAA that led to its success. Jobs were created for Ariqueños, 
taking them out of the previously precarious employment market that had relied 
heavily on agriculture.  
 
A Healthy, Educated Workforce 
As industry grew in Arica so did its population, from 1952 to 1960 Arica had the 
highest rate of growth through migration in Chile, reaching 71% and by 1971 the 
total population had reached 105,000 (Oyarzún 1962).37 The region encouraged this 
migration with Arica’s mayor, Santiago Arata, declaring, “we open our doors to all of 
Chile to come and collaborate with us”.38 Both Arica’s health and education systems 
were failing to cope with the city’s booming population and so the JAA focussed on 
expanding and improving the regions infrastructure. Health and cleanliness became 
an important signifier of modernity in Chile, an expression of progress in contrast 
with the country’s perceived ‘backward’ neighbours Peru and Bolivia (Tomic et al. 
2006). Arica’s proximity to these countries with its international borders and higher 
than average levels of international migration, increased the challenges of managing 
the health of the region.  
Improving the health of Arica’s population was near impossible with the existing 
infrastructure whereby in 1961 the hospital could only perform emergency surgery 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 La Defensa. 19th December 1975 
37 La Defensa. 25th March 1971 
38 AHVD Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966 
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due to lack of adequate equipment.39 This was an unacceptable situation and so 
investment in health services became a key priority. The JAA immediately injected 
funds into health related projects increasing the number of hospital beds, supporting 
the work of the Red Cross in the rural areas of the department, and working with 
SERMENA (National Health Service for Employees) to provide the necessary 
equipment and funds to aid the employees of Arica-based companies (LeBlanc 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
This focus on health can also be seen with the construction of the Juan Noé 
hospital which began in 1966 (Figure 34) and health education in the urban centre of 
Arica and also in the Andean towns and villages where the population was mainly 
Aymará (Figure 35 and Figure 36).40 The two most important projects in the rural 
altiplano were the multi-use clinic and boarding school in Putre whose aim was to give 
schooling to rural children who lived too far away from day-schools but could receive 
an education, meals and a home in Putre.41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 La Defensa. 1st July 1961 
40 La Defensa. 12th March 1965 
41 Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30th June 2014 
INVESTMENT IN HEALTH (USD) 
S.C.E.H. 7.665.000 
SERMENA 25.000 
RED CROSS 23.000 
TOTAL 7.713.000 
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Figure 34: Hospital Dr. Juan Noé, Arica. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
 
Figure 35: Baby being seen by a nurse. Date unknown. AHVD JAA 
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Figure 36: A nurse gives a talk on health. Date unknown. AHVD JAA 	  
Infrastructure was also key with potable water and effective sewage systems vital 
to improving the health of the citizens. Health improved so greatly that in the early 
1970s Arica was deemed to be the best fed city in Chile (Velez Coke & Castex 
Marambio 1972). This was linked at the time due to high levels of employment with 
good wages whereby families could afford to nourish themselves and their children. 
Moreover, by 1975 health provision in Arica was delivering services never before seen 
in the far north.42 This situation was a far cry from the Arica before the JAA that 
lacked healthcare services and health education. Just decades earlier Arica had been a 
place of extreme violence and danger but this was arguably changing through 
development. 
As well as care directly through healthcare services, there was an important drive 
to increase the physical activity of citizens to improve overall health and wellbeing. 
Sport became the emblem of a healthy city and through an investigation of the 
photographic archives it is possible to see just how this was enacted. From projects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Such as for tuberculosis treatment, care for infants with diarrhoeal or respiratory illnesses and children specific 
treatments as well as encouraging better hygiene, protection against zoonosis’, and industrial safety. La Defensa. 8th 
August 1975 
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such as children’s sports clubs (Figure 37) to women’s sports clubs (Figure 38) there 
was a clear drive to encourage the citizens of Arica to become more physically active. 
The JAA built many sports grounds and venues such as a gymnasium and basketball 
courts in 1963, athletics grounds and equipment in 1965, boxing grounds in 1969 
with the pièce de résistance being the 1972 Olympic sized swimming pool described 
as “one of the most beautiful in all of Chile” (Figure 39).43  
          Figure 37: Young boys play football. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 La Defensa. 20th October 1975; La Defensa. 19th April 1963; La Defensa. 29th May 1969; La Defensa. 6th June 1965 
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Figure 38: Women’s volleyball team. Date unknown. AHVD EF  
                        Figure 39: Divers at the Olympic swimming pool. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
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The role of sport in modern societies has been theorised as being an expression of 
sexuality by Freud to a form of modern warfare by George Orwell but for the JAA, 
sport was a democratising and potentially geopolitical force. The organisation 
particularly promoted team and collective sports that would unite citizens in the 
region across socio-economic boundaries. Ariqueño teams would compete against 
other regional teams, helping to forge relationships with other provinces and create a 
strong Ariqueño identity, as well as strengthening national identity with international 
competitions, particularly with Tacna. Ariqueños competing against Tacneños 
became a way to continue the rivalry between the two cities but this time in a non-
violent manner.  
With the health and wellbeing of the city improving the JAA also had to deal 
with the results of young healthy workers migrating to Arica; children. The JAA 
invested in education due to its long-term approach to development as can be seen 
through the 1961 scheme of vocational workshops for school students with workshops 
on industry, commerce, typewriting, dressmaking, and homemaking.44 This was to 
produce the next generation of workers for this modernising city, young adults to 
work in the growing factories and businesses quickly springing up. For the JAA, 
development could not be successful without education. 
Roughly 10% of JAA funds were devoted to education which included building 
schools in sectors of the city which were rapidly springing up on the outskirts, taking 
control of the educational structure which was at times restructured but generally 
follows German and French education models, and providing equipment such as 
tables, chairs, and blackboards in the city and rural interior. 45  The JAA also 
contributed to the financing of a children’s home “for the treatment of youth in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 La Defensa. 2nd August 1961. 
45 AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, Vol. 180, 1977; La Defensa. 20th March 1974; La Defensa. 24th July 1973; 
La Defensa. 4th May 1962 
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irregular situations” which was a part of a wider South American project to 
rehabilitate children.46  As well as school-level and vocational education, higher 
education was a priority for the JAA. The campuses and infrastructure of three 
universities, Universidad del Norte, Universidad de Chile Sede Arica and INACAP, 
were funded by the JAA (Figure 40 and Figure 41), attracting academics, staff and 
students from elsewhere in a bid to raise the cultural capital of the region, as well as 
providing a good higher education to the citizens of Arica.47  
 
Figure 40: Hall of the Universidad del Norte, Sector Saucache. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 La Defensa. 31st December 1969; La Defensa. 12th December 1969 
47 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014 
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 Figure 41: Construction of the Universidad de Chile, Sede Arica. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
Therefore, health and education were highly important for the JAA as part of 
their vision for creating a healthy and happy working population. While industry was 
crucial in generating funds for the JAA, those funds were for social projects such as 
these that improved the livelihoods of all Ariqueños, whether rich or poor. 
 
Arica and the 1962 World Cup 
One of the most exciting and community-uniting projects created by the JAA was 
the Carlos Dittborn Football Stadium that came to be the base for Group 1 (Uruguay, 
the Soviet Union, Colombia, and Yugoslavia) during the 1962 World Cup hosted by 
Chile.  
Arica was not originally due to be a World Cup host but the 1960 Valdivia 
earthquake, the largest ever recorded, destroyed swathes of southern Chile and meant 
that original host stadiums could not be repaired or rebuilt in time. A late stand-in 
and 2000km from the other stadiums this was nevertheless perfect timing for Arica, 
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the JAA had had four years to make a significant impact on the standard of living in 
Arica, show off its work so far to the rest of Chile and the world and make people 
aware of this growing northern city. While other cities applying to be replacement 
hosts had to request funds, Arica offered to pay all costs from the JAA and was already 
in the process of building a new stadium.48 This stadium was intended for 3000 
spectators but when Arica was selected as a World Cup city the design had to be 
altered to hold 20,000. Many modifications had to be made to the original design to 
vastly increase seating capacity, and add cabins for press and radio, an area of seating 
for journalists, and offices for all the additional staff. One year before the World Cup 
there were some worries that Arica would lose its place as a World Cup host because 
the construction wasn’t progressing quickly enough and there were claims that the 
JAA didn’t care enough about the event which spurred on the JAA who gave “its full 
support” to “do all in their power to ensure success with the tournament”.49  
The world cup acted as a catalyst for development in Arica with citizens calling 
for redevelopments before thousands of tourists were due to arrive.50 The works were 
finished in time however and the president of the Yugoslav selection committee 
applauded Arica during the World Cup stating, “we are amazed that the organisers 
have been able to construct such a magnificent stadium and such a magnificent pitch. 
We congratulate them sincerely on their efforts”.51 As well as the stadium, the JAA 
built housing for the players and tourists who would arrive, lengthened and improved 
the street ‘18 de septiembre’ which gave access to the stadium, and improved the road 
‘Diego Portales’ which would be used by tourists coming from Peru.52  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014 
49 La Defensa. 28th July 1961; La Defensa. 17th August 1961 
50 La Defensa. 8th June 1961 
51 La Defensa. 24th May 1962 
52 Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30th June 2014 
153 
  Figure 42: Scoreboard at the Carlos Dittborn Stadium for the Chile vs. USSR match, June 1962.  
  Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. [accessed 13/10/2014] 
 
Arica prepared for 8000 visitors to descend on the city for the World Cup, season 
tickets were put on sale with 15,000 allocated for residents and 10,000 for tourists. To 
plan for these tourists 936 short-term housing units, predominantly pre-fabricated 
units, were planned. 53  Unfortunately during the tournament 400 of these new 
constructions were left empty as a great number of Peruvians crossed the border for 
the match and returned to Peru the very same day.54 Despite the expansion of the 
stadium to hold 20,000, the average number of spectators for the six group stage 
matches that were played in Arica was only 8,590. However, the quarter final match 
on the 10th June between Chile and the Soviet Union had 17,268 spectators, a figure 
that still pales in comparison with the 76,594 who saw the semi-final between Chile 
and Brazil at the National Stadium in Santiago (Rematal 2006). The audience fell so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 La Defensa. 3rd July 1961 
54 La Defensa. 4th June 1962 
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far below capacity because it was necessary to buy tickets for all of the matches 
together which, with the higher cost, priced out many potential fans. 
 
Figure 43: World Cup players accommodation, Población Juan Noé. Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. 
[accessed 01/12/2013] 
 
Nevertheless when the World Cup finally began in May 1962 local press quickly 
proclaimed; “It is indisputable: Arica is the best group of the World Cup”.55 The city 
was said to be “vibrating” and Arica’s hosting of the World Cup meant that Arica 
appeared in the news on a global level.56 There’s no doubt the world cup increased 
national awareness of Arica, “until then Arica practically didn’t exist for anyone 
else”.57 Arica was aware at the time of the impact a successful World Cup could have 
on its future. One article stated “if all goes well, tourism could stay for the future, now 
that Arica has left an impression as a port of exceptional climate on the visiting 
delegates and the few foreigners”.58 One year on from the tournament, it was declared 
that the 1962 World Cup left a great legacy in Arica with the new constructions such 
as the stadium, paved roads, modern communication systems, offices and luxury 
hotels even if some of these had not been vital during the tournament.59 
In terms of creating a sense of community, while some locals felt left out of the 
World Cup due to high ticket prices, others benefited from the improved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 La Defensa. 4th June 1962 
56 Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30th June 2014 
57 Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12th August 2014 
58 La Defensa. 4th June 1962 
59 La Defensa. 30th May 1962 
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infrastructure and sense of excitement with citizens able to interact with the 
international players.60 Football has been heavily linked to civic participation in Chile. 
Political participation was expanding in mid-twentieth century Chile and football was 
positioned as a neutral entity that could cut across class and political divisions but with 
significant place-based ties to regions, cities, or suburbs (Elsey 2011). One writer 
exclaimed at how during the World Cup, no-one from any political faction dared 
speak of politics.61 Ariqueños could be proud of their region and, despite their 
isolation, feel part of Chile in this hyper-nationalistic sporting event. The whole 
country was for once united in football fever, finally Arica, the difficult northern 
border city was integrated into this national event.  
 
Transport & Tourism 
With industry booming, a growing healthy population, ever-expanding city limits 
and recognition of its existence, a good transport network and its sustainable future 
increasingly became a priority. Improved transport within and to Arica was greatly 
beneficial to industry, tourism and local citizens who were kept abreast of progress 
(Figure 44). There were five main projects that served to develop transport; the new 
airport in Chacalluta, the Rodovario bus terminal, the Chacalluta and Tambo 
Quemado customs controls, railway developments, and improvements made to the 
port to receive maritime passengers as well as facilitating industry.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The Yugoslavian team particularly integrated themselves into Arica. La Defensa. 4th June 1962 
61 La Defensa. 13th June 1962 
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                           Figure 44: JAA transport projects information stand. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Memoria SEGA. April 1978. AHVD 
INVESTMENT IN TRANSPORT (USD)62 
COMMERCIAL PORT 15.715.000 
ROADS 11.216.000 
AEROPORT CHACALLUTA 5.213.000 
RAILWAYS 2.754.000 
RODOVIARIO BUS 
TERMINAL 
1.084.000 
TOTAL 35.982.000 
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This transport plan therefore served the region at three levels; the Andean 
macroregion taking advantage of Arica’s triple-border location covering Peru and 
Bolivia (Figure 45), the national level connecting Arica with the rest of Chile, and at 
the local level improving transport within the city and region itself (Figure 46 and 
Figure 47). The JAA was also in the primary stages of constructing a road from Arica 
to the Brazilian port of Santos that would open up the region internationally, allowing 
for trade routes across the Atlantic.63 The JAA was using transport to realise its dream 
of a highly internationalised and prosperous Arica. This focus on transport was also a 
sign of the JAA’s dream of modernity. Arica had become the centre of automobile 
manufacture for the entire country and so the latest technologies to transform Arica 
into a hyper-connected, cosmopolitan city through ‘corridors of modernity’ were a 
fitting addition. Car ownership became an emblem of modernity in Chile and roads 
were necessary to shuttle citizens quickly and efficiently around cities and the country 
(Trumper & Tomic 2009). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, 466, 1975 AHVD.; Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014 
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Figure 45: Installing a sign along the international road between Arica and Bolivia. Date unknown. AHVD 
EF 
 
 
Figure 46: Underpass at Tucapel roundabout. Date unknown. AHVD EF 	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Figure 47: Construction of the Saucache bridge. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
Roads in the rural altiplano were all greatly improved and from 1964 the JAA 
began its ‘vast interior road plan’ to connect rural villages and towns such as 
Ticnamar, Chapiquiña and Belén with Arica and with one another.64 The JAA’s 
reason for this road network was to favour the development of settlements whose 
potential riches could determine the future of the province.65 It was hoped that the 
roads could stimulate the population growth of certain areas as well as economic 
growth as some small mines could be extracted which would “give new life to places 
which today suffer from isolation and helplessness”.66 In this helpless interior, the JAA 
was seen as the only possible life-giver with one newspaper headline reading; “Only 
the JAA can help the abandoned region of General Lagos”, the poorest part of the 
department of Arica.67  The roads connecting Arica to Peru were also of great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30th June 2014; La Defensa. 17th April 1964 
65 La Defensa. 5th June 1967 
66 ibid. 
67 La Defensa. 16th May 1967 
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importance along with the necessary border control as in February 1964, 3000 people 
were crossing the Chacalluta border every day (Figure 48).68 
 
 
Figure 48: Chacalluta Border Control, late 1960s. Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. [accessed 
19/07/2014] 
 
In addition to improving the lives of the citizens of Arica, the JAA wanted to 
bring more people to the region and so good transport links were essential. The JAA 
used incentives, such as the National Cueca Championship founded in 1968 and held 
in Arica every June, to increase spending and therefore the VAT that would be 
received by the JAA.69 They aimed to “take advantage of the particular climate 
conditions of the area and especially the modern network of hotels, to benefit from the 
affluence of tourists”.70 Arica capitalised on “archetypes which form part of an 
idealised Chilean tradition” that originated in southern Chile such as the cueca, ramadas 
(fairs) and huaso clubs to insert a highly traditional way of performing Chilean-ness 
into a region that had previously been Peruvian (Díaz Araya 2010:14). This served to 
create a sense of belonging and affinity with the Chilean nation for the citizens of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 La Defensa. 25th February 1964 
69 Interview. Alejandro González. 18th June 2014 
70 La Defensa. 9th November 1963 
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Arica, many of whom were immigrants from the south, as well as attracting tourists 
who, whether Chilean or not, could come to Arica to enjoy a full manifestation of 
traditional Chilean identity. Since the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) when Chile took 
control of Arica, the state has struggled with how to incorporate such a Peruvian and 
Bolivian identified region into the Chilean nation. Until 1929 Chile took an aggressive 
approach, eliminating traces of Peruvian identity such as schools, press, and churches 
but this changed as the JAA opted to promote Chilean culture through sponsored 
events and education. This served to distance Arica from its ‘sister city’ Tacna across 
the border in Peru and instead create links with Santiago, over 2000km to the south, 
and the rest of Chile. 
 
Figure 49: The National Cueca Championship 2013. http://www.republicadearica.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/20-campeonato-nacional-de-cueca.jpg [Accessed: 02/10/14] 
 
The JAA also invested in services to attract tourists such as by giving loans to 
hotels and building a casino, the second in all of Chile. Although the casino was 
expensive to build it was estimated that within a year of its opening it was able to 
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make back that expenditure in takings. 71  A 1976 memo indicated a US-Chile 
‘international venture corporation’ that would grant a US firm 100 spaces on LAN-
Chile flights to bring gamblers from foreign countries to Arica every week. Chilean 
officials estimated that this would bring US$7 million per year not including gambling 
expenditure.72 These schemes were clearly successful because by 1970, Arica was 
“after Viña Del Mar, the city which offers the greatest hotel options and even when it 
has tried to increase this capacity, it is still pales in the face of the growing demand for 
accommodation”.73 The JAA also wanted to make it easier for tourists to visit the 
rural interior and so accommodation was built in Putre and Codpa (Figure 51).74  
 
Figure 50: Casino of Arica. Date unknown. AHVD EF 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 La Defensa. 1st September 1961; La Defensa. 25th February 1964 
72 {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1976SANTIA01579_b }} 
73 La Defensa. 16th October 1970 
74 ibid. 
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Figure 51: Tourists with children in the rural interior. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
There was a desire to make Arica as beautiful as possible, which prompted 
investment in parks, gardens and beaches (Figure 52). The JAA supported Arica’s 
entry into a national floral competition with plants grown mainly in the Azapa valley. 
This was seen as a worthwhile investment of funds as “the tournament is of not just 
national importance but also of international and touristic importance”.75 One open 
letter to the JAA stressed the need to improve the aesthetics of the port and primary 
streets visited by tourists in order present the best possible face of Arica. As the city 
was rapidly growing the streets “from the colonial era, [were] narrow and completely 
inadequate for the current traffic”.76 The need to re-construct the city was seen as so 
great that Chile’s Director for Architecture declared that a “whole new city needed to 
be built, with every kind of services and with a view to the future to house 200,000 
inhabitants”.77 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 La Defensa. 21st November 1963 
76 La Defensa. 21st July 1961  
77 La Defensa. 22nd June 1961  
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Figure 52: Construction work on Lisera Beach. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
 
Figure 53: Judging the ‘Queen of the Beach’ beauty contest. Date unknown. AHVD JAA 
 
The new Chacalluta airport replaced the older El Buitre to bring these tourists in 
to the region and half of the costs of its construction were supplied by the JAA. The 
growing airline industry played a key role in promoting the region and various offers 
were presented to citizens to encourage them to travel (Figure 54). In the 1960s LAN 
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offered a discount on flights of 40% to students from the very far north in Arica and 
the very far south in Punta Arenas. This served to unite the country in a way that had 
never before been possible before long distance mass transit systems. 
 
Figure 54: Promotional tool from LAN Airline highlighting Arica as a tourist destination, 1955 when the city 
was served by the airport in El Buitre. The region is represented by the famous Hotel Pacifico and the 
Tacora volcano. Ese Arica de Antes, Facebook group. [accessed 20/09/2013] 	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55: LAN advertisement. La Defensa. 20th January 1966 	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Transport provided the necessary links to connect Arica with Peru and Bolivia, to 
the rest of the country and also within the city and wider region. This was vital for 
imports and exports as industry was prospering but also helped to develop the new 
industry of tourism. The integrative approach including investment in hotels, 
entertainment venues such as the popular casino, leisure activities such as the beaches 
that were especially attractive to Chileans from the colder south, and the invention of 
Chilean-ness with events such as the national cueca championship, boosted visitor 
numbers, which ploughed even more money back into the local economy. 
 
The Rural Interior 
The majority of JAA funds were funnelled into urban development schemes in 
the city of Arica but rural areas, despite only having a tiny fraction of the 
department’s population, were not ignored. In fact, the abundance of photographs of 
the rural interior located in the archives suggests that the JAA purposefully wanted to 
celebrate the unique culture of the highlands and the projects that they were 
implementing there. Indigenous citizens were included in ceremonies and 
photographs to make it clear that the department of Arica did not end at the city 
limits (Figure 56 and Figure 57). Many urban citizens of Arica feel a strong connection 
with the interior and were fully in favour of schemes to preserve and support the rural 
villages yet modernity in the form of transport, health, and Chilean state education 
was unstoppable. However, despite this outward display of rural projects, just 1.2% of 
total JAA expenditure was directly invested in rural towns and villages. Due to a 
problematic past relationship with indigeneity and ethnicity in Arica these projects 
must be analysed critically. 
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Figure 56: An indigenous woman cuts the ribbon at an inauguration in the rural interior. Date unknown.  
AHVD EF 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Memoria SEGA. Abril 1978  
TOTAL FIGURES (USD) 78 
AGRICULTURE 13.749.000 6.4% 
INDUSTRY 9.355.000 4.4% 
MINING 4.695.000 2.2% 
TOURISM 9.839.000 4.6% 
EDUCATION 21.590.000 10.1% 
HOUSING 60.373.000 28.2% 
HEALTH 7.713.000 3.6% 
TRANSPORT 35.982.000 16.8% 
RURAL TOWNS/VILLAGES 2.557.000 1.2% 
OTHER 4.087.000 1.9% 
SUB TOTAL 169.940.000 79.4% 
TOTAL 213.968.400 100% 
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Figure 57: A woman receives gifts from a charitable organisation. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
In 1962 the JAA published its plan for the development of the interior that 
focussed on education, agriculture and farming, health and medical assistance, social 
assistance, and legal advice. This spanned from improving existing schools (Figure 58 
and Figure 59), to classes for illiterate adults, to theatre groups, to classes on hygiene.79 
The fact that these communities are almost entirely of indigenous origin raises 
questions about what projects should and shouldn’t be held in the interior. For 
example there were campaigns using traditional songs to discourage the consumption 
of coca, a leaf that is a very important part of Quechua and Aymará culture and is 
used for religious, medical, nutritional, and cultural purposes (Figure 60). The leaf is a 
symbol of indigeniety that was not compatible with the Chilean state and so plans to 
eradicate its use were widespread.  While the aim of the JAA was to benefit all citizens 
of the department, the example of the coca leaf shows that only one specific idea of 
progress was encouraged and indigenous culture was not fully a part of this. The JAA 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 La Defensa. 18th July 1962  
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is viewed so uncritically by local citizens, as a universally beneficial part of Arica’s 
history, but the projects in the rural interior suggest another side to the popular 
narrative. 
 
Figure 58: Inauguration of a school in the rural anterior. Date unknown.. AHVD EF 
 
 
Figure 59: Students at a school in Belén singing for the governor of the province. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
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Figure 60: Folkloric Musical group (Tarkeros) in Chapiquina in the rural interior. Date unknown.  AHVD EF 
 
Many people who lived in the interior did not feel a strong Chilean national 
identity or identified more strongly with Peru or Bolivia, a trend that had existed since 
the territory changed sovereignty.80 JAA projects were therefore a way to impose 
Chilean identities and ways of living onto these communities as the state had better 
control of education, teaching Chilean-ness to young children (Figure 61), in the 
systematised national style of education in the Spanish language (Figure 62), and 
encouraging indigenous citizens to enrol in national schemes such as educational 
diplomas (Figure 63). It wasn’t until the 1980s that schools began bilingual 
educational systems in the interior that included Aymará alongside Spanish (Mondaca 
Rojas & Gajardo Carvajal 2013). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Some rural communites formed political groups to actively resist Chileanisation in the years 1883-1926. Díaz 
Araya, Ruz Zagal & Galdames Rosas (2013)  
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Figure 61: Young children waving Chilean flags in Visviri, a village located on the tripartite border between 
Chile, Bolivia and Peru. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
 
Figure 62: The Governor of the Province visits a school in the rural interior. 15th July 1976. AHVD EF 
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Figure 63: An Aymará woman receives a diploma. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
In the mountainous interior, between 1961 and 1965 the JAA focussed primarily 
on agricultural schemes to improve irrigation and production such as new fertilisers, 
novel management techniques and the introduction of species as well as providing 
agricultural loans (Quiroz Thompson et al. 2011).81 This plan was reformulated in 
1967 to work closely with the Plan Andino, a department of the JAA that took a more 
holistic approach to the rural interior. These rural projects were concentrated in the 
largest town in the interior, Putre, and were based on JAA representatives traveling to 
the interior and asking ‘what do you need?’.82 The schemes that were most successful 
were those that improved irrigation which was a constant battle in the most arid part 
of the world, and taught the proper handling of livestock such as the 1967 Putre 
project which built communal corrals for 5,500 sheep and 750 cattle.83  These were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, Informe Esquema de Planificación del Desarrollo Agropecuario de 
Arica, 1962. 
82 Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014 
83 AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, Vol 146, 1975. 
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prestigious breeds including cows from Holland and karakul sheep.84 The JAA also 
altered the agricultural business model as previously “the wool produced in the 
altiplano was bought by Bolivian or Chilean traders, being in reality unfair as they 
paid below market value or bartered for goods”.85 The JAA brought thousands of 
plants to the rural villages including 112,500 in Lluscuma, 57,500 in Ticnamar, Oxa 
and Lupica and 6000 in Chapiquiña to introduce species such as almonds, apples, 
pears and peaches.86 These non-endemic species meant that experts were needed to 
teach local citizens how to produce new crops as well as how to face specific problems. 
To this end a soil microbiologist improved irrigation in Arica based on his experience 
in the United States and another expert in olive cultivation gave courses to olive 
farmers in the Azapa and Lluta valleys.87 
 
Figure 64: Cultivation of onions at 3900 metres above sea level. February 1968. AHVD JAA 
 
During the lifespan of the JAA, 1958-1976, rural areas witnessed substantial 
depopulation as agricultural workers migrated to Arica. This was a side effect of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014 
85 AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, Vol. 146, 1972. 
86 AHVD. Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA, Vol. 339, 1969. 
87 La Defensa. 20th August 1963 
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greater communication with the city of Arica where a modern city with amenities, 
jobs, beaches, and an enviable climate were attractive to those scratching a difficult 
agricultural life in the cold, high-altitude interior.  When the JAA began the interior 
was only accessible by mule and as the JAA started to build roads that connected the 
villages with Arica the interior began to depopulate. This had begun during the era of 
the puerto libre when Aymará families began to relocate to the coast (Quiroz 
Thompson 2014). These migrants were on the whole adolescents and young adults 
who became employed in manual labour, in low-skilled industry, and in domestic 
service (Choque Mariño 2009).  
Alejandro González recognises that this may have been to the benefit of 
individuals as “it changed their lives, it connected them to life today”.88 However, 
depopulation was also a problem for rural development and also geopolitically as 
urban migration would leave the north-eastern corner of Chile which borders Peru 
and Bolivia, vulnerable. The presence of patriotic citizens acts as a fortification of a 
border especially in isolated, more vulnerable areas such as the department of Arica. 
A 1976 report by the US Department of State stated that the “primary rationale [of 
the development of Arica] has been political: to attract and hold Chileans in order to 
secure this former Peruvian territory against any effort to regain it”.89 An earlier cable 
from 1974 shows that the US Department of State was aware of the benefits that 
strengthening the local population would bring; “Chile's military government is 
headed by a general who prides himself on being a geopolitician, and he must believe 
that a vacuum inside Chile cannot but attract an historical enemy”.90 Throughout 
Latin American history, state elites have been wary of indigenous communities in 
borderlands who they see as having a strong attachment to their locale but no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014 
89 {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1975SANTIA00909_b}} 
90 ibid. 
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attachment to the nation. Projects such as the Plan Andino are therefore more than 
just about bodies at the border but about nationalistic citizen-soldier bodies at the border. 
Just as indigenous communities in the 1920s were violently coerced into either 
declaring themselves Chilean or leaving the territory, these communities were coerced 
through cultural and economic means to align themselves with the Chilean nation. 
The JAA was not a politically neutral entity. 
Thus the JAA sought to populate the interior, or at the very least create a 
presence there with the establishment of public services, security agencies, and 
military with increased transport routes.91 The Plan Andino focussed on indigenous 
populations and aimed to improve the lives of those who lived in the interior, to 
prevent them from being forced to migrate to the coast or to misplace their national 
identity.92 The aforementioned projects, from seeds and machinery to credit systems 
and all the health and education schemes in the interior were enacted to this aim.  
 
Relationship with the Citizens 
Demographically and culturally Arica became unrecognisable; even though 
population growth was predominantly by in-migration from southern Chile the region 
developed a very strong sense of local identity. Rapid population growth breathed life 
into Arica, creating a sense of community that hadn’t previously existed. In 1954 the 
‘hymn of Arica’ was written and has been sung since that date in schools, patriotic 
events, and other celebrations (Velez Coke & Castex Marambio 1972). 
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HIMNO DE ARICA 
Es tu lema la paz 
y es tu grito libertad, 
tierra señalada de inmortalidad. 
Es tu Morro imponente 
besado por el mar. 
Símbolo de gloria, patria y lealtad. 
En nuestro corazón 
hay un himno vibrante para ti. 
Clamor de multitud, 
juramento de fe en el porvenir. 
Tu noble pabellón 
con las glorias de Junio se cubrió, 
¡Arica! ¡Siempre Arica! 
¡Siempre Arica hasta morir! 
 
Figure 65: Hymn of Arica. La Defensa. 29th October1968 
 
On another cultural aspect, it became necessary to speed up the process of 
bringing television to Arica when there were “over one hundred televisions in Arica 
which exclusively received cultural, news, historical and patriotic programs from 
Channel 2 in Tacna [Peru]”.93 It was seen as so unacceptable that Peru would have 
this hold on contemporary culture in Arica that something had to be done to bring 
the technology that existed further south in Chile up to the border. The Universidad 
del Norte took up this challenge and obtained licences to install and use Chilean TV 
in Arica.94 This is part of a legacy of Tacna and Arica aiming to become more 
attractive than the other. Ever since the Treaty of Ancón was signed in 1883, these 
two provinces have attempted to lure in residents, initially with the hope of persuading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 La Defensa. 14th April 1966 
94 ibid. 
Your motto is peace  
and your cry is freedom,  
land designated for immortality.  
It’s your imposing Morro  
kissed by the sea.  
Symbol of Glory, homeland and loyalty.  
In our hearts  
there is a vibrant anthem for you.  
The roar of the crowds 
pledging faith in the future.  
Your noble flag  
with the glories of June it covered,  
Arica! Always Arica!  
Always Arica to the death! 
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the citizens to vote for Peruvian or Chilean sovereignty in the plebiscite and later to 
increase their populations and prosperity and ensure sovereignty long-term. 
The JAA is revered by Ariqueños as bringing the ‘golden age’ to Arica and 
benefiting the lives of local citizens. Job provision was a primary way in which citizens’ 
lives were affected, “For some ariqueños the JAA means the ‘boom years’ for others it 
meant employment. The JAA began after the closure of the nitrate industry whereby 
many people lost their jobs, so the JAA meant a new era of industry and employment 
for those who had been affected”.95 Jobs were so plentiful that it was reportedly very 
unusual to see a beggar or homeless person on the streets during the JAA years.96 
Other benefits extended to potable water, electricity, social centres, beaches, parks, 
and sports facilities which means that “today (especially the older populations) feel 
true nostalgia for the JAA, for the benefits which they received”.97 This can be seen 
nowadays through the oral histories of citizens and through documents from the time 
such as the following poem dedicated to the JAA. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014 
96 Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014 
97 Interview, Franco Muñoz, 30th June 2014 
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Figure 66: Poem to the JAA. La Defensa. 29th October 1968 
 
One function of the JAA that affected citizens everyday was the development of 
housing. The JAA was obliged by Law 13.039 to spend 5% of its total expenditure on 
low-income housing drastically improving the lives of the poorest citizens (LeBlanc 
2006). The JAA always surpassed the stipulated 5% and thousands of homes were 
built predominantly in the areas of Juan Noé, Santa María, Lastarria, and Nueva 
Imperial. In 1974 housing was the largest area of investment for the JAA as shown by 
the planned investments below which promised 21.23% of all spending for housing. 
 
 
 
 
JUNTA DE ADELANTO 
Admired in this city, proud  
of its advancement and progress and beauty:  
its imposing and majestic rise,  
like the Morro of Arica.  
 
Homes, schools and roads  
you display some of your work, very protectively.  
For you, Arica changed its destiny,  
Today it is strong, leading and powerful.  
 
Junta de Adelanto we named you;  
And now the face of Arica is not the same  
You managed to take it out of the swamp 
That centralism had plunged it into. 
 
So today our Junta, a colossus  
who was born without fanfare,  
thanks to the idea of a victorious statesman  
that all of  Arica fondly remembers.  
 
Junta de Adelanto principal and goal,  
symbol of the dynamism of the time.  
All Chile, standing, greets you and respects you 
and positions you as one of the forgers of the world. 
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SECTOR % OF EXPENDITURE 197498 
AGRICULTURE AND FISHING 5.08 
MINING 6.01 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 16.21 
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION 9.96 
HOUSING AND URBANISATION 21.23 
EDUCATION AND CULTURE 9.51 
HEALTH 5.96 
TOURISM SPORT AND RECREATION 10.97 
GENERAL SERVICES 9.57 
TRANSFERS 5.43 
TOTAL 100 
 
Housing was not always just a functional way to shelter families but a way to 
project the JAA’s vision for the city of Arica. 1971 was known as “the year that Arica 
built vertically” as for the first time, with a rapidly increasing population, the JAA 
decided to build apartment blocks. Apartment blocks were described as “the 
aspiration and dream of numerous urbanites”, showing Arica to be a real modern 
Chilean city.99 The JAA, moving away from the traditional Andean adobe and wood 
that had previously defined the city built mainly with reinforced concrete with a style 
of architecture referred to as brutalismo (Galeno-Ibaceta 2013). Arica can be seen as a 
‘laboratory of modernity’ that was sustained by the Puerto libre and the JAA, a small 
fishing village that had the potential to be transformed into a bustling metropolis on 
an international border.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Planned 1974 expenditures. La Defensa 24th July 1973 
99 La Defensa. 12th March 1971 
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Figure 67: ‘Lastarria’ housing which comprised 21 houses and 78 apartments. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
 
 
Figure 68: The recently completed ‘Las Magnolias’ housing. Date unknown. AHVD EF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This modern concrete metropolis was planned for every sector of society, the JAA 
aimed to be inclusive with statements such as “that there be light for everyone!”, a 
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dream which was assured in March 1969 with the comprehensive ‘Electrification 
Plan’, and “vast plan of works to benefit all sectors”.100 The JAA was nicknamed at 
one point the “rich aunt” for how it had improved the lives of Ariqueños and “had 
not neglected any sector and had given preference to those who needed it most”.101 
One article summed up the impacts of the JAA writing; “Workers, professionals, 
housewives, students, all arrived to an Arica which offered excellent universities… 
schools… medical clinics, centres of recreation, and a high standard of living in 
general in a modern and beautiful city of large parks and gardens”.102 
Therefore, for the citizens of Arica, the JAA created a cultural community, 
brought television, built parks and gardens, and provided homes. However, despite 
the nostalgia felt by citizens today, during the years of the JAA there was not universal 
agreement on the role the organisation should take and how funds should be spent. 
 
Discontent & Criticisms 
Talking to current citizens of Arica, the JAA is remembered as perfect in every 
way with no criticisms ever to be found. While the JAA was enormously successful 
documentary sources suggest there were criticisms at times, some projects were 
deemed ‘controversial’, and citizens did feel poorly treated or ignored on occasion. 
These discontents have been written out of history but were important at the time.103 
Part of using critical theoretical approaches is to question the popular narrative. 
There were instances when citizens complained about the rightful spending of 
JAA funds. In contrast to the earlier description of the JAA as a ‘rich aunt’ it was 
declared elsewhere that the “JAA has been the poor parent in an orgy of millions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 La Defensa. 31st August 1971; AHVD Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA. 95. Acuerdo 3.960, 1969; La Defensa. 17th 
January 1974 
101 La Defensa. 31st December 1971 
102 La Defensa. 19th December 1975 
103 AHVD Fondo Estudios Técnicos de la JAA. 297. Acuerdo 411, 1966 
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dollars” as money was being squandered on useless projects.104  During the creation of 
Parque Brasil JAA representatives travelled to Brazil and brought back authentic 
Brazilian plants to adorn the park. This was seen as a wasteful luxury by some citizens 
who still lacked basic services and believed that that JAA should “work only for the 
progress and wellbeing of Arica and its inhabitants for whom the Junta de Adelanto 
was created”.105  
Beautification of the city was a contentious issue with the citizens of Arica, while 
some were calling for money to be spent solely on sanitation, housing, and other basic 
necessities others wanted parks and gardens to enjoy and to attract tourists. One 
advisor to the JAA presented a statement arguing why the beautification of the Morro 
would greatly benefit Arica, particularly for reasons of tourism, with greener, better-
irrigated spaces.106 Even though the popular saying of Arica is, “The JAA made 
everything except the Morro”, even the morro was put under the guardianship of the 
organisation that was “initiating a program that should end with the total 
beautification of the Morro, as such turning it into a place of great tourist attraction 
and historical veneration”.107 This beautification was not an easy task in Arica, the 
driest city in the world, where irrigation was no small feat when Arica was in a 
constant “fight against the desert”.108 This shows the tension between citizens, some 
who argued that parks and trees were not necessary when people still lived in poverty, 
while others proclaimed the cultural, historical, and economic benefits of 
beautification.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 La Defensa. 30th July 1973 
105 La Defensa. 1st July 1961; During these trips to Brazil JAA employees were given 32,000 pesos per day, a figure 
which greatly upset many Ariqueños who, despite improvements in employment, were earning just a fraction of 
this. La Defensa. 30th June 1961 
106 La Defensa. 13th July 1961 
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Figure 69: Vicuña Mackenna Park, October 1979. AHVD EF 
 
There were also complaints that the JAA was giving “huge amounts of funds to a 
very small number of business owners instead of helping others who are more in 
need”.109 In one case, a group of ninety families from one sector of the city, El 
Esfuerzo, formed a group to voice their grievances that the JAA was ignoring their 
petitions to improve their area that was becoming unsanitary due to swampy ground 
leading to illness in 80% of children.110 This suggestion of cronyism with the favouring 
of few business owners was exacerbated by journalists complaints regarding the JAA’s 
lack of freedom of information whereby certain JAA departments had never shared 
information publicly and all JAA sessions were held in secret.111 
The transformation of Arica from a small fishing town to a dynamic city came 
with downsides as well as positives for residents. One article declared that; “The zona 
franca has been a sad reality for the majority of the old Ariqueño residents”; citizens 
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are being “displaced to the suburbs of the city” and  “just want to be left alone in 
peace”.112 Moreover, having a prosperous port located near two international borders 
opened Arica up to new levels of crime. Arica arguably became the drug centre of 
South America as will be discussed in chapter seven and in 1961 authorities had to 
buy twelve new vehicles, mainly jeeps, for the sole purpose of combatting the high 
amounts of contraband flowing into Arica’s port.113 
Furthermore there was discontent with how the JAA changed as an organisation 
during its lifespan. In 1972, Antonio Weinborn who had been heavily involved in the 
JAA at its inception, bemoaned what the organisation had become, describing it as 
having been “eaten by termites”. “The termites that the JAA brings and nourishes in 
its bowels, are they patriots or sectarians? Have they forgotten that Arica is a border 
city- an island between two countries with different economies- in which only the 
impetus and vitality of our Junta de Adelanto can shape the pace of progress that 
Chile and we need?”114 Archival records therefore show the criticism faced by the 
JAA at the time even though this discontent is now currently absent from the popular 
narrative.  
 
 
Relationship with the Government 
Shifting administrative power from Santiago to a region 2000km from the capital 
was a bold move by the Chilean government but the “JAA [was] considered one of 
the most successful experiments in administrative decentralisation”. 115  This 
entrustment was taken very seriously, as described in one article that; “From its 
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formation the Junta de Adelanto began to exercise a positive influence on the 
development of the department because the members of its advisory board took firmly 
the task of immediately making operative the powerful legal instrument which had 
been put into their hands”.116 Moreover, it was not simply that the projects that the 
JAA undertook were successful, virtually every type of development that occurred in 
Arica between 1958 and 1976 was instigated by the JAA. As one journalist put it; “It’s 
important to remember that 99% of the works, activities and initiatives of progress 
and development in all sectors of Arica have arisen from the initiatives and support of 
the Junta de Adelanto, in all we can say with fairness that it is the motor neurone and 
heart of progress of this port of northern Chile”.117 
As soon as the JAA was established it was made clear that it would run 
autonomously or semi-autonomously.  Arica, so against the centralisation that had led 
to its abandonment after its incorporation into the state, actively distanced itself from 
the rest of Chile. As one JAA adviser stated, “local commerce must unite ourselves 
against the enemies in the south”.118 The spirit of autonomy was paramount and the 
confidence of the state in the JAA was key to its success. President Eduardo Frei 
declared on a visit to Arica in 1968 that “I have wanted to come here to reiterate my 
trust in the actions of this organisation… the Junta de Adelanto is one of the first 
autonomous organisations that has worked in this country based on an effective 
administrative decentralisation”.119  
In a similar vein, Luis Beretta Porcel, JAA President, stated that; “The autonomy 
of the JAA is the generator of progress” and that “the laws of exception of some years 
ago were not a gift but rather the necessary measurements to allow for community 
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planning and to progress with adequate development”.120 It was also reiterated that 
the JAA would not be tied to any political party or stance and would act only to serve 
Arica. Antonio Weinborn, a JAA councillor, stated that “The JAA cannot be the 
political instrument of anybody… Arica is a national economic island even if 
centralism doesn’t understand it. And all of this without selling-out or political 
manoeuvring”.121 Elaborating on how this worked in practice, JAA employee Franco 
Muñoz explained that “[t]he JAA was linked to the Chilean Government through the 
Minister of Housing and the General Treasury… In terms of decisions about 
investment in infrastructure, housing and local development the JAA had a fair 
amount of autonomy”.122  
It appears that this autonomy and centralisation was not welcomed by all in 
Santiago with Franco Muñoz considering that, “I think the autonomy of the JAA 
bothered the post-Ibáñez governments (various ministers visited Arica to request 
financial support for projects which the government wanted)”.123 However despite 
considerable autonomy and these claims of political neutrality the JAA did not 
function entirely separately from the Chilean state. The President and Vice President 
of the board were the province’s governor and mayor and the port and railway 
administrators were also appointed by the government, even though these roles were 
more decorative than functional. Official JAA documents do however show the 
presence of senators and diputados at JAA sessions. 124  The Chilean state also 
approved budgets and requested that certain projects were initiated such as the port, a 
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power plant in the rural interior, and stating that 5% of the budget must be used on 
housing.125  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 70: Poster celebrating the 17th anniversary of the JAA, the ‘first experience of decentralization in 
Chile’. 1975. AHVD JAA 	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Chile in the time period of the JAA, 1958-1976, experienced dramatic political 
upheavals; from the arrival of the world’s first democratically elected Marxist 
President, Salvador Allende in 1970 to the military overthrow by Augusto Pinochet in 
1973. With the government of Salvador Allende, there were, according to Franco 
Muñoz some significant problems because Allende wished to take absolute control of 
government at every level and his involvement in various industries led to production 
problems that, therefore, led to a decrease in JAA funds.126 However, Allende did 
noticeably increase the number of JAA employees.  
There were more serious problems with the advent of Pinochet’s military 
administration in 1973 as the new General eliminated all ‘special articles’ and ‘special 
laws’ (under which the JAA had been created) and used the funds for other ends. The 
‘Chicago Boys’ who Pinochet had called in for economic advice told Pinochet that 
these articles and laws “did not contribute to the spirit of governing a country in a 
centralised manner and instead the funds should be distributed as the central 
government deems appropriate”.127 These changes by Pinochet led to the eventual 
dissolution of the JAA three years after the military coup. However, according to 
Alejandro González, during these three years the advent of the Pinochet dictatorship 
brought no changes to the everyday functioning of the JAA. 128  No employees 
represented a political party and so a separation between the JAA and the 
government could be maintained. Through looking at archival sources the reliability 
of González’s claims can be doubted as Pinochet is photographed at numerous JAA 
meetings (Figure 71) and visiting JAA officials and projects (Figure 72) and so 
complete immunity from political influence is unlikely. 
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Figure 71: Visit and meeting with Augusto Pinochet. Arica, 1974. AHVD EF 
 
 
Figure 72: General Pinochet with the President of the JAA, Luis Beretta Porcel on the General’s visit to 
Arica, 6th February 1975. La Defensa. 7th February 1975 
 
Thus, despite outward claims that the JAA was autonomous and the everyday 
running of the organisation took place in Arica, there were undeniable links to the 
government through decorative roles and funding stipulations. The JAA dreamt of full 
autonomy but this was not practical, especially in times of financial crisis when the 
organisation needed financial support. 
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Dissolution of the JAA 
With all the aforementioned projects in the fields such as industry, transport, and 
health, the JAA appeared to be hugely successful, the citizens were delighted with the 
impacts on the region, despite the noted criticisms, and the region was booming. It 
was declared by local press in 1974 that; “Owing to the activities of the Junta de 
Adelanto, Arica boasts the highest levels of demographic, economic, industrial, 
schooling, health and per capita income growth. For these reasons and an infinite 
number of others, Arica is currently one of the most important tourism and industrial 
centres in our nation”.129 The JAA even had impacts beyond Arica with other 
Chilean provinces taking great interest in the idea as well as Peruvian ministers who 
visited in 1962 who left “very impressed” with the JAA.130 The United Nations visited 
Arica to look at the work of the JAA, German Ambassador Dr. Rudolf Salat visited 
Arica and was impressed by its development calling it “a faithful expression of the 
Chilean miracle”, and two Spanish advisors were sent by General Franco’s 
government to co-operate with officials in Arica on tourism plans.131  
Due to the successes of the JAA, the Pinochet government aimed to apply the 
strategy to the whole northern province of Tarapacá as well as the southernmost 
province of Magallanes. The two extremities of this long country were seen as the 
most in need of decentralisation and investment.132 The JAA therefore became a 
model for other regional development bodies such as La Corporación de Magallanes, 
La Junta de Desarrollo Industrial del Bío-Bío, Malleco y Cautín, La Corporación de 
Desarrollo de Valparaíso y Aconcagua and la Corporación de Atacama y Coquimbo, 
among others (LeBlanc 2006). Alejandro González remarked that although the JAA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 La Defensa. 15th October 1974 
130 La Defensa. 4th July 1962 
131 La Defensa. 7th July 1964; La Defensa. 16th August 1969; La Defensa. 22nd August 1969 
132 La Defensa. 21st March 1974 
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served as a model for these other regions, they failed to replicate its success due to 
Chile’s rampant nepotism. Other development boards would elect individuals for 
their family ties as opposed to their experience or skills that has therefore affected their 
efficacy.  
However, despite all this apparent success, on the 10th December 1976, the JAA 
was officially declared dissolved. This news came as a shocking blow to the region 
though prior governmental changes were rocking the stability of the JAA.133 Citizens 
were hugely disappointed at the news as the JAA had played such a significant role in 
the development of the community.134 One citizen elaborated; “Obviously everyone 
was sad when it ended, it was an institution which carried the city forward and when 
it went the city began to fall, industry left, and the city fell into the abandonment 
which exists until today”.135 
In 1974 General Pinochet, who had taken power in September 1973, stated that 
the JAA had fulfilled its plans in Arica and should now widen its remit to the whole 
province, which went far beyond the department of Arica.136  It was declared that 
“now Arica will work in close integration and interdependency with Iquique, as its 
current status as head city of the First Region and the resource budget will be divided 
virtually in half, giving each region those resources for their owns plans of 
development”.137 1974 seemed to be a year of great optimism for the JAA with 
successful meetings with Pinochet’s government in Santiago and many plans laid out. 
Jorge Dowling, governor of the province, announced in January 1975 that “I have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Earlier, on the 12th January 1962 a new law had appeared, Law 14824, which aimed to establish new rules for 
imports and exports and had had a notable impact on port prosperity. In 1972 came the first scares that the VAT 
in Arica would be altered by which Arica would be forced to give all VAT collected in the department to Santiago. 
“For Arica it is fatal and maybe the grave for the JAA” declared the local press. La Defensa. 31st July 1972 
Nevertheless Arica was riding a wave of progress and these regulations didn’t dissuade manufacturers who had 
moved there. 
134 Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12th August 2014 
135 Interview, Constanza Sepúlveda. 10th July 2014 
136 La Defensa. 2nd February 1974 
137 La Defensa. 28th October 1974 
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total confidence in the future of the JAA” and that “the Junta is a prestigious and far-
reaching entity known country-wide for its fruitful labour for the benefit of this region 
and its inhabitants”.138 Dowling stated that the JAA would continue “even if the name 
is changed for legal reasons relating to the regionalisation of the country, its objectives 
will always remain the same and its works will continue in the same manner”.139 
The truly fatal changes came as Pinochet began radically restructuring the 
national economy. Favouring free markets and neoliberalism, all special laws and 
decrees for economic development were dissolved in the belief that success should be 
based on competition and merit, not state-propped subsidies. Pinochet’s government, 
and also the preceding administrations of Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei, relied 
on a body of technocrats involved in the highest-level policy decisions (Silva 1991). 
Pinochet employed young neoliberal technocrats trained in economics at the 
University of Chicago to design and execute economic policy and formulate an official 
ideological discourse. Disciples of Milton Freidman, the ‘Chicago Boys’ believed that 
a competitive free market economy would be the only effective solution to Chile’s 
development issues. Presented as modern and scientifically sophisticated, this 
economic strategy won support with detractors quickly dismissed as ignorant or 
pursuing covert interests.  
This is not to suggest that Pinochet was the first President interested a high-tech 
economy, as seen through the work of the JAA Chile was concentrating on modernity 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In 1971 Allende initiated the innovative Project 
Cybersyn, an information based network which forecast economic models and 
thereby manage the Chilean economy most effectively (Medina 2011). The project 
allowed for a decentralised, more democratic implementation of socialism than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 La Defensa. 30th January 1975 
139 ibid. 
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Soviet-style top-down systems. This experiment in technology, decades before its time, 
was cut short prematurely by Pinochet’s 1973 coup. 
These economic changes reversed Law 13.039 and without the income from 
customs taxes, the JAA stopped receiving funds. Pinochet removed the high import 
duties that had existed in Chile, and to which Arica had been exempt, which opened 
up industries such as electronics and automobile manufacture to the global market, a 
market on which Arica could not compete. This meant that Arica, which had 
previously been the automobile manufacturing capital of the country had just two 
companies remaining by 1977. Gradually fewer and fewer parts of the manufacturing 
and assembly process took place in Arica until it was just the final stage; “to assemble 
a car in Arica only meant air [into the wheels] and water [into the radiator]”.140 The 
owner of ‘Bicicletas Oxford’, one of largest factories in Arica during the 1970’s, 
warned that the reason for industrial decline was the removal of financial incentives as 
businesses moved south to more attractive climes.141 The automobile and electronics 
industries that had been so prosperous in Arica moved south to other parts of the 
country after these changes to the economic model and Arica no longer held its earlier 
benefits. 142  Arica was unable to compete on the worldwide free market with 
manufacturing locations within or outside of Chile.  
To add to this loss of industry, on the 25th June 1975, Iquique was declared the 
capital of the province of Tarapacá, a city well-known to be one of Pinochet’s 
favourites, which pushed Arica back out to the margins. The final nail in Arica’s coffin 
was that on the 28th October 1975 Iquique was declared a ‘Zona Franca’, making it 
the new go-to destination for imports and cheap products in Chile. This focus on 
Iquique was a direct prejudice against Arica and business owners, traders, investors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014 
141 La Defensa. 1ST February 1978 
142 Interview with Sergio Giaconi of CORDAP. El Mostrador. 29th January 2014 
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and entrepreneurs followed the economic incentives to Arica’s rival port. 
Consequently, with industry failing and with Arica sandwiched between two thriving 
areas which benefited from heavy state investment, Iquique to the south and Peruvian 
Tacna to the north, the JAA was unsustainable, without income its objectives were 
impossible, and the organisation was dissolved at the end of 1976. 
It is important to question here what Pinochet’s rationale was in decimating 
Arica’s economic development. He would undoubtedly have been aware of the 
devastating effect the dissolution of the JAA would have on the progress of the 
department as well as the geopolitical benefits of a prosperous and populated border 
region. Pinochet’s favouring of Iquique suggests that he could have continued to 
support Arica. Did Pinochet not value Arica as Chilean territory in comparison to 
Iquique? Did Pinochet fear the temptation for Peru and Bolivia of an economically 
healthy Arica? Was he confident that the border was safe regardless of its state of 
development? The following chapter will address these questions.  
Jorge Dowling’s earlier claims that even if the JAA continued under a different 
name, the running and objectives of the organisation would remain the same turned 
out to be unfounded.  In a speech in Arica on the 2nd December 1976, Pinochet 
declared that with the dissolution of the JAA all assets would be transferred to the 
private sector including the Hippodrome, the casino, and the swimming pool. The 
profits from these now privately-run facilities would be invested into development in 
Arica by an organisation known as SEGA (Executive Secretary of the Provincial 
Government of Arica).143 Among SEGA’s responsibilities was to manage the assets left 
after the dissolution of its predecessor and administer all properties for the state. 
SEGA was described by Alejandro González as “born dead. Stillborn because it had 
capital, it had all the assets of the JAA, they were selling some buildings, renting out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 La Defensa. 2nd December 1976  
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others, they had a steady income. But it couldn’t actually do anything, it couldn’t 
spend the money. So SEGA lasted until 79 or 78 and then all assets were passed over 
to the treasury”.144 Another citizen, government employee Sebastian Rojas believed 
that “SEGA was just a step in the process of eradicating the JAA”.145 SEGA acted as a 
puppet during the difficult transitional years, proclaiming to be acting in the interests 
of the region but in reality being an impotent office.  
The effects of the dismantling of the JAA were felt promptly and keenly. By 1978 
it seemed that Arica’s golden years were already fading with local press pessimistically 
proclaiming; “Industry is leaving Arica and won’t return”.146 The dissolution of the 
JAA caused anxiety for residents, many had had their lives vastly improved by the 
JAA and it was unclear whether these benefits would remain or not. This was felt 
particularly acutely by the now defunct employees, one of whom stated that the way 
they were “treated showed ingratitude for all that we have done over so many 
years…[and that they have been] transferred to other jobs where the salaries are 
inferior to those paid by the ex Junta de Adelanto”. 147  Current residents see 
December 1976 as the quick and precise end of the golden years for Arica. In the 
words of Alejandro González, when the JAA ended “it was a huge blow for Arica. 
Because when the JAA finished, Arica was paralysed, Arica died. I would even dare to 
say that since then it hasn’t recovered”.148 Alejandro González claims that the JAA 
did not disappear because the military government wanted it to, it was a secondary 
effect of modifications which were made to the economic system.149 Even if this 
secondary effect was not intentional it remains that, despite the success of Arica being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014 
145 Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014 
146 La Defensa. 1st February 1978 
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148 Interview, Alejandro González, 18th June 2014 
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directly attributed to the work of the JAA, it was government action that put an end to 
the region’s prosperity and progress. 
 
Conclusions 
Arica, after being officially incorporated into the Chilean state in 1929, was 
ignored by the heavily centralised government and was languishing economically and 
socially, much to the chagrin of the small but forceful population. The presidency of 
Carlos Ibáñez del Campo attempted to reverse this fate firstly through Decree 303 
and the puerto libre and later in 1958 with Law 13.039 and the creation of the Junta 
de Adelanto de Arica. Through projects to boost industry and use these funds for 
social schemes such as health, education, transport, tourism and housing, Arica 
became synonymous with progress, modernity and prosperity. Citizens rich and poor 
benefited from the JAA, however schemes in the rural interior were potentially 
discriminatory against indigenous communities as traditional customs such as coca 
chewing were discouraged in favour of Chilean western-based forms of education and 
health. Overall the JAA was enormously popular with local citizens and many declare 
that it directly benefited their lives. However, although in the collective imaginary of 
Arica the JAA is sanctified and never faulted, looking back on documents from the 
duration of the JAA, there was some discontent and criticism coming from citizens.  
With the advent of the Pinochet government in 1973 and a move back to 
centralisation and towards neoliberal free markets by the Pinochet government, the 
JAA became unsustainable. The organisation was unable to survive without the 
special laws that allowed industry to grow and for funds to remain in the region. The 
economy of Arica fell back into stagnation with the dissolution of the JAA, while the 
organisation had done wonders for the region during its existence, there was not a 
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firm enough productive base to keep up the momentum of industry and progress 
begun by the JAA. For this reason the JAA can be seen as ‘fictitious development’ as 
the region’s leap into modernity was temporary and could not outlast the JAA. 
Therefore while the JAA aimed to heal the troubled and violent past that Arica had 
had with economic development and while these injuries faded into the background, 
the perennial issues of abandonment and lack of investment remained. 
The JAA was an attempt at bringing modernity to an abandoned and 
impoverished town, to use economic development as a tool to raise Arica out of its 
desperate situation, creating a unique regional identity while at the same time 
integrating itself into the Chilean nation. The organisation had succeeded in 
integrating the department of Arica more fully into Chile as well as vastly increasing 
its population which acted to strengthen the country’s northern border. This proved 
to be necessary with the political turmoil that was to arrive at the border during the 
1970s. 
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CHAPTER SIX 	  	  
THE DICTATORS GO HEAD TO HEAD: 
THE ALMOST-WAR 1973-1979 
 
“By reason or by force” 
Chilean national motto 
 
 
In 1973 Chile and Peru were headed by Generals Pinochet and Velasco, military 
dictators and political enemies who squared off on the border, entangled in global 
Cold War geopolitics that disrupted Chile-Peru relations. The centenary of the 1879 
War of the Pacific was approaching and the Peruvian dictator was obsessed with 
reclaiming northern Chile as Peruvian no matter how many lives would be lost in 
doing so. As the decade progressed Chile fortified its frontiers and the border city of 
Arica became heavily militarised. Far from the earlier attempts at economic 
pacification by the Junta de Adelanto de Arica, the threat of violence returned to 
Arica in full force. Through empirical research various narratives appear, local 
citizens who had no idea they were in any danger, military officials who were certain 
Peru would successfully capture the territory, state representatives who organised 
grand displays of bi-national friendship and spies who sought to deceive the enemy 
and find out their secrets.  
These narratives tell a complex story about what the border really means for 
different actors, while the state was at a point of ‘almost-war’, the citizens of the 
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border region moved freely and lived in a spirit of friendship with their neighbours. 
Empirical research illustrates a picture of military posturing, deception, and a 
spectacle of war that permeated the military. Tensions reached an all-time high with 
the approach of the centenary of the War of the Pacific in 1979 but a multitude of 
factors meant that the threat of violence gradually dissipated. The 1970s saw overt 
displays of friendship, covert deception, and the configuring of where the border 
really lay, questioning whether Arica may have been a ‘grey zone’. International 
violence was returning to Arica and far from a ‘suture’ to heal the Chile-Peru border, 
the old wound was being dangerously picked-at and reopened under the threat of 
war. 
The causes and effects of the military tension between Chile and Peru exist at 
varying scales. The issues began largely due to global geopolitical changes, notably 
Cold War politics driven by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. This was exacerbated by national political changes in Peru and Chile both 
of which came to be headed by military dictators with conflicting ideological beliefs 
and affected those who inhabit the borderlands at the corporeal scale, their bodies 
shaking with fear and military manoeuvres. This chapter begins with a lengthy 
introduction to the geopolitical climate of the time but this is in order to better 
understand the violence that appeared as a result on the Chile-Peru border. 
These scales can be seen through two main methods; oral histories and 
newspaper reports. The oral histories focus on those who were in the armed forces 
during the 1970s, who, with sufficient distance from the events talk with remarkable 
openness and honesty. One interviewee was even a former spy who, with the promise 
of anonymity, was happy to talk about his relationship with the military and his role 
in information gathering. Oral histories were also collected from civilians in order to 
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investigate to what extent those who had no ties to the military were aware of any 
possible military threat from Peru. Certain details are provided by General Odlanier 
Mena through secondary sources when he gave interviews before his death in 2013. 
Mena was the key military figure in Arica during the 1970s but was later arrested for 
human rights violations and was imprisoned from 2009 until his suicide. Mena’s 
statements are included due to his importance in the region. Newspaper reports, 
predominantly from the right-wing pro-military La Defensa, were very important in 
showing the everyday reporting on Chile-Peru relations.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter La Defensa is a right-wing Arica-based 
newspaper that made overt statements in favour of Pinochet’s military junta; “The 
junta is not a soothing remedy but rather an effective drug that will take away the evil 
so that the illness will cease forever”.1 However, all such reporting must be viewed 
critically as there was very little freedom of press during these years. Moreover, the 
press was kept in the dark about any rumours of war even going so far as to report on 
what the foreign press was reporting about tensions between Chile and Peru.2 The 
local press in Arica distracted the citizens of the region from the problems at the 
border through articles about the good relations and ‘brotherliness’ between Chile 
and Peru. The notoriously secretive Pinochet regime never revealed official 
documents and so oral histories and newspapers are integral to uncovering this little-
known historical event. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 La Defensa. 9th January 1974 
2 For example in 1974 La Defensa quoted a Brazilian newspaper who were reporting on the Soviet Union supplying 
tanks to Peru in “unknown quantity” in an act of “the Soviets installing an armaments agency in Latin America”. 
La Defensa. 21st March 1974 
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The Cold War Superpowers in Chile & Peru 
The tensions that were to emerge on the Chile-Peru border during the 1970s 
were heavily embedded in global Cold War geopolitics. The late 1960s and early 
1970s in Latin America can be crudely characterised by a leaning towards either the 
Soviet Union or the capitalist United States. These rival powers appealed to Latin 
American governments through economic claims, each offering a better future than 
the other. The US and USSR competed for favour in the Third World with the 
former showing that liberal capitalism can bring wealth and political stability while 
the latter aimed to prove that state-directed socialism could bring about economic 
equity and social justice (Brands 2012). 
The work of Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) has argued that South American 
military regimes existed to advance US global capitalism and eradicate left-wing 
politics on the continent. However these regimes were not tools at the disposal of 
Washington, dictators had their own ideas and strategies. It is posited here that events 
in Chile were driven by these global factors but that Chile was not passive, the nation 
also managed to have worldwide influence. Chile, which felt its first effects of the 
Cold War in 1947, has been described as a “Cold War battleground”, a space where 
global superpowers were fighting for ideological hegemony but where Chile was also 
able to be a viable actor in the global balance of power itself as this chapter will argue 
(Rinke 2013).3 Moreover, the Cold War superpowers undoubtedly shaped world 
affairs but most citizens experienced the Cold War through the behaviour of their 
own governments as opposed to through global affairs. 
The most notable episode of Cold War geopolitics affecting Chile was the United 
States’ involvement in Chilean politics. The United States has been involved in 
Chilean affairs, whether overtly or covertly since the War of the Pacific when the US 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Memoria Chilena, Biblioteca Nacional de Chile [http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-3460.html] 
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attempted to bring the war to an end in order to protect US business interests in the 
region and prevent Britain gaining more economic control (Clayton 1999). US 
influence may even have begun earlier during Chile’s fight for independence from 
Spain in 1811. Throughout the history of the Chile-Peru border, the United States is 
always in the background. The US government and in particular the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been actively engaged with Chilean political parties 
since the Second World War and “…had had a presence in Chilean politics dating 
back to before 1940” but became increasingly involved with the ascent of Marxism 
and Communism in the 1960s (Fermandois 1998:6).  All political parties in Chile, 
from the 1930s until the 1980s at some point favoured US involvement but, far from 
a homogenous leaning to the US, Fermandois has argued that most political parties 
had also been involved with the USSR at some point. 
Dr Salvador Allende, when he was elected President of Chile in 1970 with 
Unidad Popular (UP or Popular Unity), believed that the USSR would support Chile 
in breaking its political and economic dependence on the US (Nogee & Sloan 1979). 
However, although the Soviets were in favour of engaging in mutually beneficial 
projects with Chile, they did not want to take political, military, or economic risks in 
order to aid another country towards socialism. The Soviets were glad that Allende 
had taken power but would not commit themselves to aiding the survival of Popular 
Unity. The USSR had little real influence on policy in Chile but Chilean communists 
did become increasingly interested in Moscow. Many travelled or studied there, and 
between 1945 and 1975, roughly 2,000 army and nearly 400 navy officers received 
postgraduate training in the USSR (Bawden 2009). Fermandois has stated that “the 
local communists developed a high degree of faith in Moscow, and the fixation on the 
Soviet model and the orthodox Marxism acted as a heavy ballast in the national 
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political game” (1998:20). Latin America was never a high priority for the USSR, it 
didn’t rely on the continent for raw materials or foodstuffs, nor did Chile need goods 
from the USSR (Nogee & Sloan 1979). Therefore, the USSR was only really 
interested in creating problems for the US, they were willing to provide some 
resources to the communists and they offered loans to the army, but they were not 
prepared to subsidise the Chilean economy as they had done with Cuba. Particularly 
after 1970, the USSR became increasingly focussed on détente with the US and 
involvement with Allende’s socialist regime could have seriously compromised this 
aim.  
When Salvador Allende became the world’s first democratically elected Marxist 
President in 1970 the US dropped its official aid to the government and vastly 
increased its unofficial aid to centre and right-wing political parties and businesses 
due to the fact that the State Department described Allende as “a threat to the entire 
Hemisphere”.4 Pre-Allende the US invested huge sums of money into Chile with the 
unofficial figures predicted to be far higher (Nogee & Sloan 1979). By 1970, the 
United States had invested $1.1 billion in Chile out of an estimated total foreign 
investment in Chile of $1.7 billion (Nogee & Sloan 1979:346). 
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  FISCAL YEARS TOTAL US ECONOMIC AID TO 
CHILE (Millions of US$)5 
1953-1961 339.7 
1962 169.8 
1963 85.3 
1964 127.1 
1965 130.4 
1966 111.9 
1967 260.4 
1968 97.1 
1969 80.8 
1970 29.6 
1971 8.6 
1972 7.4 
1973 3.8 
 
This support ended once Allende took power but the new Chilean president 
faced more than just a lack of support, he was actively victimised by the US. The 
1975 Church Commission Report that was organised to investigate troubling reports 
of illegal activity conducted by the CIA, NSA, and FBI and found that covert US 
involvement in Chile during Allende’s presidency was extensive and continuous.6 US 
President Richard Nixon persecuted the Allende government by disrupting the 
Chilean’s plans to nationalise several US corporations and the copper industry and 
directed that no new bilateral economic aid commitments could be undertaken with 
Chile. Nixon was adamant he didn’t want Chile to become ‘another Cuba’ due to the 
worldwide influence it could have thanks to its geography. Chile’s location could have 
given it influence into the heart of South America but also well into the Pacific due to 
its extensive coastline. 
The CIA which was established in 1946 (and its predecessor the OSS7) used 
militaristic techniques abroad in order to shape world politics in favour of the US, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 U.S. Senate, 1975: 34 
6 Church Report available at: http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book1/contents.htm 
7 The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the CIA’s predecessor and was established during wartime from 1942 
until 1945 and carried out espionage and propaganda for the US armed forces. American geographers were some 
of the key players in the OSS with roles in administration, writing regional reports and in cartography with the 
OSS being the single most important government institution employing American geographers during the war. 
Barnes (2006)  
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namely by eradicating communism.8 By 1954 the CIA had become an integral part of 
American foreign policy and therefore by 1970 the organisation had extensive 
knowledge and experience of operations in Latin America. The CIA directly financed 
the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio owned by Agustin Edwards, the grandson of the 
Agustin Edwards who was the Chilean Member of the 1925-1926 Plebiscitary 
Commission (Kornbluh 2003). Edwards played a large role in Chile-US relations, 
lobbying US officials to help prevent Allende’s rise pre-1970 and encouraged US 
President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in their support of military 
action against Allende once he was elected. This is one example of how Chile was not 
a passive ‘pawn’ in the Cold War but an active player.  
Post-1970, Nixon’s administration acted to “make the Chilean economy 
“scream”… spread “black” propaganda, and Washington finally goaded the Chilean 
army into the coup of 1973” (Kornbluh 1998). Declassified memos illustrate the US’s 
vehemently anti-Allende stance such as when “On Sept. 16, CIA director Richard 
Helms informed his senior covert action staff that “President Nixon had decided that 
an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States”” (Kornbluh 
1998). The US was threatened by the problems occurring in its own ‘backyard’ where 
their prestige and interests were being affected materially. The manner in which 
Nixon acted in Chile has been described as disproportionate and inappropriate due to 
the lack of evidence that the USSR was abetting Allende’s Marxist administration 
“the nature of the Soviet-Chilean relationship could hardly justify U.S. policies 
toward Allende’s Chile” (Dominguez 1999:10).  
The extent of the CIA’s involvement in the events of September 11th 1973 when 
the military junta headed by General Pinochet Ugarte took control of the country has 
been well documented, especially since the Clinton administration declassified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Trevor Barnes has documented how this occurred in Europe. Barnes (1981); Barnes (1982)  
206 
documents in 1999 (Kornbluh 2003; Weiner 2007). However, it must be emphasised 
that the US did not create the Pinochet government or its neoliberal policies, in fact 
the US failed more than it succeeded; Allende was never meant to take power in the 
first place. The State Department had attempted and failed to have congress choose 
presidential candidate Jorge Alessandri instead of Allende despite the public vote.9 
The US aided Pinochet and the Chilean military but that is not to say that Chileans 
were the docile puppets of Nixon. Moreover, Allende’s government did not fall solely 
due to the “not-so-covert machinations of the Nixon administration”; its own failings 
played a significant part (Brands 2012:4). The brutality of the ensuing Pinochet 
administration should not lead to the uncritical adulation of Allende in comparison. 
General Pinochet was an admirer of the United States describing it as “a young 
country of great economic potential, [which] is capable of exercising an indirect 
political-economic control over large areas of the world…Every day there appear new 
zones that feel the impact of this great State’s power” (Pinochet Ugarte 1981:61). 
However, against Pinochet’s wishes, US-Chile relations did shift again throughout the 
1970s as Pinochet’s human rights violations and the now-confirmed murders of 
thousands of Chilean citizens and the torture of many more made open US support 
of the military dictatorship problematic.10  
For instance, in October 1974 the United States Senate voted in favour of 
stopping all military support to Chile, set an arms embargo in 1975, and the Carter 
Administration (1977-1981) in particular distanced itself from Chile.11 In 1976 a 
meeting took place between Pinochet, the Chilean foreign minister, and US Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger (Bawden 2012). Pinochet tested the waters as to whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Letter dated 17th September 1970. Documentos Secretos de la ITT. Biblioteca Nacional de Chile. 
10 As outlined by the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de Verdad y 
Reconciliación or the “Rettig Commission”) between 1990-1991 which was established to investigate human 
rights abuses that occurred during the Pinochet regime. 
11 La Concordia de Arica. 2nd October 1974 
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Chile could rely on the support of the US if war was to break out with Peru and 
Kissinger’s non-committal response was a forewarning for the Chilean General who 
had previously been supported by the US. The perceived abandonment of Chile by 
the US angered Chileans. One article in the Arica press warned that the US “turning 
its back on this small but exemplary country” is “playing with fire” and later “they 
will complain of Marxist penetration”. The article decried that the US “has an 
obligation to support the first country to achieve freedom from tyranny” although 
adding that “it is not to criticize, but to regret the possible consequences that may 
come as a result… at a time when the Marxist battle flags are waving everywhere”.12 
The length of Chile, including Arica, was aware of US influence. 
In terms of Peru’s relationship with the Cold War superpowers, Chile’s northern 
neighbour was much more involved with the USSR than Allende had been. Peru has 
had close relations with the USSR from 1969, with only Nicaragua and Cuba having 
closer relations. General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s administration (1968-1975) rejected 
both capitalism and communism in favour of a nationalistic and non-aligned foreign 
policy, he was keen to escape foreign domination and US influence in the country. 
The CIA had been present in Peru since the mid-1960s when they set up military 
training camps and provided arms to the Peruvian government to combat guerilla 
forces. Velasco refused to accept this and expelled US military advisers, removed the 
Peace Corps presence, and nationalised US businesses but his links with the USSR 
remained based in mutual interest and financial benefits rather than Cuba-style 
involvement.  
Peru-USSR relations became closer with the government of General Francisco 
Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980) who deposed Velasco and who engaged in more 
trade with the USSR than any other Peruvian president. Much of this trade was in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 La Concordia de Arica. 5th October 1974 
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military equipment that was instigated by Peru, and the USSR responded favourably 
by offering low prices and generous credit terms (Berrios & Blasier 1991). In the mid-
1970s, one-fifth of arms being imported to Latin America were destined for Peru, 
with half of Peru’s arms imports originating from the USSR. 
When Velasco in Peru had closer ties to the USSR than Allende ever did, why 
did the US become actively involved in overthrowing Allende whereas they favoured 
the path of negotiation in Peru? One reason may be because the Peruvian dictators 
never seized power on communist ideology whereas Allende was outspoken about his 
politics and was elected democratically, with a substantial number of voters behind 
him.13 The CIA believed that the USSR and Peru had close military ties but that 
Peru remained at a pragmatic distance, shown by the fact that it purchased military 
equipment from France and the US as well as from Moscow and that the Peruvian 
navy tended to be more anti-communist and so kept a detachment from the Soviets, 
preferring to buy weaponry from Europe and the US.14 The Peruvian military 
claimed that a populist movement away from both communism and capitalism was 
the only way to prevent a Castro-style revolution. Chile was therefore seen as a threat 
that required direct US intervention whereas Peru could be reasoned with and so its 
considerable ties with the USSR were tolerated. 
 
Pinochet & Velasco: Ideological Enemies Face Off 
The governments of Marxist Allende in Chile and left-wing dictator Velasco in 
Peru were civil during their period of overlap, 1970-1973. Both were focussing on 
agrarian reform, the nationalisation of resources, and the control of business. Allende 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Although notably not a majority, On 4 September 1970, Allende obtained a narrow plurality of 36.2% 
14  CIA Research Paper. (1982) ‘Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship.’ 
[http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000496616.pdf] 
209 
recognised that although they had taken power differently, the Chilean through 
democratic means and Velasco through a military coup, both were “leading their 
people to the great avenues of authentic democracy and freedom” (Rodríguez 
Elizondo 2004:559). This sense of unity between the two countries even meant that 
when the United States threatened Allende with the embargo of Chilean copper, 
Velasco offered to pass Chilean shipments off as Peruvian (Castillo & Zarzuzi 2005). 
Allende, being fervently against North American imperialism was keen to maintain 
good border relations in order to keep the US from meddling in South American 
affairs. Both nations had signed the Andean Pact of 1969 along with Bolivia, 
Colombia, and Ecuador that aimed to give a strong base of economic and political 
power free from control by the US.15 Peruvian historian Hernán Rodríguez who lived 
in Tacna throughout the period of tension remembered how Peruvian press was 
favourable toward Allende with positive reporting of political events in the southern 
neighbouring country.16 
However, relations between Peru and Chile were transformed overnight when 
Pinochet overthrew Allende’s government in Chile. The tensions on the border began 
on the day of the military coup in Chile; the border was closed and an arms race 
began. The appearance of the fervently anti-communist right in Chile caused the 
Soviet Union to intensify ties with Peru and over the following six years sold 250 tanks 
and 36 supersonic bombers to Velasco financed by loans at a low interest rate 
(Meneses 1982). Since Velasco seized power in 1968, military strength became a key 
priority for Peru and in 1969 Peru bought planes from France, the first Latin 
American country to buy such sophisticated weaponry. Chile in contrast was weak 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The Andean Pact ended with Chile’s departure under Pinochet in October 1976. Muñoz (1982)  
16 Interview, Hernán Rodríguez. 31st July 2014 
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militarily with its equipment languishing in poor condition.17 However, Peru was 
claiming that Chile ‘started it’ by being the first to buy weapons; “We are not going to 
wait around with our hands in our pockets,” proclaimed Velasco in 1974, “while our 
neighbors make their purchases of equipment”.18 Peru’s military spending, which was 
concentrated between 1974 and 1977, soon became disproportionate to its economy, 
between 1968 and 1977 Peru’s per capita GNP rose only 40 percent, yet per capita 
military expenditures increased by over 80 percent (St John 1992). 
 
 
Figure 73: General Pinochet and General Velasco. La Defensa. 5th February 1975/La Defensa. 5th February 1974 
 
Pinochet and Velasco were ideological enemies and the friendly relationship 
between Chile and Peru could not remain. These differences in ideology between the 
dictators led to increased tensions at the Chile-Peru border. Chile withdrew its 
relations with other Latin American countries by exiting the Andean Pact and 
severing relations with Cuba worried about the island nation’s growing influence on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Chile had sourced military equipment from a variety of countries including the US, Great Britain, Switzerland, 
Belgium, Germany, Austria and Spain. 
18 ‘U.S. Reports Arms Buildup in Chile, Peru’. Los Angeles Times 17th January 1974 
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the continent. Seeing the “growing influence of the USSR” in Peru, the junta 
reversed Allende’s policy of building ties with Lima, and relations between the two 
countries soon deteriorated into talk of war (Brands 2012:157). Velasco no longer had 
reason to maintain friendly relations with Chile and Pinochet’s administration had 
roots in geopolitical theories of lebensraum and territorial space as a signifier of a 
healthy state.  
The Chilean army had been historically moulded in the tradition of the Prussians 
in terms of aesthetics but also hierarchy, discipline, and theory. Geopolitical strategy 
and theory was central to this ‘Prussianisation’ (Bawden 2012). Pinochet and navy 
commander José Toribio Merino Castro, the two most influential members of the 
1973-1990 military government were both highly influenced by German geopolitical 
ideas that posited the state as a living organism striving to survive. Pinochet taught 
geopolitics and published books such as Síntesis Geográfica de Chile, Argentina, Bolivia y 
Perú (1953), Geografía Militar (1957) and Geopolítica (1968), which illustrated his theories 
of geopolitics as a scientific explanation of the lifecycles of states and how states can 
be reordered to augment ‘national power’. Pinochet believed that his 1973 coup was 
a necessary part of Chile’s lifecycle of renewal and regeneration in the tradition of 
Ratzel’s ideas about the state as a living organism. Chilean professors in the military 
academy would use the metaphor of Chile as a body, with the central valley 
surrounding the capital being the heart, Santiago the brain, and the border zones as 
extremities in need of extra protection (Bawden 2009). Industry was the driving force 
of this body as the two World Wars had shown how important a strong industry was 
for sustaining long periods of war which led Chilean military strategists to encourage 
the strengthening of industry in Pinochet’s Chile as Argentina and Peru, Chile’s most 
likely enemies, had both larger economies and populations.  
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The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation has made public the 
brutal violence of Pinochet’s dictatorship whose project to rid Chile of the ‘bad 
Chileans’, the Marxists and Communists, is now well known. Pinochet’s pacification 
strategy meant the subjugation of leftists through military force in order to create a 
politically homogenous nation under his ideals. This violence was fed by Chilean 
machismo as Pinochet defined the nation as a family consisting of La patria/la mujer 
(the female nation), el ejercito (the male army), and their offspring, the Chilean youth. 
Pinochet posited himself as the generous, benevolent, and strong father of this nation-
family. Under Pinochet Chile was a heterosexual, traditional nation led by the army 
and the ruling administration was fuelled by machismo in order to protect the nation 
from the menace of outside threats. Pinochet embodied the supreme stereotype of 
Latin machismo. He was the authoritarian and all-powerful man who guaranteed 
stability and security at the price of liberty and human rights. His wife Lucía openly 
encouraged women to take a secondary role in support of their husbands. Women 
were severely oppressed by the state during these decades with violent sexual crimes 
rampant. Protecting the nation using control and oppression both within and without 
the state borders therefore became a key way to protect Chilean masculinity and 
violence would be readily employed to uphold this. This was not solely Pinochet 
perpetuating machismo through violence; he made the entire nation-state complicit. 
 
Trouble Arrives in Arica 
11th September 1973, the confluence of the opposing ideologies of Pinochet and 
Velasco had direct impacts on the border separating the dictators. The leaders in 
Santiago and Lima, two capitals located so far from the border joining the enemies, 
brought their politics to the previously marginalised extreme zones of Arica and 
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Tacna. Political beliefs promulgated by technocrats needed to be spatially located and 
so the physical border became the meeting point between the neoliberal Chilean and 
the left-wing revolutionary. Echoing the events of the 1920s in Tacna-Arica, once 
again the border became the symbolic centre for both nations where nationalist ideals 
could be celebrated and fought for.  
The day of Pinochet’s coup was seen as a point of extremely high tension at the 
border by General Odlanier Mena, the official in charge of protecting Arica in the 
1970s. The 11th “was an extremely delicate moment, because we were on the brink of 
war, where Peru was armed as never before in its history and General Velasco 
Alvarado had clearly stated to his people that he wanted to act on his aspirations... 
that aspiration was the city of Arica”.19 Peruvian revanchism permeated the nation-
state, all Peruvians knew the history of Tacna-Arica and refused to accept that Arica 
would remain in Chilean hands.  
The rise of Pinochet became the ideal time to act on this revanchism. Hernán 
Rodríguez explained that Velasco saw Pinochet’s coup as a moment whereby the 
border would be weaker; “Chile was a country divided in half, those who supported 
Popular Unity and those on the right so it was the perfect moment for Peru to attack 
and to recover the territories taken a century earlier”.20 The international border with 
Peru was immediately closed and “invasion was imminent. Peru had transported 400 
tanks south from Arequipa”.21 Arica was vulnerable due to the lack of human capital 
at the border, the US Secretary of State warned in 1974 of that dangers of leaving the 
extreme north of Chile depopulated and so without a large population, Arica needed 
to be militarised against the northern enemy.22   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 ‘Las memorias del general (R) Odlanier Mena: Ex jefe de la CNI escribe un libro con su historia.’ La Segunda. 
22nd September 2012 
20 Interview, Hernán Rodríguez. 31st July 2014 
21 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella de Arica. 19th March 2006 
22 {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1975SANTIA00909_b}} 
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General Odlanier Mena, a key actor in the almost-war of the 1970s was directly 
in charge of the military forces on Chile’s northern border. He arrived at the 
Rancagua Regiment in Arica on the 9th January 1973 and in his words, “the mission I 
was given was to defend the territory against a massive armoured invasion by Peru, 
which could occur at any time”.23 Unlike other officials in the military government 
who wanted conflict, Mena strived for peace at the border and his later displays of 
friendship proved crucial to upholding this aim, “I directed my efforts all day and 
often at night, fixating myself of the missions of trying to avoid war to the extent that I 
could. My mission was to defend Arica for seven days, at least. And I wasn’t sure that 
I would be able to do so for two days, due to the disproportion [in military 
strength]”.24 The Chilean military was not a homogenous mass, while some officials 
certainly wanted to invade Peru before they could strike to take the upper hand, 
namely General Forrestier in Iquique, others such as Mena viewed war as 
unnecessary and costly. With Mena’s attempts to hold the border, the city of Arica 
became imbued with military life; 
Arica as a city, it’s terrible to say, is a very important anti-tank obstacle. 
We made uniforms so that the school children were dressed like War of the 
Pacific soldiers and carried items and had first aid training, because we were 
thinking of a real war. If we lost Arica, we would never recover it, so we 
wanted to make sure it never happened. There were artillery sites in 
schoolyards and the public was informed to the necessary extent of where 
they had to go and what they had to do. The military families, around the 
Rancagua Regiment were evacuated to the rural interior more than once, 
because the regiment would be the target of Peruvian air attacks… But I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella de Arica. 19th March 2006 
24 For example General Forestier who was based in Iquique didn’t want to end his military career without a war 
under his belt.  Interview with Tomás Morales. 23rd July 2014; Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella 
de Arica. 19th March 2006 
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had to prepare for war in spite of everything, because I was in charge of the 
border and I couldn’t neglect the defences.25 
 
Figure 74: Odlanier Mena with Pinochet. http://historiabarriga.blogspot.co.uk [accessed 05/05/2015] 	  
Arica was therefore immediately transformed under Pinochet’s government and 
Mena’s command, the usually fluid border crossings between Arica and Tacna were 
immobilised and the city became a space of questionable security. The Pinochet 
regime resulted in a ‘state of exception’ whereby previous norms and rules did not 
apply (Klein 2008). To create order in a disordered zone, Mena designed a plan of 
national unity to fortify civil cohesion, reinforcing patriotism and close civil-military 
collaboration.26 From the 1920s the attempted plebiscite and later the JAA worked to 
create order in Arica in terms of a shared national identity, this was continued into 
the 1970s but with a heightened edge, unity and civilian strength were necessary to 
protect Arica against the Peruvians. 
Politics in the city were complex. Mena claimed that he “…had excellent 
relations with the socialist governor Mr. Rubilar, and communist Mayor, Mrs Maria 
Elena Diaz... She was great, she helped me with the construction of the Museo El 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 ibid. 
26 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella de Arica. 19th March 2006 
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Morro”.27 Arica was not a homogenous military space but was comprised of multiple 
actors and viewpoints probably because “…the contra-Allende faction in Arica was 
quite small, likely due to the established leftist consciousness and practices in the city” 
(Chovanec 2009:23). Mena, keen on avoiding war at the border employed tact and 
diplomacy in managing right-wing militarism in a largely left-wing city. Chilean rule 
in Arica was under threat from outside but also inside, Chile needed to assert its 
authority at the border where there were young Chilean socialists who actively 
wanted Peru to invade because they preferred to be Peruvian than to live under a 
dictatorship.28 That’s not to say the Pinochet didn’t have supporters in Arica. He 
often received a warm welcome when he visited the region and continues to have 
supporters there today. 
 
Securing the Border through Strength and Deception 
The mid 1970s saw Pinochet travel to Arica many times, a trend that decreased 
noticeably once relations with Peru improved. The greater the threat from Peru at the 
border, the more involved Pinochet became. On the 31st January 1974, General 
Pinochet, accompanied by other officials, travelled to Arica to meet with local citizens 
and the municipality to learn about Arica’s specific needs and requirements.29 During 
the visit Pinochet held meetings with workers and women to discuss future plans for 
Arica.30 Pinochet’s third presidential visit to Arica on the 6th June 1974 was declared 
to be “a demonstration that [Pinochet] has a lot of affection and appreciation for the 
city of Arica” which was reasoned to be because he had spent a significant part of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 ‘Las memorias del general (R) Odlanier Mena: Ex jefe de la CNI escribe un libro con su historia.’ La Segunda. 
22nd September 2012 
28 Interview, Hernán Rodríguez. 31st July 2014 
29 La Defensa 28th January 1974 
30 La Defensa. 31st January 1974 
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military career in the province.31 During the visit, Pinochet spoke from the top of the 
Morro, the geographic point where on the 7th June 1880 Chile successfully captured 
Arica from Peruvian control. This week, known as the ‘week of Arica’ is celebrated 
every year with great fervour with battle re-enactments, dances, parades and a fair. 
Pinochet took another trip to Arica on the 6th February 1975, the city had been 
decked out in flags and triumphant arches, pasted with the phrase ‘Welcome 
President’. 32  Other subsequent trips taken by Pinochet, often accompanied by 
ministers, variously “revitalized the hopes of Arica”, allowed Pinochet to visit military 
bases and construction projects, visit a military base in Putre in the interior, and to 
visit public works and Putre.33 The frequency and timing of these visits illustrate the 
waxing and waning of the geopolitical significance of Arica in direct relation to 
potential conflict with Peru. The Chilean government had been almost blinkered to 
Arica until Chilean sovereignty was threatened.  
 
Figure 75: Arica decked out for the arrival of President General Pinochet, 6th February 1975. La Defensa. 5th 
February 1975 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 La Defensa. 1st June 1974; La Defensa. 6th June 1974 
32 La Defensa. 5th February 1975; La Defensa. 6th February 1975 
33 La Defensa. 2nd December 1976; La Defensa. 10th February 1976; La Defensa. 29th December 1977; La Defensa. 27th 
January 1979 
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Figure 76: Pinochet meeting with workers, 6th February 1975. La Defensa. 7th February 1975 
 
 
                     Figure 77: Pinochet is embraced by a young student. La Defensa. 19th February 1976 
 
The concerns on the part of the Chilean military were based in military strength, 
namely the weakness of the Chileans in respect to the Peruvians and the readiness 
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that the Peruvians were displaying. Chile was more industrialised, urbanised, and 
with a growing middle class but Peru was ruled by the agro-exporting elites and the 
military (Rock 1994). When Pinochet took power, Peru’s military force exceeded that 
of Chile and so the latter was forced into a game of posturing and deception in an 
effort to appear larger and stronger than its northern neighbour. The Chileans 
struggled to arm themselves with modern weapons in the way that Peru had due to 
the arms embargoes imposed on Pinochet by the US and Britain. The Chilean 
regime therefore looked abroad for examples of successful examples they could 
emulate from Israel’s 1967 victory against a coalition of Arab states to the 1965 Indo-
Pakistan war (Bawden 2012). Chile related such examples to their own terrain, 
equipment, and military strategies. 
As one interviewee stated, “Peru did not need to cheat, they had the strength, 
three to four times that of the Chileans” but they would demonstrate their strength by 
“taking their tanks and cannons to the border and shooting… Peru from the other 
side would shoot cannons all night, saying they were doing exercises but it was to 
show what they had”.34 Peru was engaging in a spectacle of war in a tangible fashion, 
literally shaking the earth with their power, the Chileans could feel and hear 
manifestations of strength. Another citizen remembered how “[t]here was always the 
latent possibility of war, so of course there was fear. Chile had a clear military 
disadvantage. And you could see [Peruvian] tanks on the hills in front of you”.35 In 
August 1974 there were rumours that Peru was stationing their Russian-bought tanks 
at the port of Ilo, 100km from the border with Chile. Chile shrugged off these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014 
35 Interview, Nicolás Soto, 31st May 2014 
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rumours but press assured citizens that “Chile is ready for any scenario, as is the duty 
of the armed forces”.36  
A January 1977 article by TIME entitled ‘Girding for a bloody anniversary’ 
compared the respective military capabilities of Chile and Peru and declared that 
Peru had the advantage and would be able to take 50 kilometres of Chilean territory 
in a rapid attack yet strategists declared that Chileans would be the better fighters.37 
On one side of the frontier, the Peruvians have been moving troops, 
Soviet-built T55 tanks and American-made armored personnel carriers into 
burgeoning military bases in the southern border provinces. On the other 
side, the Chileans, bracing for a possible invasion, are mining the desert, 
implanting tank traps and building fortifications… If war broke out, Peru’s 
armor and modern planes would probably blitz about 25 miles into the 
Atacama. But the Chileans, regarded by some military men as the better 
fighters and tacticians, might be able to regroup and eventually push back 
the Peruvians.38 
 
 
Chilean Military Expenditure 1972-198139 
 1972 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Total number 
of armed forces 
47,000 73,800 79,600 … 85,000 85,000 86,000 92,000 
Defence 
Spending, 
millions of US 
Dollars 
177 420 431 484* 714* 665 984 … 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 La Defensa. 28th August 1974 
37 La Defensa. 4th January 1977 
38 Time Magazine. 10th January 1977. ‘Latin America: Girding for a Bloody Anniversary’ 
39 Muñoz (1982)  
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Military Balance, Chile-Peru 198240 
 Peru Chile 
Army Personnel 75,000 53,000 
Navy Personnel 21,000 20,800 
Air Force Personnel 40,000 15,300 
Tanks 466 270 
Other Armored Vehicles 475 561 
Field Artillery 419 290 
Naval Combatants 22 13 
Submarines 10 2 
Combat Aircraft 150 148 
Helicopters 69 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 78: Photo of Peru’s Soviet-made tanks. Time Magazine. 10th January 1977.  
‘Latin America:   Girding for a Bloody Anniversary’ 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  CIA Research Paper. (1982) ‘Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship.’ 
[http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000496616.pdf] 
222 
In the face of this clear Peruvian strength, one way in which Chile attempted to 
appear more threatening was to play into the Cold War race for power, claiming that 
Chile had the full backing of the US. Pablo Martínez, an interviewee who was a 
soldier at the time reported how the Chilean army “lied to the Peruvians, they said 
that Chile was full of Americans, that the Americans supported us. The Peruvians are 
very naïve and many believed them”.41 Wikileaks cables of 1974 suggest that Peru 
was to some extent taken in by Chile’s claims of US backing as Peru was interested in 
US naval capacities stationed in South America as part of UNITAS sea exercises.42 
The Chilean navy believed that Peru would attack Arica by sea and for this reason 
Peru was scouting out its opposition, not knowing for certain whether the US would 
support Chile in military conflict or not. This was backed up by false radio 
communication by the Chileans to trick the Peruvians into believing that the Chilean 
military was speaking to Americans. The Chileans “had a guy who spoke very good 
English, so in these times he would speak on the radio… as if he were an American 
and making things up, and it was all a lie”.43  The difference here is that while Chile 
had to lie about US support, Peru truly was receiving support from the USSR in the 
form of military equipment; they “sold Peru all the armaments they needed”.44  
The Chilean’s also used spying as a military tactic, Pablo Martínez whose work 
in the 1970s entailed trips abroad to Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina was employed by 
the military to bring back information which could give Chile an advantage if war 
came. The interviewee, who had experience flying planes was also asked to fly to 
foreign locations when he had legitimate reasons to travel abroad for work but to take 
detours and record information about military bases and so on, a request he refused. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014 
42 {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1974CARACA12018_b }} (Cable codes used to search for records within the Wikileaks 
database) UNITAS are sea exercises and in-port training involving several countries in North, South and Central 
America, conducted by the USA since 1959 in support of the US policy. 
43 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014 
44 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014 
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Another interviewee, Nicolás Soto, who was in the armed forces during the 1970s 
claimed that “Of course both Chile and Peru had spies, but spying was more of a 
Peruvian practice, to have many Chileans under surveillance”.45 Both sides were 
playing a game of deception at the border. Intelligence became the most valuable 
resource in the battle to uncover the strategy and military strength of the enemy and 
so fooling the other side and infiltrating their ranks became necessary. 
Arica therefore became imbued with espionage during the 1970s. As Sam 
Goodman (2015) has argued, spying tends to be an urban phenomenon, spies move 
comfortably and surreptitiously in urban environs. Espionage in popular culture takes 
place in cities such as Vienna, Berlin, and London; the urban is an arena for 
clandestine activities. Tangier, Morocco is another city long associated with espionage 
with its reputation as a safe house for international spying activities as during the Cold 
War it was a space of political neutrality and commercial liberty. Arica can be seen as 
a smaller version of these large and mainly capital cities where both Chileans and 
Peruvians were seeking to gather as much information as possible in order to gain the 
upper hand. 
As well as espionage, in order to appear larger and stronger to the Peruvians, the 
Chilean military employed other strategies. One now legendary example was that the 
military would buy many cheap Citroën cars which were manufactured in Arica 
during the JAA years, paint them camouflage and add barrels on top to make them 
look like tanks from afar.46 The Chileans also constructed a fake airport in Zapahuira 
which one interviewee claims still exists today as well as wooden planes so that the 
Peruvians would believe that the Chileans posed a substantial military threat.47 The 
Chileans were constructing a ‘spectacle of war’ in a covert manner, this was not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Interview, Nicolás Soto, 31st May 2014 
46 Interview, Tomás Morales. 23rd July 2014 
47 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014 
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posturing for the view of all and certainly not for the Chilean civilians, the audience 
remained confined to the Chilean military and to any Peruvians engaging in 
surveillance. Far from Peru and their unleashing of military power, Chile was forced 
to leave clues for the Peruvians, to create military traces in the desert.  
This use of camouflage and deception has roots in other military nations. The 
British Army had been convinced of the need to blend more seamlessly into battle 
surroundings during the Indian Mutiny in 1857 and the South African War 1899-
1902 but it was during World War I that the British really began to experiment with 
camouflage (Rankin 2008). They had previously felt unfavourably towards methods 
to trick the enemy, preferring to rely on superior physical strength and endurance. 
However, as technology improved, British attitudes towards deception softened. 
During World War II, strategies to mislead the enemy, to make them believe one 
thing was happening when in fact the opposite was true, became increasingly 
ingenious and experimented with (Rankin 2008). 
Camouflage in the desert in World War II saw the British challenged by the 
open smooth plane of the desert, with sand which constantly shifted, they were forced 
to hide verticality in cunning ways (Forsyth 2014). However, in the 1970s the 
Chileans wanted Peru to see their military equipment, or false representations of it. 
The Chileans were using the open plain of the Atacama as the perfect display board 
for these wooden airports and tanks made out of cars. The aim was not disguise, but 
exposure. This tactic had been earlier employed by the British who used deception, 
not concealment to fool the enemy (Rankin 2008). The British in WWII used 
dummies in the desert that required careful construction to “appear lively, yet not too 
overt and visible from the aerial view. In other words, the enemy still had to think 
that some effort had been made to camouflage and hide; if the dummy was too starkly 
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visible the enemy would most likely ‘smell a rat’” (Forsyth 2012:237). Likewise, the 
Chileans had to camouflage their fakery just enough to look real but still to be seen by 
Peruvian eyes. Together with espionage, Arica became a city of pretence, of 
subterfuge through deception, the city needed to appear as something it wasn’t; a 
militarily strong, war-ready city. 
 
Where Was the Border? 
The military strategy of the Pinochet administration raises questions over where 
the border really lay. While the official international border followed the boundary set 
by the 1929 Treaty of Lima, it can be posited that Arica was a ‘grey area’, a frontier 
zone of questionable security as opposed to a well-defended military line. There are 
many theories that the ‘true border’, the border that the Chilean military would 
actually protect in case of military conflict was at Camarones, 80km south of Arica. 
Oral histories provide statements such as “they began to defend the country from 
Camarones”, “the border really lay at Camarones”, and “since the 40s, the strategic 
idea for the area was designated as an open city and to retreat to Camarones, 
defending it from there”.48 One journalist described the situation as, “[f]aced with a 
war scenario in the north, parallel with Argentina, Pinochet designed a geopolitical 
strategy where Arica was lost and Chile retreated to Camarones. And there was the 
great dismantling of Arica and everything was moved to Iquique”.49  
Similarly, Senator Alejandro Guillier Álvarez pronounced Arica in the 1970s as 
a ‘zone of sacrifice’ so the Chileans “took the border down to Iquique, we would have 
lost Arica in the first days of battle, so they made Iquique the centre of everything and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Interview, Eduardo Hoyos, 18th June 2014; Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014; ‘Las memorias del 
general (R) Odlanier Mena: Ex jefe de la CNI escribe un libro con su historia.’ La Segunda. 
49 Udo Goncalves President of the College of Journalists. El Mostrador. 29th January 2014. Bastián Fernández 
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Arica has remained abandoned and it still is today”.50 Arica was soon becoming a no-
man’s land yet at the same time territory that was filled with bodies; an impossible 
situation if war came. Interviewee Sebastian Rojas saw this as due to Pinochet’s 
geopolitical strategy, that it was not worth wasting resources defending an area that 
was so vulnerable to Peru, “Arica was just seen as an instrument of war”.51 Arica was 
too difficult to hold, so close to the Peruvian border, and so the city would be lost and 
Chile would attempt to regain control later. As one interviewee stated:  
Arica at this time was like a fuse to Chile, it was thought that it would be 
taken by Peru in the early days of the conflict but that we would recover it 
within a week with forces that would come from Iquique or from further south. 
The population of Arica would be transferred to the village of San Miguel de 
Azapa where there would be hospitals, and to be away from the frontline of the 
battle. The truth was that Arica was not safe.52 
Figure 79: Map showing the Chile-Peru border (red) the Chile-Bolivia border (green) and the Department of 
Camarones (blue). Google maps. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6q00SGRN-M 
51 Interview, Sebastian Rojas. 8th August 2014 
52 Interview, Nicolás Soto, 31st May 2014 
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Joaquin Pérez was a member of the Chilean army in the 1970s and when asked 
whether Arica would have been safe in the event of war with Peru, answered “no, 
emphatically no, in the army contingent in which I worked, we were well aware that 
in the case of a war with Peru, Arica would be invaded and after that we would stage 
a counterattack to recover it and invade southern Peru”. 53  According to one 
Ariqueño who was heavily involved with the military, Tomás Morales, at the time of 
the military coup in 1973 Arica was not seen as highly important, military troops 
were stationed in the far north but without necessary auxiliary services such as a 
medical unit. In fact, the military only existed in its full strength as far north as 
Antofagasta, 580km south of Arica.54  
Therefore from 1973 while Arica was becoming militarised, the Chilean military 
would have focussed its efforts on holding the line at Camarones in the event of an 
armed invasion by Peru with the expectation that Arica would be lost. However, as 
the 1970s progressed and relations with Peru worsened, Pinochet and his government 
became increasingly keen to defend Arica and so strengthened the international 
border. Eventually the military brought the largest regiment, Rancagua, to Arica and 
built military complexes and defences and an air base was constructed at Iquique, 
100km south of Arica.55 According to the interviewee, Pinochet did not want a war 
with Peru and militarily, was not prepared to lose Arica, “when you look at what the 
government did, they bought the largest military regiment to Arica, you can see 
equipped military complexes, bunkers and defenses from that era”.56 In one interview 
General Odlanier Mena recollected showing Pinochet his plan for defending Arica 
and telling him that if Chile lost Arica they would not recover it. Arica became seen as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Interview, Joaquin Pérez, 7th June 2014 
54 Interview, Tomás Morales. 23rd July 2014 
55 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014; Interview, Tomás Morales. 23rd July 2014 
56 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014 
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a vital stronghold that could not be relinquished to the Peruvians who could remain 
there and then move further south.57 Elsewhere Mena stated that;  
I sped up the combat preparation of all personnel under my command: 56 
officers, 560 NCOs and around roughly 2,500 conscripts… Furthermore, I set 
demanding goals of instruction and we reinforced the territory on a huge scale. The 
first mines on the border with Peru are mine. I had to prevent the invasion.58  
 
Pablo Martínez, who moved as a young man to Arica in 1974, claimed that 
“1976 was the year that changed everything”, “in 76 it seems Peru bought armoured 
tanks, lots of weapons, Velasco Alvarado said that he would recover Arica and a lot of 
regiments came to Arica, it was filled with soldiers”, he estimates around 2000 
military personnel were stationed in Chile’s northernmost province.59 Martínez stated 
that when he was a conscript in 1976 the Chilean army feared that Peru had around 
500 state of the art tanks when they, Chile, only had 50 out-dated models. Chile 
began to lay mines along the border with Peru to prevent Peruvian tanks from 
making it to Arica and by the 1980s, 70,000 mines, notably designed to maim not kill, 
had been laid at the border (Castillo & Zarzuzi 2005). This act of laying mines shifted 
the nature of the Chile-Peru border; from a political border, to a militarised one 
(Holahan 2006). 
The geopolitical position of Arica changed throughout the 1970s, from a 
vulnerable, indefensible city to increasingly fortified and militarised, ensuring that it 
wouldn’t be lost in the event of conflict with Peru. Colonel Juan de Dios Barriga said 
in a press conference “Arica is one of the most important and sensitive borders in 
Chile. No-one can be indifferent to what happens here and it is a place which 
currently has a special validity”. He went on to report on how there would be a severe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 ‘Las memorias del general (R) Odlanier Mena: Ex jefe de la CNI escribe un libro con su historia.’ La Segunda. 
22nd September 2012 
58 Interview with General Odlanier Mena. La Estrella de Arica. 19th March 2006 
59 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014 
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crackdown in Arica on delinquency, homosexuality, prostitution and drug trafficking 
in order to ensure that Arica was ‘a strong and healthy city’.60 Arica needed to be a 
militarised city of machismo, not a weak disordered borderland.  
This can be made sense of through understanding Pinochet’s geopolitical 
strategy. Pinochet’s presidency was focused on order and strength and this, especially at 
the borders, relied on the military. As he wrote in Introduction to Geopolitics, “the best 
frontier in our times is that providing strategic security” as well as that “economically 
desirable borders are dangerous from the standpoint of security” (Pinochet Ugarte 
1981:169). This therefore answers the question posed in the previous chapter; why 
would Pinochet allow the dissolution of the JAA in the knowledge that it would 
destroy industry at the border? He arguably believed that Peru would be more 
inclined to invade Arica if it were economically successful and so when tensions with 
Peru began he allowed Arica to descend into abandonment. Instead Arica needed to 
be fortified with weapons and military bodies. As previously mentioned through the 
work of MacGinty and Williams (2009) who focus on violence around the world, 
mainly civil wars, development can actually have the effect of triggering or sustaining 
conflict through factors such as resource competition, depletion, or the greater 
movement of people. It is particularly the unevenness, or perception of unevenness of 
development that exacerbates conflict. For Pinochet, borders’ resistance “corresponds 
to the degree of strength in the vital nucleus” so events on the borders wouldn’t affect 
just peripheral regions but would additionally show Chile’s neighbours that the core 
was weakened (Pinochet Ugarte 1981:29). Pinochet would not have wanted to accept 
this humiliation by having his and his nation’s masculinity threatened.  
This desire for order in Chile had distinct racial overtones. Indigenous groups 
suffered significantly under Pinochet’s rule and the dictator’s configuration of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 La Defensa. 1st March 1977 
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borders and territory was a way to control the ‘correct’ white Chilean within the 
nation-state protected from the inferior rest of Latin America. Pinochet displaced 
indigenous communities such as the Mapuche and cut off their links to natural 
resources which were privatised under his administration. In his study of postcolonial 
Peruvian geography, Orlove (1993) links the desire and pursuit of order with the 
process of ‘othering’ in Peru that had distinct racial implications. In the same way, 
this ordering of Chile, with a firm, impenetrable border was a way to create a distinct 
line between what was Chilean and what was not, between a white modern nation 
and an indigenous, backward Peru. 
Therefore, the troubles on the border began when Pinochet’s military 
government took power and clashed with Peru’s left-wing dictator Velasco. An arms 
race began between Pinochet and Velasco and Chile, the weaker of the two, used 
certain tactics to appear stronger than it was in reality. The city of Arica was 
increasingly militarised as the Peru-Chile border gradually came to be seen as a line 
that must be held at all costs. Pinochet’s border policies were focussed on protection, 
not integration. The dictator was willing to economically abandon Arica through the 
demise of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica that had had a symbiotic relationship with 
Tacna across the border and instead chose to militarise the border with thousands of 
mines and troops. 
 
Declarations of Peace: The Public Message 
Oral histories have shown the tension that was felt by those in the Chilean 
military and the measures they took in order to deceive the Peruvians and appear to 
be militarily resilient. The study of newspaper articles from the time, however, tells a 
very different story. La Defensa ran numerous articles describing the ‘fraternal’ 
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relationship between Chile and Peru and documenting the many official events 
marking this good neighbourliness; under the Pinochet dictatorship Peru and Chile 
were heralded as “the best of friends”.61 These messages were highly engineered, the 
lack of freedom of press resulted in a space whereby knowledge was mediated and 
processed before being disseminated and consumed. The military government was 
able to dictate which stories would become known to the public and the tone which 
would be used. The fear of repercussions if the government’s wishes were not fulfilled 
was enough to give Pinochet total control of the press. 
Most articles about good relations between Chile and Peru avoided the question 
that it could ever be otherwise apart from some exceptions which reference reports of 
problems such as one article which alluded to “malicious rumours” circulating about 
“possible difficulties at the border”.62 The vast majority of articles reported on 
positive aspects of border relations. At one meeting of Chilean and Peruvian military 
officials in 1975, Iquique based General Jorge Dowling told the press, “today we are 
united with our brothers to the north, just as we always are. It’s not an occasion that 
has been specially prepared but it is the coexistence that exists between those present 
here, the reciprocity and friendship that we have with our dear friends in Tacna, Peru 
is permanent”.63 Many such declarations were made by military officials on both sides 
of the border. In a statement to the press, Velasco was recorded as saying;  
Happily the Chilean government and the Chilean people know deep 
down that Peru does not want war. Just as they don’t want it. But as are 
these merchants of the freedom of the press of large countries, imperialist 
countries principally, they’re trying to make trouble. They try to play these 
countries off one another, especially countries which are insubordinate. But 
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the truth is that there’s nothing. These imperialist countries would rejoice if 
Peru and Chile cross one another.64  
 
One Peruvian general was reported in the Chilean press as stating that “war 
between Peru and Chile is impossible” and any rumours are just “fantasies”.65 In a 
similar vein, in 1975 “Pinochet told a public rally...that only a madman would lead 
his country into war in South America. Pinochet rejected any possibility of military 
conflict, not mentioning Peru by name, but did refer to the government of Lima to 
discussing the purchasing of weapons by the neighbouring country”.66 On the 153rd 
anniversary of Peruvian independence, Chile and Peru celebrated jointly in Tacna in 
“an eloquent display of friendship”. A soiree held “was exceptional in its climate of 
heartwarming friendship and cordiality”.67 On the 18th March 1974, Commander in 
Chief of the First Division of the Armed Forces of Antofagasta, Brigadier General 
Rolando Garay Cifuentes spoke publicly on rumours that had been circulating about 
Chile’s relations with its neighbouring countries. He stated that;  
All the rumours about alleged difficulties with neighbouring countries 
are unfounded, I deny this malicious rumour. Relations with Peru and 
Bolivia are friendly and there are no elements that can be considered as 
adversary. Everything is a product of international Communism to create 
problems within Chile and uneasiness with our neighbours with the purpose 
of gaining traction in other countries.68 
 
This theme of an evil ‘other’, whether inside or outside the country, attempting 
to stir trouble was repeated on the 29th March 1974 when Peruvian president General 
Velasco was quoted as saying “Peru has no border issues with its neighbours, which it 	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considers its sister nations in the Latin American agreement”, and that any claims to 
the contrary are fictitious attempts to create friction between Chile and Peru.69 On 
the same day, speaking in Santiago, Chilean Minister for Foreign Relations, 
Viceadmiral Ismael Huerta Diaz denounced attempts to undermine friendly 
Peruvian-Chilean relations as ‘Marxist action’ when in fact the neighbouring 
countries share a common goal and have more similarities than differences including 
origins, language, traditions, religion, and membership of political and economic 
agreements.70 Economic relationships were actively sought with meetings held in 
Arica and Tacna by government officials to encourage trade and business relations 
between the two cities and therefore countries.71 Strong economic relations between 
Arica and Tacna, “geographic brothers”, were posited as mutually beneficial to both 
countries.72 Cultural as well as economic links were made, the relationship between 
Chile and Peru “has been strengthened by shows of fellowship between Chile, Peru 
and Bolivia”, argued one newspaper article, such as the meeting of military chiefs in 
Brazil and a South America football tournament whereby one of Peru’s matches took 
place in Arica with 5,000 Peruvians in attendance.73  
Beyond kind words being said about one another, members of the armed forces 
of Peru and Chile held many ceremonies and meetings “to reaffirm ties”, the largest 
and most well-known of which was the ‘Abrazo de Concordia’. 74 On the 16th 
November 1974, the armed forces of Chile and Peru sealed the fraternal relationship 
between both countries with the ‘abrazo’, a symbolic show of friendship on the border 
(the Concordia) to which all citizens were invited. 75  More than six thousand 
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Peruvians and Chileans travelled to the border to watch the solemn affair that was 
held by some of both countries’ most important military officials. The event consisted 
of parades, the singing of national anthems, and the planting of an olive tree to 
symbolise the lasting peace between the two countries.  
To conclude the ceremony there was a ‘cordial embrace’ and an exchange of 
medals between Peruvian General Artemio Garcia and Chilean General Odlanier 
Mena. Garcia stated that the event “sealed the agreements of an indestructible 
brotherhood between both armies and neighbouring peoples”.76 This act was deemed 
to be “a beautiful lesson in creating a new meaning of relations between countries and 
people… [and the] ‘Concordia Embrace’ reaffirmed the traditional friendship 
between Chile and Peru and opens a new door for mutual co-operation to face 
underdevelopment”.77 Odlanier Mena was key to this message of peace and described 
how he managed to avoid a warmongering agenda without revealing the relative 
military weakness of Chile: 
General Morales Bermúdez was in my house and he said to me ‘Look, 
Odlanier, you’re absolutely right and I congratulate you on your idea and 
support. What do you think about taking tanks to the ceremony, I put 40 or 
50, whatever you want and you put a similar amount.’ I said to him 
‘Francisco, do you think it would be better to do something symbolic? With 
bands, banners and a platoon of 30 men, what would we be doing with 
demonstrations of force?’ In reality, I didn’t have any other alternative, 
because we only had two tanks in the regiment and that was the truth. With 
these gestures we avoided the war, because Morales Bermúdez was opposed 
to it, despite communist influences from Cuba. Before becoming president he 
was invited to Cuba where they offered him everything necessary to invade 
Chile, also sponsored by Russia. But he was scared because he said why are 
we pushing for a war if we know how to start it but not how to end it?78 	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Figure 80: Military chiefs from Tacna and Arica, Peruvian General Artemio Garcia and Chilean 
Colonel Odlanier Mena, ceremonially embrace on the border between Chile and Peru. La Defensa. 16th 
November 1974 
This ceremony was a performance with a variety of end goals. The two nations 
were performing sovereignty at the border, affirming their geographic limits for their 
own national security. This was also for local populations to see the authority of their 
state on the land they ruled but in a secure, peaceful setting. Through the Abrazo de 
Concordia both Chile and Peru could broadcast a message of goodwill but also of 
assured sovereignty and strength.  
With this successful display of fraternity with the Abrazo de Concordia, Mena in 
Chile and Garcia, his counterpart in Peru maintained a friendly relationship, 
attempting to avoid the conflicts that their superiors seemed to at times encourage. 
Mena recollects that earlier, on September 11th 1973, the day of Pinochet’s coup, 
Mena had called Garcia in Tacna “to tell him “look, this is happening in Santiago 
and I called to tell you, on my word of honour, that it has nothing to do with you. I’m 
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going to close the border and you will see movements of troops but it has nothing to 
do with you, it’s to prevent anything from happing here within the country””.79  
This resulted in a feeling of reciprocity which meant that “In 1975, when 
General Morales Bermúdez decided to depose President Velasco Alvarado, he was in 
the house of Artemio in Tacna, with 16 generals and he called me and said, “I am 
returning the favour, we will take charge of the Government tomorrow in Lima”. 
“Then Morales Bermúdez took the phone and said, “Odlanier what Artemio says is 
true, tomorrow we will take the Government in Peru””.80 This reciprocity was staged 
by the two generals as a performance, image and spectacle plays such an important 
role in conflict or potential conflict, as can again be seen through the following 
recollection of Mena:  
at one point when General Artemio Garcia phoned me and told me. 
“Odlanier, you have to help me, because I am in a very serious situation here in 
Peru. I am frightened by the imminent possibility of war, the industries in Tacna 
were moving to Lima by plane, by land and with their families. If this exodus 
continues I am going to lose the race and another general could arrive here who 
has a different view and things could get worse again”. “Look Artemio,” I said, 
“you are receiving the reflection of the situation that you yourselves create. Chile 
has never thought of invading, we are happy with our border, we have no 
territorial interest of any kind. But something occurs to me. I'm going to go to 
Tacna today, alone and as a civilian, driving myself. Wait for me in the square, 
tell some journalists to come and see us, see us hug, buy some books and have 
lunch together”. So we did, and gestures like these were repeated many times 
and had a great effect because they calmed the tense atmosphere. If the two 
commanders who were supposedly enemies walked together as friends then we 
couldn’t go to war.81 
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Figure 81: Chilean General Hector Bravo Muñoz and Peruvian General Francisco Morales Bermúdez meet 
in Arica, November 1974 “looking at their common destiny of brotherhood and mutual collaboration, both 
committed to fight together against underdevelopment”. La Defensa. 12th November 1974 	  
What effect did all this talk of friendship have on local citizens? All of this positive 
reporting and engineering of media was for the benefit of the Ariqueños who were 
living on this tense border. Were solely newspaper archives studied it would be 
impossible to know how close Peru and Chile came to war. While it cannot be said 
that Ariqueños were entirely oblivious to any changes in the relationship between 
Chile and Peru it is unlikely that citizens knew the scale of risk. Their perspective of 
the border and knowledge of Peru-Chile relations was being controlled by the military 
government who did not want the public to be aware of the potential conflict. One 
interviewee who was a citizen but who had close links to the armed forces stated that 
normal citizens “had no idea how serious the situation was”.82 There was a gulf of 
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difference between relations of Chile-Peru as states and relations between Chilean 
and Peruvian citizens in the border region.  
Pablo Martínez stated that citizens had no idea about the tension with Peru; he 
only realised it when he was conscripted in 1976. He says he learned years later that 
his Peruvian friends were more worried and wrote their wills, ready to come over to 
Arica to fight while Chilean citizens had no clue. “The only ones who knew were in 
the military, on the tip of the Morro there was a star with a bulb, enormous, and no-
one knew why sometimes it would light up, sometimes turn off. Then I had no idea 
but the bulb was a call to quarters, the star was lit and the military personnel ran over 
there, it was like a siren but silent”.83 Joaquin Pérez also reflected on the difference 
between his civilian and his later military life stating, “in military circles we spoke a lot 
about the potential of the Peruvian army but in my civil life in Arica before I joined 
the army, the issue of Chilean-Peruvian relations was completely ignored”.84 This 
situation of how the military was keenly aware of the potential conflict whereas most 
civilians were not was summed up by one interviewee who said, “there was a palpable 
change in the atmosphere, not so much among the civilians but among the armed 
forces of both countries. There came a time when everyone knew a break in relations 
or the outbreak of hostilities was coming”.85 Armed forces personnel were prohibited 
from crossing the border to Peru or Bolivia but civilians could cross the border 
without problems once the immediate fears of the 11th September 1973 had passed.  
The civilians who remained unaware of the dangers at the border were sheltered 
from the anxieties of living in a potential warzone, one citizen Sebastian Rojas 
remarked that there was some news being disseminated in the press about the 
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situation but the city was so militarised that everyone felt safe.86 Citizens in Arica 
remained largely oblivious to the danger they were in, they were aware of the growing 
military presence at the border but it coincided with the ascent of Pinochet’s military 
government so it didn’t appear singular to their city. Others vividly remember living 
in fear if they learnt something of the situation, one, Vicente Díaz remembered 
“[t]here were some moments of fear during the 1970s when there were a lot of 
military exercises, lots of troop movements, when it felt like military conflict was close, 
luckily it never happened”.87  
Another, Constanza Sepúlveda, the wife of a soldier had greater knowledge of 
the risks and so recalled how “It was impossible to live calmly, because the order 
could come at any moment and the city would be evacuated and the vulnerable 
people would have to leave the city. And I, as a military wife, was a priority to be 
evacuated, I don’t know where to, it was so confidential that no-one knew, only the 
bosses knew. It’s too delicate”.88 Her husband remarked as he listened in on the 
interview that “the whole city was militarized” as the situation came very close to war, 
“there were many things that civilians had no idea about”.89 The bodies of both 
civilians and the military were at risk whether they were aware of it or not. 
In spite of this proximity to war there was little animosity between the citizens of 
Arica and Tacna. In fact, border movement seems to have been common and fluid, 
the animosity was between the two military governments. One citizen stated that “the 
reality is that we never thought that something would happen with the Peruvians, 
because we had good relations with them”.90 However, this does not mean that the 
citizens always lived peacefully alongside one another, issues particularly arose with 	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the authorities. One interviewee recalled how Chileans and Peruvians would be 
accused of espionage if visiting the other country, Peruvian police harassed Chileans 
in Tacna and that Peruvians would erect signs reading “Arica, captive, will return to 
the homeland”.91  
Peruvians appeared to have felt more unwelcome in Chile during the 1970s as in 
1975 the number of Peruvians in Arica fell by half, from 60,000 to 30,000, largely 
thought to be for economic reasons as Chile became just too expensive but also 
possibly for fear of being Peruvian in Arica. In direct contrast, when Chilean relations 
improved with Bolivia, the number of Bolivians in the city increased.92 However, by 
the end of 1976, Chile-Peru relations improved and the annual number of Chileans 
crossing over to Peru reached 122,000 (Castillo & Zarzuzi 2005). By 1980 an average 
of 2800 people were crossing the border every day and between January and 
September 1980 1,123,686 tourists and residents crossed officially from Chile to 
Peru.93 One writer in La Defensa, Jorge Bravo Tordoya, remarked on Chile-Peru 
relations, stating that “the constant and routine flow of persons, groups of people and 
families that daily and, particularly during weekends and holidays, travel in both 
directions, leading to the cultivation of friendships whose feelings deepen with time 
and frequency. Tacneños and Ariqueños open their homes with affection with great 
displays of neighbourliness and open and unreserved understanding”.94  
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Figure 82: Business in Tacna advertising in Arica newspaper showing the regularity of Chileans traveling to 
Peru. La Defensa. 5th January 1974 	  
At the beginning of the 1970s the cities of Arica and Tacna became increasingly 
dependent on one another as the scarcity of certain goods under Allende’s 
government 1970-1973 fuelled the black market trade between Chile and Peru with 
necessities such as sugar, butter, and cigarettes, although of lower quality than of their 
Chilean counterparts, welcomed in Arica to satisfy Chilean needs. There were 
regulations on what could be taken across the border, for example in 1979 it was 
prohibited to take electronic items, even those for personal use, pharmaceuticals, 
artisan goods, or confectionary from Chile to Peru.95 This did not mean they were 
not transported however, one interviewee admitted to funding his university studies 
by smuggling calculators across the border despite knowing the danger he was putting 
himself in.96 This was a genuine danger as the border was closely monitored as shown 
by one case in January 1974 when a Peruvian medical student attempted to drive 
across the border with a lorry with posters and images of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara 
posted on the side, a common practice to protect the vehicle from dust. On noticing 
this unwelcome marketing, one border official was quoted as saying “know sir, that in 	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Chile every type of political propaganda has been terminated so get rid of that 
immediately and leave our territory and border”.97 Local media predominantly tells a 
story of peaceful, fraternal relations between Chile and Peru with ceremonies such as 
the Abrazo de Concordia much discussed. This appears to have had the effect of 
protecting the citizens of Arica from fear of invasion from Peru, they were largely 
unaware of the reality of the potential conflict between the two countries. 
 
The Centenary Approaches 
Chile’s northern neighbour underwent political changes when Peru’s dictator 
Velasco, whose leftist politics had clashed so greatly with Pinochet’s, became very ill 
and many of his colleagues lost faith in him. Velasco had been popular within the 
armed forces but also with poor Peruvians who saw him as ‘playful but paternal’ 
(Rodríguez Elizondo 2004). Peru’s own spectacle which relied on a charismatic, 
passionate dictator was at risk. 
Disabled and psychologically unwell, the 64-year-old general became 
increasingly violent every day. Sometimes he closed up in long sullen silences, 
other times he had profound attacks of anger… He went for long periods 
without sleep, suffering from severe pain in his amputated leg and suspicious of 
everything and everyone… It was all proof of the progressive deterioration of 
the man who was nicknamed in his heyday, ‘Juan without fear’.98 
 
As Velasco’s poor health became increasingly apparent, on the 29th August 
1975 General Francisco Morales Bermúdez staged a military coup against Velasco 
and assumed the presidency. Bermúdez drew away from Velasco’s socialism and 
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declared a ‘second phase’ that would return Peru to democracy. However this 
change in Peruvian politics did not immediately improve relations at the border. 
Under Pinochet, the government was no stranger to elaborate displays of 
nationalism and military force, particularly on dates such as the anniversary of the 
1973 coup.99 With the centenary of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) approaching, 
the military in Arica organised a huge march at the hippodrome as well as with 
military parades in the rural interior.100 Once again, the Chileans reverted to tricks 
and spectacle to appear stronger than they really were, in the words of two ex-
soldiers:  
There was a parade at the hippodrome which started at midday and 
guys marched out and when they went out they went to a warehouse, 
changed their uniform and returned, they were marching until about 8pm, 
marching thousands, thousands of people, really impressive and it came out 
in the newspaper that they were running around, entering the warehouse, 
changing uniform and continuing to march, they spent hours marching, 
they were exhausted.101 
 
Of course I remember the centenary of Arica, there were celebrations 
throughout the week of Arica that year which had a special Chilean flavour. 
Pinochet organized the largest military parade in the history of Chile, almost 
80,000 soldiers, although in reality there were less, but they all marched 
twice to make a greater number of participants.102 
 
In contrast to these, albeit partly fictional, displays of strength and preparedness, 
the military officials of both countries continued to pronounce the friendship that 
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existed between Chile and Peru. In November 1978, Peru’s Minister of Foreign 
Relations, General Jose de la Puente Rabdill, spoke about the upcoming centenary 
and made a call to commemorate the anniversary “with a profound reflection of 
peace and the coexistence of sister countries” and that “with constructive dialogue, 
peace can be maintained in this part of the world”.103 
The centenary saw not only symbolic displays but also an influx of economic 
development. In February 1979 Pinochet unveiled his ‘Plan Arica’ as the province 
had been failing since the demise of industry and the Junta de Adelanto de Arica 
leaving 22% of citizens unemployed, the highest rate in the country. The plan 
included improvements to the coastal road, investment in the poorest areas of the 
city, forestation schemes, and roads and investment in the rural interior.104 Pinochet 
declared that he “has great affection and wonderful memories” of Arica and was 
“very concerned with the socioeconomic problem of the province and I come here to 
work with the Intendente and Governor to see to these problems”.105  
The message of progress continued with the Governor of the province Colonel 
Victor Contador declaring; “We have to have faith in Arica, the city has to keep 
growing. We can see progress happening and you are not all as badly off as you 
believe… Here you need solid, established, permanent things [as opposed to the 
economic initiative of the Puerto Libre]. Businesses have to accept the reality, which 
is not a state of risk”.106 As the centenary was approaching and it became clear that 
Peru would not invade the focus could shift away from immediate military protection 
and toward long-term development that would strengthen Arica for the future. Once 
Pinochet no longer feared Peru being tempted by the economic success of Arica, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 La Defensa. 17th November 1978 
104 La Defensa. 6th February 1979 
105 La Defensa. 9th February 1979 
106 La Defensa. 9th May 1979 
245 
economic development could begin again. Raising Arica’s poor economic situation 
after the demise of the Junta de Adelanto de Arica became a renewed goal. 
Although there was tension with the approach of the centenary, it was the 
passing of the date that led to the dissipation of tension; “it was a psychological date, 
it was an important date, reaching 100 years”.107 In February 1979 Pinochet claimed 
that relations with Chile’s neighbouring countries were improving, “some wanted to 
provoke an explosive situation on our part, but we have stayed calm and now the 
wave is passing”.108 By 1980 the tensions of the centenary had diminished and Peru 
and Chile co-operated to intensify commercial relations between the two countries 
even creating a Chilean-Peruvian Chamber of Commerce that would “normalize our 
relations and establish solid links to mutual benefit”.109 Again, as Chilean sovereignty 
was no longer being threatened at the border, an integrationist, rather than a 
protectionist strategy could be pursued.  
Pinochet continued to visit Arica, although not with the same intensity as with 
the run up to the centenary, “to renew hopes for local citizens about the future of the 
region, in the face of uncertain economic prospects that affect various sectors 
especially industry, whose recession all are aware of”.110 In the end, all of the 
resources spent on armament and displays of military strength were wasted, no war 
ever came. TIME magazine summed up this fruitlessness writing, “…both countries 
have already suffered a defeat- wasting valuable resources on arms at a time when the 
money could have been spent on advancing their underdeveloped economies”.111  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014 
108 La Defensa. 6th February 1979 
109 La Defensa.6th October 1980 
110 La Defensa. 24th October 1980 
111 Time Magazine. 10th January 1977. ‘Latin America: Girding for a Bloody Anniversary’ 
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Border Problems Elsewhere 
The passing of the centenary was a significant reason why Peru and Chile never 
went to war over Arica but it was overall due to a combination of factors. These 
include the increasing difficulties of obtaining arms as Chile was hit with another 
arms ban by the US in 1979 so they couldn’t buy spares or new equipment. Likewise 
to the north, Peru had stopped buying so many armaments and some of its weapons 
were now becoming outdated. Peru’s military spending was concentrated between 
1974 and 1977 which meant that by 1979, the weaponry which was still fairly up-to-
date when bought second-hand from the USSR was quickly falling behind 
technological advancements (St John 1992). As Paul Virilio wrote; “history progresses 
at the speed of its weapon systems” and Peru’s dreams of rewriting history and 
recovering Arica were becoming increasingly unlikely as weapons-buying ground to a 
halt (2006:90). Furthermore, both countries were having issues along their other 
borders, Peru was having problems with Ecuador and Chile with Bolivia and 
Argentina. 
Chile, with its extraordinary geography and almost impossible proportion of 
border to land surface area meant that the ribbon-shaped country was not only 
having border issues with Peru in Arica, but also with its other two neighbours, 
Bolivia and Argentina. These other threats increased the strain on the Chile-Peru 
border but also resulted in the eventual dissipation of tensions and avoidance of full-
blown war. This is a situation that Chile had experienced one hundred years earlier. 
In the 1870s Chile was having border issues with Argentina in the South over guano 
rich islands yet because Chile was fighting the War of the Pacific in the North an 
1881 treaty with Argentina was signed to avoid conflict on all borders at once. 
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Chile-Bolivia relations had been poor since the early nineteenth century and only 
worsened with the War of the Pacific. The war took away Bolivia’s coastline, a 
grievance that Bolivia has actively tried to rectify since and every 23rd March, on ‘the 
day of the sea’ Bolivians remember this injustice done by Chile. Diplomatic relations 
between Chile and Bolivia were severed in 1964 but resumed by Pinochet and Hugo 
Banzer, Bolivia’s military dictator 1971-1978. On the 16th March 1974, Pinochet and 
Banzer held a meeting in Brazil with the hope of re-establishing official relations that 
had been broken the decade earlier.112 Friendly relations between the two dictators 
resulted in a meeting on the border, named the ‘Abrazo de Charaña’ and a soft 
agreement to hand over a narrow strip of territory between Arica and the Peruvian 
border to the Bolivians.113  
The ‘Abrazo de Charaña’ “brought in a new era of Chilean-Bolivian friendship” 
and saw Pinochet and Banzer meet on the Chile-Bolivia border for an official 
handshake, a lunch where they would discuss “materials, problems and common 
aspirations” and then travel to the town of Visviri.114 Peruvian President Bermúdez 
intervened, refusing to allow Bolivia to take the narrow corridor to the sea on the 
basis of it being unlawful under the 1929 Treaty of Lima, “one reason for its objection 
is that Peru opposes the creation of a buffer between it and Chile”.115 The treaty 
stated that any territory within the provinces of Arica or Tacna ceded to another 
nation must have the full agreement of both Peru and Chile. Bermúdez’s predecessor, 
Velasco was also against this proposal and stated his belief that “Bolivia has every 
right to demand an exit [to the sea] from Chile but warned that Peru would not allow 
this exit to pass through territories that were taken from Peru during the War of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 La Defensa. 14th March 1974; La Defensa. 16th March 1974 
113 La Defensa. 9th February 1976; La Defensa. 9th January 1976 
114 La Defensa. 9th February 1976; Visviri is a small town on the Chilean department of General Lagos, located on 
the tripartite border between Chile, Peru and Bolivia. 
115 Time Magazine. 10th January 1977. ‘Latin America: Girding for a Bloody Anniversary’ 
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Pacific a century ago”.116 A following article in the same newspaper reported that 
Velasco was not alone in his sentiments and that he had the backing of all of Lima, 
that any exit to the sea would have to be taken from territory that once belonged to 
Bolivia, not Peru.117 
 Figure 83: Potential corridor to the sea for Bolivia. Map used by La Defensa. 28th January 1976 	  
This refusal by Peru was somewhat surprising as earlier it had seemed that giving 
Bolivia access to the sea would be possible as the “1929 treaty has flexibility” and 
local press had reported that a corridor to the sea for Bolivia would be seen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 La Concordia de Arica. 29th March 1974 
117 La Concordia de Arica. 31st March 1974 
249 
favourably, even by Peruvians, as progress which would bring mutual benefits.118 The 
breakdown of this agreement led to the severing of relations once again between 
Bolivia and Chile in 1978. The inability of Peru and Chile to agree on a solution to 
Bolivia’s lack of access to the sea was seen as a factor in the escalation of tension on 
the Peru-Chile border. The centenary of the War of the Pacific had been of great 
importance to Bolivia as well as to Peru and Chile as shown by Banzer’s statement in 
1975 that “Bolivia expects to regain access to the Pacific before 1979” and as early as 
1974 Banzer remarked that he “felt very close to the exit to the sea”.119 
Relations remained tense as shown by claims by Chile in October 1979 that Peru 
and Bolivia drew up an anti-Chilean resolution to propose to the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), a move that would ‘internationalise’ Arica and give Bolivia 
greater access to the sea. Chile had rejected the idea in 1976 and therefore saw it as 
unjust that it should be presented to the OAS. However, talks between Banzer and 
Pinochet probably led to a closeness that meant that Peru and Bolivia never formed a 
dangerous coalition. 
To add to these problems in the north, in 1978 Chile was having other border 
issues further south where it was in conflict with Argentina over three islands in the 
Beagle Channel. These events took precedence as the primary border issue in the 
national imagination, as one interviewee said, “When I travelled down to Santiago to 
visit family, everyone there talked about and was worried about the conflict with 
Argentina, about the British arbitration award, that gave Chile sovereignty over the 
islands of Picton, Nueva and Lennox at the Southern tip of Chile”.120 Chile had 
occupied these islands since 1892 but Argentina held maritime rights (Lindsley 1987). 
The latter first raised complaints about Chilean activity in the area in 1915 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 La Defensa. 19th January 1976; La Defensa. 14th January 1976 
119 La Defensa. 25th June 1975; La Defensa. 13th December 1974 
120 Interview, Joaquin Pérez, 7th June 2014 
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political stalemate ensued until 1971 when the dispute was submitted for arbitration 
by British monarch Queen Elizabeth II.  
By 1977 when the British submitted their judgment, Chile and Argentina were 
being led by military governments, Augusto Pinochet and Jorge Rafael Videla 
respectively (Dominguez 1999). As another interviewee stated, “the atmosphere was 
tense in southern Chile, the problems with Argentina which were as serious as the 
problems with Peru... Chile had a military government, which held legislative power, 
and Argentina also had a military government”.121  This complicated the issue and it 
was decided that the International Court of Justice at The Hague would lead the case 
and their findings would be discussed with Queen Elizabeth II. Argentina was 
unhappy with the ICJ’s award, declaring it ‘invalid’ and arguing that it favoured 
Chile. Both countries began to initiate military action.122 Tensions remained high 
until Pope John Paul II agreed to mediate; Catholicism being a shared ideal of both 
countries and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was ratified by Argentina in 1984, 
giving the islands to Chile but maritime rights to Argentina (Church 2008). 
Chile’s problems with Argentina were closely monitored by the media of Peru 
and Bolivia, it is likely that Chile’s northern neighbours were excited by the prospect 
of a weakened, distracted Chile, especially with the approach of the centenary of the 
War of the Pacific.123 For Chile the Beagle Channel was just too important and their 
attention was drawn away from northern border that had the effect of making the 
Chileans act more calmly in the north to avoid conflict on all borders just as had 
occurred in the 1870s. 
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122 La Defensa. 14th January 1978 
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Conclusions 
The tensions that surrounded the Peru-Chile border and the city of Arica in the 
1970s were bound up in global Cold War geopolitics but had impacts at the local 
scale, on the city of Arica. There were vast differences between how the two military 
governments related to one another, how military officials in Arica and Tacna 
communicated, and what life was like for the citizens of Arica during the decade. 
These varying perspectives were largely engineered; local media was employed as a 
channel through which to disseminate certain messages that created a space of 
perceived peace and harmony for the citizens of Arica. 
Pinochet and the two Peruvian presidents, Velasco and later Bermúdez were 
pitted against one another by polarised Cold War politics but were also actors 
independent of Washington and Moscow, acting on their own ideological terms. The 
opposing views of Peru and Chile resulted in bitterness and antagonism, the result 
being an arms race and threat of violence on the Peru-Chile border. The Chilean 
military changed its stance towards the city of Arica throughout the 1970s, at first 
seeing it as a dispensable frontier zone but later fortifying it and pledging to hold the 
country’s borders from there.  
Chile was fully aware of Peru’s military advantage, largely an effect of Cold War 
affiliations, and so Arica became a place of military deception. From fake airports in 
the desert to fictional radio communication with the United States and later bogus 
military parades, Chile constructed a spectacle of war and presented an image of 
force and might in an attempt to convince the Peruvians to not risk military conflict. 
Alongside these imaginings of force were declarations of peace and friendship 
between Chile and Peru. The official message was one of fraternity as disseminated 
through local newspapers even if the actions of the military governments suggested 
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otherwise. These newspaper reports assured the citizens of Arica that the border was 
calm and many citizens had no idea of the danger that their lives were in. Despite the 
potential for war as the centenary came and went, the tensions began to dissipate and 
Arica was no longer in danger. Part of this dissipation is due to Chile’s other border 
problems with Bolivia and Argentina. Pinochet became increasingly aware that it 
would be incredibly dangerous to have potential conflict on every border. 
Arica once again became a space of violence due to its border location. The city 
was vulnerable and could have been easily recouped by Peru until Pinochet and 
Odlanier Mena militarised the border and the city. Consistent with the earlier history 
of Arica as a border city, this shows the relationship between threats at the border and 
the interest that the Chilean government showed in the city. Arica was not seen as of 
importance until the gravity of the threat from Peru became clear when Pinochet 
began to make more visits to the region and military defences were installed. As the 
following chapters show this is a trend that continues through the history of Arica, the 
citizens feel abandoned by the Chilean state until Chilean sovereignty is endangered.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 	  
BIOPOLITICS AT THE BORDER: 
HIV/AIDS & ABORTION IN ARICA 1980s- 
 
In the 1970s Arica became the stage for international geopolitics involving Chile, 
Peru, and the United States just as it had been in the 1920s. However, these 
geopolitical events still affected the citizens of Arica in a corporeal sense, their bodies 
were at risk. This chapter further unpacks the corporeal effects of larger scale political 
decisions. The Chile-Peru border is a biopolitical border and through two examples 
the body is examined in terms of how the border both facilitates and hinders the 
body’s health. The Chilean state exerts biopolitical control over its subjects but only to 
a (geographical) limit; both the border and the body can be spaces of resistance.  
The border continues to be a space of contradiction; a space heavily controlled 
and monitored by the Chilean state while also being a point of escape, on the 
periphery of state control. This exemplifies the ‘crazy geography’ of the border. It is a 
space where whether studying international diplomacy, geopolitics, or biopolitics, 
violence is the thread that illustrates the paradox of the Chile-Peru border. A 
movement from the broad international scale to the corporeal scale may seem 
unconventional but it is this experimental register that uncovers the wider picture. 
This chapter begins from the assumption that poor health is a type of structural 
violence. Health is an instable variable that can be controlled to a large degree by the 
state. Therefore, the implementation of health policies can be a violent act even 
though they are commonly seen as beneficial measures. There are strong parallels 
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between peace studies and health studies, argues Galtung (1996; Webel & Galtung), 
with the same diagnosis-prognosis-therapy idea applicable to both. In fact this can be 
seen through Pinochet’s geopolitical lexicon with regards to ‘healthy states’, ‘sickness 
in society’, and evils within the population who threaten the health of the nation. It is 
in this way that to speak of the health of the border population in relation to how it is 
affected by the border and state policy at the border is not such a great leap from the 
previous chapter on international geopolitics. 
Two events in the 1980s led to changes in the health of the citizens of Arica; 
firstly the HIV/AIDS epidemic arrived in Chile and secondly Pinochet’s government 
tightened abortion legislation making the procedure illegal in every single 
circumstance. From the 1980s onwards the border is a paradoxical space of health; it 
puts the body in danger at times and provides an opportunity to reclaim the right to 
the body at others. This chapter draws on these two examples to discuss biopolitics at 
the border. 
The first example examines how Arica’s border location has resulted in the 
region having by far the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in the country. Interviews with 
healthcare workers and HIV/AIDS campaigners suggest that these reasons include 
sex work, the cheap availability of drugs which lead to riskier behaviour, and a large 
floating population of miners and migratory workers. An estimated 1.5 million adults 
and children live with HIV/AIDS in Latin America, 23,000-59,000 of whom live in 
Chile (Aggleton et al. 2003).1 It is a highly stigmatised condition with many Chileans 
lacking knowledge of the facts surrounding HIV/AIDS and there is reluctance against 
testing. Governmental, societal and self- control promote or prohibit certain 
behaviours which have resulted in Arica’s high rate of HIV/AIDS. 
The second example examines another way in which bodies in Arica have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 United Nations AIDS estimates 2013 
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biopolitically controlled but have also resisted this control. For decades Chileans have 
crossed the border for medical treatment due to the lower costs in Tacna, the 
Peruvian city 58 km from Arica. Yet one key border crossing has been generated as a 
response to Chile’s restrictive legislation on abortion, women travel to Peru to 
undergo abortions that are strictly illegal in Chile. Interviews with both medical 
professionals and those who travel for healthcare highlight the violent repercussions of 
healthcare legislation on women’s bodies. State legislation has made women’s bodies 
into biopolitical spaces in ways that cannot be legally contested. Women are being put 
in a position by the Chilean state whereby exerting rights over their own body means 
committing a crime. If they want to escape state control over their reproductive 
organs they are forced to cross a border. Travel is an act of resistance for women 
seeking autonomy over their own bodies.  
Sex can be dangerous in Arica, in particular sex that is not between monogamous 
heterosexual couples in the pursuit of children. In this chapter, violence against the 
body at the border is not directed homogenously at all bodies but is concentrated on 
certain bodies due to factors such as gender, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity and 
privilege. At the border these real or perceived identities become exacerbated and 
bring increased levels of violence. The privileging of some bodies over others is 
embedded in the potential disciplinary control of biopolitics.  
This chapter posits that the Chilean state and other plural, decentralised agents 
wield social and political power over the health of the inhabitants of the Chilean 
borderlands, with violent repercussions. Foucault’s theory of biopolitical power, 
outlined in chapter two, comes from everywhere, often deployed vertically from the 
state but also by social groups such as religious or charitable organisations (Elbe 2005). 
Foucault was largely interested in the population as a collective, how a group is 
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controlled as opposed to individual bodies but the effects of these politics is felt in 
individual human bodies (Nilsson & Wallenstein 2013). In Arica it is deviant bodies 
that are disproportionately subject to violence, namely poor, homosexual, 
transgender, and underprivileged citizens. For Jennifer Fluri “[t]he body is often the 
battleground onto which violence is orchestrated, and rights and victimization-based 
discourses are expounded to shape public opinion, policy and political action” 
(2011:291). HIV/AIDS and abortion therefore transform bodies into battlegrounds 
and the way in which individuals are treated has biopolitical implications, whether 
these are positive or negative. 
In order to understand the nature of biopolitical control in Arica it is necessary to 
understand the mentality of the governing system that was established by Pinochet’s 
military government and remains highly influential and largely unchanged today. 
This can be seen through the reproductive control of women’s bodies whereby HIV 
positive Chilean women have been compulsorily sterilised and women are prohibited 
from having an abortion under any circumstance. Biological reproduction is central to 
the idea of a political citizen in a modern biopolitical state and particularly one so 
dependent on machismo and these examples highlight how that power can be 
wielded. Ruth Miller (2007) has discussed the idea of the ‘biopolitical womb’ whereby 
women’s wombs are the commodity of the government which can draw up laws and 
regulations for certain social engineering projects. As soon as a woman has a foetus 
growing inside of her the womb becomes a separate legal arena, taking precedence 
over the rights and decisions of the woman. Through the act of becoming pregnant 
women’s bodies become subject to political discussions on life and death, race and 
nation, citizenship and motherhood, and the right of life of the foetus. 
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The HIV/AIDS Problem in Arica 
The HIV epidemic arrived in Chile in 1984 through an individual who was 
infected outside of the country.2 The first case in northern Chile was diagnosed in 
1987 and immediately the director of Arica’s hospital, Dr. Oscar Torrealba, declared 
that Arica’s medical services were ready to attend to anyone affected by HIV/AIDS.3  
Arica’s susceptibility to the virus was quickly noted and Torrealba stated that “due to 
being an area of ports and borders, and for being close to Brazil, a country with 
significant cases of AIDS, health authorities in Arica are concerned about the 
situation”.4 Government intervention began in Arica in November 1988 when an 
event organised by the Universidad de Tarapacá and The Health Service of Arica 
aimed “to analyse the problems of AIDS in great depth”. At this time the 
northernmost province of Chile had confirmed three cases of AIDS, one in Arica and 
two in Iquique. All three had died by the time the meeting took place.5 In the present 
day, the region of Arica and Parinacota holds the highest rate of HIV/AIDS in the 
country, see Figure 84 and Figure 85.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio de Salud, Vig. Epi. VIH/SIDA, 2010 
3 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 
4 La Defensa. 17th June 1987 
5 La Defensa. 2nd November 1988 
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Figure 84: Rates of HIV notifications in Chile by region 1986-2010. Arica & Parinacota, the northernmost region, 
emerges after 2001 as the region with the highest HIV rate. Ministerio de Salud de Chile “Evolución del 
VIH/SIDA Chile” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 85: Accumulated rate of HIV/AIDS in Chile by region 1984-2006. Informe Nacional Sobre Los Progresos 
Realizados En La Aplicación Del UNGASS. Chile. (2010) Gobierno de Chile Ministro de Salud y ONUSIDA 
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Since the first case was detected in the region HIV/AIDS cases have grown 
exponentially in every age group including in the last five years an increase in cases of 
individuals in their seventies and eighties.6 The very young are also a high-risk group 
with those aged 10-19 having a risk rate 4 times higher than the national average. 
One healthcare worker reported that while the overall rate is higher for men it is 
growing more quickly with women which is due to physiological factors, women are 
two to four times more susceptible to the virus than men, and cultural factors such as 
gender based violence, economic dependence, and unequal power dynamics which 
exacerbate this risk.7  The female mortality rate in Arica and Parinacota is currently 
five times higher than the national average. 8  This tends to occur when women aren’t 
tested and so only discover they have the virus when they develop complications in 
the later stages of AIDS when the chances of survival are lower. Some cases are only 
detected post-mortem.  
This reluctance to be tested stems from the high levels of stigma and abuse which 
affect the lives of Chileans with HIV/AIDS; it is not uncommon for HIV positive 
Chileans to lose their jobs, suffer a lack of privacy due to the existence of a name-
based system of national reporting, and to feel crippled by machismo, homophobia, 
and family honour (Aggleton et al. 2003). The fact that the health crisis began in Chile 
in the homosexual male community only served to reinforce machismo and the 
‘othering’ of Chilean homosexuals. The ‘small-town’ nature of Arica is often cited as a 
barrier to people taking the test as it is difficult to keep one’s HIV status private. An 
HIV/AIDS specialist in Arica, Valentina Araya, reported that “there are people don’t 
think they are at risk, they only have one sexual partner, so they don’t think it’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid. 
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important to take the test, they don’t feel ill, so they don’t see it as important, or 
they’re scared of it, knowing that they’re vulnerable, they prefer not to know”.9 This 
lack of testing means that an estimated 23,000 to 25,000 people are living with 
undiagnosed HIV/AIDS in Chile worsened by poor education on the subject with 
many Chileans confused about the facts surrounding HIV/AIDS (Muñoz Merkle 
2012). Many women believe that it is possible to become infected from using public 
toilets or that it is possible to tell by someone’s appearance whether they are HIV 
positive.10 
HIV positive women in Chile have received a disproportionate amount of stigma 
and abuse as shown by cases of forced sterilisation of HIV positive women. Daniel 
Valenzuela, an HIV/AIDS specialist in Arica, specified that “when the first HIV-
positive women began appearing in the late 90s and early 2000s, they were sterilized 
without their consent because they were seen as a danger to the public”.11 This 
occurred in Arica and a large-scale investigation was undertaken when these cases 
became public knowledge. The result was a report entitled Dignity Denied that laid out 
how women had been sterilised without their knowledge or consent or sterilised under 
pressure.12 The report details the experiences of an HIV positive 26 year old woman 
from Arica who was told she was not allowed to hug or kiss her newborn baby 
because she might infect him. These women were biopolitcally controlled by the state 
in order to extinguish their reproductive potential. Despite other options being 
available including non-invasive reproductive management or the women’s choice 
being factored into the decision, HIV positive women have been abused, humiliated, 
and violated in Chile. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
10 Figures estimated by the United Nations. Cianelli, Ferrer & Mcelmurry (2008)  
11  Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014  
12 Dignidad Negada: Violaciones de los Derechos de las Mujeres VIH-positivas en establecimientos de Salud 
Chilenos. Centro de Derechos Reproductivos: New York 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/DignidadNegada_0.pdf 
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The rate of HIV/AIDS in the region of Arica and Parinacota is not homogenous 
as very few people in the rural interior contract the HIV virus. Daniel Valenzuela said 
that in his 14 year career working in HIV/AIDS, only two patients from the interior 
contracted the virus.13 The majority of those who live in the interior are Aymará and 
have a very different worldview when it comes to sex than what is deemed to be the 
modern Chilean norm. Valenzuela stressed that sexuality encompasses much more 
than sexual intercourse and it is therefore difficult to talk “directly about sexual acts, 
that HIV is transmitted through penetrative sex without a condom by ejaculation, to 
them it's terrible to talk openly about it”. In some ways the city of Arica is posited as a 
corrupting force, as cities have always been seen, bringing evils to the pure rural 
interior. This purity of rural life clashes with the urban: 
Condoms are unknown to them, they’re better known amongst Aymará 
youth who come down from the interior to study here [Arica], they become 
somewhat urbanized, they take with them the culture of the city... It’s the 
grandparents who pass on the traditions, who still cultivate the language and 
stories, they are the patriarchs, the matriarchs, they set the rules, laws, so when 
they [the youths] are born, it’s a bit difficult to talk about sexuality or the subjects 
themselves…The youth grow up with the Aymará worldview, but when they 
come here they still live with that worldview but the Aymará culture comes to a 
junction with Chilean culture, it’s a culture shock. And many begin to explore 
themselves sexually, they have their first sexual experiences and very often 
without protection because they don’t have the information.14 
 
Due to Arica’s status as the region with the highest rate of HIV/AIDS numerous 
government mandated investigations have attempted to tackle the problem and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
However it is important to note that apart from HIV/AIDS the Aymará population in Arica suffers from far 
higher rates of mortality and morbidity that non-indigenous groups. Perfil epidemiológico básico de la población aymara del 
Servicio de Salud Arica. (2006) Serie Análisis de Situación de Salud de los Pueblos Indígenas de Chile N.1 Minesterio 
de Salud de Chile.  
14 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
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healthcare programs have been established. Arica and Parinacota is the only region 
with a designated HIV/AIDS community centre, CRIPAC. The centre works 
towards the prevention and reduction of HIV transmission mainly through access to 
information, counselling, HIV testing, and condom distribution in the region.15 
CRIPAC is centrally located in the city and is open until late at night, 16:00-23:00, to 
provide resources for those who are unable to visit during traditional hours such as 
working mothers or sex workers.16  
CRIPAC employees also target locations that have been identified as potential 
risk spots, for example employees go to an infamous nightclub ‘Martes Hot Night’ 
which is well known for its live sex shows to disseminate condoms and safe sex 
information.17 They target community events such as the indigenous dance festival 
which takes place every February, set up debates and film screenings, and run stands 
and campaigns in public places (Figure 86, Figure 87 & Figure 88). The centre’s 
director recorded that they test 2,800 people every year but reach over 9,000 people 
in the region through their work.18 These interventions can be read as biopolitics in 
action through the formal channels of government funding and initiatives. CRIPAC 
and the regional ministry of health seek to influence the health of the population 
through these centres and schemes. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14th March 2014 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
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Figure 86: Community event in Arica called “Join the Positive Culture” to spread awareness of HIV/AIDS 
in the region with an information stand, music, advice about the HIV test and artistic projects. 
http://www.viharica.cl/author/cripac/ [accessed 13/02/2014] 
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Figure 87: A CRIPAC information stand disseminating material about HIV/AIDS. 
http://www.viharica.cl/author/cripac/ [accessed 13/02/2014] 
 
 
Figure 88: CRIPAC workers at the dance festival ‘Arica con la fuerza del sol’. 
http://www.viharica.cl/author/cripac/ [accessed 13/02/2014] 
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HIV/AIDS and Sex Work  
When it became apparent that the rate of HIV/AIDS in Arica surpasses that of 
any other region it was initially thought that the cause was men traveling to Peru 
where they had unprotected sex with Peruvian sex workers and contracted the virus. 
This idea has been ruled out as the primary cause of HIV transmission yet there is still 
a significant amount of cross-border sexual activity. The regional ministry of health in 
Arica and Parinacota worked with the United Nations in May 2010 to investigate the 
issue of sex tourism across the Chile-Peru border and its relationship with 
HIV/AIDS. The results of the study highlighted the differences between the sex 
industries of Arica and Tacna. The director of the municipal health service Catalina 
López reported;  
“here it is more residential, arranged by telephone. There, in Tacna, there 
are established places, cabins with many women. We went to an area called 
Cucardas where there are three big commercial sex venues and they have 
cubicles next to each other, about thirty, and all day long one client leaves and 
the other enters, at a very cheap price, 2000 or 3000 pesos. Each of the men of 
our group, there were about four, each asked about six girls whether they would 
have relations without a condom and none accepted. This corroborates with 
what the health authorities in Tacna say, that no-one will have sex without a 
condom.”19  
 
Christian Hernández, a healthworker who has worked in various HIV/AIDS 
roles confirmed that Chileans traveling to Peru to visit sex workers “is well-known as 
something commonly practiced by the population of Arica, they take more 
precautions with using condoms there but tend not to use them in Arica”.20 In a 
culture of machismo condoms are seen as emasculating, ineffective, and a barrier to 
pleasure and women’s power to negotiate the use of condoms is limited. Valentina 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014 
20 Interview, Christian Hernández, 23rd April 2014 
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Araya stated that the likelihood of a Chilean man practicing safe sex with a sex worker 
in Peru ‘depends on the context’; “there are men who always take precautions, and 
men who never do, there are men who think some women are safer than others, 
maybe a difference between a sex worker who they frequently visit will be perceived as 
safer because they know her for example”.21 It would, therefore, appear that while 
Chilean men do visit sex workers in Tacna it has not led to an increase in HIV 
transmission as they practice safe sex on the whole. 
However, not all men travel to Peru to visit sex workers, it is much easier and 
quicker to stay in Chile especially for those with wives or families and sex workers are 
cheap and easy to find. Although prostitution is illegal it is widely advertised in the 
local newspaper La Estrella de Arica. It has been estimated that between 450 and 600 
sex workers publicise in the newspaper with adverts such as:  
• 2 friends, pretty, slim, affectionate, sweet, everything included, 6.000 
• Nataly. Sensual, 100-60-100, boyfriend treatment, with lingerie. Own home 
• Mature Chilean, 34, homes, motels, room. Own transport. 
It is common to see an emphasis placed on the transaction being an ‘affectionate’ 
one with many offering the ‘boyfriend treatment’ which means sweet words and 
caresses as well as intercourse. Many of these sex workers are not Chilean. On a 
sample from one day there were 48 adverts for sex and 18 explicitly stated that were 
not Chilean, for example:   
• 18 years old, Yenifer, beautiful Bolivian, spectacular figure, boyfriend treatment 
• Argentinian. Esteffi beautiful, boyfriend treatment open to everything, sexy 
• 5.000 Bolivian Sandra, new, young, pretty, slim, obliging, amazing attention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
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• Peruvian, 19, recently arrived, extrovert, open to everything. Homes, motels.22 
A significant proportion of sex workers in Arica are estimated to be foreign 
immigrants from nearby countries. Of immigrants as a whole in Arica and Parinacota, 
88% are from Peru and Bolivia, with the rest predominantly from Colombia and 
Ecuador.23 Daniel Valenzuela explains why many of these immigrants find themselves 
in sex work;  
“In Arica, we’re a border region, there are lot of immigrants in transit 
because Arica isn’t a region to live in or where the immigrants stay, because 
it’s a small city with a small labour force…every immigrant always goes to 
the capital because they see it as the best destination, so Arica is a city of 
transit, where often many foreigners carry out sex work or they are brought 
here to do it, they bring them to secret locations”.24  
 
While it is known that there are foreign sex workers in the industry, whether 
voluntary or coerced, the HIV/AIDS rate of foreigners living in Chile is difficult to 
estimate because only those foreigners who have Chilean residency or nationality can 
access the health services in Chile.25 
The true figures regarding the number of sex workers in Arica is difficult to 
estimate. The director of CRIPAC explained that “[a]ccording to official statistics 
there are only about 30 sex workers in Arica, being monitored, but when there are 
estimates of 450-600… There are also those who work just occasionally, sporadically, 
to pay university fees, to buy clothes, or whatever, so the figure of 30 is far too low”.26 
Moreover, sex work may take place not for money but for drugs or other favours and 
these encounters often are not undertaken safely.27 The regional ministry of health is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 http://www.estrellaarica.cl/impresa/2014/10/02/full/18/ [accessed 02/10/2014] 
23 Interview, José Tomas Vicuña. 1st April 2014 
24 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
25 ibid. 
26 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014 
27 Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14th March 2014 
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aware of the locations where sex work takes place “so we can make a map of the 
places where there are nightclubs and where the trade goes on, in those places you 
always find foreigners…there are Colombian girls, Peruvian girls, Peruvians more 
than any other”.28 
This lack of information on Arica’s sex industry is relatively new due to the 
elimination of mandatory control of sex workers in 2004. The decree required 
monthly health checks for sex workers and for them to carry a card proving that they 
were healthy which the authorities could check at any time. Valentina Araya stated 
that the decree was dissolved “because groups of sex workers in Santiago were saying 
they were being abused by the authorities, with excessive force, lots of violence, when 
they were obliged to be monitored, so it seemed from the view of human rights that it 
would be better to make the monitoring voluntary and get rid of the power of those 
authorities”.29 Daniel Valenzuela referred to the biopolitical nature of the decree 
which “was very negative, it was saying, you sold your body so we have to control 
you, you couldn’t control yourself, you didn’t have the right to sell your body… the 
checks were a form of punishment, they gave you a card saying if you were suitable, it 
was signed and stamped to say you could work”.30 Valentina Araya recalls the impact 
of the changes in the health checks: 
since this switch the health checks dropped drastically, there were about 
120 women being monitored, now we have 30, it’s very few…. This violence 
wasn’t in Arica, there were no problems… the problems were in other cities so 
the decision was made at a national level, but it hit us in a really negative 
way… When we had that large number of women being monitored there was 
virtually no incidence of disease, the only time I saw a sex worker with HIV she 
had not been infected by a client but by her partner.31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014 
29 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
30 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
31 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
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Sex workers in Chile are a highly discriminated-against group, especially if the 
sex worker is also transgender, but this has resulted in a higher level of awareness 
about safe sex practices.32 Christian Hernández believes that “sex workers usually 
have greater awareness about condom use than the general population, so I think the 
general population have a greater risk of contracting HIV/Aids than sex workers”, an 
idea elaborated by Daniel Valenzuela who stated “I think those in Arica with the 
greatest knowledge [of HIV/AIDS], and out of all the sex workers are transwomen, 
health checks aren’t obligatory for them but they still get them done… it’s to do with 
the stigma”.33 Gabriela Torres, another HIV/AIDS expert also believed this is true 
but with the exception of “the younger ones just beginning in the industry of 14, 15 
who are less aware”.34 
The result of this is that throughout South America female sex workers have low 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS compared to homobisexual men in the continent and sex 
workers on other continents (Montano et al. 2005).35 Stigma is imposed on certain 
groups of people and originates from a wide range of sources with the result of 
biopolitical control. Sex workers and transgender and homosexual individuals are 
disqualified from full social acceptance through social checks (Goffman 1963). The 
discrimination, abuse, and stigma faced by these ‘deviants’ is not directly from one 
agent or state organisation, it becomes embedded in societies and communities.  
The Peruvian government still has compulsory health checks which is seen by 
some as one of the reasons why Peru has a lower HIV/AIDS rate than that of Chile.36 
Valentina Araya stated that the “control of sex workers is stricter I think in Tacna 
because it’s mandatory, they have a large number of people being monitored which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014; Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14th March 2014 
33 Interview, Christian Hernández, 23rd April 2014; Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
34 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 
35 The term ‘homobisexual’ is rarely used in English but was commonly used by the interviewees in Spanish and 
adequately refers to men who may engage in exclusively homosexual or bisexual activity. 
36 0.5 prevalence rate in Chile. 0.4 prevalence rate in Peru. Source: United Nations AIDS 
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doesn’t happen here and there they are having regular health checks, giving out 
condoms, in every sense the monitoring is better there”.37 The HIV/AIDS rate in 
Tacna is, agreed Daniel Valenzuela, “lower than ours…they have better methods of 
prevention than we do, they invest a lot of money in prevention and promotion 
whereas Chile is totally the opposite, it spends more money on medical attention than 
on prevention”.38 The Peruvian government uses biopolitical control to manage 
sexual health at the border. 
Due to the initial thoughts that the reason for Arica and Parinacota’s high rate of 
HIV/AIDS was cross-border sex tourism, links between the health ministries of Arica 
and Tacna were established. When Arica works with Tacna it tends to be more 
focussed on attending patients rather than prevention but the two regions have 
“developed some strategies of prevention at the border, at Chacalluta, distributing 
condoms or putting up signs so people see that information when they’re traveling 
through”.39 Healthworker Valentina Araya who co-ordinates these links stated that 
“we have a campaign every year which we conduct jointly with Tacna, in the context 
of the Border Integration Committee, and we disseminate information about where 
you can take the test, preventative measures, and we have activities at the border 
control Chacalluta, giving information to those who pass through, entering or leaving 
Chile”.40  
Therefore, while the border is not a highly significant cause of Arica’s high 
HIV/AIDS rate in terms of Chileans acquiring the virus in Peru, the border is highly 
significant in being a place with a high number of unmonitored sex workers, many of 
whom are immigrants. However, studies have shown that sex workers in Chile tend to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
38 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014  
39 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
40 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014 
271 
have greater awareness of safer sex practices than the average population and so other 
reasons for the high figure must exist. 
 
HIV/AIDS and Drugs in Arica 
Another factor in the high level of HIV/AIDS in the region is the plentiful and 
cheap supply of drugs. Local health experts have argued that the high levels of drug 
use in Arica increases the probability of risky sexual behaviour and consequently the 
chances of transmitting HIV. Arica’s border location is the cause of the quantity and 
affordability of the drugs. Intravenous drug use accounts for 5% of HIV transmission 
in Chile, a low figure compared to its neighbour Argentina where the rate is 41.9% 
but drug use increases the likelihood of HIV transmission through unsafe sex (Magis 
Rodríguez, Fernando Marques
 
& Touzé 2002). Previous studies have found that HIV 
prevalence in South America is higher for men who use marijuana, cocaine, and 
alcohol (Montano et al. 2005). As Valentina Araya stated;  
“Drugs and alcohol lower your perception of risk, if before you were aware of 
how to look after yourself, when you’re under the effect of substances you become 
unaware or you don’t care, so you do things that you wouldn’t do were you not 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. You lose your inhibitions and in this 
context are more likely to have relations without taking precautions”.41 
 
Drugs have been a major problem for many decades in Arica as shown by a 1976 
conference of Bolivian and Chilean narcotic officials in Arica to address the major 
cocaine trade between the two countries in the area.42 Arica is perfectly located as a 
centre of the global drug trade, being located near the coca leaf growing fields of Peru 
and Bolivia which provide the raw material for cocaine and its narcotic relations and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
42 {{WikiLeaks cable|id=1976SANTIA09385_b}} 
272 
with the port opening South America to the world. One Ariqueño, Pablo Martínez, 
claims that Arica in the 1960s and early 1970s was in fact this global centre, 
producing cocaine and shipping it to the US until 1973 when Pinochet immediately 
cracked down on Arica’s drug lords, handing them to the drug enforcement agency of 
the United States.43 This was during the period covered in the previous chapter when 
Pinochet was concerned with creating an ordered, militarised border region. Pablo 
believes that had Pinochet not intervened, Arica would have been Latin America’s 
cocaine capital, a badge taken by Colombia when production was stifled in Chile. 
A 2008 report by the US Ambassador to Chile illustrates that drug trafficking at 
the borders continues to be a problem with “drug traffickers us[ing] false 
compartments in suitcases and cars and body cavity smuggling to sneak drugs- almost 
entirely cocaine- into Chile via the Tacna-Arica border crossing. “Mules” also cross 
the land borders on foot at night, and some smuggle drugs by boat”.44 The majority of 
these ‘mules’ are indigenous Peruvian women, many of whom are apprehended 
meaning that over half of Arica’s female prison population is Peruvian. Drug 
smugglers will send mules across the dangerous border, riddled with mines, whose 
survival or not will show the danger points. It is believed by the drug lords that those 
who live in the Andes make the most proficient smugglers as they are accustomed to 
the high altitudes and can outrun law enforcement officers from the coast.45 
Drug enforcement is difficult in Arica being so isolated, in the desert, and with 
borders with both Peru and Bolivia, resulting in it being seen by traffickers as one of 
the easiest transit routes from South America to the US and Europe. Over 70% of all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Interview, Pablo Martínez, 21st April 2014 
44 {{WikiLeaks cable|id =08SANTIAGO942_a }} 
45  ‘Cocaine invades Chile, scorning the land mines’. Nathaniel C Nash New York Times 23rd January 1992  
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the cocaine products that flow through Chile pass through the region of Arica and 
Parinacota, totaling 2,409 kilos of cocaine and 1,738 kilos of pastabase.46 
Drug enforcement agencies have therefore had to improve their detection efforts 
for example by introducing new scanners at the Chile-Peru border that examine 
about twenty people per day and in their first 9 months of operation discovered 90 
kilos of cocaine in the stomachs of 65 different traffickers.47 However as border checks 
have become increasingly innovative so have methods to smuggle drugs. For example 
in 2015 a lorry was found to be carrying 33 kilos of cocaine formed into spheres, 
bathed in mustard, and covered in onion skins making them appear remarkably 
identical to real onions. They were only discovered when the goods were x-rayed at a 
border crossing.48 
While Arica is usually a transit point between South America and the US and 
Europe, a significant amount of drugs remain in Arica, leading to by far the highest 
addiction rate in the country. One of the most common drugs is pastabase, a cheap but 
highly toxic and addictive intermediate byproduct from the production of cocaine 
hydrochloride and similar to crack. Daniel Valenzuela reported:  
Here in the region the consumption of pastabase is really high, it’s one of 
the cheapest drugs, its easily accessible, there’s a lot of it in the city. Arica is 
the cheapest city in which to buy drugs, for example a wrap for two cigarettes 
with pastabase costs a thousand pesos, in other cities it costs five thousand, ten 
thousand, but this is a transit city where everything comes in from Peru or 
Bolivia… A significant number of people here acquire HIV from sexual 
relations under the effects of alcohol or drugs or to obtain drugs or alcohol.49 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 {{WikiLeaks cable|id = 171980_Chile and Drug Trafficking.doc}} 
47 {{WikiLeaks cable|id = 2042935}} 
48 ‘Falsas cebollas con cocaína fueron descubiertas en Arica’ Soyarica.cl 24th March 2015 
49 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
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The small white bags that hold the pastabase are a common sight on the streets of 
the poorer parts of Arica and it has been estimated that every night as many as 11,000 
youths smoke monos, cigarettes made of pastabase and tobacco. 50  Youth drug 
addiction is shockingly high in Arica. Florencia Espinoza stated that “drugs were one 
of the first things that caught my attention when I came to Arica, because my work 
involved adolescents and drugs, it really struck me that there was high a level of drug 
use from adolescence and drugs that are very cheap, very poor quality, and very 
addictive”.51  
Youth gangs have existed in Arica since the 1980s, predominantly comprised of 
adolescents from poorer families, and become spaces of alcohol and drug 
consumption. These are male dominated gangs with women and girls playing a 
passive role as girlfriends or aiding in some crimes (Cayo, Benabarre & Garcia 2001). 
This culture remains today and “young people are consistently the high risk group, 
because of unsafe sex and heavy drinking”.52 This unsafe sex is exacerbated because 
to avoid becoming pregnant many young heterosexual couples are engaging in anal 
sex yet not using protection.53 There is also an increasing trend in Arica of young girls 
exchanging drugs for sexual acts, often without protection, from as young as eight or 
nine.54 
These reports from healthworkers illustrate how Arica’s border location has led 
to a culture of drug abuse; a large number of young people are taking advantage of 
the cheap and accessible although highly dangerous drugs such as pastabase. This is 
supplemented by a drinking culture which together result in a high level of risky 
sexual behaviour. Arica’s perennially warm climate and beach culture means that it’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  ‘Cocaine invades Chile, scorning the land mines’. Nathaniel C Nash New York Times 23rd January 1992  
51 Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014 
52 Interview, Christian Hernández, 23rd April 2014 
53 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 HIV infection through anal sex is many times that of transmission 
through vaginal sex. 
54 Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014 
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normal and socially acceptable to party on the street or the beach and drink 
throughout the day. 55  This drinking culture means that in 2015 the National 
Commission for Transport Security named Arica as the Chilean city with most traffic 
accidents due to alcohol.56  
Alcohol is dangerous in numerous ways as it increases the likelihood of risky 
sexual behaviour but also facilitates the development of AIDS by acting as an 
immunosuppressor. Moreover, those who consume alcohol whilst being treated for 
HIV/AIDS are more likely to abandon their treatment; the allure of drugs tempts 
individuals living with HIV/AIDS away from their antiretroviral treatment that they 
abandon to often fatal results (Rosenbloom et al. 2007). Arica’s border location has 
therefore created a dangerous situation for those susceptible to drug and alcohol use 
who are more likely to become victims of substance abuse, accidents, and sexually 
transmitted disease. 
  
Migratory Workers 
Arica’s location on the border with Peru and Bolivia has resulted in the 
movement of sex workers and cheap drugs but also of migratory workers. The region 
of Arica and Parinacota has a large number of migratory workers, or a ‘floating 
population’ which is estimated to be 20% of workers, comprised of those who work in 
mining, in transport, in agriculture, and other industries (Cortes at al. 1992). Many of 
these workers are Chilean as the national population is concentrated in the central 
region and so more workers are required in certain parts of the north. Many are also 
foreign as 27% of foreigners living in Chile are located in the extreme north in the 
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three provinces of Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá, and Antofagasta.57 
This is an at-risk population because the way of life of migrant workers is 
comprised of a series of factors that make them particularly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS 
(Campbell 1997). These risk factors are economic, social, and psychological elements 
that arise with migration. Migrant workers often spend months or years far from their 
families and so some workers, and/or their partners, visit sex workers or establish 
second homes while others work in the sex industry to relieve financial pressures. It 
then becomes more likely that if they contract the virus they will spread it as they 
move elsewhere (Parker et al. 2000). One study of migrant workers in Arica found that 
they are an at risk population due to spending long periods away from home, having 
multiple sexual partners and sex without protection and have low rates of HIV testing 
(Conley 2012). 
One example of this has been the mining industry in Chile, which employs a vast 
number of migratory workers in the extreme north, many working in shifts of ten days 
on, ten days off which can contribute to sexual promiscuity.58 Mining in the north is a 
masculine industry whereby off-shift socialising is characterised by displays of male 
dominance, sexual prowess, and virility (Salinas Meruane et al. 2012).59 Chilean 
machismo is embodied in the northern miner, a man who can take care of his family, 
is virile and promiscuous, and engages in homosocial activities such as drinking, 
watching football, and gambling. Risky sexual behaviour among miners is 
concentrated on certain dates, namely the end of the month when there is an increase 
in mobility which is pinpointed as a period of increased sexual encounters.60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 ‘Día del Inmigrante: ‘Chile es un País Abiertamente Discriminatorio y Racista.’’ Radio.uchile.cl. 18 December 
2011  
58 Mining exports accounted for 65.2% of export value in 2007 and are concentrated in northern Chile. The 
industry in the region of Arica extracts non-metals, particularly clays and boron. Instituto nacional de Estadisticas, 
Santiago, Chile 
59 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 
60 Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14th March 2014 
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Another at-risk group of migratory workers is those in the transport industry. 
Many transport workers pass through Arica due to its port and location on the border. 
Valentina Araya told me how transport workers often have multiple sexual partners in 
their regular locations of travel, others will visit sex workers when they travel. They 
are a similar group to those in mining she argued. 61  The Ministry of Health 
conducted an investigation in 2014 into lorry drivers, sampling around 100 
individuals for HIV using a fast test that gives the result in fifteen minutes.62 No 
positive cases were found but the results are unlikely to be representative believed 
Daniel Valenzuela because participation was optional and so anyone who suspects 
they may be HIV positive would not choose to have the test. An HIV positive 
transport worker would be highly stigmatised because “Chilean lorry drivers are really 
discriminatory, against homosexuals, against those living with HIV, against 
transwomen or women”.63 In this way Chile’s culture of machismo exacerbates an 
already perilous health situation as it reduces rates of testing. 
There is another group of workers who share many of the same characteristics as 
migratory workers in industries such as mining and transport yet do not officially show 
significant rates of HIV/AIDS; the armed forces. Military personnel in Arica are 
predominantly young men from regions far from Arica, many miles away from their 
families and yet they do not share the HIV/AIDS rates of other floating populations. 
Since the militarisation of Arica in the 1970s the region has had a great number of 
military personnel and so the absence of HIV/AIDS seems surprising. Is this an 
element of hope proving that certain groups can protect themselves from HIV or is 
there more to it than meets the eye?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
62 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014; Interview, Paulina Fuentes. 14th March 2014 
63 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
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Valentina Araya believed that compulsory testing and effective education has 
resulted in soldiers having greater awareness of the risks of unprotected sex and that is 
why they don’t acquire HIV;  
The military take a compulsory test when they enter the military and it’s very 
important for them to take precautions… Educational workshops in the 
institutions [means they] seem as a whole to have a better understanding of taking 
precautions. I think it has to do with the weight of the institutions, if they contract 
HIV they won’t be fired but their bosses will find out, their colleagues too 
probably… the military are supposed to meet the standards of the institution… 
they have more awareness, more self-regulation because the institution demands 
it.64  
 
This view was substantiated by a young soldier I interviewed who believed that 
the event of a soldier testing HIV positive “has not happened. Never in my career 
have I seen a soldier who is sick with AIDS and has to leave their job and the 
institution”.65 The soldier deemed this to be due to the education they receive in the 
military; “methods of prevention are recommended for people ... especially when you 
get to the unit, the brigade here, there are talks about prevention, about places, saying 
beware of certain sectors”. Perhaps education about HIV/AIDS really can work. 
However, not everyone thinks that military personnel receive such effective 
education about safe sex that not one has ever acquired HIV. As one friend said to me 
“Everyone knows those in the military have HIV, it’s linked in our minds, 
military=HIV”. Gabriela Torres, an HIV/AIDS professional in Iquique confirmed 
that she did know of HIV cases in the military but often soldiers who test positive for 
HIV are moved to administrative roles in Santiago, “to a role away from the macho, 
boots on ground role. There is punishment and separation”. 66 An HIV positive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
65 Interview, Matias Silva. 28th June 2014 
66 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 
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soldier is not seen as a reliable defender of the nation. Chilean legislation means that 
no-one with HIV/AIDS can be barred from a job or studying due to their health 
status but the armed forces is an exception to this. Compulsory health tests are 
undertaken once or twice a year in the military and HIV positive soldiers can be 
legally fired. The effect of this was explained by Daniel Valenzuela who clarified: 
so the official figure of soldiers with HIV is zero, because they fire them, so 
when they come to the public health system they’re classed as civilians because 
they’re no longer soldiers… In the past year the rate of sexually transmitted 
diseases amongst conscripts has risen sharply… the conscripts are boys of 
eighteen, youth who come to the city, from the south of Chile, they begin 
having sex, they don’t have a lot of information about where to find things such 
as free condoms so they get STD’s.67 
 
This view suggests that the notion that no soldier ever acquires HIV is false, but 
instead that if a soldier does acquire the virus, they cease to be a soldier and appear as 
civilians in the health records. This highlights the difficulties in studying the 
epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in Chile, with inaccessible statistics and studies, such as 
of the transport workers, which are challenging to conduct. While exact figures cannot 
be currently known, certain risk factors suggest that migratory workers are 
disproportionately likely to acquire the HIV virus and that Arica as a region has a 
high number of migratory workers due to its border location. It can therefore be 
postulated that these migratory workers may contribute to Arica’s high rate of 
HIV/AIDS. 
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HIV/AIDS in the Homobisexual Population of Arica  
While the previous examples of sex workers, drugs, and migratory workers are 
factors relating to the border that have resulted in Arica’s high rate of HIV/AIDS 
there are two other factors which do not relate to the border but are still important. In 
Chile more than 50% of new cases of HIV/AIDS between 2000 and 2009 were 
homobisexual men, in the Arica and Parinacota region alone, HIV cases increased by 
36.7% among gay men and 52.6% among bisexual men between 1984 and 2009.68 
For the first fifteen years of the epidemiology of virus in Arica only homobisexual men 
became infected.69 While there has been a rapid increase in cases attributed to 
heterosexual transmission, with a corresponding increase in the proportion of 
infections occurring among women, male-to-male transmission predominates in Chile 
(DeCock & Weiss 2000). 
There is a great deal of stigma surrounding homosexuality in Chile with its 
culture of machismo that leads to covert and therefore riskier sexual behavior, as 
Valentina Araya described: 
homosexual relationships are much more hidden, they are not 
permitted…so that prevents them from accessing the health services that are 
available. Our society is very discriminatory, also because Arica is a relatively 
small city, people are going to be seen…it’s hard to go completely unnoticed. 
The same goes for sex, sometimes there are secret relationships, casual 
encounters so it’s really difficult in those situations to be conscious and aware 
about condom use and sexual heath care… I couldn’t say that they use 
condoms less than heterosexuals, who also commonly have this kind of 
encounter… but among the homobisexual population this type of encounter 
is more common, they’re unable to establish a relationship like a normal 
couple…so they have these hidden relationships where the risks are higher…. 	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Certificado de Epidemiología para Gerentes de Salud 
69 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
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At every level there’s stigma so they distance themselves from taking tests.70 
 
While there are LGBT anti-discrimination laws in Chile they hold little power in 
reality and many services and institutions can turn people away based on their real or 
perceived sexuality. The Chilean state claims to be secular but again, this does not 
translate to practice. 71  What does this mean for the lives of LGBT identified 
individuals at the border? LGBT individuals in Arica report less homophobic 
aggression than those in Santiago, however, those in Santiago report lower levels of 
discrimination and better social wellbeing than those in Arica (Barrientos-Delgado et 
al. 2014). This discrimination means that many men in Chile have sex with men but 
do not identify as gay and engage in homosexual activity secretly while in heterosexual 
relationships. This has contributed to the fact that most Chilean women who become 
infected with HIV do so by their husbands or long-term partners who contracted the 
virus outside of the relationship (Cianelli et al. 2008). 
As in North America and Europe, the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Latin America 
was similar in that the initial cases were among homosexual men and injecting drug 
users and while in Chile the number of cases from intravenous drug use has been low, 
infections amongst homobisexual men has remained significant (DeCock & Weiss 
2000). 
 
Child Sex Abuse and HIV/AIDS in Arica  
The other factor that influences the high HIV/AIDS rate in Arica but does not 
relate to the border is child sex abuse. Children and adolescents in Arica are at risk of 
contracting HIV due to high levels of child sex abuse, as Daniel Valenzuela reported; 
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“there are girls and boys of ten years of age who have contracted HIV through sexual 
transmission”.72 There is a systemic problem in Chile highlighted by a 2006 UNICEF 
study on child abuse that reported that 75.3% of Chilean children interviewed had 
experienced some kind of physical or psychological violence by their parents.73 
Chilean police statistics report that 4,500 sexual crimes are committed against 
children every year but the estimated figure is seven times that.74  
Child sex abuse is the most commonly reported crime in the courts of Arica 
(Galleguillos 2007). In the region of Arica and Parinacota in 2013, 608 individuals 
were arrested for domestic violence or ‘crimes against the order of the family’ 
including 32 cases of child sexual abuse. 1634 cases of domestic violence were 
reported to the police but did not result in one arrest.75 Once again statistics are 
limited, Daniel Valenzuela reported that information on HIV positive minors doesn’t 
give exact age or how the child acquired the virus, all raw information collected is sent 
to Santiago, processed and then sent back to Arica.76 
An influencing factor in the high rates of child abuse is the lack of information 
regarding sex and the rights of children, sex education does not begin until age 15 in 
Arica and private institutions have the power to prevent any sex education.77 While 
contracting HIV/AIDS is no longer a death sentence with appropriate treatment, it 
disproportionately damages the lives of children. According to Betancur Muñoz 
“children who live with HIV/AIDS suffer from high levels of prejudice and 
discrimination, in environments that do not know how to properly care for them” 
(2008:62). 
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These factors that potentially contribute to the HIV/AIDS situation in Arica 
highlight the role of the border in health. Numerous state initiatives such as the 
regulation of sex work, the provision of resources for health campaigns, and with the 
mining industry, have either helped or hindered the HIV/AIDS rate. It is the 
combination of state initiatives with cultural and societal norms regarding sex, 
homophobia, and machismo that has created a certain biopolitical situation at the 
border that is highly violent against certain bodies. The second example of biopolitics 
at the border will take a different perspective to understand resistance at the border. 
 
Border Crossings for Healthcare 
The border through multiple factors has affected the health of a significant 
number of northern Chilean bodies with HIV/AIDS yet the border has also acted as 
a means of aiding healthcare provision for Chileans. An estimated 200 Chileans cross 
the border to Tacna in Peru in order to visit the doctor, dentist, and optician every 
day.78 Ariqueños place great value on the medical attention that can be found in 
Tacna; Chileans say they are well treated, consultations are quick, with accurate 
diagnoses and all at a low cost. The most common medical reasons are cardiology and 
ophthalmology (Podestá Arzubiaga 2011). Christian Hernández stated that “people 
travel to Peru for healthcare in abundance, I think our country is lacking in that area 
in terms of quality, cost and accessibility of healthcare”.79 Valentina Araya reported 
that Peru is popular for healthcare because it’s cheaper than in Chile, in Tacna’s 
Hospital de la Solidaridad, Chileans can be seen by a doctor for just US$4 and 
because it’s easier to book a consultation with a specialist.80 As Gabriela Torres 
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recounted, the whole of northern Chile lacks specialists and so citizens are forced to 
travel to Peru. She believes that a lot of Chileans would pay for these specialists were 
they to exist in the north but instead Tacna has both the specialist and the lower 
prices.81 
These statements were supported by Florencia Espinoza who argued that 
healthcare is of comparable quality either side of the border but the Peruvians win on 
price and speed. In Tacna multiple tests can be taken on the same day that would be 
spread out over weeks in Chile.82  My own experience of buying prescription glasses 
was that I could have an eye test, choose the frames and the glasses were made all 
within the hour for a total price of under £35 for two pairs. 
There has been some contention that Chileans are overcharged with Peruvians 
being charged less. This issue has endured for decades, for example a 1981 newspaper 
article in the local Chilean press that reported that for a medical consultation in 
Tacna a Peruvian would be charged 2500 soles and a Chilean 4000 soles.83 I spoke 
with a number of health clinics in Tacna and all assured me that today Peruvians and 
Chileans are charged exactly the same prices.84 Their businesses clearly rely on 
Chilean custom as all but one clinic stated that at least fifty percent of their clients 
were Chilean. The one clinic that claimed that very few Chileans visit was an 
obstetric-gynaecologist and the employee I spoke to was nervous to speak with me and 
clearly didn’t want me asking questions. Another obstetric-gynaecologist I spoke to 
said many Chilean women visit, either for gynealogical check-ups or for ultrasound 
scans of their pregnancies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 
82 Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014 
83 La Defensa. 14th February 1980 
84 This finding is unsurprising as they knew or could easily guess that I lived in Chile. 
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Whether or not Chileans pay more than Peruvians, they still pay a lot less than 
they would in Chile with one Chilean woman claiming she has to pay 30,000 pesos to 
see a doctor in Chile but pays 2,400 pesos in Peru while another claims that “The 
people with money stay there [in Chile] but the people with less come here”. 85 This 
was corroborated by Constanza Sepúlveda a financially secure citizen of Arica who 
told me, “I don’t go for medical treatment in Tacna, I don’t trust it. I go to my doctor 
here, if I can buy medicines cheaper there though I will buy them in Tacna”.86 Sergio 
Giaconi, General Manager of the Development Corporation of Arica and Parinacota 
(CORDAP) believes that these low prices are not a coincidence but are “a deliberate 
policy to attract people with cheap health services” as Tacna’s economy benefits 
enormously from Chilean spending in the region. 87  Therefore, due to pricing 
differentials between the two countries and the fact that Arica due to being located so 
far from the central region lacks specialists there is a significant amount of cross 
border activity for healthcare.  
 
Abortion in Chile 
However, not all of these visits across the border are for simple health check-ups 
or a new pair of glasses. Due to restrictive anti-abortion laws in Chile, some women 
cross the border from Chile to Peru in order to seek abortions.  
Chile is one of 5 countries in the world with a total abortion ban; the others are 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Malta, and the Vatican. Unusually, Chile has not always had 
a total ban. Abortions had been legal in some circumstances since the Health Code of 
1931 and the medical community vastly improved women’s rights with regards to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85‘Arica Chile es ensombrecida por progreso de Tacna Perú’ 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f6NftueKM1E&feature=share 
86 Interview, Constanza Sepúlveda. 10th July 2014 
87 El Mostrador. 29th January 2014.  
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reproduction throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. However, on the 15th September 
1989 Pinochet’s military government, on the eve of their departure from office, 
imposed draconian abortion laws making the practice illegal in every circumstance 
including to save the life of the mother or for a baby with terminal abnormalities. 
From 1931 until 1989 therapeutic abortion, to save the life or health of the mother 
was permitted but one of the main players in Pinochet’s regime, Jaime Guzman, 
vowed to eradicate therapeutic abortion claiming that women should instead choose 
to be martyrs and confront death for their unborn child (Casas Becerra 1997). 
Pinochet deemed abortions to be an unnecessary evil due to advances in medicine and 
also restricted women’s access to contraception in the 1980s, a move that saw the 
incidence of abortion increase (Paxman et al. 1993). 
Defying the legislation is dangerous for Chilean women; illegal clandestine 
abortions are significantly riskier to the health of the woman and the primary cause of 
maternal mortality in Chile is complications arising from clandestine abortions 
(Blofield 2008). Although mortality as a result of abortions has decreased in Chile, the 
number of abortions remains high and still contributes to a significant number of 
deaths (Szot & Moreno 2003). In 2003, 48% of all abortions worldwide were unsafe, 
and more than 97% of all unsafe abortions were in developing countries (Sedgh et al. 
2007). Additionally, mortality due to abortion is between 10 and 100 times higher in 
Latin America than in most European countries (Paxman et al. 1993).  
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Figure 89: WHO estimated number of unsafe abortions per 1000 women aged 15-44 by subregion. Grimes, 
D.A., J. Benson, S. Singh, M. Romero, B. Ganatra, F.E. Okonofua and I.H. Shah (2006) ‘Unsafe Abortion: 
The Preventable Pandemic’ The Lancet Sexual and Reproductive Health Series 368(9550) pp.1908-19. 
 
The United Nations identifies unsafe abortion as a major cause of maternal 
mortality with additional consequences including economic costs to health systems 
and families, stigmatisation, and psychosocial effects on women (Sedgh et al. 2007).88 
The medical cost of complications resulting from unsafe abortions can be enormous, 
in 1990 it was estimated that the cost of treating complications arising from abortions 
in Chile amounted to US$142 per patient (Gayán 1990). Beyond economics it is also 
highly traumatic for women to be forced to commit an illegal act because an abortion 
is not legally available, this is a double trauma of having to make the decision to 
undergo the abortion but also to commit a crime. Due to the illegality of the process 
women become vulnerable to other illegal activities and risky situations. One study of 
abortion in Chile found that three women she interviewed were told that the abortion 
provider required oral sex as well as cash payment. Others tell of dillitage and 
cutterage without anaesthetic, unsanitary conditions, and botched abortions (Casas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Unsafe abortion is defined by WHO as any procedure to terminate an unintended pregnancy done either by 
people lacking the necessary skills or in an environment that does not conform to minimum medical standards, or 
both. 
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Becerra & Vivaldi 2013). Women cannot report these to the authorities for fear of 
being prosecuted for seeking to terminate their pregnancy.  
Abortion in Chile is as much about class as it is about gender. Illegality increases 
the cost of a safe abortion which means that in Chile, a country of high economic 
inequality, a safe abortion is prohibited to many poorer women. A safe abortion in 
Chile can cost US$500-1000 which is beyond the means of many Chileans, forcing 
them to seek unsafe, clandestine abortions, creating a distinction between poorer and 
wealthier women (Franceschet 2006). This has direct impacts on health as 3.8% of 
urban non-poor women who undergo abortions in Chile are expected to require 
hospitalisation compared to 37.5% of urban poor women (Singh & Wulf 1994). 
Historically the rate of abortion in Chile has been highest in unskilled manual workers 
(Armijo & Requeña 1968). Moreover, poorer women and girls in Chile are less likely 
to use contraception, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will become 
pregnant. In one harrowing study by Casas Becerra (1997) of dozens of women who 
were prosecuted for having had an abortion, for illegally performing abortions or for 
being accomplices to an abortion found that it was overwhelmingly poor women who 
were prosecuted. Casas Berreca concludes that abortion prosecution is discrimination 
on the grounds of poverty; middle and upper class women who can afford safe 
procedures are much less likely to suffer complications and find themselves in hospital.  
Poor women who have no other choice than to undergo high-risk, unsafe 
abortions are far more likely to require post-abortion treatment in public hospitals 
where they can then be turned in to the authorities and prosecuted. In the 1990s, an 
estimated 150,000 women in Chile underwent abortions, 23,024 of whom were 
hospitalised. With an estimated 70,000 abortions currently taking place in Chile every 
year criminalising abortion does not prevent its occurrence but forces it underground 
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making it unregulated, dangerous, and more expensive, disproportionately affecting 
poorer women. 
Judicial punishment is a significant risk faced by these women as abortion is 
criminalised in the articles 342, 343, 344 and 345 of the penal code, as an ‘illegal 
practice’ and the punishment for having an abortion in Chile is three to five years 
imprisonment and 541 days to three years for those who perform an abortion. 
Chilean legislation prohibits and punishes whoever carries out an abortion as well as 
the woman who consents to its undertaking (Szot & Moreno 2003). The Chilean state 
holds the power to decide what happens to women’s bodies. Biopolitical control 
means that if a woman attempts to take control of her own body she could become 
swallowed into the control of the regulatory state. The illegality of abortion in Chile 
drives pregnant women to face unsafe procedures; Blofield (2008) found that 
prohibitive laws on abortion correlate with high abortion and hospitalisation rates. 
CEDAW’s recent ‘Concluding Observations to Chile’ expressed concern that 
“abortion under all circumstances remains a punishable offence under Chilean law, 
which may lead women to seek unsafe, illegal abortions, with consequent risks to their 
life and health, and that clandestine abortions are a major cause of maternal 
mortality”.89 Women are quite literally dying due to this legislation.  
Penalisation of abortion does appear to be low in Chile, “although Chilean 
medical professionals should by law report illegal abortions to the authorities, less than 
1% of women in hospital with abortion complications are reported” (Shepard & Casas 
Becerra 2007:206). This low reporting is likely due to the contradictions in medical 
professionals’ rights and responsibilities. While on one side of the debate, medical 
professionals are legally obliged to report possible crimes, they are also legally excused 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Concluding Observations of CEDAW (The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women)  regarding Chile, 25 August 2006,CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4at  para. 19. In Zampas & Gher (2008)  
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from providing information in court which had been divulged under patient 
confidentiality. 99.5% of Chilean doctors and midwives cite the main reason for not 
reporting women who undergo abortions as due to medical ethics, with other 
professionals fearing that the more women fear being reported the less likely they are 
to seek treatment when they can still be helped (Shepard & Casas Becerra 2007). 
However, many women have still been penalised for having abortions in Chile and, 
when hospitalised, at a higher rate than in other Latin American countries (Blofield 
2008). 
Since the tightening of legislation by Pinochet the relaxing of abortion legislation 
has been attempted three times in 1991, 2001, and 2006-07 but all have been 
unsuccessful. Chile’s current president Michelle Bachelet, a socialist physician, has 
publicly stated that she will not support a change to the country’s laws on abortion, 
arguing instead for tackling the problem of preventing unwanted pregnancies from 
occurring in the first place (Franceschet 2006). While in 2015 there have been 
discussions over changing the law in exceptional circumstances, such as to save the 
mother’s life “because we’re talking about restoring a law which previously existed, its 
not anything new”, argued Daniel Valenzuela, but a change which would give women 
the option of an abortion because they “just do not want [a baby], because it is not in 
their plans, this issue will not be discussed at all…they’re not going to have a real 
discussion about the right to an abortion”.90 The debate is ongoing in congress at this 
time. 
Many politicians choose to avoid the subject, as one Chilean senator stated, “the 
problem of abortion is already solved in Chile, because “everyone knows a doctor”” 
(Blofield 2008:414). This is untrue as it tends to be only better off women who know 
and can pay a confidential doctor. This type of statement negates the seriousness of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
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abortion in Chile and acts to further control poorer women. While there have been 
protests and lobbying, the class divisions, whereby middle class women can afford safe 
abortions while poorer women can’t, mean there has been no solidified base of pro-
choice activism.  
One of the most common arguments for changing the law is that abortions are 
carried out regardless of the legal situation, about a third of all Chilean women have 
one or more induced abortions during their childbearing years and an estimate from 
2008 calculated that nearly 40,000 teenage girls become pregnant and 35 percent of 
all pregnancies are terminated illegally each year in Chile (Hudson 1994).91 Chile’s 
abortion rate of 45.4 per 1000 women of childbearing age is, therefore, vastly higher 
than Catholic European countries such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal which have rates 
of 9.3, 6.4, and 11.6 respectively (Blofield 2008). Due to the inevitability of abortions 
occurring, some studies on abortion in Latin America have stressed that the most 
important challenge is not changing abortion legislation but by making the abortions 
which do occur safer, and improving treatment of women who develop problems after 
seeking an abortion (Winkinoff et al. 1991). 
Catholicism is a primary obstacle to the lack of change in legislation in Chile. 
Legislation remains unchanged due to conservative Catholic elites in Chile but 
interestingly abortion rates are higher for Catholic women than for Protestants 
(Armijo & Requeña 1968). One study by Requeña (1965) found that the likelihood of 
having had an abortion actually increases with the Catholic woman’s degree of 
religious fervour. The ingrained cultural ideals of Catholicism, machismo and 
marianismo, have conflated womanhood with motherhood in Chile and made the 
reproductive rights of women a highly contentious issue. Chile is trapped between 
wishing to portray an international image of modernity and progress and being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 ‘The slow life; The rights of Chile's women’ The New York Times 1st May 2008  
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socially conservative as shown by the fact that divorce remained illegal in the country 
until 2004. 
 
Abortions Across the border 
This status of illegality, insecurity, and unlikely change in abortion legislation 
forces women to seek non-official solutions to unwanted pregnancies. In the 
northernmost region of Chile women have the opportunity of crossing the border to 
Peru easily and quickly to Tacna where abortion options are more plentiful and 
cheaper.  It may seem surprising that women would choose to travel to Peru for an 
abortion where the procedure is illegal except in case of the threat to the life or health 
of the woman. A woman that consents to an abortion can be sentenced to up to two 
years in prison while anyone who performs an illegal abortion can be sentenced to one 
to six years in prison in Peru. As Gabriela Torres corroborated; “If a Chilean is found 
having an abortion with a provider in Tacna it is prison for the both of them”.92  
However, despite this abortions are more easily accessible, cheaper, and punished 
less often than in Chile. Healthworker Alejandra Flores suggests that women can find 
a level of anonymity in Peru that is almost impossible in Arica; “it’s more accessible, 
no-one asks any questions”.93 Clinics which practice abortions are also much more 
visible in Tacna, such as this clinic (Figure 90) which offers solutions for ‘late periods’ 
[retraso menstrual], a term commonly known to be a codeword for clandestine 
abortions. Codewords allow practitioners to deny that they practice abortions but also 
illustrate how the topic is often spoken around rather than directly with many people 
aside from healthworkers recoiling from terms such as ‘abortion’.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 
93 Interview, Alejandra Flores 22nd July 2014 
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                  Figure 90: Obstetric clinic in Tacna. 2014. Author’s photo 
These clinics can be run either by licensed physicians “who dedicate themselves 
just to [abortions], but there also a lot of people without medical training who practice 
abortions”.94 This creates a risk for women unsure of whether the procedure would be 
undertaken by a professional or not. Due to abortion still being illegal in Peru, women 
cannot use official channels to find an abortion provider. Recommendations tend to 
be word-of-mouth. Alejandra Flores stated; “I think you begin to ask. ‘Hey, do you 
know?’ So for example if I had a friend who went. It starts with contacting the friend 
of a friend of a friend of a friend who says go to the market, to I don’t know, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 
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whichever street, there you ask for a certain woman, she tells you it costs 200,000 
pesos for example”. 95  Ana Castillo, an Ariqueña interviewee who had herself 
undergone an abortion in Tacna told me how she knew where to go because her aunt 
knew the system; “it’s popular knowledge, she was a direct source, she had taken 
people before, I knew I could trust her”.96 Ana was lucky enough to have financial 
and emotional support, her father paid the 100,000 peso fee (roughly US$145), and 
her mother and boyfriend accompanied her to Tacna. 
Abortions in Peru are regarded by some as commonplace and safe with 
Alejandra Flores stating; “Of the few people I know who’ve been, no-one has had 
complications, as if they went for it over there and came back bleeding, they do it very 
well”.97 However, other views suggest otherwise, Gabriela Torres said; “I know it’s a 
risk that the standards of hygiene there aren’t the best, or so I have been told, that 
they’re scary places, but the situation is very… I don’t know. People are dying to have 
an abortion in Tacna, it’s not in the media, its not really spoken about. But everyone 
knows that people go to Tacna to do it”.98 Daniel Valenzuela raised concerns about 
the safety of abortions carried out in Peru; “they’re less regulated there, they don’t 
have the best conditions but still people from here and other parts of the north want to 
go to Peru for abortions. Because they know that even if it isn’t regulated, if it isn’t the 
safest they still go because at least it’s a possibility there… There a lot of people who 
go, to the places that aren’t the best, they’re clandestine, and after there are 
complications and they have to go with these complications to the health services in 
Chile”.99 Ana Castillo, the Chilean who underwent an abortion in Tacna recalled 
“obviously I was scared for my life, ay, it was awful, yeah I was terrified, it’s like these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Interview, Alejandra Flores. 22nd July 2014 
96 Interview, Ana Castillo. 17th August 2014  
97 Interview, Alejandra Flores. 22nd July 2014 
98 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 
99 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
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are things that aren’t legal you know, anything illegal is going to scare you because it’s 
not safe, you can’t go to someone if it goes wrong, you don’t have that right, there is 
no right to an abortion”.100 She described that the overwhelming fear was for her 
physical safety but her family were concerned about legal repercussions, speaking in 
low voices but in the gynaecology clinic “everyone knows what happens there and 
they protect each other”.101  
Women are deeply affected by this experience of having to cross the border, it is 
a trauma inscribed onto their bodies but is also emotionally traumatising. They are 
opening themselves up to risks and further violence. The work of Sharon Pickering 
(2010) has highlighted how women when forced to undertake extra-legal border 
crossings experience violence during the journey as well as at their destination. This 
also speaks to Arturo Aldama’s (2002) notion of the border being elastic, the border-
crosser does not escape the border just by transgressing it physically, Chilean women 
seeking abortions in Peru are easily distinguished as vulnerable and more easily 
exposed to risks. 
These examples show the lengths women are forced to go to due to the 
restrictions placed on them by the Chilean government. Valentina Araya suggested 
that the government’s stance on abortion is making a safe procedure, using 
medication, into an unsafe one. She remarked; “if the abortion medication is taken 
under the supervision of a doctor it’s a good method but if you do it alone its very 
risky, but as it isn’t permitted in Chile you’ll never be able to do it under the 
supervision of a doctor”.102 Better off women in northern Chile did previously have an 
alternative option under the supervision of a doctor, as Gabriela Torres who is a 
healthcare worker in Iquique reported; “in Iquique there was one gynecologist who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Interview, Ana Castillo. 17th August 2014 
101 ibid. 
102 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
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was effectively undertaking abortions, at a high cost, but he died, it was all 
undercover. His consulting room was always full but he died last year so now the 
women don’t have any other option but to travel to Peru”.103  
A very common abortion method for Chileans in Peru is misoprostol, a 
medication suitable for early-term pregnancies. Misoprostol can be administered 
orally but is more effective when administered vaginally with a reduction in the need 
for surgical intervention and the quicker onset of abortion after administration (El-
Rafaey et al. 1995). If complications do arise from using misoprostol, the results are 
indistinguishable from that of a natural miscarriage meaning that the women can seek 
medical treatment without fear. Misoprostol is legally available in Chilean pharmacies 
for the treatment of stomach ulcers and is available on the mainly internet-based 
Chilean black market for between US$73-100, a lot of money for poorer Chilean 
women (Shepard & Casas Becerra 2007). It is therefore common for women to self-
administer the pill in Peru where it is cheaper and more accessible or smuggle it back 
into Chile. According to testimonies collected by one organisation which helps women 
access safe abortions, Women on Waves, misoprostol “is very difficult to get” in Chile 
whereas in Peru “misoprostol is easily available under the brand names Cytotec and 
Misoprolen”.104  
Catalina López stated that “there are no official statistics about women who 
travel to Tacna for abortions but it is commonly known that abortion medications 
enter Arica, one called misotrol which terminates pregnancies before 12 weeks. 105 It is 
relatively easy to bring them across the border because the SAG only looks at large 
quantities of products and one can pass through with medicine for personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Interview, Gabriela Torres. 11th July 2014 
104 http://www.womenonwaves.org/en/map/country 
105 The brand name for misoprostol in Chile 
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consumption.106 Especially as Misotrol can be used to treat gastric diseases. But 
usually the customs have no idea, people put them in the bra, or wherever, in the 
wallet or purse because no one will check the body”.107 The advantageous location of 
Arica on the border in accessing misoprostol was mentioned by Valentina Araya;  
“it’s common, I remember from my university days a lot of friends or 
acquaintances did it and it was known to be easy to go and get the medication 
to do the abortion… in Tacna because here in Arica, in Chile, the drugs were 
prohibited, they couldn’t be advertised or sold… if you go online sometimes 
there are offers selling them, but they’re very expensive, now in Arica it’s not 
necessary to buy them from the internet because you can travel easily to Peru 
and buy it there much cheaper. But in other parts of Chile they have to use the 
black market online.”108  
 
The wider awareness and availability of misoprostol through the Chilean black 
market or from Peru has made abortions much safer (Casas Becerra & Vivaldo 2013). 
A women’s collective run a telephone hotline providing advice about misoprostol to 
women seeking abortions. The network run by ‘Lesbians and Feminists for the Right 
to Information’ launched in 2009 and has received more than 10,000 calls, up to 15 a 
day. They are obliged to follow a lawyer-approved script that keeps them on the right 
side of the law.109 
Women can also find out information about using misoprostol safely though the 
Dutch organisation Women on Waves, best known for their ship campaigns whereby 
they take women outside the territorial waters of their country and perform legal 
abortions under Dutch law. Additional information can be found on blogs, free online 
books, Facebook groups, and through graffiti in public spaces (Figure 91, Figure 92 & 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 SAG is the Chilean equivalent of the UK’s Department for Food Environment and Rural Affairs 
107 Interview, Catalina López. 21st March 2014 
108 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
109 ‘The Chilean Safe Abortion Hotline: Assisting Women With Illegal, But Safe, Misoprostol Abortion.’ 18th 
October 2012. RH Reality Check. http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2012/10/18/illegal-but-safe-abortion-with-
misoprostol-chilean-safe-abortion-hotline/ 
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Figure 93). Abortion is clearly a contentious issue in Chile and individuals or groups 
appearing to promote the procedure come under severe criticism. The dialogue 
between pro-life and pro-choice is literally taking place in the streets; Figure 92 shows 
a poster with an image of a foetus, interestingly a symbol usually employed by pro-life 
groups, with the words ‘this is not a human being’. A passerby clearly disagreed with 
this message and scrawled under it in marker pen ‘neither are you’. With official 
means of changing abortion legislation stalling at every attempt, activists employ 
alternative methods to show that not all Chileans agree with the status quo. Graffiti, 
an illegal act in itself, is used to spread information about abortions and resistance to 
Chilean legislation. 
 
Figure 91: Graffiti written by a safe abortion hotline.   
http://abortoinformacionsegura.blogspot.nl/?zx=fb31e2651c2ffcf0 [accessed 23/09/2014] 
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                                        Figure 92: Pro-choice poster. 2014. Author’s photo 
          Figure 93: Graffiti proclaiming ‘LEGAL ABORTION NOW!’ 2014. Author’s Photo 
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There are no available statistics regarding the number of abortions carried out 
and even healthcare professionals cannot estimate the number. When Alejandra 
Flores, a healthworker at a university in Arica was asked whether students travel to 
Peru to undergo abortions, she replied; “At least we have not had a situation in which 
a student has had an abortion which has had consequences, or we don’t know. The 
midwife would see her and all that information is confidential and stays between them 
and the patient. I have no more information than that but I know that many people 
go to Tacna to have abortions”.110 Valentina Araya provided the following comment 
on Arica’s border location in relation to abortions in Peru; “there probably are more 
abortions in Arica with its proximity to Tacna but like I say, I don’t know the national 
statistics, so I couldn’t say for sure more or less, I just know that its easier here”.111  
The only statistics available are for situations when complications occur. 
Valentina Araya stated; “there are no statistics, nowhere to search and review the 
information, but you find in the emergency services women arriving with 
complications from abortions or incomplete abortions, usually with more advanced 
pregnancies, bleeding problems, sometimes the doctors report it, often they don’t, 
they just sort the problem”.112 Daniel Valenzuela declared that “[l]ast year [2013] 
here in Arica they saw to around 300 and something abortions, girls who had done 
the abortion in some clandestine way here or in Tacna and unfortunately some 
residue remained”.113 The vast majority of these did not result in prosecution and in 
Arica in 2013, 2 individuals were arrested for crimes relating to abortions out of 14 
nationally.114  
Despite the lack of access to abortion statistics, Florencia Espinoza believed that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Interview, Alejandra Flores 22nd July 2014 
111 Interview, Valentina Araya. 22nd April 2014 
112 ibid. 
113 Interview, Daniel Valenzuela. 12th August 2014 
114 Informe Annual Carabineros, 2013. Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, Santiago 
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fewer women may be seeking abortions due to the decreasing stigma surrounding 
teenage mothers. She stated; “I think the number of abortions has actually fallen, it 
used to be a bad thing to be pregnant so they would have an abortion but now there’s 
a lot more acceptance of unmarried mothers or adolescent mothers… there are also 
rumours that abortions there haven’t been good, so they run a risk by going there”.115 
Arica now has the highest number of teenage pregnancies for girls under 15 in Chile 
and in 2010, 15.1% of girls fell pregnant between the ages of 10-19.116 
The Chile-Peru case is not alone in terms of cross-border reproductive care, a 
trend that has risen globally seeing families crossing borders for fertility treatments, 
often to fertility centres in countries with less restrictive regulations (Gunnarsson 
Payne 2013). This ‘new reproductive mobility’ stands in stark contrast with the 
reproductive mobility that occurs between Chile and Peru yet also shares similarities 
in terms of state regulation and choice. The US-Mexico border also sees women 
crossing for abortion, either American women seeking access to abortions in Mexico 
when access has been denied to them in their own country or Mexican women 
seeking safe abortions in the US (Ojeda 2006). Canadian women have also contested 
the illegality of abortion in their own country by traveling to Japan, Poland, Sweden, 
Mexico, and Switzerland for abortions (Sethna & Doull 2012). 
A case that shares some similarities is the restrictive abortion laws in Ireland that 
has resulted in a history of women traveling to Britain in search of the procedure. 
Approximations as to the number of Irish women seeking abortions in Britain vary. In 
2001 an estimated 7,000 women travelled abroad to obtain an abortion and 2015 
estimates suggest that at least ten women a day travel from Ireland to Britain for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Interview, Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014 
116  Soy Arica. 7th August 2014; Subsecretaría de Salud Pública. Programa Nacional de Salud Integral de 
Adolescentes y Jóvenes  
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abortions.117 Many more purchase abortion medication on the Internet and self-
administer. Various cases have gone to the Irish Court regarding the right of a 
pregnant woman to travel abroad in search of an abortion. The main difference with 
the case of Ireland is that Irish women travel to Britain where safe, legal abortions can 
be found while Chilean women travel to Peru where abortions are still illegal in most 
cases and visit unregulated clinics of unknown quality. Another difference is that Irish 
women, regardless of their location within Ireland are required to undertake a 
significant journey to Britain, across the sea. However, while most Chilean women 
cannot travel to another country easily and cheaply, those in northern Chile can 
travel to Peru very quickly and affordably.  
Legislation allows the state to assert its power over its territory; the Chilean 
government dictates behaviour up to the edges of its borders. In this way, crossing the 
border becomes a space of resistance for Chilean women, a way to contest the 
restrictive laws on abortion decreed by Pinochet’s government and unchanged by 
consequent administrations. Usually undertaken out of desperation rather than as a 
subversive political act, these women are nevertheless opposing the suffocation of their 
biopolitical agency through refusing to be the passive subjects of the state’s 
reproductive control. 
 
Conclusions 
The border has not just been a space of violence at the national and international 
level, with almost-wars and damaging state policy, but is also a violent space at the 
level of the body. Individuals, especially those who are poor, LGBT, and otherwise 
marginalised are more likely to be victims of this violence due to biopolitical control. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 ‘Abortion in Ireland’. The Economist. 24 January 2002; ‘At least ten women a day travel from Ireland to the UK 
to have an abortion’. The Independent. 9 June 2015 
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The 1980s were a bad time for health in Arica, the HIV/AIDS crisis emerged and 
women’s bodies became increasingly regulated and controlled. The border provides 
the perfect conditions for violence in the form of HIV/AIDS with increased 
international movement, migratory workers, and cheap drugs but the border also 
provides an escape for women trapped by the state’s prohibitive abortion legislation as 
they can travel to Peru for the procedure. Through both these examples the act of 
sexual intercourse brings violence and danger to those inhabiting the borderlands. Sex 
comes with potentially fatal risks. 
The region of Arica and Parinacota suffers from the highest rate of HIV/AIDS 
in the country and the border plays a significant role in this. The sex industry has 
become an unknown entity in Arica with the dissolution of monitoring and fluid 
population of foreign sex workers as well as those who do not identify as sex workers 
but engage in occasional paid sexual activity. The border also means that a large 
quantity of cheap and toxic drugs can be obtained in Arica leading to risky sexual 
behavior in which the HIV virus is more likely to be acquired. This risky sexual 
behavior is more likely to be concentrated in some groups more than others and 
migratory workers, of which there are many due to the region’s border location, tend 
to engage in unsafe sex practices due to being mobile and away from home for 
extended periods of time. Despite not being affected by the border, homobisexuality 
and child sex abuse are both factors that also influence the region’s rate of 
HIV/AIDS.  
Unprotected sex brings another danger in Arica with the possibility of unwanted 
pregnancy. Chile’s machismo culture with many men and boys unwilling to practice 
safe sex and the lack of female sexual agency means that a large number of women 
and girls find themselves pregnant in a country which does not permit abortions 
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under any circumstance. While economically privileged women can use contacts and 
money to obtain safe abortions with impunity this option is not available to many 
poorer women. Women in the north of Chile are in a unique position whereby they 
are easily able to travel to Tacna in Peru for cheap, available, although illegal and 
risky abortions. The most common choice is the drug misoprostol that is more easily 
available in Peru than in Chile and is safe if administered correctly.  
These two examples of health crises on the border highlight the role of the state 
and society in regulating and punishing sexual deviancy. Arica’s border location has 
created conditions which are conducive to violence against the body in the form of 
HIV/AIDS but the border also allows women to escape from the repressive abortion 
laws in Chile, illustrating the inherently contradictory nature of Arica as a border city. 
Violence at the Chile-Peru border exists at multiple scales but these scales are not 
hierarchical, instead they are intertwined in a way that makes the international, the 
state and the body tied together in the same violent processes. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 	  
THE MARITIME BORDER DISPUTE & 
THE LEGACY OF VIOLENCE IN ARICA 
 
 
 
Figure 94: Graffiti by Accion Poetica ‘That violence ceases to be tradition’. Acción poética 
www.facebook.com/accionpoeticaenchile [accessed 09/03/2015] 
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The preceding four chapters have shown how the Chile-Peru border has 
oscillated over the past ninety years between being central to the Chilean state and at 
other times abandoned. Arica as a border city can epitomise the strongest sense of 
Chilean nationalism but also rejection of the Chilean state. This fifth and final 
empirical chapter first examines the 2014 maritime border dispute between Peru and 
Chile and then unpacks the three scales that have been present throughout the thesis; 
the international, national, and corporeal, to examine how the legacy of violence still 
exists today on this paradoxical border. These are presented together to illustrate the 
effect of ninety years of violence on the border, how bordering is an ongoing process 
and to emphasise the incongruity of Arica being both central and marginal to the 
Chilean state. Violence is always just below the surface in Arica, it flares up at key 
moments when sovereignty is threatened and is suppressed at times by the state and at 
other times by local citizens. 
 
Maritime Border Disputes 
Maritime border disputes are interesting phenomena that juxtapose the fluidity of 
the ocean with the challenges of demarcating a fixed line between sovereign states. 
The ocean is fluid in its transitory resources, its meteorological processes, and just by 
its very nature and due to this fluidity and wetness of the ocean. The oceans do divide, 
argued Hartshorne (1953), but they do not separate. Struggles over sovereign rights in 
the ocean are relatively new as the ocean became constructed “as an unboundable 
and empty space of movement- an external counterpoint to the emergent idea of the 
territorial state as a bounded area of control and development-in-place” (Steinberg 
2009b:485). The ocean has been externalised, a counterpoint to the bounded, 
terrestrial state. In spite of the fluid nature of the oceans nation-states are increasingly 
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fixated on extending land boundaries into the sea and discovering that the sea brings 
distinctive challenges. This is contrary to how lines in the ocean have historically often 
acted to illustrate connections, with seafaring routes and passages rather than being 
lines of division (Steinberg 1999). 
A historical interest in oceans has burgeoned in recent years with the Journal of 
Historical Geography and the American Historical Review both publishing special issues on 
the ocean in 2006. This scholarship “combines to demonstrate that different cultures 
produce different, and often contradictory, views of the ocean, all directly linked to, 
and produced by, different political-economic systems” (Reidy & Rozwadoski 
2014:339). In the nineteenth century the world’s oceans became a space of scientific 
enquiry and intrigue with Britain and the United States leading this exploration. The 
doctrine of the freedom of the seas became pervasive and “the ocean was constructed 
as a space amenable to control by any nation that could master its surface and use its 
resources effectively” (Reidy & Rozwadoski 2014:350). Over the century nation-states 
began to assert exclusive rights over areas of or passages through the oceans resulting 
in border disputes such as this one. 
States have traditionally been the format for conceiving of the world, neat 
territorial boundaries, rooted in terra, yet maritime disputes highlight that oceans too 
are sovereign spaces on which authority must be stamped. However, the ocean is not 
just a space for territorial conflict, it is a space in which politics are created. Since the 
1990s geography has seen a turn to the hydrosphere particularly strongly within 
historical and cultural geography. Phil Steinberg’s The social construction of the ocean was 
the first major work to understand the sea as a historical and social space. Steinberg 
has addressed how the ocean is a social space which is not only ‘used by society’ but is 
‘a space of society’, acutely involved in human lives (2001:6 original emphasis).  
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Politics are not only enacted, but also constructed in oceans, oceans are not separate 
from social life, argues Steinberg (2010;1999), they shape and are shaped by socio-
physical processes. It is a pertinent issue as only one third of potential maritime 
borders between states have been officially demarcated (Diener & Hagen 2012). 
Coastal waters tend to be the part of the ocean which sees particularly intense human-
environment interactions due to the proximity between human settlement and spaces 
of rich resources (Viles & Spencer 1995). This is the key interaction that has caused 
the most controversy in the Chile-Peru maritime border dispute  
Kim Peters (2010) has called for more social and cultural insights into geopolitical 
situations and ‘legal’ geographies, which this chapter attempts to at least in part 
address. Peters is particularly interested in the ship as a legal space traversing the 
ocean whereas this chapter examines the legal geographies of border-making in the 
oceans. The Law of the Sea may be defined as the specialised set of decisions dealing 
with the nature and extent of control exercised over the marine environment 
(Alexander 1968). The legalities of the sea have become increasingly pertinent in 
recent decades as technology has developed allowing a greater quantity of resources to 
be extracted from the oceans and seabed and states therefore have greater incentive to 
claim exclusive rights over maritime territory. This growth in legal contestation can be 
seen by an increased focus on the maritime by groups such as the IBRU (International 
Boundaries Research Unit) who dedicated one of the five volumes in their 1991 
World Boundaries Series to maritime boundaries.  
While there are arguments against state-delimited maritime boundaries in favour 
of a more environmentally aware global structure the popularity of demarcation 
among states appears to be growing (Charney & Alexander 1991). The 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force in November 
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1994 and has been enormously influential in the settlement of international disputes 
with extensive provisions for dispute-settlement procedures.1 Under UNCLOS over 
four hundred pending maritime boundaries became evident leading to the growth of 
demarcation even between states that hadn’t placed importance on the boundary 
(Alexander 1986). Chile and Peru however had previously been engaged in managing 
the boundary between them and UNCLOS made the situation problematic. 
Maritime border disputes share some similarities with land border disputes yet 
there are some key differences such as physical demarcation of the border, differences 
in the concept of ‘volume’ below and above either the land or sea, and with very 
different resources involved. It is due to these differences that the maritime border 
dispute of the twentieth century cannot be seen as a simple extension of the land 
dispute addressed in chapter four but is a singular phenomenon. Parallels can be 
drawn in terms of the use of international diplomacy to settle a border dispute but the 
specifics show some important distinctions. 
 
The Chile-Peru Maritime Dispute 
The maritime border dispute between Peru and Chile formally began in 1985 
with a statement by the then Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations Allan Wagner 
who raised his country’s displeasure with Chile’s unwillingness to open up a dialogue 
about the border. It came to international attention the following decade when Chile 
ratified UNCLOS in 1997 and, in accordance with its rules, in September 2000 Chile 
provided the UN with their maritime limitation documents which showed the parallel 
18o21'00" as the maritime border between Chile and Peru. Peru voiced its 
disagreement with this border through a formal note sent to the United Nations on 7th 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 UNCLOS is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. Boyle (1997)  
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January 2001, reiterating that it did not recognise the limitation claimed by Chile. In 
2006, when the Chilean Senate approved the creation of a new region, the region of 
Arica and Parinacota, the northernmost boundary of the region was stated as ‘Hito 1 
[Boundary Marker 1] in the Chilean sea’. This caused upset with the Peruvians who 
did not recognise Hito 1 as being in Chilean territory. On the 16th January 2008, the 
government of President Alan Garcia of Peru officially requested the involvement of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, in the Netherlands. The ICJ is 
seen as the ‘go-to’ arbiter for maritime border disputes, which are the most common 
litigation submitted to the Court. 
This preoccupation with maritime borders is consistent with other Latin 
American states who during the twentieth century were at the forefront of pushing for 
maritime legislation such as the EEZ and other territorial sea claims.2 The dispute was 
over 38,000km² of maritime sovereignty between Chile and Peru who claim, Chile 
from a legal standpoint and Peru from a geographical one, that it is rightfully their 
national territory. Chile claimed that the border runs parallel from the legally defined 
land border whereas Peru claimed that this is nonsensical and ignores the 
geographical bend in the coastline and so it should run equidistant between the states 
(Figure 95). According to Charney & Alexander (1991), when a maritime boundary 
dispute is being mediated the first point of consideration is the geography of the 
coastline and the second is the equidistant line. From the outset therefore Peru 
appears to have the upper hand before the ICJ based on its geographical claim. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Exclusive Economic Zone’s (EEZ’s) were established by the 1982 United nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and covers the area of ocean between 12 and 200 nautical miles off a country’s coastline and areas of the 
seabed between 12 nautical miles and the limit of the continental shelf (if further than 200nm from the coast). 
Morris, M. (1986) p.43 
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Figure 95: Map showing the maritime boundary lines claimed by Chile and Peru. ICJ Peru Institutes Proceedings 
against Chile with Regard to a Dispute Concerning Maritime Delimitation between the Two States. Press release, 16 January 
2008 	  
This is rooted in historical agreements that are retrospectively disagreed about by the 
nations. Both parties signed agreements in 1952 and 1954, which Chile argues were 
demarcations of territorial limits while Peru argues they only demarcated fishing 
rights and not sovereignty. The 1952 agreement also included Ecuador, the states 
trilaterally declaring claims to 200nm territorial seas, and Chile and Ecuador both 
claimed that maritime boundaries were established. These parallel boundaries agreed 
in 1952 are much less advantageous to Peru than lines of equidistance (Donaldson & 
Pratt 2005). The 1954 agreement created a special maritime frontier zone between 
Chile and Peru whereby “[t]he accidental presence in the said zone of a vessel of 
either of the adjacent countries shall not be considered to be a violation of the waters 
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of the maritime zone” and a map was produced illustrating the border that Chile 
claimed (Figure 96).3 
 
Figure 96: Map showing the maritime frontier zones which Chile argued had been agreed between Chile 
and Peru in 1954. United States Department of State, Office of the Geographer, Limits in the Seas. No. 
86 (Chile-Peru) 1979 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58820.pdf 
 
These 1952 and 1954 agreements were drawn upon for Chile’s defence but 
Chile’s argument recalls numerous other historical agreements illustrating that Peru 
had agreed to the maritime limits they complained to the ICJ about on numerous 
occasions including the 1883 Treaty of Ancon, the 1929 Treaty of Lima, the 1947 
declaration of 200 nautical miles of sovereignty and jurisdiction, the 1955 Peruvian 
statement, and agreements of 1968 and 1969. Chile’s defence was “[h]ence there 
should be no legal controversy as raised by the Peru on maritime boundaries, as these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 United States Department of State, Office of the Geographer, Limits in the Seas. No. 86 (Chile-Peru) 1979 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58820.pdf 
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were already established and respected”. 4  Peru had contested Chile’s claims in 
documents in 1968 and 1969 but nevertheless conformed to the agreed boundary 
limits and with Chile built lighthouses at the maritime border, the parallel passing 
through ‘Hito 1’ [Boundary marker 1] (Santis Arenas & Gangas Geisse 1995). Chile 
took this building of lighthouses at an agreed location as confirmation of the official 
maritime border between the states (Infante Caffi 2014:16).  
With this history of the dispute and Chile refusing to recognise Peru’s claims, 
some kind of third party settlement had to be sought. But why was the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) chosen by Peru? For the Peruvian state it was unavoidable that 
Peru would have to seek peaceful mediation due to Peru being a signatory of both the 
UN Charter and the Pact of Bogotá.  The UN Charter prohibits the use or threat of 
force in order to solve disputes and instead states that; “The parties to any dispute, the 
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”.5  
The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement or Pact of Bogotá of 1948 that was 
signed by both Peru and Chile likewise obliged the parties to seek pacific means to their 
dispute. The Peruvian government legitimised the need to use international mediation 
by arguing that its claims have ‘constantly met with a refusal from Chile to enter into 
negotiations’, and that since 2004, the Chileans officially have closed the door for 
future negotiations.6 Moreover, settlement by the ICJ tends to be cheaper than a 
tribunal organised independently by both parties and has the benefit of authority and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 ‘La Defensa de Chile en la Corte Internacional de La Haya’ (2012) Libertad Y Desarrollo Temas Publicos 1091 
5 United Nations Charter Chapter VI, Article 33 
6 ICJ Peru Institutes Proceedings against Chile with Regard to a Dispute Concerning Maritime Delimitation between the Two States. 
Press release, 16 January 2008 
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a reputation as a fair and independent organisation. Chile as a nation has historically 
prided itself on its respect for order, institutions, and stability, which may account for 
Chile’s willingness to conform with Peru’s application to the ICJ (Van Der Ree 2010). 
There are clear parallels here between the 2014 maritime dispute mediated by the ICJ 
and the involvement of the United States in the 1920s plebiscite as seen in chapter 
four. Chile and Peru, so emotionally tied to the territory between them were unable to 
reach a compromise themselves and so looked abroad to a respected international 
third party who could deliver the necessary detachment and fairness. Yet again, 
international mediation was being employed in order to ‘suture’ the border, the 
wound of the Chile-Peru border that refuses to heal. 
As gleaned from interviews with citizens of Arica, some saw the dispute as 
detached from their daily lives at the border and more about point-scoring between 
Santiago and Lima. Nationalism and disputes with long-time enemies are a useful 
strategy employed by governments to quell social discontent within a country. Both 
Peru and Chile are politically divided countries with high levels of social inequality; 
the protraction of territorial disputes with one another could serve their presidents 
well. General Odlanier Mena, head of the army for many years in Arica said on the 
issue:  
A section of the Peruvian government, non-military curiously, are always 
looking for things that could hinder the relationship, because it’s a way to 
maintain national unity. I don’t know how it will finish, because it’s a claim that 
has no international legal grounds but I think we have to keep a cool head and 
think about what we gain from a new demand, that just creates problems... I 
don’t think it will end in anything, it can’t end in anything.7  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Interview with General Odlanier Mena, La Estrella de Arica 19th March 2006 
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Matias Silva, a young soldier I had interviewed reported that; “[on the day of the 
ruling] It was completely normal, in fact there is, we... I could see through the TV, 
but the army never had a degree of readiness, not even a rumour. Everything was 
normal and peaceful. It was totally normal, at no point did we prepare for anything, 
or were ready for something”.8 
However, some citizens expressed an element of fear over the dispute, aware that 
Arica would be the centre of any military action were it to occur. On a personal note I 
was warned to stay at home and avoid the city centre on the day of the ruling. The 
tensions on the matter rose to such heights that newspapers started speculating about 
an armed conflict. I spoke to Felipe Ramírez who is engaged with migrants and their 
struggles every day in his work with a Jesuit organisation, Ciudadano Global, which 
fights for migrants’ rights. Ramírez indicated how nationalist sentiments emerge 
during disputes even on a peaceful border; “we have a relationship of fluidity across 
the border with Tacna but with the situation with The Hague, these nationalist 
sentiments resurfaced, ‘ah these Peruvians’, yet you have this great human stream 
through Chacalluta between Chile and Peru, a flow of trade”.9 The group most 
concerned were Arica’s fishermen, who didn’t know what would happen to their 
prime fishing grounds if the maritime border was changed.  
Whether seen as a nationalistic chess game or a real threat to the livelihoods of locals, 
there was no doubt that as the dispute heightened, the more prominent Arica became 
in the national imagination. As has happened on numerous occasions in the history of 
Arica, this marginalised border city has only been defended and supported by the 
state when it has been threatened by an outsider. The dispute became a national 
pastime for both Chilean and Peruvians, with citizens and organisations from both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Interview with Matias Silva. 28th June 2014 
9 Interview with Felipe Ramírez. 1st April 2014 
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states putting forward their arguments as to why their position is correct. One very 
persuasive tool in these arguments was maps of the disputed maritime area. For 
example, the two maps below (Figure 97 and Figure 98) from a Peruvian lawyer and a 
Chilean nationalist group show the differences in how cartography can be used to 
persuasive effect. The Peruvian map skews the compass to point North-West so that 
the parallel that Chile argues is the maritime limit appears to divert away from the 
Chilean coast while the Chilean map uses persuasive language in the legend to 
legitimise Chile’s claim and to downplay Peruvian ‘allegations’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 97: Map presented to the ICJ by Peruvian lawyer Alain Pellet showing the persuasive power of 
maps. The Map points North-West making it appear that Chile’s claim for maritime territory is more 
aggressive than it appears on other maps. http://www.legalpe.pe/mapa_27976/2 [accessed 11/04/2014] 
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Figure 98: Map created by ‘Defense of Sovereignty Corporation’ uses language such as ‘True maritime limit’ 
to illustrate Chile’s claim and ‘Portion of Chilean sea claimed by Peru’. 
http://www.soberaniachile.cl/argumentos_contra_la_pretension_peruana_de_alterar_el_limite_maritimo.h
tml [accessed 24/03/2014] 	  
Persuasive maps are, put simply, maps designed to promote one viewpoint or 
perspective over another (Tyner 1982). While they have been popular throughout the 
history of cartography they are increasingly easy to make and to disseminate to a large 
global audience thanks to technology and the Internet (Muehlenhaus 2014). J B 
Harley (1989) has been influential in problematising the ‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ 
claims of cartographers and instead used deconstruction to break the assumed link 
between reality and representation. Influenced by Foucault and Derrida, Harley has 
shown how space is not represented equally in maps, rather maps emphasise power. 
Power is exerted on cartography and with cartography and this can be seen through 
the Chilean and Peruvian maps presented here. By choosing specific language, 
symbols, shading, scale, or perspective the map makers are able to promote their 
viewpoint over another and reach a worldwide audience rapidly online. 
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The Ruling and its Impacts 
On 27 January 2014, the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment on 
the maritime boundary dispute between Peru and Chile (Peru v. Chile, Judgment, 
General List No. 137), detailed legal accounts of which can be found elsewhere 
(Riesenberg 2014; Ahumada & Pardo 2010). The Court had to determine first 
whether a maritime boundary existed between Peru and Chile and if so, to consider 
the nature and extent of the boundary. After years of deliberation the ICJ closed the 
case by defining “the course of the maritime boundary between the Parties without 
determining the precise geographical co-ordinates. It recalls that it has not been asked 
to do so in the Parties’ final submissions. The Court, therefore, expects that the Parties 
will determine these co-ordinates in accordance with the Judgment, in the spirit of 
good neighbourliness”.10 The course of the new boundary is shown below in Figure 
99. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ICJ Press Release. Maritime Dispute (Peru vs. Chile) The Court determines the course of the single maritime 
boundary between Peru and Chile. 27th January 2014 p.5 
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Figure 99: Map showing the ICJ ruling. ICJ Peru Institutes Proceedings against Chile with Regard to a Dispute Concerning 
Maritime Delimitation between the Two States. Press release, 16 January 2008 
 
The ICJ recognised Chile’s claim that Peru had agreed to the prior border 
demarcation based on the 1952 and 1954 agreements as had the international 
community and therefore Chile could invoke the doctrine of estoppel in order to 
prevent any change to the current status quo.11 However the ICJ was unable to find 
concrete proof that Chile and Peru had agreed upon the parallel line argued by Chile 
as being the maritime boundary between the two countries “and since no maritime 
delimitation has ever been effected, Peru considers that this dispute is to be settled 
pursuant to Articles 15, 74, and 83 of UNCLOS in so far as they constitute customary 
international law and concern States with adjacent coasts. This, in manifest rejection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Estoppel precludes "a person from denying, or asserting anything to the contrary of, that which has, in 
contemplation of law, been established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers, or by his own 
deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied". ICJ Press Release. Maritime Dispute (Peru vs. Chile) The 
Court determines the course of the single maritime boundary between Peru and Chile. 27th January 2014  
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of the method of the geographical parallel which, according to Chile, forms the 
alleged existing maritime boundary” (Horna 2009:9). 
Chile and Peru both accepted the ICJ’s decision and began making changes to 
legislation and the border demarcations. Peru is not a signatory member of UNCLOS 
and so had to change its maritime legislation to allow for the free navigation of 
maritime traffic of either state or third party without prior notification. Chile, as an 
UNCLOS member state, only had to make minor adjustments to its legislation. 
Shortly after the ruling, on the 25th March 2014, Peru and Chile worked together to 
agree on the co-ordinates of the maritime border, an act of co-operation that took 
place promptly and efficiently. 
However, not all of the legal repercussions have gone smoothly. As has continuously 
occurred in the history of the Chile-Peru border, one issue was left pending; ‘Hito 1’ 
[boundary marker 1]. The problem with Hito 1 is that it is located inland and so there 
is a dispute over whether the maritime boundary should begin geographically parallel 
to Hito 1 or follow the agreed international border- the line of Concordia. This leaves 
3.7 hectares in dispute, 300 metres of coast that has been dubbed a ‘dry coast’ (Figure 
100). It means that the land territory is under Peruvian sovereignty but they cannot 
enter the sea on those 300 metres as it belongs to Chile.12 In another example of maps 
being used as tools of persuasion, map Figure 101 by a Chilean nationalist group uses 
language and cartographic techniques to ridicule Peruvian claims to the ‘dry coast’. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 La Estrella de Arica. 29th January 2014 
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          Figure 100: Map showing the triangle of ‘dry coast’ in dispute. Author’s own. 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 101: Map created by ‘Defense of Sovereignty Corporation’ which uses techniques such as 
placing the label ‘Chile’ over territory claimed by Peru and marking Peru’s claimed border landmark 
as ‘false Concordia point’. 
http://www.soberaniachile.cl/argumentos_contra_la_pretension_peruana_de_alterar_el_limite_ma
ritimo.html [accessed 26/03/2014] 
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Officials from both Chile and Peru have been vocal about Hito 1. The then 
Chilean President Sebastian Piñera said The Hague declared that “the maritime 
boundary begins at the parallel Hito 1, [and so] confirms the Chilean terrestrial 
domain of the respective triangle”. Meanwhile, Chilean ex-Prime Minister Eduardo 
Frei responded to Peruvian claims over the 3.7 hectares saying that “I consider the 
attitude of the Government and the Peruvian Foreign Ministry not only unfriendly, 
but aggressive”.13 On the other side of the border Peruvian President Ollanta Humala 
dismissed the significance of this saying that the ICJ had to state Hito 1 as the 
boundary because the Court did not have the jurisdiction to rule on land borders 
while Peruvian Foreign Minister Eda Rivas downplayed the ‘dry coast’ saying that 
there are six other such coasts in the world and so the “triangle is not in dispute”.14  
Aside from the Hito 1 controversy, the general atmosphere in Arica with the 
ruling appeared to be that it was a shame that Chile lost territory but “it wasn’t as bad 
as it could have been”.15 As one Peruvian historian has concluded, the decision made 
by The Hague could be an opportunity to close the historical conflict with dignity and 
open a door to a future of co-operation between the two states (Zapata 2011). 
However, on the day of The Hague’s ruling there was civil disturbance in the city of 
Arica with a “small mob of residents including fishermen… [that] grew to four 
thousand people” thought to be unhappy with the fact that territory was ceded to 
Peru, five of whom were detained by police.16 The Peruvian press tended to focus on 
the high number of angry protesters while in contrast, the Chilean press estimated 
that just 200 residents of Arica were protesting and the demonstration lasted “a couple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ‘Expresidente chileno acusa a Perú de actitud ‘agresiva’ e ‘inamistosa’’ RPP 27th August 2014 
14 ‘Los movimientos peruanos que apuntan a recuperar Arica el 2050 y el abandono en que la tiene Chile’ El 
Mostrador 29th January 2014 
15 ‘Pescadores de Arica: "Hubo un fallo adverso, pero no tan malo como esperábamos"’ La Tercera 27th January 
2014 
16 El Comercio. Lima, Peru. 27th January 2014 
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of minutes before rapid intervention from police, who used a water cannon to disperse 
the people”.17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
 
Figure 102: Demonstrators dispersed with a water cannon. ‘Fallo de La Haya: más de 200 personas 
protestaron en Arica y hubo disturbios’ Soyarica.cl 27th January 2014 	  
The demonstration was led mainly by fishermen but amongst the general public 
the decision was taken calmly, with over 90% of the Chilean public thinking that the 
decision of the ICJ should be respected.18 Another questionnaire of citizens in Arica 
found that Ariqueños see the ICJ ruling as insignificant in comparison to other 
challenges faced by the region (Figure 103). Likewise, the ruling has been seen by 
politicians and business leaders as an opportunity to forget the past conflicts between 
Chile and Peru and to focus instead on the ever-growing ties between the countries. 
Bilateral trade has grown to over US$3 billion a year, Chilean companies have 
invested over US$13 billion in Peru, and 158,000 Peruvians live in Chile.19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 ‘Fallo de La Haya: más de 200 personas protestaron en Arica y hubo disturbios’ Soyarica.cl 27th January 2014  
18 El Mundo. Spain. 27th January 2014.  
19 ‘A Line in the Sea’ The Economist. 1st February 2014  
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Figure 103: Pie chart showing the answers of 209 citizens in Arica to the question ‘Is implementing the Hague 
ruling the most important challenge for Bachelet in Arica & Parinacota?’ 
http://www.elmorrocotudo.cl/noticia/sociedad/ciudadania-opina-implementar-el-fallo-de-la-haya-es-el-desafio-
mas-importante-del-g [accessed 22/03/2014] 
 
One article in the local press after the ruling stated that; “In day-to-day terms the 
limits continue to be used the same as they have been for 50 years because the 
implementation of the ruling will be yet still another process that will have to be 
solved with the Incan country”.20 This appears to be true to some extent as a year 
after the ICJ ruling it was noted by one newspaper that the implementations promised 
by Chile and Peru still had not been carried out.21 Another article wrote-off the 
significance of the ICJ decision, declaring that the border dispute was not settled and 
that by 2050 Arica would be Peruvian through way of peaceful negotiation. This was 
deemed to be due to the fact that Arica feels abandoned by the Chilean state while the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 La Estrella de Arica. 29th January 2014  
21 ‘A un año de La Haya: El entrampado camino de Chile y Perú para implementar el fallo.’ Emol 27th January 
2015 
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Peruvian government “has spared no efforts in promoting Tacna in view of a great 
future”.22 
Chile has felt that it has been treated unfavourably by the ICJ on a number of 
occasions. For example losing the Laguna del Desierto area to Argentina, the 
possibility that Chile will lose more territory to Argentina in the Southern Patagonian 
icefields, and could potentially also cede territory to Bolivia who have presented a case 
for access to the sea to the ICJ. While the focus of this thesis is the Chile-Peru border, 
the influence of Bolivia is never far away. In 2013 Bolivia filed the case to the 
International Court of Justice in an attempt to reclaim access to the Pacific Ocean 
that was lost in the War of the Pacific. Bolivian President Evo Morales is convinced 
that his people have a rightful claim and is confident that the ICJ will recognise 
Bolivian sovereignty. Chile meanwhile is refusing to engage in dialogue with Bolivia 
instead arguing that the 1904 Treaty of Peace ratified by both nations asserted 
Chilean sovereignty and therefore the ICJ will not accept Bolivia’s dismissal of the 
Treaty. In May 2015 Chile officially requested that the ICJ declare that Bolivia’s 
claim is not within the jurisdiction of the Court, a request refuted by the ICJ in 
September 2015.23 The case will unfold over the next few years and it could have 
impacts on both land and maritime boundaries between Chile and Peru. If the ICJ 
rules against Chile in these pending cases, may Chile withdraw from the ICJ and 
refuse to recognise ICJ rulings? There is a chance that Chile, which has traditionally 
been open to international mediation, may become hostile to foreign intervention and 
any Chilean politicians showing strength by standing up to outsiders are likely to be 
met favourably by Chileans. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 ‘Los movimientos peruanos que apuntan a recuperar Arica el 2050 y el abandono en que la tiene Chile’ El 
Mostrador 29th January 2014 
23 ICJ Press Release. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile). 8th May 2015 
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Artisanal Fishermen in Arica 
As previously mentioned fishermen made up a large proportion of those who 
demonstrated against the ICJ ruling, with the majority of these being artisanal 
fishers.24 There have been debates as to the extent to which fishermen have suffered 
from the ruling. With this focus on fish we can see the ways in which nationalist 
discourses can run alongside practical, resource-based claims. Maritime resources 
have long been a source of contention between nations, from the British-Icelandic 
Cod Wars, as well as the Northern Atlantic more generally, numerous problems 
border issues with fishing rights in the Indian Ocean and the USA-Canadian shared 
Salish Sea (Cushing 1979; Archer & Scrivener 1982-1983; Wadewitz 2012). The 
immediate response from Chilean officials was relief that fishermen in Arica hadn’t 
lost their valuable fishing grounds, arguing that the majority of fish caught is within 60 
nautical miles of the coast. Peru was granted control over 50,000km2 of open ocean, 
but Chile retained its hold over 16,000km2 of the disputed waters, including the rich 
fishing grounds closer to shore. The Chilean Minister for the Interior declared that 
‘practically 100%’ of the fishing in Arica occurs within the 80-mile limit.25 Anchoveta, 
the fish with the greatest catch in Arica was deemed to be unaffected as 58% is found 
within 10 miles of the coast and 80% found within 20 miles, and other widely caught 
fish such as Pacific pilchard and mackerel also remain in Chilean waters (Alessandri 
2014; Infante Caffi 2014). One port worker I spoke with some months after the ruling 
stated that “absolutely nothing has changed, absolutely nothing, it’s too far out to 
make any real difference”.26  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The term ‘artisanal’ is translated from the Spanish ‘artesenal’ which denotes small-scale, craft based fishing. 
25 ‘Chadwick: “Casi el 100% de la actividad pesquera de Arica está debidamente resguardada y protegida”’ El 
Morro Cotudo 27th January 2014 
26 Interview, port worker. 11th August 2014 
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Figure 104: Tweet from a twitter account that shares news about Arica. “#Important- Fishing is concentrated in 
the sea up to mile 40, so there will be no significant changes for artisanal fishermen #Arica” arica en linea (2014, 
27 January) #Importante - Pesca se concentra en mar hasta la milla 40, por tanto, no habría cambios significaivos 
para pescadores artesenales #Arica [Tweet]. Retreived from 
https://twitter.com/aricaenlinea/status/427834777224216576 
 
 
Figure 105: The port used by artisanal fishermen in Arica. Author’s photo 
 
However, on the contrary, other artisanal fishermen in Arica have asserted that 
they have been adversely affected by the ICJ decision and have attempted to seek 
compensation from the Chilean government for their losses. 27  They had been 
pessimistic even before the ruling claiming that they could be affected “in a direct and 
irreparable way”.28 The day of the ruling, fishermen took to the streets in their 
hundreds claiming that Chile should not accept the ICJ’s decision. There were reports 
of racist anti-Peruvian chants alongside the signing of the hymn of Arica and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  ‘Court Grants Peru Ocean Territory Claimed by Chile’ New York Times. 27th January 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/americas/court-grants-peru-ocean-territory-claimed-by-chile.html?_r=0 
28 ‘Pescadores artesanales de Arica esperan con pesimismo el fallo de La Haya: “Sería un terrible daño”’ Soyarica.cl 
27th January 2014  
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waving of Chilean flags. The group marched to the local regiment barracks where 
they were promptly dispersed by armed forces.29 
 
Figure 106: Fishermen and others demonstrate on the day of the ruling. The placards read; “No more 
abandonment”, “Centralism won’t shut us up” and “Not even one metre of sea to Peru”. ‘El día de furia de 
los pescadores’ El Morro Cotudo 28th January 2014 
 
Figure 107: One demonstrator holds a placard reading “Now Chile remembers Arica” ‘El día de furia de los 
pescadores’ El Morro Cotudo 28th January 2014 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 ‘El día de furia de los pescadores’ El Morro Cotudo 28th January 2014 
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Figure 108: Women demonstrating against abandonment of local fishermen by the Chilean state after the 
ICJ ruling. The placard reads “41 years of abandonment of the artisanal fishermen” ‘[FOTOS] Fallo de La 
Haya: Pescadores artesanales de Arica protestan por abandono de las autoridades chilenas’ El Morro Cotudo 
27th January 2014 	  
Five months after the ruling, artisanal fishermen demanded compensation from 
the government to make up for their losses resulting from the change in the maritime 
border. One fisherman claimed; “We believe it is the obligation of the state to protect 
our people. We hope that the highest authority in the country knows of our demand 
so that they can help us”.30 The president of the local fishing union said; “We are not 
asking for money, we have to make that perfectly clear; but we are looking at how we 
fish, it’s our way of life”.31 He also asserted that local fishermen fish beyond the 80-
mile limit much more frequently than claimed by the Chilean government and due to 
the ruling stating that territory beyond 80 miles is now Peruvian, fishermen in Arica 
have lost 60-65% of their catch.32 The Chilean government did set out a plan for local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 ‘Pescadores artesanales de Arica piden compensaciones tras el fallo de La Haya’ El Morro Cotudo 28th June 2014 
31 ‘Tripulantes de naves especiales de Arica solicitan ayuda por pérdidas tras fallo de La Haya’ El Morro Cotudo 9th 
September 2014 
32 ‘Pescadores artesanales de Arica y fallo de La Haya: "Hemos sufrido pérdidas entre 60% a 65%’ El Morro Cotudo 
21st February 2014 
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fishermen immediately after the ICJ ruling promising benefits to artisanal fishermen 
such as better job security, pensions, and a ‘sea mall’ for selling their catch.33 
However, since the ICJ ruling, fishermen have continued to feel prejudiced with 
government plans to move the fishing port used by artisanal fishermen. They claim 
that they, who fish for local human consumption are being moved out to make more 
space for the industrial multinational companies who produce fishmeal. They see it as 
a decision from Santiago by people who are unaware of the needs of Ariqueños.34 
Fishermen complained that the Chilean state never took any notice of them until the 
ICJ ruling.35 To make matters worse, Peruvian President Ollanta Humala boasted 
about Peru’s territorial gains, bragging that they now held the once-Chilean rich 
fishing grounds. This was noted as an attempt by Humala, whose popularity had been 
taking a steep decline, to win back the nationalist support.36 
Another local fisherman claimed that the abandonment and decimation of the 
artisanal fishing industry has nothing to do with the ICJ ruling but with the Chilean 
fishing industry and in particular the monopolisation by a few elite-owned companies, 
CORPESCA being the largest in Arica.37 Unsurprisingly, with its huge proportion of 
coastline to landmass, Chile is a country that relies heavily on marine exploitation, 
with Chile’s commercial catch in 2010 being the seventh largest in the world.38  
Fishing is mainly controlled by a very small number of large industrial firms but Chile 
still has 86,000 independent fishermen.39 However, due to the large-scale aggressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 ‘Gobierno presentó plan de compensación a pescadores ariqueños por fallo de La Haya’ El Morro Cotudo 30th 
January 2014 
34 ‘Pescadores Artesanales de Arica rechazan plan que los saca del muelle pesquero’ El Morro Cotudo 9th August 
2014 
35 ‘Los movimientos peruanos que apuntan a recuperar Arica el 2050 y el abandono en que la tiene Chile’ El 
Mostrador 29th January 2014 
36 ‘World Court decision on Peru-Chile border fails to quell nationalist rivalries’ World Socialist Web Site 4th February 
2014 http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/04/peru-f04.html 
37 ‘Pescadores de Arica y Parinacota preocupados por el monopolio de Corpesca’ El Morro Cotudo 24th January 
2014 
38 ‘Fishing in Chile: Net Profits’ The Economist. 11th August 2012 
39 ibid. 
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operations carried out by the industrial firms, artisanal fishermen are struggling to 
catch enough to make a living.40 Artisanal fishers catch on average the same amount 
in one year as one industrial trawler catches in just one day. The majority of the catch 
is exported or processed into products such as harina de pescado [fishmeal] to increase its 
potential export value, the national production of which is centred in the north 
around Iquique and Arica.  
The discontent among fishermen with the ICJ ruling is just one issue of 
contention they have with the Chilean state. The fishing industry and the laws 
surrounding it have been declared as corrupt by some sectors, particularly after the 
2013 law promulgated by former finance minister Pablo Longueira. The law 
safeguarded fishing rights for seven families who control four commercial fishing firms 
for the next twenty years (accounting for 92% of the national industry) and Longueira 
himself has been identified as one of the greatest beneficiaries of the legislation for his 
role in one of the four firms, the Angelini Group. This disproportionately affects 
northern Chile where the Angelini Group controls 90% of all fishing quotas, working 
through companies they own such as Corpesca, Orizon, and South Pacific Korp. The 
Angelini Group is currently the world’s second largest producer of fishmeal. 
Accusations of bribery became public knowledge in May 2013 with proof that certain 
governmental ministers in the north had been bribed to back legislation that would 
benefit these large fishing companies. In one well-known case, Marta Isasi, a deputy in 
the national parliament, received a US$50,000 payment from fishing giant Corpesca 
SA ahead of the vote on the fisheries law.41 Isasi faces fraud charges that are ongoing.  
Another claim is that the law has made indigenous groups ‘legally invisible’ by 
stripping them of their access to fishing grounds and of their rights to fish in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 ‘Industrial fishing threatens Chile’s fishermen’ TIME Magazine 
41 ‘Chile: Artisan Fishermen vs. Industrial Fishermen’ Pulitzer Center 20th June 2013 
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traditional ancestral ways.42 Artisanal fishers are penalised by aspects of the new law 
such as mandatory GPS on every boat and licenses that are a great expenditure and 
disadvantage many fishermen.43 As one artisanal fisherman stated; “The ships that go 
after all the large fish, they have radar they have everything they need to capture the 
big ones and follow the schools of fish, they always take the biggest ones and leave the 
smallest ones, these are what they leave, the fish for the people, the rest are for 
foreigners, they are industrial fishermen, we are artisanal fishermen, and these are the 
only fish left for us”.44 
Proof of this closed, corrupt market is, argues another source, the fact that Chile 
has the 7th largest national catch in the world yet this amounts to just 0.4% of GDP.45 
The profits of fishing are clearly going elsewhere than into the national purse. This 
has raised debates over whether fish and other marine resources are public or private 
property in Chile, one view is that the process is “applying capitalism to living 
resources”.46 The advance of neoliberal administrations since 1973 in Chile and 1990 
in Peru has been pinpointed as the cause of marine overexploitation in both countries. 
Trade liberalisation has meant that Chilean fisheries production but also overfishing 
has increased considerably since Pinochet took office. His belief that fish stocks were 
copious and that market-based solutions could solve any problems led him to remove 
access restrictions in the 1970s (Ibarra et al. 2000).  
Longueira claimed that his changes to fishing legislation would benefit artisanal 
fishermen by giving them exclusive rights to the first mile from the coastline (even 
though the prior rights were to the first five miles) and that the law was necessary in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 ‘El Caso Penta y la Ley Longueira de Privatización Pesquera’ Radio Del Mar January 2015 
43 ‘Chilean Government Set To Approve Law Local Fishermen Say Would Harm Their Livelihood’ Mint Press 
News 13th July 2012 
44 Miguel Angel Maureira, Artisanal Fisherman, Caleta Membrillo, Valparaiso ‘The Privatization of Chile's Sea’ 
The Real News 18th January 2013 
45 ‘Ley de Pesca, una gran mentira a revelar en el Senado’ Chile Pesca. 25th October 2014 
46 ‘Chilean fishermen forced to take the bait for big business’ Equal Times 18th March 2013 
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order to ensure the sustainability of the fishing industry, which has faced severely 
diminishing yields in recent years due to overfishing.47 The decline of resources which 
have traditionally been found in Arica such as clams, scallops, and oysters due to this 
overfishing has been keenly noted by some citizens of Arica as shown by the following 
posts on social media:48 
 “I remember when we would find mountains and mountains of clams… clam   
empanadas all week long… parmesan clams…. Clams with lemon.. ufff” 
 “It was a familiar scene for many, unfortunately their overexploitation has led 
to their extinction.” 
 “There was no regulation!!!! Too bad Playa Las Machas [Clam beach] now 
only has the name and not the clams” 
 “Damn there used to be loads of clams and now nothing, so sad” 
 “the clams were taken indiscriminately and then came the El Niño current 
with its warm waters and gave the final blow” 
 “Does anyone know why there are no clams at Playa Las Machas [Clam  Beach] and 
who caused it?” 
 “Unfortunately it was us who went and caught them without thinking about 
the future” 
 “Hmmm the fishermen also took tonnes and took them to Procemar… where 
they were processed” 
 “When loads of people got fired from the fishing industry they set themselves 
to finding clams to sell and to support themselves without thinking that they 
were extinguishing the resource” 
 “It was at the beginning of the 80s… with the first El Niño current… after 
that the system never recovered” 
 “from what little remained in the 90s, companies such as Procemar came to 
take everything that was left” 
 “We didn’t know how to care for our own heritage, it was abused by 
everyone!” 
 “It wasn’t the ordinary citizen taking them for personal consumption, or the 
El Niño Current. It was industrial exploitation.” 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 ‘Comisión de Pesca alcanza acuerdo en tramitación de nueva regulación para el sector’ Emol 11th July 2012; 
‘The Privatization of Chile's Sea’ The Real News 18th January 2013 
48  Comment on Facebook group ‘Ese Arica de Antes’ 4th February 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/95300224419/?fref=ts 
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While local citizens and artisanal fishers suffer from depleted resources, the 
Longueira scandal continues with the length of the country witnessing demonstrations 
and marches against the legislation. 
Across the border, Peru’s fishing industry has historically been the most 
developed in the region but overfishing has been an issue. The industry is dependent 
on one species, the Peruvian anchovy which was almost fished to extinction in the 
1970s and is used to make fishmeal. Since then the fishmeal and fish processing 
industry has been managed by Pescaperú, which was founded in 1973. Peru is the 
country most vulnerable to El Niño events in the world, which causes the 
disappearance of anchoveta and a sharp fall in the catch of other species (Ibarra et al. 
2000). The Chilean and Peruvian coasts are both heavily affected during El Niño 
years, the irregular climatic event that affects the cold nutrient-rich waters that are 
needed to support the fish reserves. This means that during El Niño events certain fish 
stocks that are reduced come under threat of extinction. Chile has therefore imposed 
restrictions on fishing during some years to counter these effects. Due to its economic 
dependence on the ocean’s resources, at 8% of GDP, Peru has stalwartly protected its 
maritime borders such as in 1952 and 1954 when Argentine and US fishing fleets 
respectively entered Peruvian fishing grounds and shots were fired. In subsequent 
decades various US fishing boats have been apprehended for fishing in Peruvian 
waters. 
Water and the resources they hold are likely to become increasingly valuable 
throughout the twenty-first century as global climatic changes take place. While 
declining freshwater availability is the most pressing concern for many nation-states 
they are also looking to the ocean’s resources. Legal changes such as UNCLOS and 
EEZ’s have shifted responsibility for the ocean’s resources away from fishermen and 
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companies onto nation-states that has in turn raised the issue of resource management 
at maritime borders. As EEZ’s became recognised the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the UN (FAO) had to assess fish stocks by EEZ rather than by region 
in spite of incomplete maritime border delimitation. Peru and Chile were in fact two 
of the first countries to recognise the outside threat to the resources, particularly 
whales, they viewed as rightfully in their maritime territory instigating them to claim a 
200-mile territorial sea jurisdiction in 1947. This was later established in the 1952 
Santiago Declaration signed by Chile, Peru and Ecuador. Chilean and Peruvian 
territorial sea claims thereby began the worldwide shift towards the adoption of the 
EEZ. 
The mobility and transboundary nature of fish that move through governed 
spaces has been highlighted by the FAO as one reason for the failure of effective 
fisheries management. Article 118 of UNCLOS, for example, declares that states 
fishing on the same living marine resources or in the same area of the high seas shall 
cooperate in the conservation of these resources.49 The management of transboundary 
resources tends to be by national governments even when regulated by international 
treaties and bi or multinational conservation across maritime boundaries has been 
common since the 1990s (De Jong 2008). Rather than focussing on conservation, 
Chile and Peru’s transboundary fisheries management has centred more on the 
protection of the rights of fishermen. In 1954 Chile and Peru signed the Special 
Maritime Zone Agreement which created a buffer zone along the maritime boundary 
which at the time Peru and Chile referred to as the parallel extending 12 miles beyond 
the coastal line. This meant that fishermen who had strayed out of their own 
territorial waters would avoid sanctions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 UNCLOS, Articles 63(2) and 64(1) 
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Despite traditionally relaxed movement of both Chilean and Peruvian fishermen 
along the maritime border the arrival of the dispute at the ICJ seemed to make the 
situation tenser. In 2014 ten fishermen were apprehended and couldn’t leave Arica 
until Chilean and Peruvian officials could come to an agreement, fifty-five days after 
they were captured.50 They were given refuge by the Artisanal Fishermen of Arica 
Syndicate which further shows the contradiction of the border. These Peruvian 
fishermen were being cared for by Ariqueño fishermen at the very same time that 
nationalists were demonstrating against Peruvian gains awarded by the ICJ. As 
highlighted previously there is a huge difference in how locals treat their neighbours 
across the border and how the two nations relate to one another. The Peruvians 
worked in the port of Arica painting boats, carrying ice, and shucking mussels in order 
to buy food to eat and to attempt to pay off the fine imposed on them by the Chilean 
government of 60,000 Peruvian soles (US$18,000).51 Due to this impossibly high fine 
two of the detainees fled home to Peru. 
This case study of the maritime border dispute between Chile and Peru 
highlights how violence through xenophobia or anger at the Chilean state remains 
present in Arica today. The tension between Chile and Peru which has existed since 
before the War of the Pacific and has waxed and waned ever since, though never 
disappearing, is clearly still present. The nationalistic and at times racist sentiments 
expressed by politicians, organisations, and individuals ran through the maritime 
dispute. Another issue that reappears is the feeling that Arica is being abandoned by 
the Chilean state. The country took notice of Arica on the day of the ruling when it 
was under threat and local citizens took this as an opportunity to voice their 
dissatisfaction with this abandonment. Fishermen in particular felt abandoned, angry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 ‘Chile dejará sin efecto denuncias contra pescadores peruanos’ El Comercio, Peru 7th February 2014 
51 ‘Peruanos detenidos por pescar en aguas chilenas ya cuentan con un albergue en Arica.’ Soy Arica 21st January 
2014 
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that the Chilean state made no effort to protect the fishing grounds so vital to their 
livelihoods. This was worsened for them by the prejudice they have faced by a corrupt 
fishing law that protects the rights a few industrial firms to the detriment of artisanal 
fishermen. Bodies also became a space of contestation during the dispute, whether 
those demonstrating against the state and being dispersed by water cannons or the 
fishermen claiming to have had their maritime mobility unfairly restricted, meaning 
they can’t access the resources they desperately need.  
 
The Legacy of Violence in Arica 
So far this thesis has examined historical moments in Arica, beginning in 1925, 
but what has the inheritance of this history been? How is violence still present in Arica 
today? The following sections examine the other ways, beyond the maritime dispute, 
that the legacy of violence remains in Arica at the international, national, and 
corporeal levels. The first scale addressed is the international and how the relationship 
between Chile and Peru is enacted today. Secondly, at the national level the Chilean 
state has, in the eyes of many Ariqueños, continued to abandon or even victimise 
Arica. Thirdly, at the corporeal level the body remains under threat of violence 
whether this is the risk of landmines at the border or epistemic violence in the form of 
racism. 
To address these three scales separately is not to suggest that they exist 
independently nor that they act as a ‘trickle-down’ hierarchy with the international 
influencing the national that acts on the corporeal for instance. Instead they are 
equally tied up with and acting against one another. The power and supremacy of 
violence indeed comes from the way in which violence is simultaneously acting at 
multiple scales. 
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The International Level  
The maritime border dispute is a perfect example of the current situation at the 
Chile-Peru border with continued antagonism between the two states but good 
neighbourliness between the residents of the borderlands. We have seen the tension 
between Chile and Peru at the border in Arica emerge at various points; with the 
attempted plebiscite in the 1920s, the almost-war in the 1970s, and the maritime 
dispute of 2014. Even since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, the country has 
continued to have problematic relations with its northernmost neighbours, Peru and 
Bolivia (Van Der Ree 2010). Chile’s neo-liberal identity, which it has actively pursued 
since Pinochet’s regime, has only increased tensions with these neighbours who have 
portrayed Chile as imperialist and aggressive. The return to democracy after the 
Pinochet dictatorship in 1990 did however see a return to the integrationist policies at 
the border that Pinochet had broken.  
While relations between Chileans and Peruvians on the border have generally been 
positive, the nationalistic displays of the two states have used Arica as a theatre of 
jingoism and one-upmanship. This has meant that Arica, which Peru has dreams of 
one day reincorporating into its national territory, remains in a precarious position, its 
safety relying on the good-neighbourliness of Chile and Peru. Over the time period 
examined here, 1925 to 2015, Chile and Peru have had many issues pending. 
Outstanding problems that should have been settled by the Treaty of Lima in 1929 
took many decades to resolve with the maritime border dispute still with its own issues 
pending. For example the wharf, a railway station, and a customs house that Chile 
promised to build in Arica in the Treaty of Lima were only addressed in 1999. The 
stipulations were to build a dock, offices, and a railway station to be used freely by 
Peru and to construct a statue of Jesus Christ atop the morro with his arms 
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outstretched, one arm pointing to Chile and the other to Peru (Figure 109) (Bitar 
2011). However, despite being symbolically important, the infrastructure provided for 
Peru in reality is little used. Although it must be noted that other infrastructure 
between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia has been improved and in 2012 a paved road from 
Arica to the port of Santos in Brazil, a dream of the JAA, was completed. 
 
 
Figure 109: Statue of Christ on the summit of the morro. 2014. Author’s photo 
 
One interviewee, Constanza Sepúlveda, summed up the view of many Ariqueños 
when she said; “is Chilean sovereignty in the region secure? The truth is I don’t know. 
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Peru is never going to stop saying they want to recover Arica”.52 Endangering the 
spirit of good neighbourliness, both Chilean and Peruvian officials or those close to 
them, have been prone to making inappropriate and aggressive statements. In Peru 
much of this has centred around provocative Peruvian President Ollanta Humala, for 
example his brother has stated “I will go to Arica, but only mounted on a tank” and 
his father, Isaac Humala, gave an interview to a Chilean magazine in 2006 where he 
stated that “the invasion of Chile [by Peru] would be by rifle and penis… Chile 
deserves to be peruvianified… nine months after invasion you would have so many 
Peruvians”.53 Just as after the War of the Pacific Chile ‘chileanised’ Arica, Humala 
dreams of revenge through Peruvians raping Chilean women who would give birth to 
half-Peruvian children. The culture of machismo so present in Chile and Peru equates 
the domination of the enemies’ women with domination of territory. Worsening the 
situation, in 2007 Ollanta Humala led a nationalist march to the border with Chile ‘to 
defend national sovereignty’.54 He has also been open about his beliefs that Peru had 
acted in a cowardly manner in the face of the maritime border issue with Chile, 
allowing Chile to consolidate its position.55 Another international gaffe occurred in 
2008, when Peruvian Army Chief Edwin Donayre was seen on video saying that 
Chileans should not be allowed into the country, and that should they enter their 
bodies would have to leave in ‘boxes’[coffins] and, when these ran out, in ‘plastic 
bags’.56 
Chilean officials have tended to be more careful with their language, but other 
signs of potential aggression have been noted. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs 
referred to Chile’s defence ’spending spree’ in 2007, reporting that Chile was worrying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Interview, Constanza Sepúlveda. 10th July 2014 
53 Interview with General Odlanier Mena, La Estrella de Arica 19th March 2006; ‘Una invasión a Chile sería con 
fusil y con pene’. The Clinic Online 6th June 2011 
54 ‘La guerra de Humala contra Chile’ El Pais 4th April 2007 
55 ‘Humala dice que Perú muestra cobardía ante Chile en tema marítimo’. Emol 23rd March 2007 
56 ‘Video Strains Peru-Chile Relations’. Reuters 30th November 2008 
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its neighbours Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. Chile’s armed forces are semi-
autonomous and receive 10% of export earnings from state-owned copper company 
CODELCO, the largest copper company in the world, meaning that in 2008 the 
armed forces received US$1 billion from the copper agreement alone (Villa & Weiffen 
2014). This highly controversial ‘Ley Reservada del Cobre’ was introduced in 1958 to 
maintain the armed forces and each year CODELCO deposits the funds into the 
army, air force and navy ‘secret’ accounts at the Central Bank of Chile. This is a 
controversial arrangement because it is outside of democratic control, it does not need 
to compete for funds against other sectors, and spending decisions are unsupervised 
and lack accountability.57 Increases in the value of copper have provided the armed 
forces with vast sums of money that has been spent largely on expanding and 
improving arms (see  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 110). This has led to concerns over the military balance in the region and 
whether Chile is preparing for “War of the Pacific: Part II”.58   
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 ‘Changing the Financial Management of the Defense Sector in Chile: Leaving Expenditure Earmarks Behind.’ 
Public Financial Management. 25th November  2009 
58 ‘Chile’s Aggressive Military Arm Purchases are Ruffling the Region, Alarming in Particular Bolivia, Peru and 
Argentina’. COHA. 7th August 2007 
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Figure 110: Defence expenditure by Chile and Peru 2006-2014. Donadio, M. & M. de la Paz Tibiletti (2014) Atlas 
Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y Caribe.  RESDAL: Buenos Aires 	  
A lot of this weaponry goes straight to Arica, which Chile has also maintained as 
a heavily militarised city, as one soldier explains; “There are many soldiers in this city, 
mainly because it is the city bordering Peru. It isn’t that the army of Chile seek a war 
or the army of Peru seek a war either. But things have been this way for so long”.59 
This defence spending and militarisation of the border doesn’t aid a situation whereby 
Chile is often seen as arrogant, distancing itself from its South American neighbours. 
How Chile has been perceived by its neighbours has been impacted by its 
“geographical location, ‘locked in’ by the Andes mountains to the east and deserts to 
the north, has given the country an historic orientation towards the Pacific Ocean, 
‘looking away’ from the other Latin American countries” (Van Der Ree 2010:209). 
Chile’s historical racism, xenophobia, and aggression have created a complicated 
present. 
There is clearly violence bubbling just under the surface at the Chile-Peru border 
with Peruvians speaking of rape and armed invasion and the Chileans silently holding 
their military strength. Ariqueño academic Vicente Díaz sees this as inevitable stating, 
“[b]order regions between two countries will always have tension, it’s one reason why 
Arica hasn’t been able to develop”.60 Some of this tension is insidious and not 
immediately visible. For example, to increase efficiency of border travel local mayors 
have had the ‘Tacna-Arica Agreement’ since 2003, which has improved the co-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Interview, Matias Silva. 28th June 2014 
60 Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12th August 2014 
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operation of transport services ferrying thousands of travelers across the border every 
day. Initiatives include improving infrastructure at the terminals and eradicating 
hawkers and homeless people who previously congregated at the Peruvian bus 
terminal. A transit law signed by the governments of Chile and Peru in 1983 explicitly 
stated that better transport between Tacna and Arica was important for the ties of 
friendship and good neighbourliness between the nations.  
This agreement allowed nationals to travel between Chile and Peru just with an 
identification card and for seven days with no further paperwork. It is not prohibited 
to work during those seven days but this is a rule commonly flouted particularly with 
Peruvians who work as manual labourers, in agriculture, in hospitality, or in domestic 
service during the week and return to Tacna at the weekends. Peruvians crossing with 
their identity card can cross to Arica but cannot travel further into Chile without 
special permission given on proof of a passport and US$1000. On the other hand 
Chileans can travel much further into Peru with just the identity card. An interior 
border checkpoint between the Chilean cities of Arica and Iquique at Cuya ensures 
that Peruvians aren’t traveling further into Chile unauthorised. The tension is 
therefore this inequality imposed on Peruvians and Chileans, they are seen differently 
when they cross the border. A Peruvian in Arica looking for work is more likely to be 
seen as a potential criminal, as a drain on Chile’s resources. A Chilean in Tacna is 
seen as an opportunity; they go to Peru to spend money whether on healthcare, 
goods, or eating out. The way that border checks are carried out means that while 
Chileans are treated as tourists, Peruvians are treated as immigrants. 
However, as has been noted at various points, there is a gulf between the 
relationship between officials in Santiago and Lima and the sentiments held by the 
citizens. Chile and Peru have a long history of perceived antagonism that has long 
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threatened their relationship but Arica has exemplified the possibilities of a healthy 
relationship between the two nations (Rehren 2004). After all, “Ariqueños and 
Tacneños have been, historically, crossers of borders, constantly travelling between 
one city and the other, for reasons of commerce, recreation, health, education or to 
visit family” (Podestá Arzubiaga 2011). Interview participants provided views such as; 
“There has always been friendship between the citizens of Tacna and Arica, 
always…Arica was Peruvian, there are descendants of Peruvians here, in Tacna there 
are descendants of Chileans, there are families that cross the border”.61 And; “Arica 
and Tacna are sister cities, when one lacks something the other gives it, that’s how its 
always been and that’s how it’ll be until the end of times”.62 In one study, 82% of 
Peruvians asked claim to be “ in total agreement” that both countries “should think of 
a future of co-operation” which 72% of Chileans answered the same. Furthermore, 
78% of Chileans and 76% of Peruvians asked claim to be “in total agreement” that 
the two countries “should increase their commercial and economic relations” 
(Alessandri 2014:12). 
In contrast, studies of Chileans and Peruvians as a whole and not just those who 
live on the border show that they still see their neighbour negatively. For instance, 
Peruvian feeling against Chile as measured in 2008 has shown that neither the 
increase in commerce and investment, nor the increased movement of people has 
improved historic distrust (Eckholt Ithurralde 2012). Moreover, various videos on the 
video sharing website ‘Youtube’, often produced by local news channels, have 
discussed the relationship between Arica and Peru. For example, one video entitled 
‘Arica Chile is overshadowed by progress of Tacna Peru’ is enlightening in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Interview, Vicente Díaz. 12th August 2014 
62 Interview, Hernán Rodríguez. 31st July 2014 
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comments it received.63 Due to the boundless, online nature of the videos they are 
watched by Chileans and Peruvians alike, this video appeared to attract the interest of 
many Peruvians in particular who contributed comments such as;  
  “EX-PERUVIAN BROTHERS ARE WELCOME” 
 “ARIQUENOS, YOU ARE AND WILL BE PERUVIAN, ITS JUST A 
MATTER OF TIME THAT YOU WILL RETURN TO BE PART OF OUR 
LAND, WHERE YOU BELONG. FAR FROM THE THEIVING AND 
ELITIST CHILEAN GOVERNMENT” 
 “What they don’t know that every pill for the Chileans has a little dose of 
cyanide” 
 “Oi, don’t tell them all!” 
 “he’s just being sarcastic, and the others too, Tacna benefits from the money left 
by Chileans just as the Chileans benefit from lower hospital prices and good 
quality products.” 
  “Sooner or later Arica will return to Peru, it’s just a matter of time. Have faith 
Peruvians.” 
 People from Arica, Tarapaca, Iquique are seen in Tacna. It seems good to me, 
and I think they are very welcome, as their ancestors were Peruvians and Peru 
does not forget, you must never forget.” 
 “Welcome Chilean brothers, always welcome in our country, we are brothers 
and I hope your situation improves Arica. Long live Latin America!” 
 “The love that Peru has for Arica will exist forever, even if it stays Chilean.” 
 “ALL OF ARICA WILL BE GREEN, WITH PERUVIAN WATER… THEY 
WILL MAKE CANALS… ARICA WILL PROSPER WITH PERU… A 
VERDANT PARADISE… IN CHILE THERE IS NO WATER NOR WILL 
THERE EVER BE” 
 “Arica and Tarapacá would be very well received and welcomed by us here in 
Peru. Greetings.” 
 “ARICA AND TARAPACA WILL LIVE FOREVER IN THE HEART OF 
EVERY PERUVIAN. WE WILL NEVER FORGET.” 
 “Eventually Arica will return to us, for better or worse…” 
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In order to soften these sentiments and encourage the positive views of future co-
operation, groups and organisations are attempting to improve cross-border relations 
between Chile and Peru. One Jesuit organisation, Rompiendo Fronteras [Breaking 
Borders] runs workshops for youths from Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. A Jesuit 
spokesperson celebrated the understanding and enjoyment that can be gained from 
diversity, coexistence, and multiculturalism, stressing that differences are an 
opportunity, not a barrier.64 As well as cultural initiatives, the economy continues to 
play a huge part in improving Chilean-Peruvian relations. The border is heavily 
crossed today with more than 4,000,000 annual border crossings.65 In November 
2009, US Ambassador to Chile, Paul Simons visited Arica to better understand Chile-
Peru relations at the border. Cables released by Wikileaks illustrate that Simons found 
“close integration between people and business and excellent law enforcement 
cooperation”, that “the border region does not share the tension that exists in the two 
capitals that has been the topic of news headlines” and that “Chileans and Peruvians 
alike regularly travel between the two cities for tourism, shopping, dining, and 
business opportunities, and local leaders only expect that those ties will continue to 
grow”.66  
While Arica and Tacna were similar economically in 1990, strong investment 
initiatives by the Peruvian government have increased activity and seen a boost in 
population, meaning that by 2010 Tacna was economically far more successful than 
Arica. Furthermore, in a complete turn-around for the area, in recent years, Arica can 
now be seen to be being ‘Peruvianised’, the dream of many Peruvians as quoted in the 
above YouTube comments. During the fifty years between the War of the Pacific 
(1879-1883) and the 1929 Treaty of Lima, Chile systematically ‘Chileanised’ Arica 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 El Morro Cotudo. 24th September 2011 
65 {{WikiLeaks cable|id= 09SANTIAGO1170_a}} 
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through murders, deportation, and epistemic violence. Now, through the regional 
impact of globalisation, the prolonged economic crisis in Arica, the accelerated 
economic growth of Southern Peru, the outdating of the classical geo-political 
approach, and the influence of new educational programs, what is now a Chilean city 
is seeing a growing influence of Peruvian culture. This was confirmed by Tacneño 
historian Hernán Rodríguez who stated; “It’s strange now how it has changed, that 
Arica is now being peruvianified, they’re eating Peruvian food, they prefer the food, 
Peruvian music, dances”.67  
Even though the long intertwined territories of Tacna-Arica had been pulled 
apart in 1929, their interdependency and cultural overlap cannot be prevented. 
Interestingly however, while Peruvian culture is becoming more permeated in 
everyday life in Arica, southern Peru has very little Chilean culture. A large reason for 
this is that northern Chileans who associate themselves with Andean culture are more 
likely to engage with this culture in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador where it is more 
strongly realised. It has been estimated that 3,000-4,000 Tacneños work illegally in 
Arica and commute home on the weekends which, added to those living in the city 
legally, creates a large proportion of Peruvians.68  Chileans have looked to the success 
of Tacna, a city that benefits from significant investment by the Peruvian state, which 
has boomed while Arica has struggled, with a growing population that has been 
described as a ‘human shield on the border’.69 
There has been talk of Peruvian investment in Tacna as a long-term strategy 
whereby Peru will encroach south and take Arica by peaceful means before 2050. 
Peru want to show that they can care for the area better than Chile can, and that 
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69 ‘Los movimientos peruanos que apuntan a recuperar Arica el 2050 y el abandono en que la tiene Chile’ El 
Mostrador 29th January 2014 
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Arica would have a more prosperous future in the hands of its former sovereign. 
Sergio Giaconi, general manager of the Development Corporation of Arica and 
Parinacota (CORDAP) has stated his concerns about 2029, the year in which Arica 
will celebrate its centenary of being officially Chilean. Giaconi believes that Arica will 
be noticeably underdeveloped in comparison to Tacna in Peru and the rest of Chile, 
which would encourage Ariqueños to feel more open-minded to the idea of Peru 
reclaiming the region. Giaconi stressed that the situation must be reversed if Chile is 
to ensure its sovereignty.70  
This illustrates some of the issues which have prevented a more amicable 
relationship between Chile and Peru; a history of antagonism has lingered which 
causes officials from both nations to speak or act in hostile ways even though relations 
between Chileans and Peruvians on the border remains largely good-natured. This 
has raised concerns in recent years however, that Arica is gradually becoming 
‘peruvianified’ as it’s distance from Santiago and proximity to Peru takes its toll.  
 
The National Level  
As highlighted by the fishermen during the maritime dispute, unless Chilean 
sovereignty is at stake at the border, Arica has felt abandoned by the Chilean state. 
Even as far back as 1954 Gabriela Mistral, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, 
wrote after her visit to Arica, “Arica deserves a greater and better future”. This has 
continued into the present-day and in 2008 the region had a poverty rate of almost 
19%, five points higher than the national average, disproportionately affecting 
indigenous Ariqueños and children. Moreover, the region of Arica and Parinacota 
suffers from the highest rate of unemployment in the country nor has the region been 	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performing well economically, a government investigation in 2009 found that out of 
the eleven sectors of industry, nine were in decline.71 
The most significant move by the Chilean state to recognise Arica was in April 
2007 when President Michelle Bachelet signed law Number 20.175 which created the 
region of Arica and Parinacota, splitting the former Province of Tarapacá into two. 
This separated the extreme north into two administrative regions, with two capitals, 
Arica and Iquique. The reason for this split was given on the 21st October 2005 when 
Bachelet stated; “Regarding the Region of Tarapacá, there was, from the date of its 
creation, frustration and complaints from the community of the Province of Arica 
who argued that they met the requirements for regionality and had sufficient capital 
to become a region itself based on its economic, demographic, territorial, historical 
and institutional characteristics” (González Miranda & Ovando Santana 2010:64). 
This has been seen as a move of decentralisation to give more autonomy to a region 
that “has characteristics which are unique in the territory and national society, both in 
its origin and in its historical development” (González Miranda & Ovando Santana 
2010:61). 
The creation of this new region was recognised as some compensation for the 
unfortunate situation of Arica being sandwiched between two territories which have 
been strongly supported by their respective governments; Iquique to the south and 
Tacna to the north in Peru. Both of which “have grown extraordinarily supported by 
favourable legislation with powerful commercial and industrial scope and therefore 
whose populations have consequently boomed, drawn by work, commerce and the 
standard of living”.72 The preference of Iquique began, as mentioned in chapter five 
when it was made a zona franca in 1975 which aided Arica’s decline which was then 	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worsened by Tacna being also made a zona franca in 2002, “[t]he result of which has 
been to prevent Arica being the natural centre of commercial, industrial and cultural 
integration between Chile, Peru and Bolivia”.73 
The favouritism of Iquique to the detriment of Arica can be seen through 
economic statistics. The region of Arica and Parinacota consistently has the lowest or 
second lowest gross domestic product of regions in Chile whereas the region of 
Tarapacá tends to have the second highest of the country’s fifteen regions. In 2012 
income per capita was US$5,884 in Arica but US$20,427 in Iquique.74 Moreover, in 
2013 the region of Tarapacá received twice as much government investment as the 
region of Arica and Parinacota.75 This economic advantage began under Pinochet 
and may be the reason for the differences in population growth between the capitals 
of the two regions, Iquique and Arica, since Pinochet took power. To add to this 
economic difference between the two northern cities, in the 1988 plebiscite which led 
to Pinochet eventually standing down, citizens were given the choice to vote ‘si’ if they 
wanted Pinochet to remain in power or ‘no’ if they wanted a democratic election to be 
held. Iquique, the city economically favoured by Pinochet overwhelmingly voted ‘si’ 
while Arica overwhelmingly ‘no’ (Bitar 2011). This has led to a divide in the north 
with Arica feeling cut off from the region to its south economically and politically. 
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75 Sociedad de Fomento Fabril. http://web.sofofa.cl 
       Population of Iquique Population of Arica 
1973 60.000 160.000 
2013  300.000 210.000 
351 
As previously mentioned, many Ariqueños point to the possibility of war as the 
reason for the neglect of Arica. One interviewee, Florencia Espinoza, stated; “I feel 
that this is a city neglected in terms of investment, I have always wondered why when 
it has potential in tourism, in mining, from agriculture, but various governments 
haven’t been willing to invest in Arica. I have heard that this was maintained as a state 
policy because of potential conflicts with Bolivia or Peru, that Arica is a dispensable 
city and therefore not worth investing in”.76  Florencia believed that it was an 
intentional act to make Arica poor and therefore less desirable to the Peruvians. On 
the question of why Arica has been so abandoned, Alejandro González replied; “I 
would dare to say that it’s due to a fear that there could be a problem with the 
Peruvians, that we will be the first to suffer because it is us they will bomb or 
whatever”.77 This view was echoed by a newspaper article entitled ‘Why doesn’t Chile 
feel affection for the north?’; a question answered by one ex-senator as that “it is 
territory won in war and so it could be easily lost in the same way”.78  As illustrated in 
chapter six there was a strong argument in the 1970s that Arica was a ‘grey zone’ that 
wouldn’t have been defended by Pinochet with all the military’s potential. This 
argument appears to remain as seen by a confidential cable written by US 
Ambassador Paul Simons in November 2008. Simons learnt from government 
officials that the military deemed Arica too difficult to defend in the case of an attack 
and so the hardline for defence would be just north of Iquique where Chile's fleet of 
28 F-16 fighter aircraft are stationed. However, these government officials, Diputado 
Paredes and District Attorney Jorge Valladares, do not warrant this as serious as 
armed conflict is unlikely.79 
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Drugs are a serious problem in Arica and this has led some citizens to feel 
victimised by the Chilean state. Interviewee Constanza Sepúlveda described drugs as 
the worst thing about Arica and that “[i]f you travel from Arica to Iquique it’s like 
crossing an international border, all your bags, everything are checked…it’s like we’re 
in a prison but within the prison we’re free”.80 Just as Peruvians cannot travel further 
into Chile than Arica without authorisation, Chileans are also subjected to internal 
border checks due to Arica’s reputation for drug trafficking. Constanza’s husband 
elaborated saying; “in other parts of the country you say you’re from Arica and 
they’re going to say ‘ah you’re a drug trafficker’”.81 Since the War of the Pacific the 
Chilean state has attempted to create a homogenous nation and yet those in the 
extreme north are still ‘othered’ and lack the same treatment as those in more central 
areas of Chile. 
When Ariqueños blame the Chilean state for this abandonment they’re not 
always referring to decisions made by Santiago but often point to politicians in Arica 
as the culprits. As the US Ambassador to Chile noted; “In a country that is 
consistently ranked by Transparency International as Latin America's least corrupt, 
this city of 200,000 is responsible for a disproportionate share of Chile's relatively few 
scandals. A number of local politicians, including the former mayor, have been 
convicted of embezzling and misuse of public office, often related to municipal 
services performed by their businesses”.82 The Ariqueño-Aymará community has 
been left out of political decisions and has therefore mobilised to peacefully contest 
political issues. This combined with corruption has created a culture of mistrust 
between local citizens, especially those of indigenous origin, and politicians.  
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The result of abandonment, along with poverty and unemployment, is that Arica 
has been forced into closer relationships with Peru and Bolivia. One interviewee who 
has lived in Arica for sixty years contemplated; “Maybe our proximity to 
neighbouring countries, Peru and Bolivia, makes us more international and live like 
them in a different world. It’s so much easier for us to go to Tacna than to Iquique. I 
can’t go to Iquique, it’s my country and everything, but it’s 300km away, that’s the 
next city! Tacna is just 40km. So our connection is more with other countries than 
with our own country. And Chile thinks the same way about us, Chile ends at 
Iquique”.83 Tomás Morales who has lived in the region for many decades posited; 
“Arica isn’t Chilean, Arica is Andean”, explaining that Arica is so culturally different 
from the rest of Chile due to influences from Peru and Bolivia that Chilean 
governments “don’t know what to do with Arica”. 84 Due to its geographical position, 
cut off by the Andes the rest of Chile does not have simple access to other countries 
whereas Arica has access to both Peru and Bolivia. 
Another result of abandonment has been the birth of a grassroots movement 
fighting for independence or autonomy from the Chilean state. The centre of this 
movement has been on social media with Ariqueños sharing comments, photos, and 
‘memes’ regarding independence.85 In one online discussion on the Facebook group 
Arica Independiente as to whether inhabitants of Arica felt themselves to be more Chilean 
or Ariqueño, a variety of responses were offered including: 
 “I think the people are discontented because of how the city has been forgotten, 
and for the centralism which makes us feel more Ariqueño than Chilean”  
 “Arica, always Arica!” 
 “I feel Ariqueño, I WILL NEVER FEEL REPRESENTED BY A STATE 
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84 Interview, Tomás Morales. 23rd July 2014 
85 A meme is an image, video, or piece of text, typically humorous in nature, that is copied and spread rapidly by 
Internet users, often with slight variations. 
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DICTATORSHIP… EVEN LESS WHEN THE CHILEAN STATE HAS 
ROBBED US” 
 “To follow up the political themes of my friend above, the traditions of the centre 
and south of the country are really different, they teach us the cueca and huasos 
that simply don’t belong here, they should teach us of the Aymará, the 
chinchorro, guano, our own things. Another point is the strategic abandonment 
of the city by the centralist state, but we must also remember that we Ariqueños 
continue making mistakes with our representatives, once people begin voting for 
people that have Ariqueño hearts, things can change.” 
 “AYMARA ARIQUEÑO FOR ALWAYS, LONG LIVE ARICA… THE 
MORE IT IS ABANDONED BY CHILE THE MORE I LOVE MY ARICA” 
 “Ariqueña 100% there’s no city like this” 
 “From Serena down they don’t know the battle of the morro for Arica, nor our 
traditions, why do we worship their traditions on the 18th [September] if they 
don’t recognise ours? And to be a true Ariqueño isn’t about blood or ancestry, it 
is purely a question of identity and affection for the city” 
 “Ariqueño, but it isn’t to do with feeling neglected at the central level, here there 
are structural and physical elements. Maybe we are more tacneño than 
Santiaguino or Limeño, it’s difficult to promote national identity from over 
1000km, even more so if it’s based on xenophobia and centralism.” 
 “Ariqueño, unfortunately our city doesn’t have value or importance. Arica is 
known for its high quantity of drugs, maritime conflict, natural disasters… and 
maybe nothing else. At 41 I see a city that doesn’t’ improve, it doesn’t grow, it 
doesn’t take flight like other cities” 
 “Ariqueña and proud to be so. Daughter of an earth rich in a mixture of races 
and cultures. Blessed to have been born where the coast, valley and altiplano 
meet” 
 “Ariqueño for always, Chilean by bad luck” 
 “Always Ariqueño and proud to have Aymará blood, Chilean by defect, Bolivian 
for pleasure and Peruvian because once upon a time by ancestors were too” 
 “I was born and raised in this beautiful city, for me we lost the nationality when 
the dictatorship took away the resources given to the Junta de Adelanto, what 
progress we had in that time, since then all the governments we’ve had have put 
as at a standstill, but its also our fault for being led by politicians from elsewhere 
who don’t fight for us”86 	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These comments span the multitude of sentiments felt by Ariqueños; affinity with 
Peru, abandonment by Chile and centralism, and disconnect with Chilean 
nationalism. Social media has been used to organise demonstrations and marches for 
the independence cause (Figure 112), share important signifiers such as the regional 
flag of Arica and Parinacota (Figure 113), reinforce collective beliefs, and make 
humorous social commentary on the situation of Arica and its poor management by 
the Chilean state (Figure 114, Figure 115 & Figure 116). The group will also rally 
around specific issues such as calling for the flag of Arica to fly atop the Morro where 
currently stationed is one of the largest Chilean flags in the country, 18 by 12 
metres.87 Some citizens have complained about the huge Chilean flag, arguing that 
placing a flag does not mean integration and believe instead that the flag of Arica 
should replace, or one of equal size be flown alongside, the national flag.  
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Figure 111: Imagined map of South America with Arica included. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente 
Estado’ https://www.facebook.com/arica.independiente?fref=ts [accessed 26/04/2015] 
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Figure 112: Image used in Facebook group calling for those in favour of regional autonomy to a 
demonstration in downtown Arica. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente Estado’ 
https://www.facebook.com/arica.independiente?fref=ts [accessed 26/04/2015] 	  
 
Figure 113: “A Chile without centralism. In favour of regional autonomy. Arica and Parinacota” Image 
used in Facebook group calling for autonomy. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente Estado’ 
https://www.facebook.com/arica.independiente?fref=ts [accessed 26/04/2015] 
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Figure 114: “We were Peruvians, almost Bolivians, now Chileans, but always Ariqueños”. Facebook 
group ‘Arica Independiente Estado’ https://www.facebook.com/arica.independiente?fref=ts [accessed 
27/04/2015] 
 
 
Figure 115: “Ariqueños are used to… seeing how Chile cares about Iquique, seeing how Peru invests in Tacna, 
seeing how Chile shuts us up with a mega flag on the Morro. Regional autonomy for Arica and Parinacota!! Wake 
up idiot ariqueñ@” Image used in Facebook group calling for autonomy. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente 
Estado’ https://www.facebook.com/arica.independiente?fref=ts [accessed 26/04/2015] 
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Figure 116: Picture showing the presidential changeover between Pinera and Bachelet. Pinera is saying “I leave 
you with Arica abandoned and without tsunami alarms” [marepoto refers to an embarrassing error he made in a 
speech]. Bachelet replies “That city is still Chilean?”. The text at the bottom reads “Strength! To the independent 
republic of Arica & Parinacota”. Facebook group ‘Arica Independiente Estado’ 
https://www.facebook.com/arica.independiente?fref=ts [accessed 27/04/2015] 
As shown by these ‘memes’ humour is commonly used by Chileans to highlight 
serious issues. One article chose to take the satirical approach with a spoof headline 
stating; “Government authorities discover the existence of Arica” and tells the story of 
a government minister who was studying a geography textbook and found Arica. This 
fake minister is quoted as saying at a press conference “[w]e never thought cities 
existed north of Americo Vespucio [the ringroad surrounding Santiago], we always 
heard our grandparents referring to a northern city where the War of the Pacific was 
fought, but we didn’t think it really existed. This discovery will change public policy in 
Chile, now that we are certain that there is human life in the north of our country”.88 
One argument for the use of humour in human societies is for aiding us to overcome 
sociocultural inhibitions and relieve tension caused by fear. Therefore, the humour 
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applied to Arica’s abandonment through memes and articles shows what a worrisome 
issue it is. 
Debate over what can be done about this issue, or whether it will ever change is 
common in Arica, through the radio, newspapers, social media or in conservation. 
One ex-employee of the JAA, Alejandro González, stated his belief that the only way 
for Arica to recover would be to become the recipient of a special law such as the ones 
that supported the JAA from the 1950s to the 1970s. Arica cannot compete against 
two areas that benefit so much from state investment, Iquique and Tacna, and so 
some incentive for industry or tourism is necessary.89 The possible answer to this call 
came in June 2014 when Michelle Bachelet launched a ‘special plan for the extreme 
region of Arica and Parinacota’ which has been described as “the closest thing to the 
Junta de Adelanto” and will give a billion US dollars to the region over six years with 
a strategic focus on tourism, heritage, identity, agriculture, commerce, and education 
services. 90  The three main foci of investment are housing, public works, and 
education. The plan is that the scheme will give the region the kick-start is has so 
desperately needed and encourage private investment in the area. Opinions have been 
mixed as shown by the pie chart below (Figure 117). There does remain an element of 
optimism however with 45% of citizens feeling hopeful about the Special Plan.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Interview, Alejandro González. 18th June 2014 
90 ‘Plan Especial Arica y Parinacota: entre la apuesta histórica y la falta de capital humano regional’ El Morro Cotudo 
4th July 2014 
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Figure 117: Pie chart showing the responses of 569 citizens of Arica to the question “What do you think about the 
special plan for the extreme region of Arica & Parinacota?” ‘¿Qué opinas del Plan Especial de Zona Extrema de 
Arica y Parinacota?’ El Morro Cotudo 14th September 2014 
 
The Corporeal Level 
As a result of past conflict in Arica, the border remains dangerous today 
especially for certain bodies. The previous chapter discussed this through HIV/AIDS 
and abortion border crossings but the fact remains for the whole of the time period 
studied. For example, due to the history of militarisation on the border, particularly 
under Pinochet, the border remains militarised today, with landmines still maiming 
those who attempt to cross the border illegally. According to current estimates, 71,732 
of Pinochet’s mines still lie beneath the desert, constantly moving with groundwater 
flow and earthquakes.91 As reported by the National Demining Commission, between 
the 1970s and 2014, 140 people have died or suffered bodily injury as a result of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 ‘¡Estas minas se van de Arica! Ministros llegaron a desminar la frontera’ El Morro Cotudo 11th September 2014 
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landmine or undetonated military explosives on the Chile-Peru border.92 These cases 
tend to involve non-Chileans such as a 21 year old Colombian man and a 32 year old 
Peruvian man who were both injured in 2013, a case whereby two people died when 
a vehicle drove over an anti-tank mine smuggling contraband across the border in 
2012, and a 20 year old Colombian man who lost his left foot after standing on a mine 
attempting to leave the country illegally from Chile to Peru in January 2015.93 The 
Governor of Arica has voiced his concern over the removal of these mines as he 
argued it would encourage more people to cross the border illegally.94 In this way a 
brutal remnant from Pinochet’s dictatorship is allowed to remain precisely due to the 
violence it continues to wield.  
Another form of violence against the body in Arica has been racism. Racism is a form 
of epistemic violence that occurs when certain subject positioning’s are oppressed, 
excluded, or silenced.  Epistemic violence more generally is the use of law and 
language to marginalise or victimise specific people and groups. Arica has always been 
an ethnically diverse region, as shown by the following classification of ethnicities in 
1871 (Figure 118) but it has also been a region with racism. Racism has been a system 
of power wielded by white Chileans against indigenous communities, Peruvians, and 
Bolivians in the far north. 
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93 El Morro Cotudo. 3rd October 2013; ‘Peruano que cruzaba ilegalmente la frontera Chile-Perú le detonó una mina 
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94 ‘Gobernador Patricio López afirma que el desminado en la frontera promueve el paso ilegal de personas’. El 
Morro Cotudo 25th March 2013 
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Ethnicity Number of 
People 
White 1030 
Black 1464 
Black Mixed Race 1251 
“Indians” or “Indian Mixed 
Race” 
4064 
Chinese 35 
Total 7844 
Figure 118: Ethnic groups in Arica, 187195 
	  
Arica has a racialised history, having been settled by indigenous groups since at 
least 10,000BC these groups were subjugated by European white colonisers from the 
sixteenth century onwards. Racial prejudice against Peruvians and Bolivians did exist 
in Chile before the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), but Chile’s victory in the war 
confirmed, strengthened, and popularised those prejudices. Meanwhile in Peru, the 
defeat served to strengthen the myth of Peruvian inferiority (Klaiber 1978). Whiteness 
was seen by some Chileans as the reason for Chile’s military successes, due to 
homogenous ethnicity free from indigenous blood (Donoso 1942). Meanwhile 
conversely Chilean historian Francisco Encina believed that Chile’s military strength 
came from the mixture of Araucanian (Mapuche) blood with that of the European 
colonisers. The Mapuche were much respected for their resistance of colonisation and 
admired for their aggression and tenacity. Therefore this combination of Europeans 
with the Mapuche who had “greater physical strength than all other Hispanic 
mestizos” resulted in a ‘military race’ (Encina 1954:48). 
In the 1920s, Chile’s racial classification in the national census catalogued ‘the 
totality of the Chileans from the south’ as white whereas Peruvians were given one of 
five classifications; blanca, mestizo, indigena, negra, or amarilla (Skuban 2008). This 
was part of Chile’s reconfiguration of nationhood, of portraying itself as a modern, 	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white nation, different from Peru and in fact different to every other country in Latin 
America. While across the continent mestizaje was being celebrated, Chile was engaged 
in a project of racial whitening.96 Discourses during the twentieth century continued 
to be exceedingly derogatory toward indigenous communities, for example Peruvian 
writer Alejandro Deustua (1937:68) claimed that it is impossible to educate indigenous 
Peruvians because “[t]he indian is not, nor can be, more than a machine”. The 
extreme north was in contrast with the rest of Chile however, in 1923, the Chilean 
politician Luis Barceló (1924) wrote a ‘racial description’ of the population of the 
Chilean controlled Arica, Tacna and Tarapacá concluding that the local people differ 
from the rest of Chile, being predominantly Aymará and speaking Aymará with only 
those in urban centres also speaking Spanish. In spite of significant indigenous 
populations spanning the length of Chile the indigenous movement didn’t really 
galvanise until the 1980s and serious problems of racism persist today (Choque 
Mariño 2009).  
Interviewee Florencia Espinoza described that other areas of Chile have greater 
ethnic blending but in Arica there are clear differences between ethnicities. She points 
out the victims of racism in Arica; “those of Chinese descent from Chinese slaves, 
people of black origin too, the Aymará are also highly discriminated against, to say 
nothing of the Peruvians, it caught my attention when I moved here [from the south], 
how badly treated the Aymará are, independent of whether they’re Chilean or not, 
plus with the terrible discrimination against Peruvians, I was shocked, it us who are on 
their land, we are invading their space, their land, their territory”. 97  The 
discrimination is systematic, she continued, “I have seen it on the street, how people 
mistreat Aymará or Peruvians, usually in groups, Chileans shrink when they are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 For a thoughtful examination of mestizaje in Latin America see Wade (2005)  
97 Interview with Florencia Espinoza. 11th April 2014 
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alone, except for when there is alcohol, which makes them bold and self-confident”. 
Felipe Ramírez who works with a Jesuit organisation that engages with refugees 
explained that discrimination against those with darker skin can be seen as an on-
going process of Chileanisation.98 His work involves promoting a culture of hospitality 
for immigrants in Arica, rather than discrimination, which is challenging in a culture 
that teaches racist attitudes very early on in life. He clarified; “Children in 
kindergarten here, at five or six were taught to kill Peruvians, because Peruvians are 
bad, to a child of five! They believe so early on that the other is the enemy. It’s also a 
product of the economic policies of the last thirty years, there are commercial 
relationships but there is no Latin American integration… and now we are seeing 
ghettoes of foreigners in various sectors of Arica”.99  
This legacy of violence against certain bodies is therefore a direct product of 
Arica’s violent past; the militarisation of the region in the 1970s under Pinochet 
during the period of almost-war with Peru and the racism which stems from the War 
of the Pacific during which Arica was taken from Peru. 
 
Conclusions  
The maritime border dispute between Chile and Peru has been a useful 
illustration for many of the problems faced by Arica as a border city today. The 
border dispute, which formally began in 1985, has been a bone of contention between 
the two countries who disagree upon where the maritime border lies on geographic 
and legal principles. Peru submitted the dispute to the International Court of Justice 
in a move reminiscent of the international mediation by the United States as 
examined in chapter four, and the ruling was given in January 2014. The ruling 	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awarded territory to Peru but left Chile with its richest fishing grounds. While the rest 
of Chile breathed a sigh of relief and forgot about the ruling, artisanal fishermen in 
Arica could not overlook the loss of territory. The fishermen claimed to have lost 
access to the grounds necessary for the livelihoods and voiced their anger against the 
Chilean state’s inertia, which, after fishing scandals favouring industrial companies, 
has just been another nail in the coffin of their industry. 
Looking beyond the maritime dispute, to other ways in which violence lingers in 
Arica today, it can be noted at international, national, and corporeal levels. The 
international level shows how even now there are pending issues between Chile and 
Peru, that both sides have spoken or acted aggressively and Peru still harbours hopes 
of recovering Arica. However, there are prospects of positive bi-lateral co-operation in 
the future. The Ariqueño identity has been palpably formed by the region’s 
relationship with its neighbours to the north and this could be the key to Arica’s future 
especially seeing as at the national level Arica continues to feel abandoned by the 
Chilean state particularly in comparison to Iquique to the south and Tacna to the 
north in Peru. This has been attributed to the precarity of Arica in the case of war and 
has resulted in a situation whereby Ariqueños feel closer to Peru or Bolivia or have felt 
the need for independence. Finally, at the corporeal level, the military history of Arica 
has created a situation in which landmines maim or kill multiple people every year 
and significant levels of racism permeate society today. 
Arica has oscillated between moments of violence and moments of pacification 
through international diplomacy and economic schemes. The socio-economic history 
of Arica has been described dramatically by historian Galdames Rosas as “in 
perpetual movement between heaven and hell, between hope and desperation” 
(2005:12). The border has been a space of contradiction, creating violence with Peru 
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and oftentimes Bolivia as well, but it has also been a space of fruitful co-operation and 
understanding between Chileans and Peruvians. The way Santiago sees Peru is often 
completely at odds with the lived reality of the border. Despite this co-operation, 
violence still remains, Peru and Chile have historically found one issue after another 
to create problems, the maritime dispute just being the latest. The future for Arica is 
uncertain; it’s possible that Bachelet’s latest economic plan will lift Arica out of its 
stagnation and a thriving cosmopolitan city will return to its heyday. Another 
potential situation could be that Peru will recover the region taken by Chile, either by 
military force or pacifically, swooping in to save Arica from the mismanagement of 
the Chilean state. Or maybe those calling for autonomy will be heard and Ariqueños 
will be able to take their future into their own hands. However, the general feeling in 
Arica is that nothing much will change, Arica will continue to be abandoned by the 
Chilean state, Peru will always be talking about recovering Arica without acting on 
their claims, and Arica’s golden age will remain a story to tell the grandchildren. 
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CHAPTER NINE 	  	  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis has illustrated the paradoxical nature of the Chile-Peru border 
focussing on the border city of Arica. Over ninety years of history, from 1925 until 
2015, Arica has been abandoned but militarised, forgotten but fighting, over various 
cycles of boom and bust dependent on international geopolitical and state forces, 
moulded by a Chilean flavour of machismo. These changes happen in waves; Arica 
has oscillated chronologically between violence and pacification, between growth and 
stagnation. This has shown how international borders can be central to the state’s 
notion of territory, vulnerable frontiers which must be protected when sovereignty is 
threatened from outside but also how when the border is perceived to be secure, the 
borderlands can be neglected without fear. This was especially noted with Pinochet’s 
fear that an economically strong border is more attractive to outside usurpers.  
The importance of the border to the nation has been highlighted in the thesis 
during the 1920s when Chile aggressively fought to win the attempted plebiscite in 
Tacna-Arica, in the 1970s with the almost-war with Peru and in 2014 with Peru’s 
claim to maritime sovereignty. It was argued that Arica was conversely abandoned 
post-1929 when Arica was officially incorporated into Chile until the Junta de 
Adelanto de Arica committed to raising the region out of its precarious situation ‘on 
the basis of its own men’, and since the 1980s when health at the border has 
progressively worsened and the region became plagued by drug abuse, racism, 
unemployment, child abuse, and corruption. Arica has waxed and waned between 
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being the ‘centre of Chile’ when the idea of the nation is threated and a poor, dusty, 
peripheral fishing town when sovereignty can be ensured. The theme running 
through the five ‘border moments’ studied in this thesis has been violence. This has 
rarely meant individual-on-individual violence or even international warfare but has 
tended to be the ongoing threat of such warfare, of biopolitical control over individual 
bodies, and of epistemic racialised violence. The violence studied here can often be 
traced back to masculinities and the Latin American performance of machismo. 
The first empirical chapter, chapter four, examined the role of the United States 
government in the attempted plebiscite of 1925-1926, showing the global significance 
of the border through the perspective of a handful of Americans living in Arica, 
namely General Pershing and Major Quekemeyer. This was the most violent episode 
in Arica’s history and the international effort was to pacify this violence through 
diplomacy and the act of drawing borders and while the plebiscite failed due to 
Chile’s overt aggression, the border was eventually demarcated and in 1929 Arica the 
region became Chilean and Arica the city became a border city. 
The fifth chapter charted the decline of Arica’s national importance after 1929. 
State legislation allowed for the creation of the Puerto Libre in 1954 and the Junta de 
Adelanto in 1958 which saw local citizens build a more prosperous and thriving 
region. This was pacification through economic development. However, while the 
state had allowed these changes for the better, the state also brought about the 
dissolution of the JAA with General Pinochet’s economic restructuring of the country, 
driving Arica back into economic precarity at the end of the 1970s. 
Chapter six focussed on other changes which occurred in Arica during the 1970s, 
while it was abandoned economically, the border became increasingly militarised as 
the two macho dictators, Pinochet in Chile and Velasco in Peru, began an arms race 
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with the latter aiming to recover Arica at the centenary of the War of the Pacific. In 
fact the border may have been abandoned economically precisely to allow for Arica to 
become a military space. Arica once again became a place of violence, even if this 
time only through threat. Due to the spectre of Peruvian revanchism Arica had shifted 
in its importance and sovereignty in the north needed to be maintained against 
hostilities from Peru.  
Chapter number seven picks up chronologically from the previous chapter but 
with a very different perspective on violence, this time not in terms of international 
conflict but at the scale of the body. Once again illustrating the paradoxical nature of 
the border the chapter examines the role of the border in Arica having an unusually 
high rate of HIV/AIDS but also how this same border has been the route of escape 
for women with unwanted pregnancies seeking abortions that are easier to obtain in 
Peru.  
The final empirical chapter, number eight, seeks to understand violence at the 
border in the present day. The recent Chile-Peru maritime conflict exemplifies how 
international conflict and the threat of violence at the border is persistent and constant 
and how at state and corporeal scales the bordering of Arica is an ongoing process 
affecting the lived experiences of those who inhabit the borderlands. Corporeality and 
biopolitics become highly significant at the border; the lands where the state and the 
‘other’ across the border determine who and who cannot be located in certain spaces. 
This has been seen through the historical time period studied from voting rights in the 
1920s, military positions, abortion rights, and fishing grounds in 2014. 
Each of these moments creates layers of meaning, each one stacked upon another 
but they are also intertwined. Over the past ninety years the richness and complexity 
of the border has been added to so that Arica is not just the territory battled over in 
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the 1920s, or a laboratory for urban development mid-century, or the location of an 
almost-war, a space of illness, or a maritime dispute. Arica is all of this history and is 
informed by this history, it is a multi-dimensional border city. 
This thesis set out with three aims; the first was to investigate how and why a 
culture of violence has been created and maintained yet also contested at the Chile-
Peru border. The primary way that Arica has experienced violence has been 
economic abandonment by the Chilean state due to its peripheral location and 
militarisation due to international threats to national sovereignty. The impacts of this 
has led to the vulnerability of Arica as a region against territorial claims by Peru but 
has also harmed the bodies of local citizens, often fatally. However, I also found out 
how violence, while it has been created and maintained due to Arica’s border 
location, has also been contested with efforts, mainly from local citizens but also at the 
international level, to soothe the area’s violent history. 
The second aim was to examine how actors at the international, national, and 
corporeal levels have been involved in violence or its suppression at the Chile-Peru 
border. This is more complicated and depends on the actors more precisely and at 
what time period, for example the United States was involved in the attempted 
plebiscite of the 1920s which aimed to put an end to local violence but later in the 
1970s aided Pinochet in his 1973 coup d’état. The United States has been a constant 
presence at the Chile-Peru border whether overtly or covertly. Additionally, at the 
border, local citizens often have a healthy cross-border relationship which contrasts 
with the Peruvian government which has threatened to regain Arica through military 
force. The Chilean state meanwhile has contributed to situations of violence through 
abandonment, leading to Arica’s poverty and poor health while at other times 
approving legislation in favour of Arica and protecting the border when it was most 
372 
under threat. The local municipality and individuals have borne the brunt of the 
violence but have also resisted it most effectively through forging Arica’s modern 
industrial identity under the Junta de Adelanto, forming the independence movement, 
or defying the state by traveling Peru in search of abortions.  
The third and final aim was to understand how a sustained culture of border 
violence has affected the city of Arica and its inhabitants. Present-day Arica with its 
poor health, racism, drug abuse, corruption, unemployment, and poverty can be seen 
as a result of the past ninety years of violence at the border, because of its border 
location at one extreme end of a ribbon-shaped country. Despite initiatives to raise 
Arica out of its stagnation and to protect Arica against outside threats, none has been 
successful long-term and both Peru and Bolivia still retain dreams of taking Arica for 
their own. 
While this thesis has taken violence as a lens through which to understand the 
role of the border in Arica I do not wish to portray the region as violent or unsafe. 
Daily lives in Arica feel in fact far from violence, it is a city with low-crime, a relaxed 
‘beach-bum’ lifestyle and enormous regional pride just unfortunately located between 
the two prosperous cities of Iquique and Tacna and dreaming of the golden heyday 
years of the Junta de Adelanto. 
In order to study the varied themes covered in the thesis it was necessary to use a 
diverse set of methodologies. This was a form of collage to build up ninety years of 
border history in Arica to view bordering over time and the lived experiences of the 
border at different scales. This necessitated tailoring methodologies to the specific 
event or time period of study and therefore spanned historical personal diaries, 
newspapers, photographs, official records, interviews/oral histories, and social media. 
373 
Using any fewer could not have built up the rich and diverse empirical data that I 
collected over a year in the Unites States, Chile, and Peru.  
Certain concessions had to be made due to the ambitious themes and timeframe 
studied. Each empirical chapter is arguably worthy of deeper individual study at 
doctoral or postdoctoral level and great insight could be made from each. There are 
avenues within this thesis which could be pursued further in order to arrive at 
practical, policy recommendations particularly with the themes on economic 
development schemes, HIV/AIDS, abortion, and maritime disputes but the objectives 
of this thesis did not provide space for appropriately thorough recommendations to be 
made. In the current world order states cannot decide whether or not they have 
international borders but they can choose how to govern those peripheral 
borderlands. However, my aims were to go beyond an in-depth study of one issue to 
instead explore what can be gained from bringing together such different themes. 
As well as looking at the ‘border moments’ individually, the thesis as a whole 
could arguably be broadened, extending the same themes to the other side of the 
border, to Tacna in Peru. This would give fresh insights into the experiences of Arica 
as well as providing the silent voice in this thesis, the Peruvians, the constant ‘other’ 
living across the invisible line in the sand. While this thesis has taken the Chile-Peru 
border as its object of study, Arica has also been shaped by another border, that of 
Chile-Bolivia, to which I have been unable to give fair attention due to the scope of 
the project. However this is a salient time for Chile-Bolivia relations as Bolivia takes its 
claim for a right to the sea (potentially through Arica) to the International Court of 
Justice at The Hague. As of September 2015 the ICJ has declared that it has 
jurisdiction to rule on Bolivia’s claim to a six mile strip of land that would run along 
the present Chile-Peru border. Finally, this thesis also comes from a very specific 
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standpoint from my personal position as a researcher and while this could never be 
undone, the border can never be seen truly objectively, it is nevertheless imperative to 
note. 
The contribution of this thesis to geography has been to add to work that focusses 
on the processes and lived experiences of bordering after a border has been 
demarcated. Through empirical research it also highlights the persistent violence of 
borders and the paradoxical and contradictory nature of borders that rise and fall in 
international and state importance depending on external threats. There can be no 
universalising theory of borders all of which are wacky and unique due to their 
specific histories and geographies but borders can tell us important stories about 
resistance and determination against violence at international, state, and corporeal 
scales.  
Mark Salter’s analogy of the border as a ‘suture’ seems a particularly apt way to 
theorise the Chile-Peru border. For Salter (2012:734) the suture is “a process of 
knitting together the inside and the outside together and the resultant scar”. This 
emphasises that the border is not a non-place, it is not a dissolute imaginary line in a 
globalised world, it is the legacy of a violent wound, the result of a process that is 
never quite finished. The border is always in process, the scar can continue to heal, it 
can be slowly picked at and irritated, or it can be brutally ripped open and these 
happen in different ways for different actors at the border. There can be no 
homogenous border identity when the lived experience of the border differs so 
drastically; an Aymará family who have left the highlands to make a better living in 
the alien city, descendants of white Chileans relocated to populate the north, a newly-
buzzcut soldier of 18 stationed to protect the border while spending his weekends 
enjoying the cheaper amusements of Tacna, artisanal fishermen trawling for anything 
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the corporations haven’t swept away, a gay man living with AIDS and daily 
discrimination, a pregnant teenage girl desperately searching for a solution. All 
equally inhabit the border even if the border and border polices don’t affect them in 
the same way. 
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-Record Group 59, Department of State 
-Record Group 76, Records of boundary claims commissions & arbitrations 
-Record Group 84, Diplomatic Posts & Consulate, Chile 
• Library of Congress, Washington, DC 
-John J. Pershing Papers 
-Charles Evans Hughes Papers 
-Calvin Coolidge Papers 
-William Smith Culbertson Papers 
-General Francis L. Parker Papers 
-William Smith Culbertson Papers 
-Frank B. Kellogg Papers 
377 
-Annual Foreign Relations Reports 
 
 
Newspapers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chile Pesca Equal Times Radio Del Mar 
COHA La Concordia de Arica Radio.Chile.cl 
El Comercio La Defensa Reuters 
El Ferrocarril La Estrella de Arica Soy Arica 
El Mercurio La Legal Soy Chile 
El Morro Cotudo La Segunda The Clinic Online 
El Mostrador La Tercera The Economist 
El Mundo Los Angeles Times The Independent 
Emol New York Times	   Time Magazine 
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